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Aquinas’ treatment of the Creation narrative (Genesis 1:1-2:4) within QQ 65-74 of the prima 
pars of his Summa Theologiae (ST) has long been and remains neglected, virtually unread, 
within the community of the readers of Aquinas. This neglect is born of a mistaken expectation 
of this section of the ST as a quest for theological or philosophical truth. Those reading his 
parallel treatments of the same material have deemed ST I, 65-74 insufficiently robust, 
shallow, even embarrassing for those who see him as a theological touchstone. But the 
readers of Aquinas in general and of the ST in particular have not asked why Aquinas elected 
to engage in this apparently simplistic treatment of a Scriptural passage which addressed 
issues that were foundational to his philosophical and theological project. Drawing upon 
Aquinas’ historical context and through comparison with his other treatments of the same 
biblical material this thesis argues that within these QQ Aquinas deliberately shaped his use of 
patristic sources to create both a primer on the use of these patristic sources for his students 
and, in so doing, also made a necessary appeal to all his readers that they embrace Augustine’s 
epistemic humility. Read through this lens, ST I, 65-74 provides important insights into 
Aquinas’ use of ideas and authoritative texts and once more gives voice to his still relevant call 
for epistemic humility.  
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In 1266 the Dominican friar Thomas Aquinas began to compose what would become an 
important element of the classic theological canon – the Summa Theologiae (ST). 
Nearly eight centuries later, in the first decades of the 21st century many continue to 
read this work and appreciate both its theology and philosophy. Members of the 
scholarly community frequently cite the ST authoritatively in far-ranging discussions of 
ethics, Christology, ecclesiology, ontology, epistemology, and much more.  
This state of affairs marks a transition in the reading and use of Aquinas.1 Since the 
Reformation and until the first decades of the 20th century, Aquinas was frequently 
considered a purely Roman Catholic voice, the articulator of the controversial doctrine 
of Transubstantiation and hence inappropriate for most Protestant theologians.2 Roman 
Catholics, for their part, cheerfully embraced Thomas as a weapon in their battle against 
the Protestants, but rarely ventured outside the manuals and other devices of Neo-
Thomism. Reading Aquinas in this post-Reformation, Tridentine polemical context 
constrained Aquinas to be read through a particular hermeneutical lens. While such 
generalizations are never entirely true, most readers of Aquinas up to the middle of the 
20th century tended to read Aquinas as a source of theological and philosophical truth 
statements. His massive treatment of theology in the ST was either articulating a 
position against which one argued or for which one propounded over against an 
opponent almost exclusively defined by Reformation categories. But that hermeneutical 
1 Thomas J. White, O. P. “Thomism after Vatican II,” Ordo Praedicatorum, accessed 12.1.2013.  
http://www.op.org/sites/www.op.org/files/public/documents/fichier/white_thomism_after_vatican_ii.
pdf 1-3. 
2 In this author’s own seminary experience, (Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, 1987-1991) Aquinas was 
rarely mentioned unaccompanied by a reference to Luther’s estimation of him in The Babylonian 
Captivity in which Luther considered Aquinas to be somewhat pitiable. WA, 6:508 , Longe enim aliter 
Aristoteles de accidentibus et subjecto quam sanctus Thomas loquitur, ut mihi dolendum videatur pro 
tanto viro, qui opiniones in rebus fidei non modo ex Aristotele tradere, sed et super eum, quem non 
intellexit, conatus est stabilire infoelicissimi fundamenti infoelicissima structura. 
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lens has largely been replaced in the first decades of the 21st century. So complete is this 
transformation that one occasionally reads scholars wistfully yearning for a return to the 
Thomism against which many of their immediate predecessors struggled.3  
The works of Thomas Aquinas first gained a re-assessment and fresh reading outside 
the polemical context of the Protestant/Catholic debates within the scholarly community 
of Catholicism. A leader among the proponents for this re-reading of Thomas was a 
fellow Dominican, the French scholar, Marie-Dominique Chenu (1895-1990). In his 
influential Toward Understanding St. Thomas, Chenu, argued for a historically 
contextualized reading of Aquinas and rejected the ahistorical, polemical reading which 
he felt distorted Aquinas’ works and ideas by removing them from their immediate 
context and forcing them to address problems which Aquinas did not have in mind.4 
Part of the larger movement within Catholicism which included elements of liturgical 
renewal, social justice, and intellectual revitalization which together culminated in 
Vatican II (1962-1965), Chenu occupied a place within the reform-minded Catholic 
intellectual community.  
1. The Observed Neglect of ST I, 65-74 
It is no accident that I begin this thesis with Chenu and his attempt to return to a more 
authentic and fruitful reading of Aquinas. The author of this dissertation is convinced by 
the argument which Chenu put forward in regard to the inauthenticity of the ahistorical 
reading of Aquinas and therefore uses Chenu’s claim that Aquinas must be read in his 
context as the methodological foundation of this author’s own thesis.5 But there is 
another and more specific reason why we begin with Chenu. Within Toward 
Understanding St. Thomas, Chenu pleaded that more careful attention should be paid to 
three exegetical sections of the ST: I, 65-74, the exegesis of the first chapter of Genesis 
which this dissertation examines; I, 98-105, Aquinas’ treatment of the ancient law 
codes; and III, 27-59 in which Aquinas examined a harmonized account of Christ’s life 
3 Gregory F. LaNave, “God, Creation, and the Possibility of Philosophical Wisdom: The Perspectives of 
Bonaventura and Aquinas” in Theological Studies 69 (2008), 813-814.  
4Marie-Dominique Chenu, O.P., Toward Understanding St. Thomas. Trans.: Albert Landry O.P. and 
Dominic Hughes O.P., (Chicago: H. Regnery and Co, 1964), 298-301. 
5 White, 7, makes a similar argument. 
2 
 
                                                          
drawn from the New Testament Gospels. Chenu argued that the modern reader could 
not truly understand Aquinas’ thought until these passages were comfortably integrated 
into the framework of the entire ST. To see them as anomalies within the ST or as 
digressions was to misunderstand Aquinas the theologian and the nature of the entire 
work. In Chenu’s estimation, Aquinas clearly held that this material belonged in this 
document and was central to Aquinas’ thought. Chenu himself does not articulate a 
thoroughly convincing argument for why he believed this material was important to the 
ST, but thought it had something to do with Aquinas’ understanding of the very nature 
of theology. I do not seek to quarrel or wrestle with Chenu’s suggestions for why this is 
vital. I rather want to observe that he made this statement at all. Chenu would not have 
written such things if he did not observe that these passages were being neglected in his 
time. Chenu’s contemporaries clearly were not reading them for he thought it necessary 
to urge his audience to read them.6 We will note later within this introduction that while 
contemporary scholars have heard Chenu’s broader appeal to pay greater attention to 
Aquinas the exegete, they have not embraced his exhortation that they integrate QQ 65-
74 of the prima pars into their understanding of Aquinas the theologian.   
This thesis pays attention to the motives, content, and message of one of these three 
sections of the ST which Chenu noted and for which he pleaded an audience, namely I, 
65-74. We have engaged in an examination of the content of these QQ in comparison 
with other treatments of this Scriptural material, both within the corpus of Aquinas’ 
published works and in comparison with his medieval peers. That examination has led 
us to conclude that Aquinas’ use of Scriptural and patristic sources, particularly 
Augustine, is the critical element which explains this anomalous section of the ST. We 
contend that only in consideration of his use of these sources are we able to construct a 
cogent model which explains the rationale and content of these QQ and which provides 
a viable hermeneutic for reading these QQ profitably.  
In making this assertion we also must wrestle with the opinions of the many scholars 
who read Aquinas today. As noted above, the community of scholarly philosophers and 
6 Ibid., 259-262. Chenu’s estimation is also borne out by a survey of mid-20th century theological 
scholarship. Consider Philip J. Donnelly S.J., “Saint Thomas and the Ultimate Purpose of Creation” in 
Theological Studies, 9:2 (1941), 53-83. While the subject of his article has multiple points of intersection 
with the content of QQ 65-74, he never once cites them, but cites extensively in the prima pars and 
secunda-secundae partis throughout his article. 
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theologians who respect and consider Aquinas’ ideas have been largely unmoved by 
Chenu’s plea for a more careful and thorough integration of these passages of the ST 
into their understanding of Aquinas. Rarely do scholars quote these QQ from the ST. 
Indeed at times it appears that some have not even read this section of the ST. This 
thesis asserts this neglect on the part of scholars is due to an errant expectation of this 
material. Ellen Charry observed that since the Enlightenment the discipline of theology 
has undergone a significant transformation. She contends that generations of Locke’s 
readers have failed to observe his own nuanced understanding of knowledge and have 
therefore come to screen all theological truth claims through a filter of scientific 
methodology.7 Charry posits that much of pre-Enlightenment theology was in fact 
seeking not a scientific but a sapiential truth. This theological project was far more 
interested in the development of the reader than in establishing a universal or falsifiable 
claim.8 While Charry does not cite this section of the ST in support of her contention, 
she considers Thomas Aquinas to be one of her primary and clearest examples of a 
theologian who is best read in this pre-enlightenment reading of theology which she 
labels “aretegenic” or, in her own definition of that term, a reading “which results in 
virtue.”9 Thomas J. White, O. P. concurs: “Reading Aquinas teaches one how to think 
theologically.”10 
This thesis concurs with White’s and Charry’s reading of Aquinas in so far as it notes 
that he is, at least in these QQ, questing after a different goal than the assertion of a truth 
claim in a post-Enlightenment sense. Reading these QQ as a quest for theological or 
philosophical truth has obscured a more likely occasion and thus also a more profitable 
reading of these QQ. Aquinas did not use this section of the ST on a quest for a 
theological truth; rather, these QQ are better explained as pedagogical exercises which 
seek to inculcate skills which we will reference as reverential reading and epistemic 
humility. In Charry’s language this is an aretegenic exercise. In saying this we 
acknowledge that a large number of scholars have noted the pedagogical nature of the 
7 Ellen T. Charry, By the Renewing of your Minds: The Pastoral Function of Christian Doctrine, (Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1997), 7. 
8 Ibid, 6-9.  
9 Ibid, 6, 19-23.  
10 White, 7. 
4 
 
                                                          
ST.11 We do assert, however, that while this understanding of the ST has been 
acknowledged widely, it has not governed the reading of many, especially when 
attention has been given to the subject matter found within I, 65-74, namely the 
Creation narrative of Genesis 1. 
The foundation for this reading has been widely acknowledged for some time. In the 
1947 Aquinas Lecture delivered at Marquette University, Etienne Gilson presaged’s 
point. Under the title History of Philosophy and Philosophical Education Gilson noted 
the difficulty of teaching a student to be a philosopher. His preferred technique was to 
eschew the secondary literature, put the original source material, in this case Aquinas 
himself, into the hands of the student and, under the guidance of the mentor, lead the 
student through the questions of the text. This process, he thought, would result in more 
than students who knew about philosophy but rather resulted in students who were on 
the way to becoming philosophers themselves.12 Gilson suggested that this is the normal 
practice which has been present in philosophical education for millennia. As we shall 
see later, Gilson did not observe that Aquinas employed exactly the pedagogical process 
Gilson himself outlined in 1947. Like Gilson’s ideal professor of philosophy, Aquinas 
was making theologians by that same time-tested and reliable method, putting the 
essential data of the theological discipline, Scripture, into the hands of his students and 
in a controlled environment letting those students develop the skills of the theologian. 
Rather, Gilson, looking for theological and philosophical truth assertions, along with 
almost every other reader of Aquinas, turned from these questions in frustration and 
perplexity. 
The errant expectation that Aquinas is propounding a truth claim has caused modern 
readers of Aquinas to miss several elements within these ten QQ. Frustrated by the 
relatively simplistic treatment of the days of Creation, most have turned instead to 
Aquinas’ first systematic work, the Scriptum super libros sententiarum (Commentary) 
and the Quaestiones disputatae de potentia (De potentia), the record of a series of 
11 See Leonard Boyle, The Setting of the Summa Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas. (Toronto: Pontifical 
Institute of Medieval studies, 1982), 17-18. Thomas O’Meara Thomas Aquinas: Theologian, (Notre 
Dame: Univ of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 50-53, articulates the same argument.  
12 Etienne Gilson, History of Philosophy and Philosophical Education, (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette Univ. 
Press, 1948), 29-32.  
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disputations which Aquinas conducted in preparation for writing this section of the 
ST.13 As we concede later in this introduction, this choice on the part of his modern 
readers makes a certain amount of sense. Those earlier treatments are far more 
satisfying for the person who reads Aquinas seeking what he believed and thought about 
matters of philosophy and speculative theology with regard to the Creation narrative. 
This inattention to ST I, 65-74, however, has obscured his treatment of Scriptural and 
patristic sources within these ten QQ, especially the complex interplay between the 
interpretation of Genesis 1 which was made by Basil and another, quite different 
interpretation which was made by Augustine. In addition, we assert that this neglect of 
Aquinas’ treatment of patristic sources has resulted in many missing the more 
significant point which Aquinas made regarding epistemic humility, a humility which is 
essential for hearing some of the more daring assertions he will make later in the work, 
but which is also necessary for all who would come to the questions raised for the 
readers of Genesis 1 today.  
We will heed Chenu’s appeal for reading in context. This neglected context of the ST is 
also important for reading this section of the ST. This thesis has devoted its first and 
second chapters to an examination of the broader situation of these QQ. The first 
chapter situates these QQ within Aquinas’ other works and his own life. The second 
chapter examines the use of Augustine in light of a surging movement contemporary to 
Aquinas. In order to differentiate this movement from other movements related to 
Augustine, we employ the label “Augustinist”, a term which we borrow from James 
Weisheipl, one of Aquinas biographers of the 20th century.14 Asserting the primacy of 
Augustine’s ideas over all fields, this Augustinist movement was, at the time of 
Aquinas, threating to quash intellectual inquiry. Briefly stated, those chapters argue that 
these QQ reflect Aquinas’ devotion to the Dominican Order, particularly as he sought to 
fulfill a charge laid upon him by that Order to revise the Order’s internal educational 
system.15 We also argue that Aquinas did so with a sense of urgency, for hostile 
elements were mounting increasingly strident and aggressive attacks on the mendicant 
13 James A. Weisheipl, O.P., Friar Thomas D’Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Works (Washington DC: 
Catholic Univ. Press, 1983), 358-359, 363. 
14 Ibid., 339. 
15 C. H. Lawrence, The Friars: The Impact of the Early Mendicant Movement on Western Society, 
(London: Longman, 1994), 84-85.  
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friars of the Ordo Predicatorum whom the priories educated and equipped for the 
preaching task. The nature of this attack upon the mendicants, however, due to its 
Augustinist underpinnings had ramifications for all fields of inquiry, especially the 
speculative theological work which occupied Aquinas.  
The third chapter of this thesis begins to construct the hermeneutical lens through which 
we will re-read these QQ. We note a series of patterns within Aquinas’ handling of 
sources. Within these QQ, Aquinas manipulated his sources, often narrowing the focus 
of an Article, but more importantly giving the reader occasion to notice not the 
conclusion reached but the principle which was applied to the patristic resource under 
consideration. Building on the historical context and Aquinas’ unusual treatment of 
sources, the fourth chapter will complete the process of constructing this hermeneutic 
and propose and identify a pedagogical movement and progression within these QQ.  
Having constructed a hermeneutical lens by which these QQ might be read, the final 
section of this thesis embodies these conclusions with a detailed and fresh re-reading of 
ST I, 65-74. This reading argues that Aquinas manipulated his sources and presented his 
material in such a way that a reader/student who encountered this material would have 
developed a theological habitus essential for medieval preaching. In a second, 
apologetic movement which is also discernible within these QQ, Aquinas urged an 
epistemic humility, both upon his students and the larger theological world in which he 
lived and wrote.  
2. Contemporary Scholarship’s Neglect of ST I, 65-74 More Closely Examined 
This thesis has already observed that current scholars of Aquinas are not reading or are 
misreading this section of the ST. This assertion needs further demonstration and 
examination before we proceed to the recasting of these QQ.  
a.  Recent renewed interest in Aquinas as an exegete does not extend to these 
QQ.  
As noted earlier in this thesis, one of the early leaders in the current scholarly 
reassessment of Aquinas, M.-D. Chenu, pleaded with his contemporaries in the middle 
of the 20th century to read and integrate this section and two others of the ST into their 
reading of Aquinas. Chenu argued at this point that one had to see the whole of 
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Aquinas’ exegetical labors as integral to his more speculative and philosophical works. 
While Chenu was rather vague in describing exactly what the fruit of such an 
integration of Aquinas’ textual commentary might be,16 his successors in Aquinas 
studies have broadly followed his advice. Recent attention focused upon Aquinas’ 
commentaries has been particularly robust. Momentarily setting aside the vigorous 
conversations which take place in the various theological and philosophical journals, a 
survey of recent book-length treatments reveals efforts to expand the audience via 
translation; e.g., The American Academy of Religion commissioned a translation of 
Aquinas’ commentary on Job and published it in 1987.17 So robust was this interest in 
the exegetical works of Aquinas that the publisher T. and T. Clark offered the scholarly 
community a book-length survey of the various exegetical works of Aquinas in 2005, 
noting in the introduction to the work a “somewhat belated recognition that his 
commentaries are part and parcel of his theological work.”18Another indicator of the 
growing influence and authority of Aquinas the exegete is seen in the fact that these 
works have been put to use in answering contemporary debates, e.g., Stephen 
Boguslawski waded into the frequently explosive debate on the medieval roots of anti-
Semitism armed with Aquinas’ commentary on Romans in 2008.19 In perhaps the most 
obvious indicator that a significant community of scholars takes Aquinas seriously as an 
exegete, Matthew Levering and Michael Dauphinais compiled a book-length collection 
of essays from a wide variety of authors reflecting exclusively on that same 
commentary on Romans by Aquinas in 2012.20 Aquinas’ more systematic/philosophical 
readers have also increasingly paid attention to his exegetical work and the foundational 
role of Scripture within his thinking. Joseph Wawrykow in The Westminster Handbook 
to Thomas Aquinas under the heading of Scripture wrote:  
16 Chenu, 308-316. 
17 Thomas Aquinas, Literal Exposition on Job: a Scriptural commentary on providence, Trans.: Martin 
Yaffe and Anthony Damico, (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987).  
18 Thomas G. Weinandy O.P.C. Cap., Daniel A. Keating, and John P. Yocum, Eds.: Aquinas on Scripture, 
(London: T and T Clark International, 2005), Intr. 2.  
19Stephen Boguslawski, Thomas Aquinas and the Jews (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2008).  
20 Matthew Levering and Michael Dauphinais, Reading Romans with Thomas Aquinas, (Washington DC: 
Catholic University Press, 2012).  
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“To say that Scripture is the principal source of Aquinas theology is to 
risk understatement, perhaps even distortion. Aquinas draws on a wide 
range of writings in constructing his theology. But in insisting that 
Scripture is the principal authority (ST I.1.8 ad2), he means more than 
that Scripture is to be counted among the written sources on which he 
draws, or that it is the first among these sources. Rather, Scripture is 
authoritative in a unique way, which distinguishes from his other 
sources.”21  
This activity in the field of Aquinas’ exegetical work renders the almost complete 
neglect of these ten QQ puzzling. The numerous recent publications which have been 
focused upon Aquinas’ exegetical works do not include his treatment of Genesis 1 in 
these ten QQ.  
b.  The rationale for this neglect. 
The most reasonable explanation for this neglect may be found in the estimation of the 
advocates and proponents of Aquinas. In his brief introduction to his translation of this 
section of the ST in 1967, nearly 20 years after Chenu made his appeal for the study of 
this section, William Wallace noted that these QQ were considered “antiquarian” and 
had been neglected for some time. He further suggested that this was not a new 
development but simply the continuation of an assessment which had roots in the first 
manifestations of Thomism during the Renaissance. The treatment of these QQ by the 
great Reformation era commentator on Aquinas, Cajetan, was “briefer and more 
perfunctory than…any other.” Wallace noted that even Aquinas’ own fellow 
Dominicans were not studying these QQ in the Dominican studia of the mid-twentieth 
century.22 His bleakest assessment comes in his observation about contemporary 
scholarship:  
“Scholars who search the works of St. Thomas for insights that may 
prove helpful in the solution of contemporary problems have, with one 
21 Joseph Wawrykow, The Westminster Handbook to Thomas Aquinas, (Louisville, KY: John Knox 
Westminster Press, 2005), 137. 




                                                          
accord, despaired of finding anything of lasting value in these pages of 
the Summa.” 23 
In 1967 Wallace offered several suggestions for why he considered this neglect to be 
inappropriate, but even these are somewhat pallid and betray what he thinks about the 
content of these QQ. He first expressed the hope that we could, by studying the 
mistaken science herein, learn something about Aquinas and the medieval period which 
was “shedding…an encumbering tradition” and “planting…seeds that were later to 
flower into the breath-taking science of our day.”24 In other words, this section of the 
ST presented a useful data point for plotting the trajectory upon which modernity found 
itself, that is more thoroughly “unencumbered” by tradition and far more “breath-
taking” in its scientific knowledge. In light of such an assessment, it is not hard to 
imagine why the students at Dominican priories and other interested readers might look 
elsewhere when they came to study Genesis 1.  
Wallace made a second suggestion for why these QQ might be important for the 
contemporary reader. Wallace proposes that the reader might find a measure of 
scientific wisdom in Aquinas. He notes that Aquinas’ knowledge of medieval science 
was “impeccable” and yet “his extreme reserve and hesitation when opting for one or 
other theory of medieval science” is held up as laudable. Aquinas, in Wallace’s 
estimation, should be emulated because he “preferred to say too little, rather than to 
commit himself on points of detail that soon would be superseded.” 25 This is certainly 
true, but what strikes this reader is that Aquinas was not commended by Wallace for his 
wisdom in treating theological traditions, patristic resources, or the discipline of 
theology itself. He was not commended for articulating an exegesis of a Scriptural text, 
but the evaluation was based upon apprehension of natural science/philosophy. In 
Wallace’ estimation Aquinas was a wise, albeit primitive, scientist who understood that 
his data set did not allow him to reach certain conclusions. In other words, the way in 
which Aquinas handled the deficiency in his own science was noted by Wallace, not the 
proficiency of his theology.  





                                                          
Wallace’s observations about the state of scholarship with regard to these QQ remain 
valid today, nearly half a century after he made those observations. The recently 
published (2005) introduction to the commentaries of Aquinas which was mentioned 
above, Aquinas on Scripture, does not include these ten QQ in its survey of his 
exegetical works.26  
c.  The neglect of these QQ within the theological community. 
The inattention to these QQ is commonplace and persistent. This fact becomes even 
more problematic when seen against the backdrop of the robust scholarship, research 
and writing, which has recently focused attention upon Aquinas’ words about Creation 
as a theological locus. One finds that scholars have expressed intense interest in 
Aquinas’ Commentary II, 12-15 and De potentia 2-4 which address the same questions 
and issues as ST I, 44-49 and ST I, 65-74. As a measure of the intensity of this interest, 
consider the recent publication of On Creation. The editorial board for Thomas Aquinas 
in Translation took the unusual step of securing access to the recently completed but 
heretofore unpublished Leonine critical edition of De potentia III, commissioned a new 
translation, and published it in response to demand for this work which they note in the 
introduction.27 It should likewise be noted that this demand for a new translation of the 
critical edition does not reflect a lacuna in English translations of Aquinas’ works. Wipf 
and Stock, in 2004, had reissued the very serviceable translation of the entire De 
potentia which Lawrence Shapcote, O. P. had completed in 1952. The Aquinas-reading 
community was demanding a new translation of the critical edition, before that edition 
was itself published, because that community is closely parsing what Aquinas had said 
about Creation. The introduction to On Creation further illustrates this paragraph’s 
contention that these QQ are neglected in scholarly circles in that it notes the close 
connection between De potentia and the prima pars but ceases all references to the 
prima pars after I, 49, despite the fact that I, 65 has considerable overlap with Question 
3 of De potentia.28  
26 Weinandy, et al.  
27 Thomas Aquinas, On Creation, Trans.: S. C. Selner-Wright, (Washington DC: Catholic University Press, 
2011) intr. vii and xvii. 
28 Ibid, vii-xvi. 
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When one turns to journal articles and essays which examine Aquinas’ Creation 
theology or his Scriptural hermeneutic, again one notes an almost complete silence with 
regard to these QQ. Gilles Emery O. P., in an essay entitled “Trinity and Creation,” 
posited that Aquinas saw the persons of the Trinity, which he described as personal 
emanations, evidenced within the Scriptural definition of Creation.29 Emery holds that 
Aquinas conceived of the second person of the Trinity as an emanation of the mental 
activity of God, particularly intelligence/knowing, and the third person as the emanation 
of the will of God, particularly the will expressed in love. Creation, in Emery’s 
estimation, was therefore a foundational doctrine for Aquinas and closely integrated 
with his understanding of the Trinity, seeing that the Creation gave evidence of God’s 
intellect (Word) and will (Love) combining in the creative act. In an admittedly 
incomplete survey of Aquinas’ thought on this matter,30 he opted to focus primarily on 
the ST. Naturally he explores in some detail the QQ which discuss the knowledge and 
will of God, but also the brief section on the Creation in general in I, 45-49. The 
surprising omission is I, 74, 3ad3 in which Aquinas addressed the charge that the 
Creation was improperly described because the second person of the Trinity was 
inadequately involved. In his response to that Objection Aquinas asserted that within 
both the work of Creation and the work of formation the Trinity is insinuated.31 The 
passage succinctly, pithily, and effectively makes the case for Emery’s thesis, but it 
does not appear within his essay. It would have been particularly helpful to Emery in the 
argument he struggled to make about the development of Aquinas’ Trinitarian thought 
and his more refined articulation of the Trinity within the ST.32 
A singular example hardly makes the case for neglect. We can also consider Mark 
Johnson’s article from 1992 in which he sought to establish that Aquinas read multiple 
literal senses within the biblical text.33 Herein he suggests that six loci within Aquinas’ 
29 Gilles Emery, “Trinity and Creation” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, eds. Rik van Nieuwenhove 
and Joseph Wawrykow, Trans.: Patrick Martin, (Notre Dame: Univ of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 58-76.  
30 Ibid., 59. 
31 I, 74, 3ad3, Et sic in utroque opere creationis et formationis, Trinitas personarum insinuatur.  
32 Emery, 64-65. 
33 Mark F. Johnson, “Another Look at the Plurality of the Literal Sense” in Medieval Theology and 
Philosophy, 2 (1992), 117-141.   
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oeuvre constitute his treatment of the plurality of the literal sense. The language 
employed within Johnson’s article suggests that he is presenting the final analysis which 
should convince the reader and that his treatment is exhaustive. Whereas Emery above 
admitted that his survey was incomplete, Johnson would have the reader conclude that 
he is offering a complete and persuasive argument.34 The six loci which Johnson 
examines range broadly: two from the Commentary (II, 12, 1, 2 and IV, 21, 1, 2, 1 ad3.), 
an example from the proceedings of Aquinas’ quodlibetal disputations (Quaestiones de 
Quodlibet VII, 6, 1, ad5), another from De potentia (4, 1), one reference to the ST (I, 1, 
10), and a final reference to Aquinas’ abandoned revision to the Commentary (Lectura 
romana in primum Sententiarum Petri Lombardi I, pro., 4). In Johnson’s estimation 
these are the six texts which “touch on a plurality of the literal sense of Scripture.”35 
Strikingly, he does not include I, 65-74 in which Aquinas argued for the validity of both 
Augustine’s literal interpretation and Basil’s literal interpretation of Scripture. For eight 
of these ten QQ (66-72 and 74) Aquinas developed the implications of both literal 
meanings without opting for one over the other, but took great pains to accommodate 
both literal interpretations to the science of the day and the text of Scripture. Johnson’s 
argument is effectively made by Aquinas’ steadfast refusal to endorse one or the other 
as the “correct” reading, even, at times, taking great care not to do so. Aquinas 
explicitly states Johnson’s primary contention at the end of I, 74, 2c. In that corpus 
Aquinas had once more presented the very different strands of interpretation 
championed by Augustine and Basil. At the end of the corpus he introduced his 
responses to the various Objectives with this careful phrase, “So as not to prejudice 
either view, it is necessary to respond to both views.”36 His Responses are a catalogue 
of how to accommodate both interpretations to the literal text of Scripture and the 
natural philosophy of his day, but more importantly, both interpretations are given equal 
time. It is as though Aquinas deliberately demonstrated that both interpretations were 
not only possible, but even necessary for the reader of Genesis 1.  
Throughout these ten QQ Aquinas’ writing has embodied the very point to which 
Johnson has striven, namely that Aquinas held that there were multiple valid literal 
34 Ibid., 117-120.  
35 Ibid., 120. 
36 Ut igitur neutri sententiae praeiudicetur, utriusque rationibus respondendum est. I, 74, 2c.  
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readings of the text, in the case of Genesis 1, the literal readings of Augustine and Basil. 
As Aquinas unfolded the six days of Creation recorded in Genesis 1, he assiduously and 
scrupulously refused to prioritize one literal interpretation over another. Johnson makes 
not one mention of this fact. Had Johnson confined himself to the exegetical 
commentaries of Aquinas, perhaps this omission would have made sense, but he 
primarily works within the systematizing theological works of Aquinas, citing another 
passage within the prima pars as one of his six loci.  
In considering the subject matter of the loci which according to Johnson demonstrate 
that Aquinas held for a plurality of Scripture’s literal meanings, the gravity of the 
omission becomes even greater. The first locus Johnson considers is Commentary II, 12, 
1, 2, in which Aquinas asks whether all things were created at once and distinct in 
species.37 The fourth locus he examines is De potentia IV, 1, in which Aquinas asked 
whether the creation of unformed matter preceded in duration the creation of things.38 
Both of these Articles are direct parallels of material which form the central debate that 
Aquinas conducted within ST I, 65-74. Johnson’ primary argument contends that 
Aquinas argued for the plurality of literal meanings under the theological topic of 
Creation, specifically the interpretation of Genesis 1:1-2. In both of the parallel 
treatments, Johnson sees the argument for a plurality of literal senses to be rooted in 
Aquinas’ treatment of Augustine’s literal reading of an instantaneous Creation and 
Basil’s literal reading of six calendar days of Creation. In both of these passages, 
Commentary II, 12, 1, 2 and De potentia IV, 1, Aquinas argued that both very different 
literal interpretations of Basil and Augustine were valid, exactly the contention which is 
embodied within ST I, 65-74. Johnson never references these QQ in the 24 pages of his 
article. When he turns to the recently discovered reportatio of Aquinas’ early attempt at 
a revision of the Commentary, the work which Aquinas abandoned immediately before 
taking up the ST, Johnson asserts that he finds clear evidence that Aquinas believes in 
the plurality of literal senses at least in some passages of Scripture, especially Genesis 
1:2. But he does not cite Aquinas’ treatment of that very passage in I, 65-66 and again 
in I, 73-74. Reading Johnson’s article, one would never know that Aquinas had put the 
principle of plural literal senses into practice through an extended examination of 
37 Commentary II, 12, 1, 2, Utrum omnia sint creata simul, et distincta per species.  .  
38 De potentia IV, 1, Utrum creatio materiae informis praecesserit duratione creationem rerum. 
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multiple interpretations of a Scriptural passage in ST I, 65-74, and thereby had placed 
an explicit discussion of this important hermeneutical issue in the oeuvre of his ST.  
It is not reasonable to posit that Johnson was unaware of ST I, 65-74. The various 
commentaries, journals and articles which form the content of Aquinas studies are quite 
consistent and thorough in their cross-referencing the various works of Aquinas. The 
dependence of the prima pars upon De potentia and the comparison of the ST to the 
Commentary are regular elements of any scholarly examination of the ST. The most 
likely explanation for the omission of ST I, 65-74 from the discussion referenced above 
is that Johnson, along with most scholars, simply considers this to be an inferior 
theological work by Aquinas. This line of thought is not recent. As Wallace noted, 
Cajetan’s comments were “perfunctory” and brief.39 Etienne Gilson, a contemporary 
and colleague of Chenu, made a brief, singular, and informative reference to these QQ 
in 1924. He begins by noting that Aquinas in these QQ added nothing to the doctrine of 
Aristotle. He proceeded to note that Aquinas displayed “none of the curiosity of a 
Robert Grosseteste,“ and seemed to be puzzled that while Aquinas could have pursued 
subjects such as zoology and natural philosophy as did his Master, Albert the Great, 
Aquinas draws back from them. In describing what these QQ actually do accomplish, 
Gilson wrote the following:    
“The questions of the Summa theologiae commenting on the work of the 
six days provided him with many occasions to exercise his natural 
ingenuity in one or the other of these two directions. Thomas has no 
heart for the task and saves his ingenuity for other subjects. The essential 
thing in his eyes is to preserve intact the very letter of Scripture; being 
well aware, moreover, that it is not a treatise on cosmography for the use 
of scholars, but an expression of the truth intended for the simple people 
whom Moses was addressing, and thus is sometimes possible to interpret 
in a variety of ways.”40  
39 Wallace, Intr., xx. 
40 Etienne Gilson, Thomism: The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Trans.: Laurence K. Shook and 
Armand Maurer, (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2002), 204-205. 
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Gilson perceived these QQ to be less than useful, perhaps even a lamentable loss as he 
seemed to wish that Aquinas had pursued these questions along the lines of Grosseteste 
and Albert. He had reserved his “ingenuity” for other subjects. This sentiment is 
certainly what Wallace asserts within his introduction to the work when he says they are 
“completely traditional, and their presentation shows little originality.”41 Contemporary 
scholarship apparently joins Gilson and Wallace in their estimation, even if the 
estimation must be inferred from a lack of treatment rather than a positive statement. 
Even in his estimation of what these QQ are trying to do, Gilson picked up one aspect of 
Aquinas’ exploration of patristic sources, the principle of condescension, and applied it 
to this entire section of the ST.  
There is reason for Gilson’s assessment as well as that of others. Scholars have rendered 
this judgment based upon an appropriate comparison with the treatments of the same 
subjects within De potentia 2-4 and Commentary II, 12-15. In those two treatments 
Aquinas quoted far more patristic and philosophical resources than in ST I, 65-74 and 
the questions are much more thoroughly examined. Those treatments are clearly a quest 
for theological and philosophical truth as Aquinas carefully integrates the text of 
Scripture with the philosophy of his time. If ST I, 65-74 is a similar quest, it is simply 
deficient. The scholar who is looking for the expected profundities for which Aquinas is 
justifiably known will find his or her quest much more amply rewarded when that 
search gleans through the appropriate sections of Aquinas’ Commentary, De potentia, 
Summa Contra Gentiles, and other sections of the ST, just to name a few of Aquinas’ 
rich contributions to the discussion of Creation.  
3.  Appeal for a re-assessment of these QQ.  
This thesis does not take issue with the conclusion that these QQ do not present the 
theologian with the resource for the deepest of Aquinas’ speculative thought on 
Creation. We do, however, question the presuppositions of the search. Removed from 
its context the ST has frequently been read as a systematic theological text which 
endeavors to provide conclusive answers to theological questions. Catholicism’s use of 
Aquinas to meet the challenges presented by Protestantism beginning with the Council 
41 Wallace, Intr., xx.  
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of Trent in the 16th century contributed to this tendency.42 In that context the ST was 
expected to be a compendium of theological truth pressed into service as it engaged in 
intellectual combat with contexts and questions which Aquinas had not considered. 
What has been lost in this use of Aquinas has been the context for which Aquinas was 
writing, namely the educational reform program which the Order had laid upon his 
shoulders.  
While scholars such as Chenu and Wallace have insisted that these QQ are important, 
surrounding and later scholarship has largely ignored these pleas for their integration. 
We contend that this is because the readers of Aquinas are not reading these QQ in light 
of that pedagogical purpose and the context of the numerous young novices entering the 
Dominican priories. When one takes these factors into account, these QQ become not a 
resource for theological profundity but something else. They serve not to demonstrate 
Aquinas’ mastery of science and his ability to harmonize medieval science to 
theological or philosophical conclusions. It is not therefore valid to read them as a 
milestone for the modern scientist to observe how far we have come, as Wallace 
suggested. Nor do they provide some otherwise inexplicable key to the theology of 
Aquinas as Chenu postulated. These QQ reflect a Master of Sacred Page struggling to 
elevate the intellectual and theological skills of his students and more likely the students 
of his students. It was a daunting and remedial task since too many of them had not 
benefited from the rich Liberal Arts traditions which had informed and shaped his prior 
students whom he had taught at the University of Paris. Aquinas had already addressed 
what he considered the necessary points of the doctrine of Creation in ST I, 45-49, but 
the interlude of this section, a hexaemeron, within the table of contents of the Sentences 
afforded Aquinas an opportunity to return to the discussion of Creation. This time 
however, having already established the theology of Creation, he came to this topic with 
the freedom to address this serious lacuna in their education and the role of Augustine 
within theology in general.  
The gap within their training was a critical weakness for the young Dominican friars 
which had the potential to endanger the students’ vocation. Key to their success as 
preachers within the boisterous and burgeoning cities of thirteenth-century Europe was 
an adroit handling of patristic texts. Failure to do so equipped the Order’s enemies with 
42 Diarmaid MacCulloch, The Reformation: A History (New York: Penguin, 2003), 86-87. 
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valid charges to lodge against them. These QQ were written in a climate of increasing 
hostility and open attacks being made against the validity and future of the mendicant 
orders. Aquinas knew that the preaching friars’ success depended upon integrity in the 
interpretational task which lies behind Christian preaching. He also knew that key to 
interpretational integrity was the careful handling of these patristic theologians. This 
section of the ST is not on a quest for theological truth in the final sense. Indeed, that 
quest in the context of interpreting Genesis 1 might be problematic. Aquinas strove 
herein to inculcate a habitus within the student who must quickly43 learn to handle 
patristic texts, the raw data of medieval theology.44 
The substantive re-reading of these QQ which we propose leads the author to postulate 
another rationale for these questions and their particular characteristics. It seems likely 
that Aquinas had an expanded, secondary audience in mind as well, an audience which 
would come into clearer focus in the secunda and tertia pars. Therein he made some of 
his most daring assertions and sought to integrate speculative theology and the moral 
theology found within the confessors’ manuals which he sought to supplant.45 In so 
doing Aquinas reasonably anticipated opposition from several quarters. The anti-
mendicant faction was only one. The Augustinist movement which sought to invalidate 
most speculative theology was gathering momentum and had found powerful voices and 
allies within the ecclesial hierarchy.46 Even from those who were theologians, Aquinas 
could expect some antipathy. By the end of the discussion of Christology in the tertia 
pars he effectively called the Christological formulation adopted by many of his 
colleagues in the discipline Nestorian, an epithet that had particularly negative 
connotations in the medieval period.47 When the use of patristic resources within these 
43 Lawrence, 87-88, a Dominican could be licensed by the Order to preach after one year of instruction. 
The more expansive license to preach granted to a praedicator generalis, however, required no less than 
three years of study. See “Early Dominican Constitutions” in Early Dominicans: Selected Writings, Ed.: 
Simon Tugwell, O. P., (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1982), 467.  
44 Mark D. Jordan, Rewritten Theology: Aquinas after His Readers, (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006) 
120.  
45 Marie-Dominique Chenu, Aquinas and His Role in Theology, Trans.: Paul Philibert, O.P., (Collegeville, 
MN: Liturgical Press, 2002), 111-113. See also Jordan, 7-9. 
46 Lawrence, 13. 
47 Joseph Wawrykow, “Hypostatic Union” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, Eds.: Rik van 
Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow, (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2005), 245-246. 
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QQ is taken seriously, another apologetic objective begins to emerge which is naturally 
both sympathetic and synergistic with the pedagogical goal. Aquinas appears to have 
been pleading for epistemic humility. He heard Augustine appealing for this same 
humility within his commentaries and works on Genesis 1. This would have been of 
great benefit to his Dominican students, and furthermore, had they adopted this posture 
of humility, his theological peers would have been able to listen to his subsequent 
arguments.   
That this goal is not commonly recognized is easily enough explained. Aquinas appears 
to have failed in this quest. Within a few years of his death the Augustinist movement 
seemingly prevailed. The teaching of Aristotle along with several of Aquinas’ ideas was 
proscribed by the Bishop of Paris.48 His appeal for an intellectual space had apparently 
been unheeded by his peers, and even within the Dominican community there were 
those who doubted the orthodoxy of Aquinas in the late 13th century. The Dominican 
Archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Kilwardby (1272-1278), considered some of 
Aquinas’ ideas to be so dangerous that he forbad the faculty of Oxford to teach them. 
His successor as Archbishop, John Pecham (1279-1292), a Franciscan and former 
faculty colleague of Aquinas in Paris, was even more adamant in his opposition. It 
would take the Dominican order several decades to rehabilitate Aquinas’ reputation and 
works.49 By then the historical and personal context had changed and his works were 
quickly put to uses which he had never imagined.50  
4. Summary of the Goals and Conclusions of this Thesis.  
As already noted, this thesis concedes that the scholarly community which engages in a 
quest for theological and philosophical truth neglects these QQ for valid reasons. If the 
scholar desires to know Aquinas’ deepest thoughts on the Creation narrative of 
Christianity, she or he should seek elsewhere within the works of Aquinas. But the 
scholarly community has too hastily assumed that this reflects a fundamental deficiency 
48Henry Denifle, Ed., Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, (Paris: Delalain Bros., 1889) 543-555, no. 
473. For further discussion of this condemnation consider Weisheipl, 333-337 and Jean-Pierre Torrell, 
Saint Thomas Aquinas: Vol. I, The Person and His Work.  Trans.: Robert Royal, (Washington DC: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1996), 300-302.  
49 Weisheipl, 337-347. 
50 Torrell, 302ff.  
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in I, 65-74, as if it had been an “off day” for Aquinas when he came to this material. An 
important question has remained unexamined: Why does Aquinas not ascend to the 
intellectual and speculative heights of his prior treatments of this material? Why is it, in 
the words of his commentator and translator, William Wallace, O.P., that Aquinas’ 
treatment here is “completely traditional” and its “presentation shows little originality”? 
Aquinas’ other treatments of this material are profound. He was clearly capable of 
rigorous treatment of this material. Aquinas had examined the problems posed by 
Genesis 1 and produced one of those profound treatments just months before writing 
these QQ, hence we can conclude he was still interested in this material, for he had 
pursued it there with vigor and acumen. Why does he apparently aim so low that 
scholars ignore this work, and even his fellow Dominicans are embarrassed to teach it 
within their studia? 
The answers to this question are found in a close reading and analysis of Aquinas’ 
treatment of his sources, primarily Augustine and Basil, but also Chrysostom, Boethius, 
Pseudo-Dionysius, and John of Damascus among others. When these are read closely, 
compared to his other treatments of the same material and those of his contemporaries, 
important patterns and conclusions begin to emerge. Coupled with the historical context 
and Aquinas’ own words about the prima pars, the reader of this thesis will come to 
understand more clearly why he composed these ten QQ and what roles they play within 
the entire work.  
It is our contention that this section of the prima pars deserves a fresh and complete re-
assessment as a primer on reading patristic sources for the students of the Dominican 
studium personale51 which Aquinas operated in Rome. It also gives the reader a clear 
insight both into the pedagogical processes which obtained in the 13th century and the 
challenging world in which Aquinas lived and fulfilled his vocation as a Dominican 
theologian. Furthermore, these questions pose to the theologians and philosophers of the 
21st century an important and consistently necessary appeal to the same epistemic 
humility to which Aquinas summoned his students and peers in the 13th century.  
5. Methodology and Structure 
51 See Boyle, 9-10 and Torrell, 143-144 for discussion of whether Aquinas operated a studium personale 
at Santa Sabina.  
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As intimated above, this thesis employs a number of devices in the presentation of its 
arguments. The foundational research methodology is comparative analysis. Aquinas’ 
treatment of the hexaemeral material in ST I, 65-74 is compared to parallel treatments 
by Aquinas, particularly in Commentary II, 12-15 and De potentia 2-4, but also to prior 
and subsequent sections of the ST itself. Born of a close reading of the text and noticing 
peculiar structures and treatments of Aquinas’ use of patristic sources, this analysis is 
focused upon the use of patristic sources within these works. The fact that Aquinas 
treated this material at several junctures within his career affords the scholar an 
opportunity to observe not only parallel treatments but also a development within the 
thought of Aquinas over the period between the publication of his Commentary in 1256 
and the writing of ST I, 65-74 in 1268. At some points, but to a lesser extent, our 
research also compares Aquinas’ writing to that of his contemporaries, particularly the 
commentary upon the Sentences written by the Franciscan Bonaventura whose own 
floruit coincided with that of Aquinas.  
This comparative analysis was also conducted in light of the extensive and recent 
scholarly research which has already taken into account the historical record of 
Aquinas’ life and period. Utilizing the generally agreed upon shape of the 13th century 
world, the life of Aquinas, and the many forces which were at work, certain changes, 
even distortions, which this research has noted in the comparison of Aquinas’ material 
have become more cogent and coherent.   
The various observations of this comparative reading in light of historical realities are 
then synthetized into an intellectual schema or plan that seeks to account for the 
observed characteristics of ST I, 65-74. The comparative analysis suggests that this 
section of the ST was written with intended goals which were distinct from the purposes 
which drove Aquinas to produce the prior and subsequent elements of the ST, 
Commentary II, 12-15, and De potentia 2-4. The data are most fully accounted for by 
adopting the aforementioned dual purposes for this work: pedagogical and apologetic.  
This schema has been distilled into a new set of expectations, a new hermeneutical lens, 
for reading these questions. Seen as a primer on reading patristic authorities which 
embodied the epistemic humility of Augustine in a hostile context, the reader of these 
questions might reasonably expect to find a number of elements within these ten QQ.  
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Regarding the pedagogical occasion for the work, a close reading of these QQ should 
give evidence of the following: 
1. A pedagogical arc should be evident. Moving from a simplistic to more complex 
questions and treatments of sources.  
2. This pedagogical arc would also be observed in a synthetic development of 
principles. Elements of prior Articles would be combined and integrated into 
higher order principles which would guide the reader of patristic material.  
3. The material would be more narrowly focused than a speculative theological 
work. Extraneous, conflicting, and overly complex material would be excised, 
allowing the instructor and the student to focus more sharply upon the principle 
at hand.  
4. Boundaries of appropriate use will be demonstrated, clearly demarcating when 
interpretation has transgressed hermeneutical lines. At the same time, the lines 
will not be allowed to collapse unnecessarily. The reader will understand where 
the appropriate areas of question and ambiguity lie.  
5. The treatments of individual topics within an Article will preference discussion 
over argumentative conclusion. If there is a simple answer to a question, 
Aquinas might withhold that simple resolution until the student has had 
opportunity to explore the question under consideration.   
6. The reader might also expect that some sort of a pedagogical exercise be present 
in order to provide an opportunity for the student, under the guidance of the 
instructor, to put into practice the principles received.  
Regarding the apologetic occasion for the work: 
1. The treatment of sources will highlight the fluid nature of exegesis; the 
interpreter is confronted with interpretational quandaries which defy 
explanation. 
2. Important subsets of the doctrine of Creation will be demonstrated as being 
arenas for substantive theological disagreement. The reader will be made to 
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conclude that we do not “know” as much as is commonly assumed about 
foundational topics. 
3. The aforementioned ambiguity will engender a measure of humility when 
reading patristic texts. Multiple answers or solutions to perplexing elements 
within the text will be presented, but while some readings are eliminated, that 
process does not eliminate all ambiguity.  
4. In light of the rising Augustinist movement of his day, the reader will expect to 
see questions of authority, especially those that pertain to Augustine, treated 
carefully. The reading of his material will be deep and Augustine’s authority 
will be examined and may be used as a weapon against those advocating his 
supremacy.   
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Chapter 1: Reading Aquinas in His Context 
The scholarly community has increasingly accepted Chenu’s call to read Aquinas’ 
works within an appropriate historical context. This is not a simple task as dates for 
some works are contested1 and Aquinas himself does not afford the reader many clues 
about such context within his writing. The text of ST I, 65-74, however, is datable with 
some precision. It almost certainly was written sometime between November, 1267 and 
early spring of 1268, a window of approximately six months. Within I, 79, 4, the section 
immediately after the QQ under consideration here, Aquinas cited a paraphrase of 
Aristotle’s De anima made by Themistius, translated by William of Moerbeke, but not 
made available to Aquinas until 22 November, 1267.2 It is generally accepted that the 
entire prima pars was completed in the spring of 1268, which necessitates Thomas 
composing ST, I, 79, 4 between November 1267 and the spring of 1268. Since Aquinas 
occasionally cited earlier material within the ST, but not subsequent material, he 
appears to have worked through the QQ in their numerical order. It is reasonable, 
therefore, to conclude that Aquinas was working on QQ 65-74, which fall immediately 
prior to Q 79, in either the very late fall of 1267 or, at the latest, the early part of 1268. 
While it is conceivable he could have written in the spring of 1268, Aquinas composed 
another 40 QQ, divided into 192 Articles, after Q 79, suggesting the composition of Q 
79 would have fallen in the earlier part of that roughly six month span.  
This chapter situates Aquinas and ST I, 65-74 within their immediate and larger 
historical context. In the next chapter, we will explore in greater depth the intellectual 
climate in which these QQ were composed. Several points of historical context bear 
upon the reading of these QQ and this chapter addresses these historical concerns. Of 
primary importance is the immediate audience for the QQ. For whom did Aquinas write 
these QQ, and, secondarily, what can we understand about the motivations which drove 
Aquinas to compose them? It is also important to bear in mind that Aquinas did not 
teach in an isolated studium located in some remote location, but had been posted by the 
Dominican Provincial leadership to Rome and later Viterbo with the intent that he 
1 This is especially true of some of Aquinas’ exegetical works such as his commentaries on Isaiah and 
Jeremiah. See Weisheipl, 369-370.  
2 Weisheipl, 361. 
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function as a scholarly theological resource for the papal court.3 His “expert opinions” 
published in this time4 attest to the role he played in service to the court and the Order. 
This important context which must also be accounted for as Aquinas addressed these 
QQ.  
1. ST I, 65-74 at a pivotal juncture in the life of Aquinas. 
The ST is divided into four parts, prima pars, prima-secundae partis, secunda-secundae 
partis, and tertia pars. As Aquinas transitioned from the prima pars to the two elements 
which comprise the secunda pars he experienced a significant change in his life 
circumstances. Having begun the ST in Italy, he embarked upon the writing of the initial 
QQ of the secunda pars as he began his second regency on the faculty of the University 
of Paris. More than one scholar of Aquinas has suggested that the marked change which 
they have noted at this juncture within the ST is due to the change in venue. They 
suggest that the far more academic climate of the university, the higher quality of 
students, and the conflicts which he addressed within that academic community, 
particularly the Aristotelian crisis in the faculty, all contributed to the tenor and content 
of the secunda pars. It should also be noted, that, as they make this comparison, most 
scholars also express their preference for the secunda pars over the prima pars. Torrell 
considers the prima pars to be coldly metaphysical and dry while the secunda pars is 
“far more human, full of delicacy and nuance.”5 For our purposes, while we may 
disagree with that assessment of the two parts, we concur that they are different and that 
the difference may indeed be due to contextual factors. Aquinas himself may have also 
noted the differences in the works. He published the first two Parts of the ST at the same 
time in 1272 but as separate volumes. From the beginning until well after his death the 
Parts of the ST were normally published and distributed as separate volumes.6  
Aquinas completed the prima pars in 1268 while in papal court in Viterbo, Italy, but he 
had conceived, planned, and inaugurated his work while teaching Dominican students at 
3 Weisheipl, 230-231. 
4 Contra Errores Graecorum, ad Urbanum IV Pontificem Maximum (1263); De Regno ad regem Cypri 
(1265-1267); De emptione et venditione ad tempus (1262/1263); et al. 
5Torrell, 246. See also Weisheipl, 244, for similar estimation but alternative suggestion for causes. 
6 Boyle, 23. 
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the Dominican studium at Santa Sabina in Rome (1265-1267). There he had been 
charged with operating the Italian province’s first provincial school and where he also 
had become an important resource for the papal court.7  
2. The First Audience: Aquinas’ Students and the Occasion and Shape of the prima 
pars.  
As one considers these 10 QQ, a primary contextual question arises regarding the nature 
of these students Aquinas was given to teach, the young men whom one might presume 
were his first readers. And here we must admit that the actual students of a medieval 
Regent Master, whether at a university such as Paris or the Dominican priories and 
studia, are an elusive quarry. One reads many treatments of the medieval university and 
could almost conclude that they did not actually have any students.8 But of course 
teachers do have students. While events transpiring outside the walls of the priory and 
the personal history of Aquinas are also important, the ST was a document written for 
an audience, readers who were his students, and their identity will be critical for a 
proper understanding the influence of those secondary factors upon the work.  
a. The need for a summa.   
Aquinas conceived of the ST and began writing while teaching in a school (studium) 
which had been newly created and which had no current parallel in the Italian province 
of the Order. The authority to operate the school had been established by the leaders of 
the Italian province of the Dominican Order at a provincial chapter meeting held in 
1265 in Anagni. Aquinas was present at the conference, likely advocating for this 
course of action and influencing the schools foundation and composition. The capitular 
fathers must have seen a need for this school in order for them to take this step. What is 
not as clear is the extent to which they believed the problem they addressed by its 
foundation was an educational shortcoming in their younger friars or the need to afford 
some venue commensurate with their famous and brilliant star theologian.9 While it is 
7 Weisheipl, 195-7, 361. 
8 Leland E. Wilshire, “The Condemnations of 1277 and the Intellectual Climate of the Medieval 
University” in The Intellectual Climate of the Early University: Essays in Honor of Otto Gründler, Ed.: 
Nancy Van Deusen. (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 1997), 160-161. 
9 Weisheipl, 195. 
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most likely a combination of both, there is good indication that the educational 
background of the friars in Italy and the system for their education was indeed weak and 
the leadership of the province was aware of this.10 
What is clearer and more important for this thesis is what Aquinas thought of these 
young men whom the Italian priories sent to him. He left no record of any estimation of 
their relative competence as students, but one can discern something of a value 
judgment in several pedagogical decisions which Aquinas made. It appears that Aquinas 
began lecturing at this new studium on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, concurrently 
revising his own Commentary which had treated those patristic sentences compiled by 
the Lombard. He quickly abandoned the Sentences both in his lectures and his revision 
of the Commentary. Aquinas’ Commentary had been his initial theological work, 
completed in 1256, a decade earlier and composed while he lectured on the Sentences. 
To use the Sentences within theological education was conventional, even expected. 
The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) had effectively institutionalized the Lombard’s text 
for such purposes. That Council had sought to standardize the curriculum and did so by 
incorporating the Lombard’s Sentences at the core of that curriculum. The Lateran 
Council mandated the length of the period of study which was to be devoted to the 
Sentences and established that lecturing upon the Sentences would be the pre-requisite 
training for anyone to be licensed to lecture on the Scriptures.11  
The fact that Aquinas abandoned the Sentences as a text is therefore suggestive.12 The 
Sentences of Peter Lombard had been the standard work for Masters of Theology in 
much of the 13th century. All theologians lectured upon these selections from patristic 
authorities which the Lombard had gathered together under various topics. It would 
have been natural for Aquinas to have turned to this work as he considered the 
curriculum for this studium in Santa Sabina. For reasons which he does not explicitly 
10 Boyle, 10-11. 
11 Phillipp Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book (Ontario: Broadview Press, 2007), 61-62. 
12 Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself: Aquinas’ Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae, 
(Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1987), 22-24, suggests that Aquinas’ recent exposure to the theology of the 
Greek patristic theologians both enabled and necessitated this abandonment of Lombard’s work. 




                                                          
state, he felt that treating the Sentences and reworking his Commentary would not serve 
the goals of this studium and the Order.  
b. Why this Summa theologiae? Situating the ST within its literary context.  
To serve this new studium and its students, Aquinas set about writing a summa. Despite 
its current and strong affiliation with Aquinas’ works, the summa in the medieval period 
could be applied to a broad genre of theological literature. On one end of the spectrum 
in the medieval period, experienced Masters of Theology regularly produced summae in 
which they organized material around a theme or motif for their students.13 Some 
contend that Aquinas himself wrote three summae: the ST, the Summa contra gentiles 
(1259-1265), and a smaller work entitled Compendium theologiae (1269-1273.)14 His 
peers likewise were constructing systematic theological treatises which sought to 
organize the content of the discipline around a coherent theme. The first Dominican 
Regent Master at Paris 1229-1230), Roland of Cremona, had written a summa of the 
Sentences.15 Sophisticated and substantial, these works were written for a readership 
which extended beyond the students who might have read them, articulating for the 
larger theological community the particular unifying vision of theology held by the 
author. These documents did not supplant16 the Sentences, but would have served as a 
body of secondary literature for students of theology.  
While teaching in Paris, Aquinas would have had access to a number of these works, 
including the Summa universae theologiae. This work is normally attributed to 
Alexander Hales (1185-1245), who died shortly before Aquinas arrived in Paris. This 
summa, like many contemporary treatments of theology, organized its discussion of 
13 Chenu, 299 and Thomas O’Meara, O.P., Thomas Aquinas: Theologian, (Notre Dame: Univ of Notre 
Dame Press, 1997), 41-53.  
14 O’Meara, 44. 
15 Nancy Spatz, “Approaches and Attitudes to a New Theological Textbook: the Sentences of Peter 
Lombard” in The Intellectual Climate of the Early University: Essays in Honor of Otto Gründler, Ed.: Nancy 
Van Deusen. (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 1997), 31. 




                                                          
God around the sacraments.17 Aquinas’ own mentor, Albert, was himself writing a 
summa but was, despite his long life, unable to finish his Summa theologiae in which he 
organized his material around a hierarchy which he perceived in the created order.18  
Academic summae were written in the university settings, but most of them were not 
intended for a true beginner in the discipline. For many of Aquinas’ contemporaries, the 
summa genre served as means to re-publish a clearer and more mature version of their 
commentary on the Sentences. This appears to have been the goal of Albert’s summa 
project which adheres very closely to the content of his earlier commentary on the 
Sentences. It appears that Aquinas may have initially conceived of this project in a 
similar way as he began teaching in Santa Sabina in 1265.19 As we have noted, he 
initially lectured on the Sentences while recasting his Commentary but abandoned this 
effort in order to embark upon writing the ST.  
Unlike many of his academic peers, however, Aquinas acknowledged that he wrote this 
summa for beginners (incipientes)20 and seems to have meant by that term a body of 
students who were truly beginning their theological education. It appears that he did so 
because the standard academic text, the Sentences of Peter Lombard, had proven itself 
to be unworkable for him and his students and the existing texts which were intended 
for these beginners did not meet with his approval.21  
It should also be noted that the term summa was not restricted to the academic summae 
written by regent masters of theology such as Albert and Alexander. There was another 
body of literature which used the term and which sought to address the theological 
beginner. It also appears that Aquinas was not satisfied with these alternatives. In 
writing a summa for beginners Aquinas was joining a rather forgettable movement in 
17 Alexander Hales (Attributed), Summa universae theologiae, Eds.: Bernardini Klumper and the 
Quarracchi Fathers, 4 vols. (Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1924-1948). (Accessed via 
GoogleBooks.com) 
18 Markus Führer, "Albert the Great", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition), 
Ed.: Edward N. Zalta, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/albert-great/>. 
(Accessed Nov. 7, 2013). 
19 Weisheipl, 197. 
20 ST, prooemium (pro.)  
21 Torrell, 119-120.  
29 
 
                                                          
theological publishing. Several authors, many of them Dominicans, had composed 
documents intended for an audience of theological beginners which they styled summae 
but which were little more than manuals intended to guide the preacher in hearing a 
confession. Boyle lists several of these in his discussion of the ST’s setting and suggests 
that Aquinas had these in mind when he composed at least the initial part of the ST.22  
c. A work driven by his students and the mission of the studium.  
There could be any number of reasons which moved Aquinas to abandon the standard 
academic text of the 13th century, the Sentences of Lombard, and to eschew the 
available alternatives. It seems hardly conceivable that one of those reasons is that the 
material in the Sentences was too basic or simple for his students. Far more likely, 
Aquinas considered the material too advanced or complex for these students. Boyle 
argues that the best and brightest of the students whom the priories put forward for 
advanced training within the Dominican system were being sent to the universities such 
as Paris, Cologne, and Naples. A Dominican province was limited in the number of 
students it might send to the Dominican study houses at the medieval universities. There 
were only five of these studia generalia of the Dominican Order and each province was 
allowed to send two friars to study at each of these, the only exception being Paris 
which was equipped to receive three students from each province. Thus only eleven 
students were sent from the entire Italian province to the Order’s five studia generalia. 
The Italian province also operated two provincial houses of study, studia provincialia, 
associated with local universities which received some students. 23 While the numbers 
of students who were attending the universities was perhaps quite small, it also must be 
said that Aquinas was receiving the students of the second rank. The reader who comes 
to these questions understands that Aquinas’ audience, at least for this prima pars, was a 
step below what he had taught at the University of Paris.  
It also appears that the Dominican Order was concerned about the quality of these 
students. It is hard for the modern reader to remember, but the Dominican Order in the 
mid-thirteenth century was quite new. Dominic had died only a few years before 
Aquinas was born and it was only shortly before that, 1217, when he had dispersed his 
22 Boyle, 2-3. See also the excursus on the prooemium later in this chapter.  
23 Boyle, 7-12. 
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followers to the universities. Riding the crest of a movement which was sweeping 
across Europe, all mendicant orders saw the number of their members rapidly increase 
in the 13th century. William A. Hinnebusch, O.P. concludes from reading early 
documents of the Dominicans that, while in 1220 there were perhaps 300 friars of the 
Order, by 1256 there were some 13,000 members of the Order.24 Torrell suggests that 
such growth meant that the young men who made up this new wave of novices were 
also changing.25 Initially the men attracted to Dominic and his new Order of Preachers 
had been the highly educated men of the universities such as Alexander Hales and 
Albert the Great. They often came to the Order while at the universities. The mendicant 
movement was by the middle of the 13th century, however, entering a second phase in 
which the majority of novices were entering priories from outside the ranks of the 
university students and without the foundational training afforded by the universities. 
The mendicant movement was flourishing and this meant that it was penetrating deeper 
into the general population. This fact created a situation which struck at the very heart 
of the Order which saw its priories as a sort of “dispersed university.” In 1259 the 
visitors who were charged with oversight of the priories were commanded to note 
vacancies, primarily among the lectores, and press capable young men into service 
where needed.26 These lectores and their educational function were considered vitally 
important to the Dominican Order. The Secretary General, Humbert, had mandated that 
they might only enter spiritual retreat at certain times of the year which would result in 
the smallest impact upon the daily lectures they provided.27 
The students whom Aquinas taught at Santa Sabina would have likely returned to their 
priories to serve as lector. In writing the ST, Aquinas effectively had two pedagogical 
audiences, both the immediate student and the students of that student who would soon 
be licensed to preach himself. Which of these student populations prompted Aquinas to 
abandon the Sentences is indiscernible, but a likely supposition is that it was both of 
them.  
24 William A Hinnebusch, O.P., The Dominicans: A Short History, (New York: Alba House, 1975), 19-20. 
25 Torrell, 96-98. 
26 C. H. Lawrence, The Friars: The Impact of the Early Mendicant Movement on Western Society (London 
and New York: Longman, 1994), 72-74, 80-85 
27 Boyle, 4. 
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Aquinas, having elected not to use the Sentences which had comprised his own 
education, considered that what was needed for this situation was a new work, a summa. 
An academic summa, regardless of the intended audience, was not a project which was 
lightly undertaken. A proper summa dealt with the whole of theology and was organized 
around a specific theme or motif.28 The raw material of a summa was generated in 
disputations, formal and stylized academic activities which were organized around 
topics. These disputatae were not as tightly written or formal as a summa, frequently 
allowing for more speculative activity, some of which was not fruitful. A summa, in 
comparison, was expected to be more tightly focused and formal. These disputations 
formed the core of medieval scholarship and research. Aquinas had presided over 
several disputations during his prior tenure as a regent master in the University of Paris 
and continued to do so while in Italy. These were incomplete for his purposes here, 
however, and before he undertook the prima pars, sometime in 1265 or 1266, he 
conducted a disputation whose proceedings were published and remain extant (De 
potentia).29 Both his earlier Commentary and these disputations, especially De potentia, 
are important for the reader of this thesis and of ST I, 65-74. Many of the conclusions of 
this thesis will be based on a comparison of the ST with these works.  
Perhaps because it was the structure with which he was most familiar, surely because he 
thought it was beneficial for his students to organize his material this way, while he had 
rejected the Sentences as the text for his studium, Aquinas retained the basic topical 
order in which the Lombard had progressed within his Sentences. While the ST would 
not be another commentary on the Lombard’s collected “sentences” of patristic 
theologians of Christianity, Aquinas retained the “table of contents” from the 
Lombard’s work, dealing with this material in the same order. In another notable point 
of distinction which sets the prima pars apart from the other Parts of the ST, Aquinas 
abandoned even this dependence on the Sentences when he began the prima-secundae 
pars in 1268.  
 
28 O’Meara, 44-54. 
29 Weisheipl, 123-128. Here I follow Weisheipl’s chronology for the disputations, a chronology which is 
itself disputed.  
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3. Excurses into the Prooemium and its Importance for Reading the prima pars. 
This discussion of Aquinas’ readership occasions a closer examination of his only 
published words on the readers of the prima pars. Likely just before publishing the 
prima pars, prima secundae partis, and seconda secundae partis in 1272, Aquinas 
penned a brief Introduction (prooemium) to each Part of his work. Before examining the 
prooemium of ST I, it is worth noting that Aquinas had very specific ideas of what this 
genre of literature was endeavoring to do and what a good prooemium accomplished. In 
his commentary on Aristotle’s De anima,30 Aquinas noted that Aristotle had also 
written a prooemium and describes there a three-fold purpose or necessary elements 
(quae necessaria sunt) for such an introductory statement. In Aquinas own words, a 
prooemium first must render the reader favorably disposed (benevolum). Second, it 
renders them docile (docilem) or accepting of the structure (ordo et distinctio) of the 
work. Finally, it is necessary that a prooemium renders the reader attentive (attentum).31 
The reader of Aquinas’ prooemium to the prima pars will need to ask whom he would 
be rendering well disposed, docile, and attentive. Is it the beginner (incipiens) or the one 
who instructs the beginner?   
For the purpose of more closely examining these words, the entirety of this very brief 
document pertaining to the prima pars is reprinted here: 
Because a teacher (doctor) of catholic truth ought not only to educate the 
advanced (provectos) but also to instruct beginners (incipientes) – in 
accord with the Apostle’s words “as unto little ones in Christ I gave you 
milk as drink, not meat” (I Corinthians 3:1) – our principal aim in this 
work is to consider what pertains to the Christian religion in a manner 
befitting the instruction of beginners (incipientium). For we have 
reflected on the ways in which what various others have written are an 
30 Sententia libri de anima, lectio 1, n. 2, In tractatu autem de anima, quem habemus prae manibus, 
primo ponit prooemium, in quo facit tria quae necessaria sunt in quolibet prooemio. Qui enim facit 
prooemium tria intendit. Primo enim ut auditorem reddat benevolum. Secundo ut reddat docilem. Tertio 
ut reddat attentum. Benevolum quidem reddit, ostendendo utilitatem scientiae: docilem, praemittendo 
ordinem et distinctionem tractatus: attentum attestando difficultatem tractatus.  
31 See Ralph McInerny, Boethius and Aquinas, (Washington D.C.: Catholic Univ. Press, 1990), 58-59, for a 
more substantive treatment of Aquinas’ comments on Aristotle’s prooemium.  
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enormous hindrance to those who are relatively new to this teaching: 
sometimes on account of the useless multiplication of questions, articles, 
and arguments; sometimes because the things that beginners need to 
know are not treated in accord with the proper sequence of learning, but 
rather according to the requirements of textual commentary or the 
occasion of an academic debate; sometimes even because frequent 
repetition of the same things has tended to produce weariness and 
confusion in the minds of listeners. Striving, therefore, to avoid these and 
other such mistakes, we shall try, with confidence in God’s help, to 
pursue what pertains to this sacred teaching succinctly and clearly, as far 
as the subject matter allows.32 
Aquinas obviously took quite seriously his pedagogical task and noted deficiencies in 
the materials used for the teaching of the beginning students, the learners he named 
incipientes.33 Recent scholarship has suggested that this pedagogical goal is central to 
the ST and that a failure to take it into consideration leads to a serious misunderstanding 
of Aquinas’ thought. 34  
32 ST, I, pro., Quia Catholicae veritatis doctor non solum provectos debet instruere, sed ad eum pertinet 
etiam incipientes erudire, secundum illud apostoli I ad Corinth. III, tanquam parvulis in Christo, lac vobis 
potum dedi, non escam; propositum nostrae intentionis in hoc opere est, ea quae ad Christianam 
religionem pertinent, eo modo tradere, secundum quod congruit ad eruditionem incipientium. 
Consideravimus namque huius doctrinae novitios, in his quae a diversis conscripta sunt, plurimum 
impediri, partim quidem propter multiplicationem inutilium quaestionum, articulorum et argumentorum; 
partim etiam quia ea quae sunt necessaria talibus ad sciendum, non traduntur secundum ordinem 
disciplinae, sed secundum quod requirebat librorum expositio, vel secundum quod se praebebat occasio 
disputandi; partim quidem quia eorundem frequens repetitio et fastidium et confusionem generabat in 
animis auditorum. Haec igitur et alia huiusmodi evitare studentes, tentabimus, cum confidentia divini 
auxilii, ea quae ad sacram doctrinam pertinent, breviter ac dilucide prosequi, secundum quod materia 
patietur.  Translated by Brian Shanley, O. P.,  in The Treatise on the Divine Nature: Summa Theologiae I, 
1-13, (Indianapolis/Cambridge:  Hacket Publishing Co., 2006), 2. 
33 Chenu, Toward Understanding Thomas Aquinas, 297-298. Thus argued Chenu, however, he also is 
quick to point out that he considers Aquinas, like many academics, to be somewhat deluded about the 
abilities of beginning students. Probably for this reason John Jenkins, C. S. C., Knowledge and Faith in 
Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 5, on the other hand, argues that the 
intended audience is advanced students in his attempt to describe the readership of the ST.  
34 Vivian Boland OP, “Truth, Knowledge and Communication: Thomas Aquinas on the Mystery of 
Teaching” in Studies in Christian Ethics 19.3 (2006), 294-6. 
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The identification of these beginners is therefore critical for understanding the prima 
pars of the ST, and to a lesser extent the whole work. Additional prooemia were written 
for both elements of the secunda pars, suggesting that Aquinas may have intended these 
words to apply to the prima pars distinct from the secunda pars. Furthermore, he did 
repeat this concern for the incipientes in those subsequent prooemiae. This contention is 
bolstered by the fact that he published these as separate documents.  
Aquinas’ choice of this word for the beneficiaries of this text is merits further 
examination. The Index Thomisticus35 indicates the word only occurs 62 times in the 
entire corpus of Aquinas as a plural participle. If one filters out the instances in which 
this word is used inside quotations of other authors (18 occurrences), an interesting 
pattern is quickly noted. Aquinas most frequently used the term in contrast with 
proficientes and perfecti (31 occurrences).36 Even more important for understanding this 
term, the significant majority (21 occurrences) of the instances of comparison with 
proficientes and/or perfecti are found within the ST itself, primarily in QQ’s II-II 183, 
184, and 186 (12 occurrences). If our presumption is correct and these prooemia were 
written shortly before submission to the publisher, the prooemium of the prima pars 
would be roughly contemporary with these QQ from secunda-secundae partis.  
In this final section of the secunda-secundae partis of the ST, Aquinas turned his 
attention toward the reditus of humanity through Christ. In this discussion he posited 
three states or conditions (status) of mankind: The incipientes who desired to be rid of 
evil, the proficientes who sought to love the good, and the perfecti who sought to be 
united with God. He understood this functioning on both the level of actuality and the 
level of desire. Hence an incipientes might be someone who had mastered his sinful 
passions, but not yet had come to love the good. He might also be someone who simply 
desired to master those same sinful passions, but did not yet desire to love the good. The 
perfecti, on the other hand, might be perfected in fact, enjoying a complete unity with 
God or may simply desire such unity.  
35 Accessed via http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/it/index.age (13, November, 2010).  
36 The few remaining instances (11 occurrences) of incipientes fit into a quite unremarkable and 
expected pattern of use for the participle, widely scattered throughout the works of Aquinas. 
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Incipientes are consistently contrasted within the ST with those who are in a process and 
with those who have arrived at the end of that process, hence his contrast here with the 
advanced (provecti). While within the prologue this contrast is made in the context of a 
different virtue than the QQ’s which occur at the end of II-II (in the prooemium 
knowledge, in II-II, 183-186 love), the consistent pattern of usage within the ST would 
suggest that Aquinas had a clear content for this word. The incipientes are not those 
who are simply “behind” the author in progress, as perhaps an initiate is to a master, but 
they are in something of a different state. They may have recognized that they lack 
something or have turned away from ignorance, but they have not yet attained to that 
other state, “advanced” in knowledge.  
This understanding of the usage and meaning of incipientes affects how one conceives 
of the intended audience of the work. It is the contention of this thesis that these 
incipientes may not have been the first audience, but a second audience, who read or 
heard this document under the tutelage of a lector within the priories of the order. These 
lectores would seem to be the primary audience of at least the prima pars of the ST. 
When Aquinas speaks of a text which has in mind the instruction of beginners,37 it 
would suggest he may be writing for an audience which is also interested in this 
instruction of the beginners. I propose that this other audience of interested pedagogues 
is comprised of the lectores who would be charged with the daily instruction delivered 
to these beginners and who had been sent to Aquinas for instruction at the studium in 
Santa Sabina where the ST was conceived and initiated.  
The prooemium also suggests that in writing the ST Aquinas seemed to believe he was 
filling a serious lacuna in the materials available to theological educators. At the time of 
the inception of the work, Aquinas was engaged in the educational system of the Roman 
Province of the order, perhaps in the establishment of a studium personale.38 For 
reasons which we have explicated, we disagree with both Chenu and Jenkins as cited 
above who struggle to identify the incipientes as if they were the intended readership.  
Aquinas’ statement within the prologue regarding his estimation of the other materials is 
difficult to reconcile with this interpretation that incipientes are the audience. There 
37 ST I, pro., propositum nostrae intentionis in hoc opere est, ea quae ad Christianam religionem 
pertinent, eo modo tradere, secundum quod congruit ad eruditionem incipientium. 
38 Torrell,  143-144. 
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were in fact a great number of these books being produced from many sources in that 
period. The very first books published by the Dominican Order were manuals for these 
incipientes, iuniores and simplices, and this continued during Aquinas’ lifetime and 
throughout the ensuing centuries until the period of the Reformation.39 The problem 
with understanding that Aquinas is addressing the incipientes directly in the prooemium 
is that it only makes sense in a more modern context in which publishing technology 
has significantly reduced the value of books and afforded even a beginner the 
opportunity to browse a bookstore for options. The choice of a text for a student body 
made up of incipientes in the medieval world would not have been the incipientes 
themselves, but the individuals who had been charged with their education. The lector 
would have had the only copy and the incipientes would have transcribed the content of 
that text from the singular copy which was in the hands of the instructor and read to the 
incipientes.  
While Aquinas certainly had in mind the young friars who were entering the order, his 
actual audience were, I assert, the promising young men Italian priories were sending to 
Santa Sabina for him to train as lectores for the ongoing educational mission of the 
order.40 These lectores were not themselves incipientes but had been recognized as no 
longer being a beginner and had hence been charged with presenting a daily lecture on 
Scripture for the increasingly youthful and unprepared friars within the priories of the 
Italian Province. Dominic himself had envisioned the Order’s priories as sort of a 
dispersed university. In addition to a prior, the lector was the only other office within a 
priory mandated by the constitution of the Order.41  
In further support of a double audience consisting of lectores and incipientes, Aquinas’ 
treatment of this material is considerably less sophisticated than elsewhere within his 
oeuvre. At the same time as he is writing these QQ, he is able to conduct relatively 
sophisticated disputations with his students at Santa Sabina in the process of producing 
De potentia. If he had argued this material with his students a few months prior to 
39 Boyle, 2-3. 
40 Torrell, 119-120, suggests that Aquinas realized the extensive lacunae in the Dominican educational 
system and the need for new pedagogical materials while at Orvieto, as he was given to teach in a 
substantial but single priory.  
41 Lawrence, 74-75, 84-85. 
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composing these QQ, why not retain the same level of sophistication? The only readily 
available answer seems to be that this material was intended for those students to use 
upon their return to the priories of the Order, as they were called upon to conduct 
lectures for the benefit of the incipientes.  
The Order’s success and rapid growth had resulted more than one problem which 
needed to be addressed. Initially the men who responded to the call of Dominic to serve 
within the Ordo Predicatorum had arrived more or less fully educated. In the middle of 
the 13th century, however, the order was experiencing dramatic growth due to its 
increasing popularity and acceptance within the ecclesial culture. Papal support also was 
a likely contributor to this success. Many who were now entering their novitiate were 
not yet educated. Since the preaching task remained vital to the mission of the Order, 
this presented a significant challenge. The preachers would need to be educated.42 The 
council at Valenciennes, upon the recommendation of Aquinas and his fellow 
academics, would opt to develop the system of priories, lectores, and other structures of 
the order to create a more integrated educational system.43 Having thus been a 
participant in the re-ordering of this system, it would not have been strange or out of 
place for Aquinas to have taken something of a proprietary interest in the quality and 
character of the education of the incipientes. He would have also understood that as a 
Master of Theology, his task was to address the system in which they were educated.  
This suggestion seems to answer two important questions which have perplexed 
scholars who read the ST (see comments by Chenu and Jenkins above). First it allows 
the incipientes to be truly beginners, as the word would most obviously suggest. They 
were simply the many young men who were entering the Order throughout the 13th 
century, novices and beginners to this apostolic life and the study of theology which 
increasingly marked the Dominican Order. Secondly, this suggestion allows for the 
complexity of the work, especially the complexity which one experiences in the rest of 
the prima pars, in that the actual readership was not in fact these beginners, but the men 
who had been charged to teach these incipientes as lectores. I believe that the ST started 
out as something of a teacher’s manual for lectores, or perhaps a manual training these 
42 Lawrence, 80-85. 
43 Torrell, 96-98. 
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lectores. I also would concur with those who note the change in the document when one 
proceeds to the secunda pars. In the context of the university environment it would 
appear that the focus upon these lectores receded somewhat and the occasion of 
theology addressed in its most advanced medieval state reasserted itself.  
It must also be said that it is unlikely that the students of Paris, where Aquinas’ career 
was forged, were ever far from his mind. In truth it may be an unfavorable comparison 
of the young Dominican friars to his former Parisian students which initially prompted 
this project. He may have through this document simply sought to improve Dominican 
education.44 As this pertains to Questions 65-74, I believe that in this section of the ST 
Aquinas sought to inculcate within these instructors of incipientes a careful and 
respectful handling of patristic sources which adhered to a number of hermeneutical 
principles. As such, these questions served as something of a primer and demonstration 
of these principles. We shall examine these hermeneutical principles in greater depth in 
the second and third chapters which deal with sources and Aquinas’ treatment of those 
sources.  
Before examining the sources which occupied Aquinas’ attention in these ten QQ, 
several additional interlocking and salient historical points will be important to the 
conclusions which we assert. The first important point to remember is the proximity and 
nature of Aquinas’ students to this task. As we have already suggested, this was a 
document which was likely motivated by the needs of his students. But it was not only 
the students of the studium in Santa Sabina which may have been on his mind. As 
already noted, at the end of his first regency in Paris, in 1259, Aquinas had been sent to 
a provincial conference of the Dominican Order in Valenciennes. He was summoned as 
the senior Master of Theology along with four of his fellow Dominicans who were also 
his peers in that academic rank to serve on a special commission on behalf of the 
provincials of the Order. Their charge was to examine the educational system within the 
provinces and priories of the Dominican Order and make suggestions for its 
44 Boyle, 11. Boyle points out that Aquinas was named a preacher general of the Italian province in 1560 
which gave him the right to speak at the periodic gatherings of the order. Within 4 years of his 
appointment and participation in these provincial chapters the province, which heretofore had never 
addressed education, had conducted an internal assessment and come to the conclusion that study in 
the province had been “neglected.” He sees the hand of Aquinas behind these conclusions which 
ultimately led to the foundation of the studium in Santa Sabina. 
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improvement. 45 Boyle suggests that this commission was the impetus behind Aquinas 
seeking the studium in Santa Sabina several years later and subsequently his conception 
and production of the ST as a text book for the training of lectors and friars beyond his 
own students.46 Expanding the readership into this larger body of the thousands of 
young men who were studying with the far-flung priories of the Ordo Predicatorum 
suggests the next point of historical importance: The nature of Aquinas himself.  
4. The author: Thomas Aquinas, friar of the Ordo Predicatorum. 
The second point is that Aquinas received the aforementioned charge at Valenciennes 
very seriously. The simple fact that he continued writing the ST after leaving the 
studium in Santa Sabina is itself suggestive of this fact. By all indications, Aquinas’ 
dedication to the mission of the Dominican Order was unwavering and deeply rooted. 
Already as a youth he had overcome considerable opposition to his affiliation with the 
Dominicans. Being the youngest son of a family in the minor nobility of Italy, his 
parents had envisioned a career for their youngest son Thomas within the Church. They 
did not, however envision that ecclesial career as a Dominican, rather as a Benedictine 
monk, likely with the idea that he would become an Abbot. This was certainly within 
reach for someone entering a monastery from his social station. His decision as a 
student at Naples to join one of the mendicant orders was not well received by his 
widowed mother. Considering the long and fruitful history of both the Franciscan and 
Dominican Orders and their generally favorable estimation as important members of 
Roman Catholicism, it is hard for the modern reader to remember that in the first half of 
the thirteenth century the Dominicans were perceived as a new and not entirely 
trustworthy movement. In hindsight it is easier to see that the mendicants were a natural 
outgrowth of the rising cities of Western Europe. To the entrenched nobility, both 
within the ecclesial hierarchy and among the lay nobility, the mendicants looked to be 
upending social order.47 
Fearful that his family might interfere, the leadership of the Dominican Order was 
attempting to remove the young Thomas Aquinas to France when his elder brother 
45 Torrell, 96-98. See also Weisheipl, 138.  
46 Boyle, 10-11 
47 Hinnebusch, The Dominicans: A Short History, 25-26. 
40 
 
                                                          
intercepted the party north of Rome. Accompanied by soldiers from the army of 
Emperor Frederick II, they seized Thomas and imprisoned him for more than a year 
during which his mother and siblings sought to dissuade him from this course. His 
brother attempted to seduce him with a prostitute. His mother cajoled, pleaded, and 
threatened, but young Thomas remained resolute. He was committed to this decision, a 
commitment from which he never wavered. 48 
Thomas Aquinas appears to have been a true believer in the Dominican project 
throughout his life. Chenu claimed,  
“It is plain that Thomas’s joining the Preachers – in spite of the violent 
opposition of his family (1244) – was, together with the religious 
orientation of his soul, the factor that fashioned all his activity, 
considered not only from an outward point of view but, especially, from 
that of doctrine and motivation.” 49  
Looking at the man through the lens of his works, it is easy to forget that Aquinas chose 
the Order of Preachers (Ordo Predicatorum) long before he was an academic. He did 
not reject his family’s station, wealth, and career opportunities as an academic to be an 
academic. Before he was 20 years old, before his formation as an academic had entered 
even its intermediate stages, Aquinas left his secure position in a noble family to join a 
mendicant order of preachers as a friar. The opportunity for a successful, even 
illustrious academic career was a later development in the life of Aquinas.50 He could 
not have known that he would dine with kings and popes when he made that vow. He 
joined the Order to pursue the apostolic life.  
It just so happened that the Dominican Order recognized the talent of the young man 
who had joined their order and put him into roles and locations which were designed to 
benefit the Order’s kerygmatic goals. Paris was, in the middle of the 13th century the 
48 Weisheipl, 25-36. 




                                                          
center of a preaching movement which has been likened to popularized scholasticism.51 
The theology faculty of the University of Paris, especially its mendicant members, 
consisted of well-established providers of essential resources for the preachers who 
were flooding the streets of European cities at the time. Shortly before Aquinas arrived 
in Paris the faculty had produced one of the first truly successful concordances of the 
Bible. Even the economics of publishing had been brought into service to this task. The 
commentary had been distributed through a recently devised pecia system by which a 
preacher could rent a portion of it or the whole concordance for a time, far more 
economically than purchasing it.52 In suggesting that Aquinas wrote these QQ in 
support of the preaching task, the training of the Dominican preachers of Italy, we are 
not proposing a disjuncture from his earlier career, but in fact a continuation of what he 
had already been doing. This had been the rationale for the Dominicans training him 
from the beginning.  
Aquinas’ own behavior was consistent with this assessment of the intensity and stability 
his motives. Shortly before undertaking the composition of the ST, he was offered the 
abbacy of Monte Cassino, the influential and lucrative Benedictine Abbey near his 
home. The pope even offered to dispense with the need for him to be a member of the 
Benedictine Order, allowing him to retain his membership in the Dominican Order. It 
was the very goal his parents had envisioned for him and the offer itself may have 
originated with familial machinations in the papal court.53 He respectfully declined. 
Pope Clement IV also offered him the even more lucrative Archbishopric in Naples, 
near his ancestral home, and a cardinal’s hat. Aquinas refused them all, insisting that 
Clement should never suggest such a thing again.54 He remained a friar of the 
Dominican Order and he served it. This dedication to the Ordo Predicatorum is vitally 
important to reading Aquinas’ ST, especially these ten QQ in that it supplies a critical 
rationale for the pedagogical arc of which we take note in chapter 4.  
51 D’Avray, D. L., The Preaching of the Friars: Sermons diffused from Paris before 1300, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1985), 164. 
52 Ibid, 74-76. 
53 Weisheipl, 33. 
54 Weisheipl, 232. 
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Too often his fellow ecclesial and especially his Dominican interpreters simply assume 
this dedication of Aquinas and make little mention of it; his secular readers frequently 
ignore this aspect of Thomas. The result of this silence and the failure to observe this 
critical element of Thomas the human being is that these ten QQ of the prima pars have 
proved opaque and dissatisfying to many who read them. But when one considers that 
they were composed by a man who took very seriously the charge which had been laid 
upon him personally as a member of the Valenciennes commission and the vital role 
which education played within the mission of the Order, these QQ, both in terms of 
their structure and their content, begin to make a great deal more sense. They reflect 
Aquinas’ attempt to embody the very program of educational improvement for which he 
had advocated as a member of the commission and which he perceived to be of vital 
importance to the success of his Order.  
5. Conflicted Context: the Waxing Anti-Mendicant Impulse. 
The third important contextual element which the reader must consider in reading these 
QQ is the hostile world in which Aquinas lived and worked and into which he would 
send his students as members of the Dominican Order. This too is frequently overlooked 
by those who read Aquinas but this omission may be more excusable. It is not without 
reason that Aquinas is sometimes called the “Serene Doctor” whose works seem to rise 
above controversies which permeated the 13th century. When reading the ST and his 
other more systematic works, one gets very little sense that these documents were part 
of robust theological, political, and ecclesial discussions, discussions which transpired 
in the boisterous lecture halls of the University of Paris and the Papal courts. Aquinas, 
though he was a member of a religious order, was not cut off from the world of the 
cities, universities, and courts. The mission of the friars, unlike that of monks, was to 
engage society in the burgeoning cities of Western Europe. To this day, in contrast to 
the monastic vocation, the friars are not found in an isolated monastery situated in some 
remote valley or on a hilltop, but always in the population centers.  
Aquinas himself was personally acquainted with this rough and tumble world of 
medieval politics. He had been born into the politically charged and frequently violent 
world of the Italian minor nobility. One might simply consider his own family’s 
response to his decision to join the order. But politics would follow Aquinas his whole 
life, often in the context of considerable hostility. His inaugural lecture at the University 
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of Paris had to be conducted under the protection of an armed guard because secular 
members of the theology faculty opposed to his appointment had stirred up students and 
local Parisians to the extent that his life was in danger.55 Such violence was common in 
medieval universities. In 1252, a few years prior to Aquinas’ inception as a Master, 
Pope Innocent IV demanded of the university Chancellor that he deny benefits and 
privileges of enrollment to all students who were found, without cause, to be carrying 
arms.56 His proximity to and participation in the papal court would have regularly 
exposed him to a political environment. His emphasis on divine governance within the 
sections of the ST which immediately follows the QQ under current consideration, as 
well as a concurrent document regarding kingship, suggest that he had occasion to think 
about the exercise of power and authority in a political context.57 
It is difficult to ascertain from his systematic theological writings the extent to which 
that environment was hostile to the mendicant orders such as the Dominicans. One 
detects very little emotion within Aquinas’ writings. We know that the violence which 
surrounded Aquinas’ inception onto the faculty of the University of Paris had been 
occasioned by hostility directed at the mendicants. While the instigator on that occasion, 
another member of the theology faculty at the University of Paris, William of St. 
Amour, would eventually be rebuked and exiled by the order of the Pope, the 
underlying tension which had given rise to William and those who agreed with him 
remained after 1256. The Dominicans were perceived by many to be the instruments of 
papal reform, a reform which was not welcome in many corners of western 
Christendom. Gregory IX (1227-1241) in his bull Nimis Iniquia had granted the 
mendicant orders autonomy to preach and hear confessions. This effectively interrupted 
the income stream for many dioceses since substantial gifts were frequently given to the 
confessor. While Dominican priories thrived, many outside the mendicant orders and 
their papal allies saw them as threats and sought any and every occasion to thwart their 
mission. This hostility would obtain throughout the 13th century and into the 14th 
century as witnessed by the Lollard movement‘s considerable antipathy against the 
55 Torrell, 79-80. 
56 Denifle, 238, no. 213. 
57 De regno ad regem Cypri (dated 1265-1267 by Weisheipl, 388.), ST I, 96, and 103-119. Aquinas also 
began but did not finish a commentary on Aristotle’s Politics (Sententia libri Politicorum), likely during 
his second regency in Paris, (see Weisheipl, 380-381). 
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mendicants.58 Even members of religious orders other than the Dominicans were 
occasionally hostile. In 1240 a ruling by the same Pope had declared that self-imposed 
mendicancy rendered the Dominicans the most rigorous of orders. The rule of the day 
held that a religious could exchange membership in one order for another, but only to 
join a more rigorous order. This effectively meant that the Dominicans could receive 
members from every other order, but no Dominican could join another order. This 
caused a great deal of friction and hostility even from their fellow ordered members of 
the ecclesial community.59 
Torrell suggests that the best insight into the nature of Aquinas the man is gained 
through reading his handful of polemical tracts: Contra retrahentes, De perfectione, and 
Contra impugnantes which were written in defense of the mendicant orders and their 
particular charism for the sake of the church.60 Following the conventions for such 
writing in the medieval period, Aquinas comes across as a far more forceful and 
emotional writer. The fact that these are his only polemical tracts is significant. The 
medieval university was a tumultuous place. The fundamental university activity, the 
disputation, was by its very nature confrontational and these confrontations regularly 
spilled over into published polemical tracts. Aquinas largely remained aloof from this. 
In contrast to many of his peers, disputes with fellow academics, confrontations within 
the ecclesial community around him, truly all other disputes, whether theological or 
otherwise, were constrained and argued within the academic disputation. Only one 
matter was so pressing and important to Aquinas that he would repeatedly enter the wild 
world of medieval polemical tractates: the validity of the mendicant orders. 
Aquinas clearly and properly perceived his Dominican order to be under some sort of an 
attack and he met that attack via his tracts. And while the tracts are not contemporary 
with the writing of the prima pars the attacks on the mendicants were continuing and 
were being addressed by the papal court while Aquinas was present.61 During Aquinas’ 
58 Lawrence, 152-159. 
59 Ibid, 72-73. 
60 Torrell, 80-82. 
61 Josef Pieper, The Silence of St Thomas, (London: Faber and Faber, 1956), 14, asserted that the 
mendicant and Aristotelian disputes rocked 13th century Christendom with a “passionate violence we 
can scarcely understand.”  
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first regency William of St. Amour had been exiled but his ideas and influence did not 
go away. In 1266, often working through his proxy, Gerard d’Abbeville, William 
renewed these attacks with yet another tract, Collationes catholicae, which he addressed 
to the newly elected Clement IV.62 Gerard, for his part, dedicated his Advent 
Quodlibetal disputation to attacking the mendicants at the university in Paris. The death 
of Clement and the ensuing three year vacancy in the papal office provided an 
opportunity for the anti-mendicant forces to make their case. Eventually this threat to 
the mendicants would have to be met in force at Paris. The leadership of Dominican 
order would turn to Aquinas to meet that challenge by posting him to Paris for an 
unusual, second regency in 1269.63 However serene and irenic one might consider his 
writing to be, his superiors and peers clearly thought he was the man who could best 
lead this charge.  
This thesis examines one section of that prima pars, more specifically QQ 65-74, in 
which Aquinas, following the Lombard’s table of contents, took up the content of 
Genesis 1, the Creation narrative. Having already addressed the essential questions 
which revolve around the Creation event, particularly the nature of God as first source 
of Creation in ST I, 2-26, and I, 45-49, Aquinas was revisiting this biblical material in 
these QQ. He had established the theology which he considered critically important for 
the discussion of Creation prior to I, 65-74. The return to the topic of Creation in the 
Lombard’s table of contents presented him with an opportunity to pursue a different 
goal within his treatment of these QQ.  
The nature of the genre also would have made this section of the ST an inviting 
opportunity for Aquinas to engage in a pedagogical exercise. The medieval world was 
awash with treatments of Genesis 1.64 The Hexaemeron as a type of commentary had a 
long and well-represented history within the Christian tradition, with the most notable 
patristic treatments being the hexaemeral sermons of Basil65 and the several treatments 
62 Weisheipl, 263-264. 
63 Weisheipl, 115-116.  
64 Wallace, 211. 
65 Basil, In Hexaemeron, I-IX.  
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by Augustine.66 The Lombard had served to establish the genre further by dedicating a 
section of the Sentences to this chapter of Christian Scripture, thereby assuring that 
every Master of Sacred Page in the 13th century would have read and commented upon 
this material.67 The topic was still lively and appealed broadly to listeners in the 13th 
century. Bonaventura, Aquinas’ colleague and fellow mendicant, presented a series of 
sermons or lectures on the six days of Creation in 1273 which were recorded by his 
fellow Franciscans and remain extant.68 It would not have been out of place, therefore, 
for Aquinas to embed a Hexaemeron within his ST, an exegetical work within an 
otherwise systematic treatment of theology. The issue remains the sort of hexaemeron 
which he wrote. Having read prior and subsequent QQ and Articles of the ST, many 
have come to these QQ expecting a similarly erudite, profound, and penetrating 
treatment but have been disappointed.69  
This thesis notes that the threat to the validity of the mendicant orders was reasserting 
itself as these QQ were being written and suggests that the disappointing and puzzling 
nature of these QQ is best understood in light of that context and the opportunity 
afforded by the resumption of this material within the ST. Documents attacking the 
Order were in the Pope’s hands. Aquinas had been given an opportunity to renew his 
friendship with his old master, Albert the Great, who had been dispatched to the papal 
court in 1262 to address the conflict surrounding the mendicants. This conflict was not 
on the periphery of Aquinas’ world. It makes a great deal of sense that Aquinas began to 
meet the growing anti-mendicant threat within his theological writing and only resumed 
writing polemical tracts upon his return to the faculty in Paris where the challenge was 
immediate and he had been placed into the focal point of the Dominican response.  
These ten QQ were composed within the increasingly hostile climate of the latter half of 
the seventh decade of the 13th century. Aquinas could not have avoided the continuing 
controversy which surrounded his Order. He responded through his students, equipping 
66 Augustine, De genesi adversus Manichaeos, De genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus, De genesi ad 
litteram, Confessiones XII, and De civitate dei XI.  
67 Wallace, 213-215.  
68 Collationes in Hexaemeron, Ed. and Trans.: William Nyssen, (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1964). 
69 Gilson, Thomism: The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, 204-205.  
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them to enter that hostile world by inculcating a careful, reverential reading of patristic 
theologians with a profound epistemic humility. The student who internalized what 
Aquinas said here would successfully avoid the valid criticisms which might have been 
leveled by an educated hearer against a poorly schooled Dominican preacher. That 
preacher would also have been equipped to provide cogent answers based on a reading 
of patristic theologians which was wider and deeper than the reading done by most of 
his antagonists. Because this reading of patristic authorities will focus primarily upon 
the reading of Augustine, we treat this patristic resource in greater depth in chapter two 
as we further explore this hostile intellectual climate. 
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Chapter 2: Augustine and Aquinas 
That a treatment of a medieval theologian should start with Augustine is hardly 
surprising. Augustine’s writings formed one of the pillars upon which the medieval 
conceptual world had been built.1 Through his many interpreters and through the 
ongoing popularity of his own works, Augustine had assumed a position of significance, 
even dominance, over the theological landscape, a position which he held through the 
period of the Reformation and beyond.2 In his recent treatment of the Reformation 
Diarmaid MacCulloch asserted that the primary arguments of that period all took place 
within the “mind” of Augustine.3 In treating a controversy of the century prior to 
Aquinas’ floruit, Marcia Colish makes a similar claim as she treated the school of 
Abelard and the Victorines which contended about the proper understanding of 
marriage. Each side within that debate sought ascendency by marshalling Augustine’s 
occasionally divergent comments and writings on marriage against the other.4 To 
engage in theological discourse in the medieval period meant one had to deal with the 
bishop of Hippo.  
Augustine’s considerable significance only increases when one considers the medieval 
scholar’s use of Augustine under the theological locus of the biblical Creation account. 
Augustine revisited the issue of Creation and particularly the first chapters of Genesis 
several times throughout his writing career.5 These texts and Augustine’s many other 
1 Etienne Gilson, Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, (New York: Random, 1955), 363, wrote that 
while other influences were present, the fundamental positions of the medieval period were “all 
Augustinian” and that these positions “dominate the rest as the forma totius perfects, unifies and orders 
its whole.”  
2 M. D. Chenu, O. P., Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, Trans.: A. M. Landry, O. P. and D. Hughes, 
O.P., (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1964), 405. 
3 Diarmaid MacCulloch The Reformation: A History, (New York: Penguin, 2003), 107-114, asserted that 
the Reformation is best understood as a controversy which pitted different interpretations and 
emphases of Augustine against each other.  
4 Marcia Colish, “The Sentence Collection” in The Intellectual Climate of the Early University: Essays in 
Honor of Otto Gründler, Ed.: Nancy Van Deusen, (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 1997), 
12 
5 Augustine has five extant, significant treatments of Creation: De Genesi contra Manichaeos; De Genesi 
ad litteram imperfectus liber; De Genesi ad litteram; Confessiones, XII-XIII; and De civitate dei, XI and XIV.  
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writings had done much to shape the theology and culture of medieval Christianity, 
especially as they came to the question of origins and the First Cause.  
This chapter seeks to establish three points. First it acknowledges the debt which 
Aquinas owed to Augustine’s thought when he turned to explicating the hexaemeron. In 
this, Aquinas was thoroughly a follower of Augustine’s thought. Second, this chapter 
explores Aquinas’ utilization of Augustine’s works, both in terms of how much he knew 
of Augustine and how these works function within the writings of Aquinas. Finally, this 
chapter would articulate the role which Augustine’s theological/philosophical method 
played in the development of Aquinas’ own theology and philosophical outlook as he 
embarked upon the writing of the ST.   
1. Aquinas’ debt to Augustine  
As noted above, the choice to approach the work of Aquinas through an Augustinian 
filter could be justified on the basis of Augustine’s vast influence within the medieval 
world. Augustine possessed an authority (auctoritas) in Aquinas’ world with which one 
had to reckon. One gets a sense of this from reading ST I, 39, 5. The arguments about 
divine essence and the Trinity need not concern us here, what is interesting is that in I, 
39, 5ob1 Aquinas noted that Augustine had posited a position which he concluded was 
simply in error regarding the procession of essence within the Trinity. His endeavor to 
preserve Augustine’s integrity in the Response6 to that Objection reveals how highly 
Augustine was esteemed by Aquinas and his peers. The Response to the Objection is 
entirely dedicated to preserving Augustine from the charge of error. Augustine’s 
language may have been improper in this instance, but it was careless language, not 
genuinely in error.7 
6 I, 39, 5ad1, Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, ad exprimendam unitatem essentiae et personae, sancti 
doctores aliquando expressius locuti sunt quam proprietas locutionis patiatur. Unde huiusmodi 
locutiones non sunt extendendae, sed exponendae, ut scilicet nomina abstracta exponantur per concreta, 
vel etiam per nomina personalia, ut, cum dicitur, essentia de essentia, vel sapientia de sapientia, sit 
sensus, filius, qui est essentia et sapientia, est de patre, qui est essentia et sapientia. In his tamen 
nominibus abstractis est quidam ordo attendendus, quia ea quae pertinent ad actum, magis propinque 
se habent ad personas, quia actus sunt suppositorum. Unde minus impropria est ista, natura de natura, 
vel sapientia de sapientia, quam essentia de essentia. 
7 See Bruce Marshall, “Aquinas the Augustinian? On the Uses of Augustine in Aquinas’s Trinitarian 
Theology” in Aquinas the Augustinian. Eds.: Michael Dauphinais, David Barry, and Matthew Levering. 
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Augustine’s considerable gravitas as a theological resource does not fully explain 
Aquinas’ debt to Augustine. Aquinas had received from Augustine more than 
authoritative theological insights and exegetical technique; although, he received those 
as well. Much of the academic and intellectual ethos which is attributed to Aquinas can 
be traced to Augustine’s writings. Within Augustine’s works Aquinas read that the 
human being is on a quest toward ultimate truth without ever completely arriving at that 
goal.8 He read from Augustine that ambiguity and paradox are the fertile fields of 
intellectual inquiry.9 Augustine strongly warned his reader not to be too certain of 
theologically speculative conclusions10 and encouraged his reader to appreciate the need 
for intellectual space, an open field for curiosity, imagination, and creativity in order for 
theological life to flourish.11 Augustine had articulated that all truth, even from sources 
outside the Christian tradition, “belonged to God.”12 In many respects, Aquinas 
thoroughly reflected the ideas and attitudes of Augustine.   
When considering the Augustinian hermeneutic applied to the hexaemeron, Ernan 
McMullin noted13 three principles of Augustine’s reading of Genesis which are easily 
discernible in Aquinas’ subsequent treatment.  
1. The relevance of cosmology to theology.  
2. Natural philosophy cannot contradict Scripture. 
3. Cosmology is not the primary focus of Scripture; rather, that primary focus is 
salvific  
(Washington DC: Catholic Univ. Press, 2007), 41-61, for a more substantive discussion of Aquinas’ 
treatment of Augustine within ST I, 39. 
8 Conf. XII, 32, 43; see also Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo, (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 
2000), 70. 
9 Gen. ad litt., V, 8, 23. 
10 Gen. ad litt., I, 19, 39. 
11 Revisions II, 24, 1. 
12 De Doctr. Chr., II, 18, 28. See also Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, (New 
York: Random, 1960), 234.  
13 Ernan McMullin, “How should cosmology relate to theology?” in The Sciences and Theology in the 
Twentieth Century, Ed.: Arthur Peacocke, (Notre Dame, IN, Notre Dame Press, 1981). 20-22. 
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McMullin profitably held that these principles within Augustine’s thought functioned in 
a dynamic, almost competitive, interaction with each other. The first principle meant 
that one could not simply divorce theology from the observable world. The second 
principle on the surface could be seen to relegate natural philosophy to a subservient 
role, but it did not do so. Augustine held that the thoughtful interpreter of Scripture 
needed to seek congruence but that, while Scripture was hierarchically superior, conflict 
may be resolved by amending the interpretation of Scripture in light of natural 
philosophy.14 These two principles play out in nearly every Article of the QQ under 
consideration in this thesis as objections are raised, and the text of Genesis 1 most often 
forms the sed contra for each Article.  
The final element, however, may be the most significant contributor to Aquinas’ 
treatment of Genesis 1. As Augustine matured, especially within his anti-Manichean 
works, he increasingly posited a distance between the cosmological tension created 
within the human being who observed nature and read the text of Scripture as an 
authority.15 Augustine’s willingness to consider Creation in another category seems to 
have enabled Aquinas to do the same, thus creating a kind of theological laboratory in 
which he was able to conclude that the reverential reader of Scripture and the patristic 
theologians may not be able to reach a firm and ultimate conclusion.16  
This is not to say that Aquinas was wholly or solely dependent upon Augustinian 
thought. He drew from a notably wide range of resources for his theological and 
philosophical insights. We will discuss in greater detail his relationship to some of these 
in the portion of this thesis dedicated to an evaluation of these other sources, but two of 
them merit brief attention as we here consider Augustine. The first of these is Aristotle 
some of whose works had only recently been reintroduced to Western Europe through 
Islamic and Jewish interpreters and translations. While Aristotelian philosophy was 
14 Carol Harrison, Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of Saint Augustine, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1992), 114-116.  
15 Paul Allen, “Augustine and the systematic theology of origins”, in Augustine and Science, Eds.: John 
Doody, Adam Goldstein, and Kim Paffenroth, (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2013), 15. 
16 See David Fergusson, “Interpreting the Story of Creation: A Case Study in the Dialogue Between 
Theology and Science” in Genesis and Christian Theology, Eds.: Nathan MacDonald, Mark W. Elliot, and 
Grant Macaskill, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), 155-174, for a contemporary articulation of the 
tentative nature of both scientific and theological conclusions in this regard.  
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foundational to his understanding of hylomorphic physics, Aquinas is to be numbered 
within the second generation of Aristotelian readers. His mentor, Albert the Great, was 
to a more significant degree beholden to Aristotelian thought and notably less critical in 
his adoption of Aristotelian categories and arguments. Aquinas can be distinguished 
from his mentor in that he is more circumspect in his handling of Aristotle.17 Where 
much of Albert’s work is simply the restatement of what Aristotle wrote, Aquinas is far 
more developed in placing Aristotle within a hierarchy of resources.18 Aquinas’ use of 
both Augustine and Aristotle was not systematically sustained and this dynamism can 
be noted even within the writing of the ST through a simple numerical comparison. As 
one reads through the ST, the frequency of quotations from Aristotle diminishes and the 
quotations from Augustine increase.19 As these questions fall within the earliest 
elements of the ST, Aristotle is frequently cited and forms another important foundation 
to Aquinas’ examination of the six days of Creation.   
The second resource which should be briefly noted at this juncture is Dionysius, 
frequently known as Ps.-Dionysius. While it is known today that this author was a 5th 
century Neo-Platonist from the region of Syria, Aquinas and his colleagues considered 
that Dionysius, or ‘Denis’ in Aquinas’ writings, was the same man mentioned in Acts 
17:34, one of the Apostle Paul’s first gentile converts to Christianity and a philosopher 
of first century Athens. This proximity of a classical era philosopher to an apostolic 
witness lent these works an authority which approached that of Scripture for many of 
his medieval readers.20 Aquinas is no exception to this medieval state of affairs and 
Dionysius contributed significantly to Aquinas’ thought. Of particular interest to the 
reader of these ten QQ, the ideas of Dionysius enriched Aquinas understanding of a 
very Augustinian topic: words as signs. Within Dionysian thought, and it should be 
noted that this is in some tension with the Augustinian formulation, Dionysius held that 
the verbal sign could be much more than a sign. Dionysius understood that the verbal 
images of God, which pagans ridiculed as crude, were much more than metaphors. 
17 Weisheipl, 43-43. 
18 Torrell, 228ff. 
19 Torrell, 245-6. 
20 Paul Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to Their Influence, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 15. 
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These words/signs were in fact incarnational vessels of God. This notion seems to have 
been particularly important for Aquinas as he explicated QQ 65-74. Although Aquinas 
does not often quote Dionysius within these questions,21 Paul Rorem asserts that 
counting quotations is not an accurate gauge of the Areopagite’s influence. Rorem finds 
Dionysian ideas underpinning without quotation or citation arguments across the 
theological spectrum in the medieval period, including Aquinas.22 
While Aquinas drew from many resources, the challenges and insights offered by 
Augustine’s ideas predominate within QQ 65-74 of the prima pars. This may be 
attributable to more than simply Augustine’s considerable contributions to the exegesis 
of Genesis 1. Aquinas use of Augustine within these QQ of the ST may also be 
attributed to Augustine’s singular usefulness in meeting what was for Aquinas a very 
contemporary challenge. Aquinas’ reading of Augustine needs to be contextualized by 
the modern reader within a debate which was taking place within the thirteenth century. 
Aquinas’ mentor, Albert the Great, had opined that while Augustine was the leading 
theological authority, he would seek out the works of Galen or Hippocrates when sick 
and Aristotle when he sought to understand the natural world. He was driven to make 
such a comment in response to a movement within and outside the Dominican order 
which sought to establish Augustine as the final word on all matters, not only 
theological, but also in medicine, natural philosophy, and astronomy.23 This Augustinist 
movement was not simply a fringe body of reactionaries. It was gathering momentum 
throughout much of Aquinas’ life and won substantial victories in the months and years 
following Aquinas’ death. On the third anniversary of Aquinas’ death, March 7, 1277, 
Stephen Tempiers, the Bishop of Paris, under pressure from the Pope and this 
Augustinist faction, issued a list of 219 condemned teachings,24 some of which were 
21 Eight times in QQ 65-74, but five of these are in the articles devoted to the Creation of light.  
22 Rorem, 30. 
23Albert the Great, Scriptum super sententiarum II, 13, C, 2c. Borgnet, Vol. 27, 247,  Unde sciendum, 
quod Augustino in his quae sunt de fide et moribus plusquam Philosophis credendum est, si dissentiunt. 
Sed sid de medicina loqueretur, plus ego crederem Galeno, vel Hipocrati: et si de naturis rerum loquatur, 
credo Aristoteli plus vel alii expert in rerum naturis. For analysis of Albert’s statement see Weisheipl, 43.  
24Henry Denifle, Ed., Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, (Paris: Delalain Bros., 1889) 543-555, no. 
473. For further discussion of this condemnation consider Weisheipl, 333-337 and Torrell, 300-302. 
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attributed to Aquinas,25 but most of which were directed against any whose theology 
had been shaped by Aristotle, his Islamic commentators, and resources other than 
approved patristic theologians. For the next fifty years this faction worked vigorously to 
quell the sort of intellectual debates which Aquinas, Albert the Great, and other like-
minded scholars had sought to foster.26 Eventually the doors which the condemnations 
of 1277 sought to slam shut did swing back open, but it was only through the effort of 
academics who struggled to do so.27 Even Bonaventura, Aquinas’ fellow mendicant 
friar and Regent Master at Paris, would, in his later years, assert the primacy of 
Augustine over all other knowledge. This fight would be carried on after Bonaventura’s 
death by his student and successor to the Franciscan chair of theology at Paris and even 
still later the Archbishop of Canterbury (1279-1292), John Pecham. 28 In a letter 
addressed to the Bishop of Lincoln, dated 1 June, 1285, Pecham asserted that while he 
was in favor of philosophical study in general he disapproved of recent inventions 
which were:  
“weakening and destroying with all its strength what Augustine teaches 
concerning the eternal rules and the unchangeable light, the faculties of 
the soul, the seminal reasons included in matter and innumerable 
questions of the same kind, let the Ancients be the judges, since in them 
is wisdom, let the God of heaven be judge, and may he remedy it.”29  
The sort of thinking in which Pecham engaged was not simply a reaction to Aquinas 
and his peers; it had been present, albeit not quite so virulently, when Aquinas arrived in 
Paris as a student. Stephen of Tournai (1128-1203), the Abbot of Ste Genevieve on the 
Mount, had a generation earlier expressed his disapproval of the Masters at Paris asking 
25 Wilshire, 151-156, argues, contrary to most biographers of Aquinas, that Aquinas was not actually the 
target of any of these condemnations, nor the subject of the subsequent 30 condemnations published 
by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Kilwardby, O. P. a few weeks later in Oxford.  
26 Cf. Weisheipl’s discussion of the condemnation and eventual rehabilitation of Aquinas’ teachings 
immediately after his death, 331-340.  
27 Wilshire, 178 
28 Weisheipl, 245 and 285. 
29 John Pecham, Registrum epistolarum, Vol. III. 871, 901-902. Quoted and translated by Etienne Gilson, 
Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages,” (New York, Random, 1955), 359.  
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questions and conducting disputations on topics such as the Trinity and Incarnation. “As 
if the works of the holy fathers are not enough,” he complained.30 For Stephen, these 
topics were settled, the answer had been given, and the inquiry into these topics was 
complete. At this time, in Stephen’s considered opinion, the task of the theologian was 
to impart the conclusions of these “fathers”, not to raise doubt and open old questions 
anew. Stephen could have pointed to more than one theologian who exemplified this 
approach to theological education. One of the earliest systematizing works in the 12th 
century was the Elucidarium by Honorius Augustodunensis. His attempt to educate his 
fellow Benedictines in pastoral and theological matters bore a striking resemblance in 
its goal to that of Aquinas, but could not have been more different in its approach. By 
offering up his best answers in simple form, he sought not to foster intellectual inquiry 
but to lay such questioning to rest.31  
As Aquinas composed the ST, therefore, he was already immersed in an increasingly 
conflicted intellectual climate in which Augustine was being used by various factions 
among his peers and contemporaries both to pursue theological inquiry and to quash 
that very same inquiry.32 The entire project of the ST hung on the validity of such 
inquiry, the very thing he was seeking to inculcate within the incipientes for whom he 
wrote.  
This theological inquiry was vitally important to Aquinas. In Aquinas’ view, to be a 
human being is to be a learning creature.33 Unlike many within the Augustinist 
movement, he did not consider that theology had found final truth, rather it needed 
continually to be on a quest for such truth and it needed to be questioning the 
formulations of truth which it regularly asserted. With the project of the ST Aquinas 
sought to raise significant questions regarding theological conclusions which were 
30 C. H. Lawrence, The Friars: The Impact of the Early Mendicant Movement on Western Society, (London 
and New York: Longman, 1994), 13. Stephen of Tournai is quoted from PL. 211, 517.  
31Colish, “The Sentence Collection,” 4-5. 
32 Wilshire, 151, expresses some puzzlement that the condemnations of 1277 are not discussed more 
thoroughly as matters of academic freedom. 
33 ST III, 9, 4c, in which Aquinas argues that Christ’s intellect had to include the ability to learn actively or 
he would not have been a true human being. It is also interesting to note that this regard Aquinas is 
contradicting what he had written in earlier treatments of this topic.  
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widely held in his time. He had to know that such a challenge would not be well 
received. An example of this can be found in the recent work of Joseph Wawrykow in 
which he contends that Aquinas challenged nothing less than the Lombard’s assertions 
regarding the options for understanding doctrine of Christ’s Incarnation.34 In Sentences, 
Book III, distinction 6, the Lombard had posited three possible conceptual models for 
the Incarnation of Christ. Through reading the documents which had been produced at 
the time of the ecumenical councils of the fourth, fifth and sixth centuries,35 Aquinas 
had come to realize that two of these “opinions” were essentially Nestorian and had 
been rejected by the patristic theologians who had come to be called orthodox. Not only 
would this conclusion, if accepted, force a significant reconsideration of a primary 
theological concept for his peers in western Christianity, but Aquinas would in effect 
accused some of those peers of being Nestorians in the tertia pars of the ST. That term 
“Nestorian” had come to have a particularly pejorative sense within the medieval world, 
even if not always accurately applied.36 As a result, when Aquinas embarked on the ST 
he was not only contributing to theological education in the medieval period as he 
observes in the ST’s prooemium, he apparently had in mind to challenge foundational 
positions which many of his peers considered orthodox. For this reason he needed 
intellectual maneuvering room. In a sense he needed to “loosen up” some long held 
theological convictions. Put another way, he needed his readers and peers to approach 
theological assertion with considerable epistemic humility.  
The locus of Creation provided Aquinas with a natural opportunity for Aquinas to 
pursue that goal. The content and significance of Genesis 1 provides an intersection of 
both unanswered questions and theologicial interest.37 Anyone who wrote about 
Creation was almost guaranteed an audience in the 13th century. A conflict which 
revolved around the topic of Creation had recently resurfaced. Not only had the 
Albigensian movement questioned whether God had made the world at all, the recent 
34 ST III, 2. 
35 Weisheipl, 164-168, Aquinas was the first medieval scholar to cite many of these documents.  
36 Joseph Wawrykow “Hypostatic Union” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, Eds.: Rik Van 
Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow, (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 235-237. 
37 R. R. Reno, “Beginning with the Ending” in Genesis and Christian Theology, Eds.: Nathan MacDonald, 
Mark W. Elliot, and Grant Macaskill, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), 28, considers the opening 
chapters of Genesis to be an invitation to this sort of speculative theology. 
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reintroduction of some Aristotelian material had called into question several hitherto 
unquestioned assertions about the material world and its creation. Perhaps from the 
Timaeus or from Neo-Platonism it appears some were reexamining the understanding of 
creatio ex nihilo. The divine emanation theories of Avicenna, Averroes, and other 
interpreters of Aristotle were calling into question the Christian assertion that God had 
not used secondary causes to create and that the material universe had a beginning point 
and was not itself eternal.38 These intellectual challenges had caused Aquinas to expend 
considerable energy on this issue and write extensively. So much so that one of his 
modern readers has played upon his name and argued that he should be called “Thomas 
a Creatore” and not “Thomas d’Aquino.”39 We can confidently say that Aquinas was 
working within a locus of theology which he knew very well and which was of interest 
to his readership. It was also a field of theology in which a maelstrom of sophisticated 
philosophical arguments, conflicting ideas, and firmly held opinions presented 
dangerous pitfalls to his fellow Dominican friars, especially those whose theological 
formation was in its beginning stages.  
Augustine’s interpretation of the hexaemeron would also prove particularly useful in 
order to lay important foundations for the project we have just described for a number 
of reasons. First, Augustine’s position as a theological authority in the medieval world 
was unassailable. As noted earlier, there were significant voices which at the time were 
seeking to assert Augustine’s authority pertaining to all areas of knowledge. By using 
Augustine to force open this intellectual space, Aquinas was in effect using his enemies’ 
own weapon against them. But there is yet another reason that made Augustine 
attractive for this sort of project. Augustine’s actual theology of Creation was widely 
cited but quite often only superficially known. As we will subsequently demonstrate, 
many thought they understood Augustine, but not many had read him carefully and 
thoroughly.  
In ST I, 65-74 Aquinas did not, however, seek simply to replace one orthodox statement 
with another. He was not trying to assert Augustine’s theological statements about the 
38 Stephen Baldner and William Carrol, Aquinas on Creation: writings on the “Sentences” of Peter 
Lombard Book 2, Distinction 1, Question 1, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1997, 22-
26.  
39 Torrell, 163-164.  
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Creation were more true than other statements as much as he was endeavoring to 
inculcate a theological habitus within his readers, the very habitus which he had learned 
from his extensive and careful reading of Augustine’s works. In order to do this, 
Aquinas needed to have a viable alternative to Augustine’s treatment of the Creation. 
This presents a second reason that Augustine’s treatment of the six days of Creation was 
attractive for this purpose. Such an alternative was readily available in an equally 
unassailable ancient source: Basil. In the centuries prior to Aquinas, another strand of 
interpretation, which was supported by numerous patristic theologians, had come to be 
generally accepted by most theologians. The most authoritative resource for this was a 
series of sermons by Basil on the six days of Creation recorded in Genesis 1 (Hex.) 
These were widely read and had served as the prototype for a kind of commentary 
which was frequently undertaken up to and after the period of Aquinas, nearly 900 years 
after Basil preached.40 Basil’s concordant readings of Genesis 1 and the readings of 
other patristic theologians were generally favored at the time of Aquinas. This was both 
exemplified and reinforced within Peter Lombard’s Sentences in which he simply said 
that one should not accept the timeless Creation which Augustine espoused.41 This was 
followed by a further explanation in which the opinion of “many others” was said to be 
more congruent (magis congruere videtur) with the meaning of Genesis 1 than 
Augustine’s opinion.42  
The third reason Aquinas may have chosen this locus of Theology in which to conduct 
this exercise was likely because Creation as a doctrine was so familiar to the reader. 
Peter Lombard had included a section on the hexaemeron within the Sentences. 
Hundreds of commentaries on the Lombard’s Sentences had been written within the 
40 Wallace, 205. 
41 Sentences II, 12, 1, Deinde elementa distinxit Deus et species proprias atque distinctas singulis rebus 
secundum genus suum dedit, quae non simul, ut quibusdam sanctorum Patrum placuit, sed per intervalla 
temporum ac sex volumina dierum, ut aliis visum est, formavit. 
42 Sentences II, 12, 2, Quidam namque sanctorum Patrum, qui verba Dei atque arcana excellenter 
scrutati sunt, super hoc quasi adversa scripsisse videntur.  Alii quidem tradiderunt, omnia simul in 
materia et forma fuisse creata; quod Augustinus sensisse videtur.  —  Alii vero hoc magis probaverunt 
atque asseruerunt, ut primum materia rudis atque informis, quatuor elementorum commixtionem atque 
confusionem tenens, creata sit; postmodum vero per intervalla sex dierum ex illa materia rerum 
corporalium genera sint formata secundum species proprias.  Quam sententiam Gregorius, Hieronymus, 
Beda aliique plures commendat ac praeferunt, quae etiam Scripturae Genesis, unde prima huius rei 
cognitio ad nos manavit, magis congruere videtur. 
59 
 
                                                          
growing number of universities of Europe and all of them included some treatment of 
the hexaemeral material. Aquinas’ contemporary, Bonaventura, might serve here as an 
exemplar of what Aquinas’ contemporaries were writing in this regard as well as an 
illustration of a medieval approach to the questions raised by Genesis 1.  
A theologian of considerable gravitas in his own day, Bonaventura’s theological 
writings remain significant to this day.43 Within his commentary on the Sentences 
Bonaventura concurred with the Lombard over against the ideas of Augustine regarding 
the six days of Creation. Augustine’s theory was cursorily explained, but dismissed. The 
value of the six calendar day Creation was asserted and Augustine himself was 
contextualized as a theologian who was seeking to make his doctrine more palatable to a 
contemporary philosophical community.44 Bonaventura did not write that Augustine 
was in error, but Augustine’s interpretation can only be heard inside that context of a 
philosophical debate. In Bonaventura’s opinion, Augustine was not trying to explain 
things as they “had to be” (quam quid factum fuerit). Bonaventura expended 
considerable effort to show that Augustine was not in substantive contradiction to the 
others, but he had to be read in this philosophical context. He even appealed to 
Augustine’s concept of multivalent meaning of Scripture45 to suggest that Augustine 
may sound at odds with the others, but for Augustine’s time it was something the Spirit 
of God had in mind. The Seraphic Doctor, however, clearly held that the Spirit did not 
have this interpretation in mind for Bonaventura’s audience. Throughout this attempt to 
keep Augustine from the charge of error, however, Bonaventura did not wrestle deeply 
with the actual content of what Augustine said. Augustine was asserted to be inside the 
stream of orthodoxy on this matter, but the actual theology of Augustine was not 
substantively examined. This entire analysis of whether Creation took place in six 
calendar days or in an instant occupied just under 1100 words in the Latin text of 
43 The Franciscan community is currently in the process of translating a number of Bonaventura’s works 
and publishing them at this website: http://www.franciscan-archive.org/index2.html.  
44 Bonaventura Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarium II, XII, 1, 2  Et sicut patet ex eius 
(Augustine’s) intentione ibidem, magis volebat intellectum ex Scriptura elicere, ex quo Scriptura non 
posset a viris philosophicis derideri, nec propter hoc aliquis, naturali philosophia imbutus, a fidei veritate 
retardi, sicut ipse aliquando fuerat retardatus, magis, inquam, quam intellectum principalem exponere, 
quem ibi habuit Legislator; et magis intendit ostendere, quid congruum fuerit vel tunc esse potuerit, 
quam quid factum fuerit.  
45 Conf. XII, 30, 41 – XII, 33, 43. 
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Bonaventura’s commentary. The first two Articles in Aquinas’ ST I, 65 contain just 
under 1,500 words.  
This is not an aberration within the treatments of this issue. Even Aquinas’ own teacher, 
Albert the Great, within his Summa, while more open to Augustine’s idea, did not 
actually explicate or explore this issue deeply.46  Although Augustine’s ideas were not 
unknown to the theological community of his day, his contribution to the exegesis of 
Genesis 1 was superficially treated. The default position of most theologians was an 
acceptance of the strand of literal interpretation which will be attributed to Basil within 
ST I, 65-74 and which the Lombard himself had espoused.  
It appears that the majority of those who read Augustine on this matter and other 
matters may not have actually read very deeply in Augustine. Even the usually 
provocative Peter Abelard, in his Hexaemeron47 did not take up Augustine’s question of 
a simultaneous Creation.48 This rather shallow knowledge of Augustine served 
Aquinas’ purposes well. By demonstrating the general lack of depth within the 
theological community in regard to a figure such as Augustine and furthermore in 
regard to such a central doctrine as Creation, a topic which was frequently written about 
and discussed, Aquinas would have forced the reader to concede the possibility of the 
re-evaluation of other central doctrines, in the case cited above: Incarnation. By putting 
his readers into the position of accepting Augustine’s counter-intuitive interpretation of 
Genesis 1, Aquinas may have also forced his readership to be somewhat circumspect in 
the use of Augustine as an answer to all questions theological and otherwise.  
Aquinas did not limit his theological energies simply to challenging the Christology of 
his peers. The understanding of the Incarnation could be an esoteric conversation even 
by scholastic standards. Aquinas was a creative and constructive theologian whose ideas 
were large and would need to be heard in an atmosphere of openness if they had any 
chance of adoption and implementation. Toward this end, Augustine also may have 
been considered helpful, particularly as he addressed Creation. Here Aquinas’ purposes 
46 Albert the Great, Summa  P. II, tr. 11, q. 46, a. 1. 
47 Peter Abelard, Expositio in Hexaemeron. CCCM: 15. Eds.: M. Romig, D. E. Luscombe, and C. Burnett. 
2004. 10-11, and 24-25.  
48 See discussion in Colish, Peter Lombard, 323-325.  
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may be seen in the very structure of the ST. QQ 65-74 are followed immediately by the 
section of the prima pars which explored his challenging anthropology. This lengthy 
and beautiful discussion of the human being closes out the prima pars and thus leads the 
reader into the integration of the theological and moral teachings in the secunda pars 
which follows immediately.  
The fact that Aquinas used a treatment of the six days to accomplish these goals may 
also reflect a fortuitous placement within the table of contents of the Sentences. The 
prima pars follows the order in which this material was presented in the Sentences of 
Peter Lombard. Assuming that Aquinas conformed the ordering of these QQ to the 
outline of the Sentences, these QQ would have come immediately prior to some of 
Aquinas’ innovative material. If our thesis is correct, and QQ 65-74 of the prima pars 
are in fact an attempt to loosen up a somewhat ossified theological system so that 
Aquinas could introduce new ideas, these QQ on the six days of Creation are in the 
ideal place for that to happen, since some of those new ideas include the definition of 
the human being and the integration of theology into the human life. Within the 
Lombard’s ordering of the Sentences, those ideas follow immediately after the 
discussion of the hexaemeron.  
Within the two following sections, Humanity: QQ 75-102 and Governance: 103-119, 
Aquinas asserted an understanding of the human being which, had it been adopted, 
would have challenged the medieval world’s idea of what is a person. Some have 
argued that in this regard the ST represents an attempt to integrate both Aristotelian and 
Augustinian thought as well as the integration of more theoretical and practical/moral 
theologies which had become bifurcated within the Dominican and larger Medieval 
educational systems.49 Already in his commentary on the Sentences Aquinas had 
postulated that the human being stood in a unique position as both a fully spiritual and 
physical entity, bridging two worlds. In Aquinas’ own words, the human being is a 
“horizon creature.”50 In the estimation of most scholars, Aquinas’ project in this regard 
did not succeed. He had sought to integrate the theological and moral life more fully and 
more intentionally. Within a generation of his death, his treatments of moral theology 
49 Chenu, Toward Understanding Aquinas, 55-7. 
50 Commentary, III, pro., homo enim est quasi orizon [sic] et confinium spiritualis et corporalis naturae, ut 
quasi medium inter utrasque, bonitates participet et corporales et spirituales,…    
62 
 
                                                          
were being stripped out of the ST and read in isolation from the more theoretical 
theology and anthropology which undergirded them.51 
Contending with his theological peers does not exhaust the rationale for using 
Augustine this way. As noted in the first chapter of this thesis, the stated and primary 
goal of the prima pars was the reform of theological education within the studia of the 
Dominican Order. The foregoing also must be understood in that light. Aquinas had 
been charged earlier in his career, while in his first regency at Paris, with reforming the 
Dominican educational program. This educational system was located within the 
priories and various studia of the order and only culminated for only the brightest and 
best students in a university degree.52 The majority of the incipientes would not attain to 
the universities but would enter the rapidly changing and conflicted world of medieval 
urban preaching. Aquinas appeared to have this general student in mind when he wrote 
this text; although, as noted, it is possible he may have overestimated their abilities. He 
sought to inculcate within his audiences, both the lectores within the priories of the 
Dominican order and their students, a spirit of open-minded inquiry and intellectual 
rigor. For this too, Augustine’s humble questing for Truth and intellectual flexibility 
were important. The appeal that Augustine made within his treatment for an open-
minded reader53 would be an important attribute which Aquinas sought to instill within 
his intended thirteenth century audience, both the immediate students and the larger 
academic world whom he is also addressing.   
And thus it is fitting that Augustine should shoulder this burden within in the ST. 
Aquinas’ contemporaries who were using Augustine and other patristic theologians as 
proof-texts in order to shut off intellectual inquiry had fundamentally misread and 
misunderstood their primary resource. When it came to Creation, one of the most basic 
theological tenets of the medieval period, Augustine had not posited his Creation 
theology in order to end discussion, but to continue discussion. He had argued for an 
epistemic humility which allowed for ambiguity and even paradox within the confession 
of the Christian faith. In rhetorical terms, Aquinas turned his opponents’ own perceived 
51 Mark W. Jordan, Rewritten Theology: Aquinas After His Readers, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2006), 
7-9. 
52 Torrell, 96-98.  
53 Conf.  XII, 31, 42.  
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“trump card” against them. The Augustine whom they sought to cite as a final authority 
had argued against that very enterprise. What is more, he had done so in the treatment of 
what is the most foundational element of medieval theology: Creation.   
2. The Augustine Aquinas Knew  
The preceding discussion suggests the importance of understanding just how much of 
Augustine’s body of work Aquinas knew. In turning to this question, we first note 
considerable development over the career of Aquinas. Since the ST was written toward 
the end of his career, it is of particular interest to determine how much Aquinas knew at 
that point, but the facts that Aquinas himself seemed to undergo a transformation in his 
reading of Augustine and that in this he can be distinguished from his peers are also 
significant. Thomas Aquinas seemed to believe he had learned something which his 
community of fellow theologians and the larger ecclesial community needed, something 
which he had also been forced to discover. The magnitude of Aquinas’ discoveries in 
this regard is difficult to overstate. He was the first scholastic, for instance, to quote 
directly from the official documents which came out of the first ecumenical councils. 54  
As already noted, theologians in the thirteenth century were well acquainted with the 
writings of Augustine, but most often this acquaintance was with a redacted and excised 
Augustinian corpus. This filtered body of works by Augustine was the result of 
structural realities in the program of theological education at the time. The progress of a 
theologian through the ranks of Bachelor and Master of Theology involved ascending 
through a number of categories. Early in the process, the student conducted cursory 
lectures on the Scriptures and later lectures on the Sentences of Peter Lombard under the 
guidance of a Regent Master.55 Due in part to Lombard’s ecclesial authority and the 
value of his work, his collection of sentences56 had come to dominate theological 
education in the thirteenth century and into the fourteenth. By the 1240’s, the Sentences 
had become the required textbook for all students who had achieved the rank of 
54 Weisheipl, 164-168. 
55 Philipp W. Rosemann, The Story of a Great Book, (Ontario: Broadview Press, 2007), 60-62. 
56 Peter Lombard had been a master of theology at Paris and, shortly before his death, consecrated as 
the Bishop of Paris in the middle decades of the twelfth century. Phillipp W. Rosemann, Peter Lombard 
(New York: Oxford, 2004), 37-38. 
64 
 
                                                          
Bachelor of Theology.57 While later scholasticism, the Renaissance, and the 
Reformation would eventually unseat Lombard’s Sentences from this position; as late as 
the 16th century a young Martin Luther wrote glosses as he lectured on the Sentences of 
the Lombard.58 In the 13th century the culminating work of a student’s progress in 
formal theological education was the production of a commentary on the Sentences of 
Peter Lombard.59 When this commentary on the Sentences had been thoroughly 
examined, approved, and published, one was awarded the title “Master of Theology.” 
There are hundreds of extant commentaries by various medieval scholars on these 
Sentences from this period, up to and including that of Martin Luther in the early 16th 
century.60  
In this way Lombard’s came to serve as a gateway to Augustine and other patristic 
theologians for the medieval scholar. This was particularly true of Augustine. The 
Sentences contain nearly 1,100 quotations from Augustine, far more than any other 
theologian. The Lombard appears to have known much of the Augustinian corpus, 
including De doctrina Christiana, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, 
Enchiridion, De Genesi ad litteram, and Retractationes. There are, however, some 
significant omissions. Most notably for this discussion, he does not appear to know De 
Trinitate.61   
Lombard’s work formed a type of canon of medieval theology. As is often the case, 
however, when using a standard canon of literature, many students do not read much 
further than the prescribed elements of that canon and this appears to have been true 
57 Spatz, 31. 
58 Rosemann, Peter Lombard, 3. See also Spatz, 27-52, for another examination of this critical work 
through the eyes of its readers.  
59 At the point at which Aquinas wrote, this use of the Sentences was still a relatively new phenomenon. 
Alexander Hales (Master at Paris 1220-45) had been first to lecture on the Sentences. The controversy 
which erupted was resolved by requiring lectures on the Sentences but limiting them to the Bachelor’s, 
under the tutelage of a licensed Master. Rosemann, The Story of a Great Book, 60-62. 
60 Rosemann, Peter Lombard, 198. The authors of the Franciscan Archive website have collected and 
linked a number of medieval commentaries on the Sentences to the internet: http://www.franciscan-
archive.org/lombardus/. 
61 Rosemann, Peter Lombard, 56. 
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with the Lombard’s Sentences.62 When one turns to the early works of Aquinas and his 
peers, one finds regular quotation and reference to the works of Augustine, but often 
that reliance does not stray too far or deeply beyond the quotations found in Lombard’s 
Sentences. Consider the able colleague of Aquinas, Bonaventura who, in his 
commentary on the Sentences,63 has an entire Question devoted to refuting the 
Manicheans in which he has no citation of Augustine’s considerable output regarding 
the same Manicheans. Though Augustine’s works were readily available, and remained 
in publication throughout this period, much of the theological discourse of the time was 
limited to the quotations and immediate context of those quotations which Lombard 
included in his work.  
Before one levels a charge of intellectual laziness and academic ineptitude, it must also 
be said that Lombard’s work was four volumes and included a broad selection of 
materials excised from the writings of patristic theologians, medieval authors, and the 
glossa ordinaria. There is a great deal to read and discuss within Lombard’s work. 
Rosemann suggests that this was in fact the reason the Sentences proved so successful. 
It was a clear advance over other attempts to assimilate patristic theologians and 
systematize the theology of medieval Christianity. What is more, because the Lombard 
occupied a transitional point in the development of systematic theology, his work struck 
a particularly flexible balance between dogmatic statements and questions simply left 
unanswered. This combination afforded the medieval theologian a large and frequently 
unfinished field upon which he might work. The Sentences provided the medieval 
theologian with a rich, however circumscribed, environment in which an entire 
academic career might be conducted.64 
Aquinas was notable in the medieval period for his unwillingness to let the Lombard 
delimitate his reading. While he wrote his earliest works, including his commentary on 
the Sentences, with a rather limited set of sources, his use of Augustine and other 
patristic sources grew significantly throughout his career. By the time he wrote the ST, 
his use of patristic and other ancient sources would by one estimate “sextuple.” This 
62 Chenu, Toward Understanding Aquinas, 52.  
63 Bonaventura, Commentaria in quatuor libros sententiarum II, 2, 1 
64 Rosemann, Peter Lombard, 195-8. 
66 
 
                                                          
was not limited to Augustine. His contemporaries noted Aquinas voracious appetite for 
resources and that, unlike many of his day, Aquinas sought access to the works of Greek 
patristic theologians which had been largely ignored by his peers.65  
3. Excursus into Aquinas’ use of Augustine: Creative Agency  
To this point we have made several assertions regarding Aquinas’ use of Augustine 
which need to be substantiated. Within the material which is treated within QQ 65-74 of 
the ST, the question of creative agency presents an opportunity to illustrate two points 
about Aquinas’ treatment of Augustine. One can easily notice an increasing access to 
and use of patristic sources, including Augustine as his career progressed. Careful 
reading and comparison with earlier treatments in Commentary and De potentia, 
however, will also reveal subtle and important shifts in how he utilizes Augustinian 
material in the formulation of his arguments.  
As a subject for a comparison this topic serves well for at least two reasons. First, it is 
treated no less than four times by Aquinas over his career affording the reader an 
opportunity to observe the development of Aquinas’ use of sources. Second, it is an 
issue which was of considerable import even centrality to Aquinas’ theology for it 
touches upon the exitus and reditus themes which are found within many of Aquinas’ 
more ambitious works. Even within his earliest works such as his Commentary this 
exitus and reditus movement is discernible as he treats this material. For Aquinas, both 
the source of the Creation and the teleological goal of Creation demanded his most 
careful attention. In terms of Aquinas’ theology, creative agency was no peripheral 
topic, but central to what he believed and wrote. Thus, we conclude that this locus is a 
viable assay of Aquinas’ use of Augustine.  
This excursus demonstrates several of the assertions we have already made. Aquinas 
use of Augustine was growing deeper and broader as he marshalled a broader array of 
sources to support his arguments. But the reader will also notice that the trajectory of 
the treatment of Augustine undergoes a significant shift when one picks up ST I, 65-74. 
The argumentation is simpler as is the treatment of the sources. But of greater 
65 Torrell, 139. 
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significance, the role which Augustine played within the work of the text was 
substantively changed.  
Aquinas first treatment of the question of creative agency is found within the 
Commentary completed in 1252-56, prior to his first regency in Paris. The Lombard had 
broached the subject of whether Creation might happen via intermediary beings in II, 1, 
2 and 3. He began the discussion with a favorite mechanism of scholastic theologians: 
the definition of terms. In the first paragraph he noted that the words for create (creare) 
and make (facere) have an important distinction in that one, to create, is properly only 
attributable to God for it implies the creating of being, whereas the other, to make, is 
attributable to human beings as well, such as a craftsman might make a tool or object. 
He concluded with the observation that Scripture is not entirely consistent in this. In 
terms of sources he cited, the Lombard made neither an allusion to a source nor any 
quotation of a source.  
Looking at a slightly larger context within the Sentences, in Chapter 3, the Lombard had 
begun to deal with the rationale for his preceding statements and to deal with the 
sources on this matter. He most likely had a passage of Augustine in mind at the 
beginning of Chapter 3 in which he noted that the Scriptures frequently ascribe to God 
attributes which are better said of creatures; although, this is not clear.66 Later in the 
same chapter the Lombard attributed a quote to Aristotle, but it was in fact known by 
Aquinas’ time to be from the first paragraph of Ambrose’s commentary on the 
hexaemeron.67 He refuted (evacuo) this error of “Aristotle” and those who agree 
through a longer quote from Hugh of St. Victor, a 12th century theologian. 68  His 
primary argument revolved around what was properly said only of God alone as 
unmoved and unchanging but which the vagaries of human language occasionally 
misattributed to creatures. Aristotle was labeled as a pagan source of error among some 
theologians for he had introduced the notion that there could be more than one source of 
being, an idea which the Lombard rejected.  
66 The editors of the Franciscan online archive suggest: Gen. ad litt.,  I, 18, 36. http://www.franciscan-
archive.org/lombardus/opera/ls2-01.html  (Accessed 18 May, 2012). 
67 Ambrose, Hexaemeron I, 1, 1.  Ed.: C. Schenkl, 1896, CSEL Vol. 32/1. 
68 Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacramentis I, 2, 1.   
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Aquinas in treating this this question in Commentary II, 1, 3 agreed with the Lombard 
but expanded the sources and significantly deepened the argument. In support of 
multiple sources of being Plato is cited as is Liber de causis69 in the first Objection. In 
the fourth Objection Aquinas quoted one of his favorite authors, Dionysius. In the first 
sed contra statement Aquinas cited John of Damascus70 for his condemnation of the 
idea of another source of being. He also noted that the Lombard was not entirely 
consistent in this. In Book IV, Distinction 5 the Lombard had himself spoken of the 
human role as an agent in the creative act of Baptism.  
Aquinas had composed his Commentary while lecturing on the Sentences as a Bachelor, 
1252-56. Ten years later, in 1265-66 he conducted the academic disputations which 
would be published as De potentia.71 Under Question III, 4, Aquinas took up the same 
question of whether the creative power or act was communicable to a creature. The 
conclusions Aquinas reached were not substantively different from those which he 
articulated in his Commentary. The depth of the argument there, however, was 
substantially more complex, as was the treatment of the patristic sources.  
The reader of De potentia notices the dependence of this document upon Aquinas’ 
Commentary. One sees nearly all of the same references as in the Commentary and 
indeed there are elements of the argument in De potentia III, 4 which were nearly 
verbatim quotes from Commentary II, 1, 3. He reproduced and expanded his resolution 
of the Lombard’s discussion of the human being as a creative agent in Baptism. 
Dionysius was again referenced, as is the Liber de causis, and Aquinas used the same 
quote from the Damascene’s De fide orthodoxa which anathematized anyone who held 
to a creative agent other than God. Only the passing reference to Plato in Commentary 
II, 1, 3ob1 was omitted from De potentia’s treatment.  
69 Aquinas, along with his contemporaries, first received this text as a work of Aristotle. Later in his 
career, he procured a much more accurate translation from Greek into Latin and concluded accurately 
that this was a Neo-Platonist work, not by Aristotle.  
70 John of Damascus had only recently been translated into Latin and was known to the Lombard, but it 
appears his access to the text was limited and hence his inclusion of De fide orthodoxa was limited to 
books I and III of the Sentences. In the intervening decades since the publication of the Sentences John’s 
work had been much more widely diffused through theological circles. Rosemann, Peter Lombard, 38. 
71 Weisheipl, 358 and 363 
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While the reader notes similarities and echoes of the Commentary, the reader also 
notices the expansion of both the argument and the resources, particularly those from 
Augustine whose statement from De Trinitate III, 1, 7-8 delivered the conclusive 
rejection of the idea that God might have deputed to angels his creative work. In another 
expansion Aristotle’s Metaphysics was woven into the Objections on three separate 
occasions with citations from books IV and VII. It is the appearance and the breadth of 
Augustine’s works which are most notable. In De potentia Augustine first appeared in 
the fourth Objection with a citation from Gen. ad litt. II, 8, 16-19. In the sixth Objection 
Gen. ad litt. IV, 22, 39 was cited. Both these citations from the objection picked up on 
Augustine’s treatment of the Creation within the angelic minds. In the eighth Objection, 
Augustine was again quoted from In Evangelium Ioannis tractatus, LXXII, 3, 
seemingly in support of the Lombard’s position that the human being might participate 
in Creation through a sacramental act. Again in Objection 12 Augustine is cited, this 
time from De immortalitate animae 16, 25, once more in an apparent argument that the 
spiritual creature creates the corporeal being.  
The sed contra consisted of five statements, the first and last being arguments from 
reason, the second being a citation of Dionysius which addressed the first Objection’s 
quotation from the same work. The third and fourth sed contra statements were both 
appeals to statements made by Augustine. The first from De Trin. III, 8 and 9, and the 
second from Gen. ad litt. VI, 12, 22. This same quote from De Trin. surfaces again in 
the corpus of the Article as the conclusive point that angels cannot create.  
Within the corpus of the Article, the belief that God created through intermediaries is 
denied in the strongest possible terms,72 anathematizing those who hold the idea and 
72 De potentia, III, 4c, Et ideo secundum fidem Catholicam ponimus, quod omnes substantias spirituales 
et materiam corporalium Deus immediate creavit, haereticum reputantes si dicatur per Angelum vel 
aliquam creaturam aliquid esse creatum; unde Damascenus dicit: quicumque dixerit Angelum aliquid 
creare, anathema sit.  
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labeling it a heresy. Aquinas wants no doubt to linger about his position in this regard.73 
However, the corpus proceeds for several more paragraphs of material, particularly 
focused on extracting the Lombard from that charge of heresy and explaining what he 
meant by the priest participating in the creative action through the sacrament of 
Baptism. But the Lombard’s internal contradiction is a truly minor issue, seemingly 
concocted by Aquinas himself.74 Here one notices a practice which is common in 
Aquinas’ works: the minor or contrived dispute used as an occasion to ask the questions 
which lead to deeper theological truths. Aquinas invited the reader to look into the 
question “carefully”75 and this yielded a complex five-fold excursus into the creative 
action of God.   
In comparing Commentary II, 1, 3 and De potentia III, 4 one can see that Aquinas’ use 
of patristic sources has grown far more robust. He is quoting from a much broader field 
of works. One also notices that the argumentation has grown more sophisticated and 
precise. None of this is surprising. He was maturing as a scholar and theologian.  
Within months of conducting and composing De potentia, Aquinas wrote QQ 65-74 of 
the ST.76 But this is not the only locus for this discussion with the ST. He also treated 
this very same question in I, 45, 5: Whether it belongs to God alone to create.77 This 
issue is then revisited in ST 1, 65, 3: Whether they (corporeal creatures) are made 
through the mediation of angels.78  
73 That there was no doubt may have in fact been a matter of some import for Aquinas. The recent 
interest in the Arab commentators on Aristotle had introduced the idea of creative agency among other 
ideas. On three separate occasions, both during (1240) and after Aquinas’ time in Paris (1270 and 1277), 
the Bishops of Paris issued lists of condemned errors which were taught by the faculty of the University. 
The lists included the charge of teaching that there were multiple creators or deputed creative agency. 
See Weisheipl, 331-340 and scholium note at http://www.franciscan-
archive.org/bonaventura/opera/bon02028.html  (Accessed 18 May, 2012).  
74 When Bonaventura treats the same question, he makes no mention of the apparent contradiction 
within the text of the Lombard’s sentences. Bonaventura, Commentaria in quatuor libros sententiarum 
II, 2, 2.  
75 De potentia, III, 4c, Sed diligenter consideranti apparet hoc esse impossibile. 
76 Weisheipl, 361. 
77 ST I, 45 pro., utrum solius Dei sit creare. 
78 ST I, 65 pro., utrum sit facta a Deo mediantibus Angelis.  
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A comparison of the argument and sources in I, 45, 5 with the preceding works again 
bears interesting fruit. The deep and expansive argumentation and source manipulation 
of De potentia has been greatly reduced, but bears the unmistakable imprint of that 
work when compared to the Commentary. Aristotle again appeared in the Objections, 
but no longer his Metaphysics; in Objection 1 Aquinas cited De anima. The 
aforementioned citation of Augustine from De Trinitate III, 8, comprised the entire sed 
contra. The corpus cites Liber de causis again, but not the same passages which 
featured so prominently in the De potentia. Here the material appeared in the corpus 
and is intended to simplify and bring the question to resolution.  
Having answered the primary point in dispute, however, Aquinas again raised the 
aforementioned “problem” of the Lombard’s statement that in the sacramental act the 
human being is also creative. This time the idea is placed into a parallel construction79 
to that of Avicenna, the Persian commentator whose works were widely read in 13th 
century scholarly circles. Again, the refutation of the confusion about the Lombard’s 
argument provided an occasion to explore the creative act, but this time in much greater 
simplicity, involving a charming illustration of a saw being used to make a bench by a 
workman.  
As already noted, Aquinas returned to the same issue twenty QQ later within the section 
of the ST under consideration by this thesis. In Q 65, 3 Aquinas asked whether angels 
might not be intermediary creative agents of God. His answer again was clearly in the 
negative. Here Aquinas once more cited Augustine’s De Trin. but not the same passage 
that served in that role in the sed contra in I, 45, 5. This time Augustine is paired with 
Psalm 103:24 and Aristotle’s Metaphysics in the first Objection, apparently supporting 
the notion of an angelic creative agency. The argument is that such an arrangement 
would befit the wisdom of God. This is a critical distinction. In both De potentia and in 
ST I, 45, 5, Augustine was a primary authority to whom Aquinas appealed for support 
in reaching the theologically proper conclusion. In 65, 3 Augustine was quoted to create 
the tension of the Article, but ultimately refuted. He did not appear as the resolution of 
the issue, even though his statement in De Trin. had already been cited for exactly this 
purpose in I, 45, 3.  
79 ST I, 65, 5c., Et secundum hunc etiam modum Magister dicit.   
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The second and third Objections of 65, 3 were more substantial, quoting from Aristotle 
and arguing that the diversity which confronts the observer demands a multiplicity of 
creative agents. The sed contra was simply the text of Genesis 1:1 and the argument 
which was made opposed the rationale put forward by the Objections. It was one of the 
rare moments in QQ 65-74 in which Aquinas actually came to such a decisive 
conclusion.  
This examination of Aquinas’ treatment of sources reveals at least two conclusions. The 
first is in support of Torrell’s claims that Aquinas experienced an explosion of resources 
in the ten years which came between his commentating on the Sentences and the 
composition of De potentia.80 The citations are far more significant, from a much 
broader body of authors and documents, including works which are not thought to have 
been known to the Lombard. What is more, the reader notices that Aquinas had 
integrated these additional sources, in this case the citation from De Trin. into the core 
of his argument, allowing Augustine’s words to definitively answer the Objections’ 
challenge to divine monergism in Creation.  
But when we turn to the ST, the reader then notices another, contrary motion in regard 
to the sources. Rather than the expansion of resources, Aquinas muted and subtly 
changed his treatment of resources. In ST I, 45, 5 Aquinas still made his point forcefully 
and conclusively, but with far more economy. The number of sources was greatly 
reduced and the length of the argument was also reduced, although its primary elements 
were retained. Augustine’s strong words from De Trin. III, 8 are retained and carry the 
same force they had in De potentia. This simplification would suggest that the 
pedagogical character of these questions is driving the use of sources. Incipientes need 
to enter this patristic world in small steps.  
In the topic’s repetition, however, in I, 65, 3, the sources undergo still more mutation. 
Augustine and Aristotle are still present, but only within the Objections, both of them 
seemingly in support of the notion of angelic creative agency, an idea which has already 
been refuted in I, 45, 5 and which was about to be refuted in the corpus of this Article. 
This article’s refutation of the Objections appealed to no authority other than the first 
verse of Genesis 1 from the sed contra.  
80 Torrell, 139. 
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It is the contention of this thesis that this transition in the treatment of Augustine is 
significant. In the commentary portion of this thesis,81 Article three of Question 65 in 
the prima pars will be demonstrated to be in a conversation with the Articles which 
surround it. Not only was creative agency theologically important to Aquinas, but he 
was carefully positioning Augustine within the hierarchy of sources, reining in the 
authority of Augustine who had been used in the prior articles to establish important 
theological points. Having already dealt with the question earlier in the ST at I, 45, 5, in 
which he had used Augustine to compel the reader to the right conclusion, Aquinas 
cited Augustine in 65, 3 to be in support of the erroneous position which the Article 
refutes and contrary to his earlier usage of Augustine’s material.  
If both ST I, 45, 5 and I, 65, 3 are to be understood in pursuit of the proper answer 
alone, this is a strangely inconsistent use of Augustine. Far more likely, it seems, 
Aquinas was leading his reader to the proper answer in I, 45, 5 for it bears the closer 
resemblance to the treatment of this same question within both Commentary II, 1, 2-3 
and De potentia IV, 3. Both of these earlier treatments had clearly been on a quest for 
such truth. ST I, 65, 3, however, suggests that Aquinas had another goal in mind, a goal 
which had something to do with the nature of Augustine’s authority. Aquinas arrived at 
the same conclusion, but Augustine’s role in arriving at that conclusion has been 
completely reversed. In the other treatments, he was the source of the proper answer. In 
this treatment, Augustine provided the problematic concept which must be refuted.  
Aquinas can be seen as having gone through a process of maturation in regard to all his 
sources, but particularly Augustine. From the time of his Commentary until De potentia 
and the ST he has significantly increased his knowledge of Augustine and other patristic 
theologians. Weisheipl and Torrell both attribute this to the completion of another work 
of Aquinas at the time, the Catena aurea or “Golden Chain.”82 This was a chain of 
glosses on the four Gospels begun in 1262 and completed in 1267, while Aquinas was 
in Oviedo and Rome.83 It was notable at the time for its variety of sources and 
especially for using Greek sources which Aquinas received from an unknown source. 
81 Pp. 146-148. 
82 Weisheipl, 171 and Torrell, 139, 
83 Weisheipl, 371. 
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In his treatment of Augustine in the ST, however, one sees that while he had a great deal 
of Augustine at his disposal, Aquinas’ use of Augustine was exceedingly careful, even 
manipulative. Augustine might be quoted to decide an argument. Or, in the event that 
the same argument is treated elsewhere, another portion of Augustine’s writings might 
be cited in order to create the tension upon which the argument was constructed. In this 
way, we see that within the ST Aquinas’ use of Augustine had transitioned from being 
only an authoritative source of theology for Aquinas into being a tool which he put to 
pedagogical and disputative ends.  
4. Augustine as a tool in Aquinas’ work 
Thus far the reader has noticed that Aquinas had both broadened his reading of 
Augustine and matured in that reading and as a theologian. Augustine was not only an 
authoritative source but was also a pedagogical tool in his effort to open up his readers’ 
theological world to new ideas. Of course, this is not to suggest that this was unique or 
original to Aquinas. Placing patristic sources into a dialectic tension was a hallmark of 
the medieval theological method.84 But Augustine’s words on the six days of Creation 
proved to be an especially effective lever for Aquinas’ purposes.  
As already noted, Augustine’s treatment of the Creation was useful to Aquinas simply 
for its volume. Here he had ample material with which to work, indeed so much that 
many of his peers seem to have settled for synopses of Augustine rather than mastering 
this entire corpus. Three of Augustine’s exegetical works written over his entire career 
focused principally upon the interpretation of the first chapters of Genesis. Even before 
his elevation to the bishopric in Hippo, indeed before his ordination into the priesthood, 
as early as 388,85 he wrote a work entitled De Genesi contra Manichaeos (On Genesis 
against the Manicheans). This work, his first known exegetical text, sought to address 
criticisms leveled against the Christian faith by Manicheans, specifically those which 
arose from the Creation account. On several occasions within the arguments in defense 
of the Scriptural account of Creation, Augustine made use of a spiritual or allegorizing 
84 Colish, 11-12. 
85 Edmund Hill, On Genesis, vol 13 in “The Works of Saint Augustine,” Ed.: John E. Rotelle, O. S. A., (New 
York: New City Press, 2002), 13  
75 
 
                                                          
interpretation, setting aside the literal understanding when it proved too difficult.86 He 
had learned this practice from his mentor, Ambrose, who himself was a reader and 
admirer of Origen.87 
Augustine was by his own admission not satisfied with this work. He also had 
apparently met with some criticism of his methods, and thus between 393 and 395,88 he 
attempted a second commentary which would be strictly literal. He found, however, that 
he was unable to complete this work because, in his own estimation, he was simply not 
up to the task, leaving off after verse 25 of the first chapter of Genesis.89  Only at the 
end of his career, after publishing another and complete attempt at a literal commentary, 
did he return to this incomplete and unpublished work and publish it in its incomplete 
form; although, he did append a brief section to the end. To distinguish it from the later 
work, Augustine named it De Genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus (Unfinished Literal 
Commentary on Genesis,).  
Less than a decade after leaving his earlier commentary unfinished, perhaps as early as 
401, Augustine began his second attempt at a literal commentary of Genesis entitled De 
Genesi ad litteram (Literal Commentary on Genesis). He did not, however, publish it 
until 416. His letters suggested that his colleagues were urging him to publish but he 
claims the delay was due to the fact he was taking great care in this work.90 He also was 
most likely distracted by the Donatist controversy, the fall of the city of Rome in 410, 
and ill health. 91 This work in 12 books represented what Augustine considered his best, 
86 Revisions I, 18. 
87 Gerard Watson, “Origen and the Literal Interpretation of Scripture”  in Scriptural Interpretation in the 
Fathers:  Letter and Spirit  edited by Thomas Finan and Vincent Twomey, (Dublin/Portland, OR: Four 
Courts Press, 1995), 84. See also Confessions V, 11, 21 and again in V, 14, 24 for Augustine’s own 
account of how Elpidius’ and Ambrose’s figurative interpretations of difficult passages from the Hebrew 
Scriptures played into his conversion to the Christian faith from Manichaeism.  
88 Hill, 105. 
89 Revisions I, 18. 
90 Letter 159, 2  CSEL, 44, 499f.  
91 Hill, p. 164. 
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but not perfect, interpretation of Genesis. That estimation on his part is tempered by the 
fact that he did not disavow the earlier attempts.92 
Two other treatments of the Genesis 1 text by Augustine also merit inclusion here. At 
the height of his creative career, as the city of Rome had fallen and the entire western 
world seemed to be shaken, Augustine undertook a great work which eventually 
contributed substantively to the re-casting of the philosophical underpinnings of western 
culture: De Civitate Dei contra Paganos libri viginti duo (The City of God), written 
between 412 and 426. Through its many subsequent readers and interpreters, Augustine 
created a framework which served as an intellectual foundation to much of the medieval 
period. While this is not primarily a work of exegetical commentary, in books 11 and 14 
he dedicated considerable attention to the Creation account of Genesis 1-3, returning to 
the ideas he had posited in his commentaries. The city of God, in Augustine’s 
estimation, is built on the creative event. The other treatment of Creation which must be 
noted comes within the Confessions, a work even more striking for its personal nature 
and which precedes The City of God. Written shortly after the year 400, Augustine 
devoted almost the entirety of book 12 of Confessions to his peculiar understanding of 
the creative event. Within this work Augustine was creatively exploring self-awareness 
in ways which continue to shape western thought. By expending so much effort on this 
subject one might conclude that Augustine’s own self-awareness was derived from his 
understanding of Creation.  
It is apparent that when Augustine came to the most significant questions of his life, he 
repeatedly and extensively returned to this theology of Creation. Because Augustine had 
treated Creation in several genres and for multiple purposes, Aquinas found within his 
words a useful, flexible tool for multiple purposes in the thirteenth century as well. Of 
significant value was the fact that Augustine himself was positing an interpretation over 
against a more widely accepted understanding of Genesis 1. This meant that much of 
Augustine’s treatment involved an appeal for an epistemic humility which allowed for 
someone to consider his ideas.  
92 In his comments on the Unfinished Literal Commentary in the Revisions noted above, Augustine does 
not endeavor a large scale revision of the text of the unfinished work, but simply urges the reader to 
consider it in light of the later and completed work. See Karla Pollmann, “Augustine, Genesis, and 
Controversy” in Augustinian Studies. 38:1 (2007). 211.  
77 
 
                                                          
When one turns to the actual content of Augustine which Aquinas found so useful, the 
reader must account for an issue which has arisen for the modern reader, but which did 
not obtain for Aquinas and his readers. This difficulty derives from the definition of 
“literal.” This question has been extensively discussed and dissected over the past 
generations with little or no effect on how most moderns read the words of Augustine.93 
The modern reader tends to hear the word ‘literal’ and assumes this word connotes a 
singular meaning of the text which is stripped of all literary devices such as metaphor or 
allegory.94 In a current context, this sort of a literal reading of Genesis 1 means a six 
calendar day Creation event. A literal reading of “day” must mean a 24 hour period of 
time. While the ancients recognized this interpretation of Genesis 1 as a valid literal 
reading,95 they did not so understand literal as preclude any other literal reading of the 
text. For the ancient and medieval theologian, a literal reading of the text was a reading 
which took very seriously the words which were on the page as significant in their own 
right. The order of those words, the absence of a word, even the spelling or misspelling 
of a word might be significant. Origen, the Alexandrian commentator of the third 
century, who remains well known for his occasionally excessive allegorical reading of 
the text, rooted all those allegories and spiritual interpretations in a careful reading of 
93 This may be attributed to the lamentable fact that many who have studied theology and patristic 
theology specifically cannot agree on the meaning of this word. Often and erroneously the modern 
definition is substituted with the simplistic assertion that the ancient meaning for literal is encompassed 
in “authorial intent.” See: Alister McGrath “Augustine’s Origin of Species:  How the great theologian 
might weigh in on the great Darwin debate.”  
www.http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2009/may/22.39.html (05/13/2009), or Steven Baldor and 
William Carroll, Aquinas on Creation (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1997) 3, n. 4. For 
a much better definition of literal, consider K. E. Greene-McCreight, Ad Litteram: How Augustine, Calvin, 
and Barth Read the “Plain Sense” of Genesis 1-3. (New York, Washington, D.C./Baltimore, Boston, et al: 
Lang, 1999), 17 and 32; see also Pollmann, 209-210. 
94 For an example, see “literal" in The Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms. Chris Baldick. Oxford 
University Press, 2008. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. (Accessed 25 May, 2010.) See 
also Louis LaVallee, “Augustine on the Creation Days” in Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 
32:4, Dec. 1987, 457. In the opening paragraphs of this article he provides an exemplar of a theologian 
imposing this modern definition of “literal” upon the works of Augustine. 
95 See Basil In Hexaemeron homily 8, SC 26: 428-430. 
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the Scriptural text which he understood to have been dictated by God to the biblical 
authors.96 Augustine repeatedly treats his literal meaning of Genesis in this way.  
An example of Augustine’s understanding of a literal reading can be found within his 
treatment of Genesis 1. In all three of his commentaries, Augustine began by wrestling 
through this question of what a literal reading might be.97 In the Gen. ad litt. Imperf. he 
supplied a readily accessible clue to what he had in mind. After a very brief discussion 
of the history of interpretation in which he noted four approaches to the text, he delves 
immediately into the meaning of the word “beginning.”  
As regards the historical (literal) sense, we ask what in the beginning 
means; that is, whether it is in the beginning of time, or in the beginning, 
in the very Wisdom of God, because the Son of God actually called 
himself the beginning when he was asked who are you, then? And he 
said, The beginning, as which I am also speaking to you (John 8:25). 
There is, you see, a beginning without beginning, and there is a 
beginning with another beginning.98  
Augustine did not pose these two readings of “beginning” as a choice between a literal 
and a figurative or metaphorical meaning.99 Instead, Augustine posited two literal 
meanings to this word “beginning.” In Augustine’s mind, the interpreter of Scripture 
who seeks the literal meaning of the text has options. The reader of this thesis is urged 
to contrast Augustine’s view with the contemporary, post-enlightenment reading which 
sees the literal reading as a reading which is confined to a singular meaning, a reading 
96 Gerard Watson, “Origen and the Literal Interpretation of Scripture” in Scriptural Interpretation in the 
Fathers:  Letter and Spirit. Eds.: Thomas Finan and Vincent Twomey, (Dublin/Portland, OR: Four Courts 
Press, 1995), 80-82. 
97 Gen. contra Man., II, 2, 3; Gen. ad litt. Imperf., I, 3, 6-10; and Gen. ad litt., I, 1,1-5,11. For a 
contemporary reflection on the meaning of “beginning” along the lines of Augustine see Reno, 38.  
98 Gen. ad litt. imperf., 3, 6, Secundum historiam autem quaeritur quid sit: In principio, id est, utrum in 
principio temporis, an in principio in ipsa Sapientia Dei, quia et ipse Dei Filius principium se dixit, quando 
ei dictum est: Tu quis es; et dixit: Principium quod et loquor vobis. Est enim Principium sine principio, et 
est Principium cum alio principio. 
99 Augustine seems to have considered that being limited to a singular literal meaning was irrational; 
although, the fact that he treats it in De Divers. Quaest., q. 65 suggests that even in his own day some 
held this idea. cf discussion in Lubac, vol ii, 7ff.  
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which takes all other meanings and would consign them to the category of “figurative.” 
While a 21st century reader might surely consider Augustine’s reading of “the 
beginning” as referring to Christ to be a figurative reading, Augustine considered it as a 
validly literal reading. Augustine argued that there are multiple literal readings of the 
text. He may have even understood that there were infinite readings of a text.100 This 
did not mean Augustine held that any reading was possible. Every interpretation was 
subject to his well-known hermeneutical principle of the twin loves of God and fellow 
human beings.101 The establishment of that boundary however, did not result in a 
singular meaning, but presented the reader with a field of interpretational 
opportunity.102 
Aquinas himself had treated Augustine’s interpretation of this verse within his 
Commentary and subjected Augustine’s interpretation to some further clarification.103 
Although he had not fully concurred with Augustine on other issues, he did not question 
the plurality of a literal sense. As we noted in the Introduction, Mark Johnson argues 
persuasively in his article that Aquinas also held for a plurality of the literal sense.104 
Aquinas, his academic peers,105 and his immediate readers did not subscribe to 
modernity’s definition of literal, both within the interpretation of Scripture and other 
100 Gen. ad litt.  I, 21, 41. See also Thomas Finan, “St. Augustine on the ‘mira profunditas’ of Scripture: 
Texts and Contexts” in Scriptural Interpretation in the Fathers:  Letter and Spirit, Eds.: Thomas Finan and 
Vincent Twomey, (Dublin/Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 1995), 170-171.    
101 De Doctr. Chr. I, 36, 40. Quisquis igitur Scripturas divinas vel quamlibet earum partem intellexisse sibi 
videtur, ita ut eo intellectu non aedificet istam geminam caritatem Dei et proximi, nondum intellexit. 
Quisquis vero talem inde sententiam duxerit, ut huic aedificandae caritati sit utilis, nec tamen hoc dixerit 
quod ille quem legit eo loco sensisse probabitur, non perniciose fallitur nec omnino mentitur. 
102 E.g., Gen. ad litt. I, 21, 41. See also Greene-McCreight, 50-52.  
103 Commentary II, 1, 1, 6ob1, Videtur quod inconvenienter exponatur: in principio creavit Deus caelum et 
terram, idest in filio. Pater enim est principium totius divinitatis, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo per principium 
appropriate debet intelligi pater. And Commentary II, 1, 1, 6ad1, Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio 
principii effectivi appropriatur patri, sed ratio principii exemplaris per modum artis appropriatur filio, qui 
est sapientia et ars patris. 
104 Johnson, 117-141.  
105 John Boyle, “The Theological Character of ‘Division of the Text’” in Medieval Christian Exegesis of the 
Bible, Eds.: Jane D. McAuliffe, Barry D. Walfish, and Joseph W. Goering, (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 
2003), 279.  
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ancient texts.106 The medieval theologian did, however, along with every generation of 
humanity, struggle with the limits of theological discourse and an appropriate epistemic 
humility when addressing metaphysical and theological topics. The impulse to overstate 
the conclusions and provide simple answers to complex questions did not begin with 
modern undergraduate essay writers.107 In this sense, the modern and the medieval 
theologian may be said to contend with similar forces. From our reading of Aquinas’ 
QQ 65-74, Aquinas identified Augustine as a resource for the inculcation of an 
epistemic humility within his readership. Augustine had pleaded for his audience to 
consider the possibility of his interpretation. Aquinas imbibed the spirit of Augustine’s 
argument and sought to explicate the two competing and seemingly mutually exclusive 
strands of interpretation of Genesis 1, but in the end adopted Augustine’s theological 
method against Augustine’s proposed theological content by refusing to admit that one 
interpretive strand was to be seen as correct at the expense of the other. By so doing he 
was establishing through the manipulation of resources and the exploration of Scriptural 
texts the limits of theological knowledge.  
Augustine’s argument in this regard was useful to Aquinas because it was persistent and 
consistent. While Augustine was aware of the interpretation of others which held a six 
calendar day Creation event,108 Augustine insisted that he offered an equally valid 
literal interpretation of Genesis 1 which was different.109 Augustine read the same 
words and concluded that they could literally be referring to an instantaneous event 
which was explained using “day” as a logical and not a temporal marker.110  
This counter-intuitive reading of Genesis 1 by Augustine, which the Lombard and his 
commentators, save Albert, had rejected, Aquinas explored in great detail and used 
106 Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams, Anselm, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 35:  
“Surprisingly large stretches of medieval philosophy take off from throw-away remarks by Aristotle,…”   
107 See the earlier citation of Colish on Honorius Augustodunensis’ Elucidarium. Colish, 4 
108 Basil, Chrysostom, et al. 
109 Conf., XII, 17, 25 – 18, 27; Gen. ad litt.   I, 18,37-21, 41; IV, 28, 45;  et al.  See Thomas Finan  “St. 
Augustine on the ‘mira profunditas’ of Scripture: Texts and Contexts” in Scriptural Interpretation in the 
Fathers:  Letter and Spirit  edited by Thomas Finan and Vincent Twomey, (Dublin/Portland, OR: Four 
Courts Press, 1995) 170-171.  Cf. Pollmann, 209-211. 
110 Beginning with Gen. ad litt. IV, 21, 38 and continuing to the conclusion of Book IV, 35, 56 Augustine 
makes his most thorough examination of this idea. He also visits it in Conf., XII, 13, 16ff.  
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within these QQ of the prima pars both to establish an epistemic boundary for 
theological discourse and at the same time create an open space for theologically 
creative activity. In forcing open intellectual space through the admission that two 
literal but divergent readings of a text had to be entertained as possible, Aquinas forced 
his readers to evaluate with some skepticism ideas which they had received and 
considered to be certain. Within the newly opened fissures in theological certainty, 
Aquinas sought to explore new ideas about humanity, the Incarnation, and the ultimate 
end/goal of salvation itself.  
As noted earlier in this thesis, these QQ of Aquinas served more than one purpose. 
While forcing a re-evaluation of a core doctrine of Medieval Christianity, Aquinas also 
schooled incipientes in the proper use and reading of patristic sources. This aspect of 
these QQ must be treated in greater detail in subsequent chapters and within the 
commentary itself where the structures and pedagogical arc of the QQ can be more fully 
examined and explained. But while this explication must wait for that portion of the 
thesis, it can also be seen why Augustine would prove a natural case study for a Regent 
Master seeking to school his students in the proper use of patristic sources. Augustine’s 
considerable authority and the frequency with which he was quoted created the perfect 
environment for this project as well. 
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Chapter 3: Aquinas’ Treatment of Authoritative Sources within ST I, 65-74 
As noted within the Introduction to this thesis, scholars of philosophy and theology 
frequently ignore these QQ within the ST. The philosopher finds that Aquinas’ 
treatment of the material hardly advances the discussion of ontology or the proof of 
God, two subjects which might be expected in a treatment of origins. Etienne Gilson’s 
estimation of these QQ from a philosopher’s point of view continues to be valid.1 The 
scholar interested in the history of science might come looking for an exploration of 
Aquinas’ hylomorphic physics, but while it is presumed, such physics does not serve as 
the focus of these questions. The theologian also finds reasons to look elsewhere in the 
ST for riches. The topic of Creation is treated, but not substantively advanced over the 
earlier treatment of QQ 45-49. In form, these QQ are an exegesis of Genesis 1, but even 
read this way they are an exegesis which proves unsatisfactory. Aquinas sifted the 
interpretations of patristic theologians but came to no conclusions.  What is more, as is 
frequently the case when one reads medieval theologians, the scientific assumptions are 
embarrassing in light of current understanding.2 After all, how much time does one 
really need to spend on the discussion of the waters above the firmament when 
astronauts have regularly returned from the arid reaches of space and report not some 
vast ocean of water but emptiness and cosmic dust?  
This chapter expands upon the assertion articulated in the Introduction to this thesis. 
There we suggested that the frustration of the theologians and the philosophers in 
reading these QQ, while well founded, is due to the fact that they come to these pages 
looking for something other than what Aquinas intended them to find. This 
misapprehension of Aquinas’ purpose is most clearly demonstrated in the examination 
of Aquinas’ treatment of authoritative sources. That examination of Aquinas’ sources 
occupies this chapter. In the first section of this chapter the reader is given to notice that 
the use of Scriptural sources in 25 of the 29 Articles is markedly different than Aquinas’ 
treatment throughout the rest of the QQ. In the four Articles which do conform to 
Aquinas’ usual practice, the examination of subject matter and structure suggest these 
Articles are better read as belonging to the larger goals which Aquinas intended for the 
entire work, particularly the exitus and reditus motif. When one excludes these four 
1 Gilson, Thomism, 205-206. 
2 Wallace, Intr. xxii. 
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Articles and exclusively considers Aquinas’ use of patristic resources in isolation from 
his use of Scriptural sources, another pattern emerges. Augustine and Basil are held up 
as exemplars of divergent interpretational strands, but neither is prioritized nor favored. 
Aquinas expressed3 a desire to retain a parity and appears to have manipulated sources 
to create that parity for the reader. The interpretation of both strands is articulated and 
integrated into both a reading of the Scriptural text of Genesis 1 and into medieval 
natural philosophy without resolution of apparent contradiction or competing 
conclusions.  
In examining the philosophical sources, these also reveal an unusual pattern of use and 
function within these QQ. The philosophers, primarily Aristotle, function in purely 
supportive roles throughout these questions, most often providing the backdrop against 
which the theologians can be more clearly or cogently perceived. The observation and 
analysis of these patterns will yield the conclusion that QQ 65-74 of the prima pars 
address the interpretation of these theologians and the reader’s response to these 
interpretations more than these QQ address the actual “truth” of Genesis 1. Aquinas’ 
treatment of these interpretational strands suggests to his reader that this truth can only 
be discerned in broad strokes and not fine details. Aquinas argued that this lack of 
resolution created an ambiguity which must accommodate the potential that either of 
these two strands of interpretation could be correct and opens the possibility which 
Aquinas will posit in the final Article that neither of them is correct.  
1. The First Source: Scripture 
In any exegetical exercise such as QQ 65-74, the first source with which an interpreter 
must wrestle is the text of Scripture itself.4 Medieval regent masters of theology were 
well versed in the texts of both New and Old Testaments.5 Every medieval Master of 
Theology began his academic career delivering cursory lectures over Scripture as a 
3 I, 74, 2c, Ut igitur neutri sententiae praeiudicetur, utriusque rationibus respondendum est. 
4 See ST I, 1, 8, for Aquinas’ own formulation of the role of Scripture as a source among theologians and 
philosophers. Scripture is posited there as an absolute source, which can answer the questions of those 
who raise difficulties and questions, but which concedes nothing to those who raise objections.  
5 Lubac, 66-72. 
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Bachelor6 and fulfilled his vocation by offering more substantive Scriptural lectures as a 
Master7. This mastery of sacred page was an even more significant reality for one of the 
mendicant Masters of Theology than for a secular. As a Dominican friar and appointed 
as a lecturer within both priories and studia of the order, Aquinas’s life was steeped in 
Scripture. Being a devout member of the Ordo Praedicatorum, it is likely that he could 
have recited the Psalter from memory as it was sung in its entirety within the priories 
every week. Because it was mandated by the rule of the Dominican Order, even when 
he was not lecturing, Aquinas would have attended lectures on Scripture daily during 
his 30 years within the order.8 It simply can be assumed that Aquinas had a deep 
familiarity with the text of Scripture.  
The reader of QQ 65-74 who is considering Aquinas’ use of sources notices both his 
utilization of Scripture and the lack of Scripture citation. If one excludes the references 
to the first chapter of Genesis which naturally permeate these QQ, within the Blackfriars 
edition of the ST, the editor notes just 39 instances in which Aquinas cited or alluded to 
Scriptural passages which do not fall within Genesis 1. When compared to his use of 
other authorities, this number is slightly more than half of the 72 citations attributed to 
Augustine.  
When one compares this to other sections of the ST an important contrast can be noted. 
It is true that there are more philosophical sections of the ST in which Scriptural 
references are relatively rare. Someone reading I, 3 on the Simplicity of God, as an 
example, would find entire articles therein which do not reference Scripture once. When 
the Scriptural material is available and important, however, such as in I, 3, 1, in which 
6 Aquinas likely did this as a Bachelor in the studium generale under Albert the Great in Cologne, 1245-
48. Torrell, p. 27. Aquinas’ commentaries on Isaiah (Leonine edition, vol 28) and Jeremiah with 
Lamentations (Parma ed, vol 14, pp. 577-685) which are generally thought to date from these initial 
lectures are extant. See Weisheipl, 369-370 for discussion of dating.  
7 These lectures were frequently made into commentaries, either by the process of publishing a 
student’s notes, a reportatio or by the publication of notes corrected by the Master, an expositio. Of 
Aquinas publications in this genre survive commentaries on Job (Leonine ed, vol 26); Matthew 
(incomplete – Parma ed, Vol 10, pp. 1-278); John (Parma ed, vol 10, pp. 279-645); The Letters of Paul 
(Leonine ed, 32); Psalms 1-54 (Parma ed, vol 14, pp. 148-553) and his famous commentary on the four 
gospels, usually known as the Catena aurea (Parma vol 11-12).  
8 Boyle, 4, the lector in a priory was a required position and, in the thirteenth century was only allowed 
to enter his personal spiritual retreat at times which would result in the smallest impact upon these 
lectures.   
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Aquinas explored the simplicity of God under the question “Is God a Body,” Scriptural 
citations permeated the discussion. When Scripture spoke to a subject, Aquinas 
incorporated that text as his highest authority. A more appropriate comparison is made 
to those QQ which, like I, 65-74, address specific Scriptural content. In ST III, 27-59, 
Aquinas explored the life of Christ, drawing from all four of the Gospel accounts of 
Christ’s life. In III, 46 he examined the Passion of Christ in 12 Articles. This might be 
compared to the 29 Articles in I, 65-74. As was done with the references to the Creation 
account in Genesis 1, if one excludes the references to the Passion narratives in the four 
Gospel accounts, one finds no less than 62 Scriptural citations and allusions from 21 
books of the Christian Scripture.  
Further comparison of III, 46 with QQ 65-74 of the prima pars is striking. When 
treating the passion narrative, Aquinas repeatedly mined significant treatments of the 
Passion of Christ found elsewhere, such as Isaiah 53, Psalm 22, and Philippians 2. 
Significant treatments of the Creation event in other portions of Scripture are not 
utilized by Aquinas when making his arguments in ST I, 65-74. Absent from the 
treatment of Genesis 1 is the significant discussion of the Creation in Romans 8 by the 
Apostle Paul. Isaiah who spoke eloquently of the new Creation is only mentioned once 
and that is a passage from chapter 14. Psalm 104 with its poetic rendition of Creation 
event is not cited once, nor is the account in Proverbs 8. The book of Job, which has an 
extensive treatment of the Creation in chapters 38-41, is also entirely absent. This last 
omission is particularly important as Aquinas had completed a lengthy commentary on 
the book of Job in 1264.9 Psalm 148 and the Gospel according to John receive the most 
significant and concentrated attention with but 4 and 5 references respectively. Of 
further interest, the references taken from the Gospel according to John are not 
principally found in the prologue of the book with its famous restatement of Creation 
which would seem a logical source from which one would anticipate Aquinas to derive 
a Christian discussion of the Creation event.10  When one remembers that Aquinas had 
lectured upon and published commentaries on many of these works, these omissions 
become suggestive. If this is a quest for philosophical or theological truth, one must 
9 Weisheipl, 368.  
10 Two citations from the prologue of John 1:3 (74, 3ob1); 1:17 (73, 1ad1); the other three citations fall 
later in the book at John 3:5 (74, 3ad4); 5:17 (69, 2c); and 19:30 (73, 1ob1).  
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wonder why he eschewed these important Scriptural resources, resources which he 
effectively utilized elsewhere within the ST.  
This absence of Scriptural citation is made more puzzling when one reads a citation of 
Augustine which is not only quoted within these questions, it is essentially repeated. In 
I, 68, 1 Aquinas listed three objections to the making of the firmament on the second 
day. The sed contra is simply a quotation of Genesis 1, verses 6 and 8. Aquinas began 
the corpus by paraphrasing two hermeneutical principals established by Augustine.   
“Augustine teaches that two points should be kept in mind when 
resolving such questions. First, the truth of Scripture must be held 
inviolable. Secondly, when there are different ways of explaining a 
Scriptural text, no particular explanation should be held so rigidly that, if 
convincing arguments show it to be false, anyone dare to insist that it 
still is the definitive sense of the text. Otherwise unbelievers will scorn 
Sacred Scripture, and the way to faith will be closed to them.”11  
In the next article, I, 68, 2, Aquinas again posited a number of objections from reason 
against the idea that there are waters above the firmament. The sed contra is once more 
a restatement of the Genesis text. In confronting the tension created by these apparently 
contradictory views he begins the corpus with an unusually long quotation from the 
second book of Augustine’s important commentary on Genesis.  
“Augustine observes, The Scriptural text has more authority than any 
human theory. Therefore, however and whatever these waters may be, 
we cannot in any way doubt that they are there.”12 
Both citations and their use as resolution of strong tensions between Objections and sed 
contra statements suggest Aquinas placed Scripture into a pre-eminent position as an 
11 I, 68, 1c, sicut Augustinus docet, in huiusmodi quaestionibus duo sunt observanda. Primo quidem, ut 
veritas Scripturae inconcusse teneatur. Secundo, cum Scriptura divina multipliciter exponi possit, quod 
nulli expositioni aliquis ita praecise inhaereat quod, si certa ratione constiterit hoc esse falsum, quod 
aliquis sensum Scripturae esse asserere praesumat, ne Scriptura ex hoc ab infidelibus derideatur, et ne 
eis via credendi praecludatur.  Trans.: Wallace, 71. 
12 sicut dicit Augustinus, II super Gen. ad Litt., maior est Scripturae huius auctoritas quam omnis humani 




                                                          
authority. Yet, he made very little use of Scripture in presenting the arguments within 
this section of the ST. This could be viewed as an example of hypocrisy on his part, but 
we argue against such a conclusion. It suggests, rather, that Aquinas had a goal other 
than stating or carrying a theological argument of significance for the entire work or 
even the argument which was in dispute. When one takes into consideration the great 
skill which Aquinas had previously displayed in commentaries and other theological 
writings and in other sections of the ST in the use of Scripture as an authority, this 
relative absence of Scriptural citation is suggestive of another purpose for these QQ. At 
this point, one must also note that Aquinas had been engaged in the production of one of 
his most significant works, the “Golden Chain” (catena aurea) 13  which both 
Weisheipl14 and Torrell15 cite as having transformative effect upon the theology and 
writing of Aquinas. His examination therein of various patristic commentaries and 
sermons on the text of the New Testament’s Gospel accounts seems to have changed the 
way he used these patristic resources. In terms of chronology, Aquinas completed the 
catena aurea and almost immediately began composing the ST.  
The explanation for the absence of Scriptural citation presents itself in analysis of the 
Articles in which Aquinas did make use of extra-Genesis Biblical citation. Aquinas 
extensively cited portions of Scripture outside the first chapter of Genesis in four 
Articles: 65, 1; 68, 4; 73, 1; and in the final Article of the section, 74, 3. If one excludes 
these four Articles, only eight extra-Genesis 1 citations are found the remaining 25 
Articles of this section. This observation suggests that one might discern some reason 
for this divergence in the use of sources. That reason becomes apparent when one 
compares the subject matter of each of these four Articles. Each addressed a topic which 
was somehow important for the larger goals of the ST.  
Article 65, 1 is naturally important as it leads off the discussion of the Creation by 
posing the question of whether corporeal creatures are from God. This Article revisits 
foundational material found in ST I, 45-49. The subject under consideration had 
considerable implications for the entire work, especially as he developed this idea in the 
13Catena aurea in quatuor Evangelia, Ed.: A. Guarenti, (2ª ed.: Marietti, Taurini-Romae, 1953).   
14 Weisheipl, 171-174. 
15 Torrell, 139. 
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subsequent Parts. The fact that God was indeed responsible for the corporeal Creation 
had to be settled conclusively. Wide ranging Scriptural citations fill the first Article and 
his conclusion was a firm “Yes.” But in Article 65, 2 the extra-Genesis Scriptural 
citations almost completely disappear and this continues in the subsequent articles of the 
Question. In those articles, and those of QQ 66-68 Augustine and his fellow theologians 
of the past make up the bulk of the citations until the reader reaches I, 68, 4. Here 
Aquinas again made use of significant Scriptural citation outside of Genesis 1. In this 
Article Aquinas took up the question of whether there is only one heaven. While this 
might strike the reader as a rather obscure subject; Aquinas took this quite seriously, 
because in this article he focused on the reditus of the whole Creation, a topic which 
occupies center stage in the secunda secundae partis and the tertia pars of the ST. 
When, in the course of examining this question, the subject bore upon the goals of the 
entire work, Aquinas increased the level of authority. When the conclusion reached 
within an Article was important for Aquinas’ larger goals for the ST, the answer was 
supported by the highest authority at his disposal.  
Once this teleological element is introduced and the question settled, Aquinas again let 
Scripture recede into the background and the arguments between Augustine and the 
other theologians resumed. This was only re-interrupted in Article 73, 1 in which 
Aquinas dealt with the completion of the divine work and whether it should be ascribed 
to the seventh day. This time the question itself was not truly the matter at hand, but 
presented Aquinas with a pretext to range into a topic important to the entire work. In 
this case, the treatment of the completion of Creation on the seventh day prompted 
Aquinas to bring up the subject of the Incarnation of Christ and his role in the 
Creation’s arrival at its final, eschatological goal. Again this had implications for 
arguments yet to be articulated in the tertia pars. Aquinas here articulated the principle 
that both created nature and divine grace would have to come together in order to reach 
Creation’s final goal. The act of Creation had supplied the natural material, but the 
Incarnation supplied the grace necessary for the consummation of future glory. At this 
point of the discussion he had again broached a concept which was of critical 
importance to the entire work. Aquinas once more set aside the treatment of Augustine 
and other theologians and raised the level of authority, drawing upon Scripture as the 
primary authority.  
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It would seem that at the critical junctures within these questions, when the topics came 
close to the exitus and reditus motif, the primary goals for which the ST was written, 
and when the answers made a difference for what was said later, Aquinas made use of a 
higher level of authority to make his argument. These articles thus function as points of 
contact with the major themes of the entire work, points upon which his primary 
arguments turned. In the intermediate portions of these QQ, the other 25 Articles of this 
section of the ST, Scriptural authority receded behind the issues which were raised by 
the patristic theologians who had interpreted Genesis 1, thus allowing the debate among 
the various patristic authorities to be minutely examined. It was the interpretation of 
these patristic theologians which was under scrutiny here, not the actual meaning of 
Genesis 1. Had the actual meaning of Genesis 1 been in question, Aquinas would have 
argued these QQ’s and Articles with much more robust Scriptural authority.  
It cannot be maintained that these four Articles by the nature of their subject matter 
particularly merited a Scriptural component over against the other Articles in QQ 65-74. 
It is not the case, for instance, that these Articles alone involved topics upon which 
Scripture presented more obvious resources. In truth, the complete absence of Psalm 
104 in the discussion of the second and third day suggests otherwise. Psalm 104 is a 
poetic rendition of the Creation event which pays particular attention to the Creation of 
the firmament (day 2) and the establishment of land (day 3). Psalm 104:24 “In wisdom 
you have made them all;” would seem especially important as Aquinas contended with 
Origen in 65, 2 and 3. Consider his rebuttal to Origen’s interesting argument that the 
Creation contradicts the divine principle of justice in 65, 2ad3. Origen had argued that 
the variety in Creation violated God’s equal treatment of all, his justice. Aquinas 
rejected this argument, appealing to God’s wisdom. Psalm 104 provided a perfect 
Scriptural citation in support of Aquinas’s argument. Aquinas knew this, in fact, just a 
few months before, while conducting the disputation which became De potentia, 
Aquinas had utilized this very verse to make this very argument against this same idea 
of Origen.16 This was a citation which Aquinas and his fellow friars in the priory had 
likely sung hundreds of times; a citation he had used in prior works to make this very 
point, nevertheless, he did not use it here.  
16 De potentia, IV, 2ad29.  
90 
 
                                                          
The contention of this thesis is that Aquinas is not really interested in rebutting Origen 
as much as he tried to inculcate a reverential reading of Origen and other early Christian 
authors which critically examined their statements, let them speak to the current 
generation of reader, and which served the larger purposes of the ST. To restate an 
earlier assertion, this seems to be a pedagogically driven text, which sought to inculcate 
a habitus within the 13th century reader, not a text which asserted various theological 
truths which Aquinas sought to be adopted by that reader.  
This theory is reinforced by the treatment of Scripture as a resource in the final article of 
the section on Creation in which one also finds a number of Biblical references outside 
of Genesis 1.17 In a departure from his usual structure, this Article includes neither a sed 
contra nor a corpus, but simply a list of Objections and individual Responses to the 
Objections.18 It could be that this final Article is simply an omnibus Article, a 
convenient locus for Aquinas to gather together items which he had not worked into 
earlier articles. I think, however, that the replies to the various Objections argue for 
something else. They are quite long in comparison with other replies to Objections and 
what is more they are theologically significant. Also significant is the fact that these 
seven Responses to the Objections are one of the few places in this section of the ST in 
which all three strands of sources (Scripture, patristic, and philosophical) come together 
and interact with one another on something like an equal footing:   
The Responses in Article 74, 3 bring together the three different sources into a 
conversation. For not only is Scripture present, but so are Augustine and Basil, the two 
primary protagonists of the theological debate. Even more interesting, the non-Christian 
sources are also woven into this final article of the whole treatment. Rabbi Moses, a 
Jewish interpreter of Aristotle, is quite favorably treated in ad3 and ad4. In keeping with 
the previous QQ of this section, no conclusions are reached, but all the sources have 
their say. Did Aquinas, in 74, 3, present an example of the approach to Augustine, Basil 
and others for which had had argued within this entire section of the ST? Was this 
perhaps an exercise or a list of possible debate subjects upon which the students of the 
priory might practice? Both are possible, I am inclined to favor the latter. But in no way 
17 ST I, 74, 3. 
18 Wallace notes that Cajetan, Aquinas’ Reformation era commentator, thought that the response to the 
first objection should be considered an article. pp. 162-3, note a.  
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do these Objections and their Responses fit neatly into any theological or philosophical 
reading of the text. They must have another purpose which most reasonably is 
pedagogical. 
2. The Second Source: Patristic Theologians 
That Aquinas used a genre common in the 13th century, a hexaemeral commentary, to 
develop an example of a reverential reading makes a great deal of sense. William 
Wallace in the introduction to the Blackfriar’s edition of the ST, Vol. 10, suggests that 
the medieval scholar who addressed the Creation account in Genesis 1 had “an 
embarrassment of riches” when addressing resources.19 As earlier noted, Augustine 
himself had written five significant works which dealt with this subject, four of which 
are quoted or referenced within QQ 65-74.20  The editor attributes seven citations to the 
Confessions, three to the De civitate dei, four to the De Genesi contra Manichaeos, and 
46 to the De Genesi ad litteram. Missing from the list of citations is De Genesi ad 
litteram liber imperfectus. In addition to these commentaries on Genesis, the editor 
credits Aquinas for citing material five times from De Trinitate.  
In order to achieve his goals, Aquinas utilized a tension between Augustine and another 
familiar interpretive strand of theology championed by the Cappadocian Basil. Basil 
lived and wrote in the generation immediately prior to Augustine. His works were 
known to Augustine and cited by him. His series of sermons delivered on the 
hexaemeron21 were both well-known and important for medieval interpretation of the 
Creation event. In these sermons, Basil had sought to establish the validity of the 
Creation event for a literate and learned audience in the fourth century and to draw out 
its moral implications.22 Aquinas cited these sermons 21 times according to the editor. 
19 Wallace, intr p. xx. 
20 It should be noted that this conclusion was reached by surveying the editor’s citations in the 
Blackfriar’s edition of the ST. Because Aquinas does not often cite works of Augustine by name, the 
compilation of such citations is not an exact science. Furthermore, because Augustine repeated himself 
in many of these works, which reference Aquinas has in mind may not be clear and may reflect simply 
the editor’s greater familiarity with one work over another. Hence, general trends might be seen, but 
considerable care must be exercised when using such a compilation.  
21 In Hexaemeron I-IX. SC:26.  
22 Wallace, p. 205. 
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He also suggests that on another three occasions the ideas which Aquinas attributed 
only to “some say” are found within Basil’s Hexaemeron sermons.  
Basil’s interpretation of Genesis 1 evidences a strong “Scripture over secular learning” 
position, but he sought to engage the secular learning as much as possible. He was at 
times dismissive of secular science but seemed on the whole to have been sensitive to 
the fact that his audience was well read.23 He generally tried to reconcile or harmonize, 
but when faced with expressed doubts regarding the length of the Creation event 
insisted that the days of the Creation week were genuine calendar days, periods of 24 
hours. This assertion and its attendant implications for the Creation narrative are his 
primary and critical points of departure from the interpretation which Augustine put 
forward in the next generation.   
John Chrysostom, the preacher of Antioch and Constantinople from the late fourth and 
earth fifth centuries, was also regularly cited by Aquinas within these questions. His 
eleven sermons on the Creation narrative in Genesis 24 are cited nine times. Chrysostom 
was especially important for establishing two important principles as Aquinas 
interpreted Gen 1. His assertion that many of the apparent problems within text of this 
chapter of Genesis are actually due to an accommodation of the primitive hearers was 
invaluable to Aquinas. 25 Often and unfortunately translated “condescension”, this term 
(συγκατάβασις) in Chrysostom is better understood as “considerateness.” Chrysostom 
understood that God in his loving-kindness was taking into consideration the state of the 
first audience. The presumed state of Moses’ audience often forced God to use words 
which were, in Chrysostom’s estimation, earthly or thick (παχύτης).26 
23 See Wallace’s discussion of this in Appendix 7 “Hexaemeron: Patristic Accounts”, 202-210. 
24 Chrysostom, In Gen. PG 53, 21-98.  
25 Cf. I, 67, 4, res; 71, 1, ad1 and ad4.  
26 Sten Hidal, “Exegesis of the Old Testament in the Antiochene School with its Prevalent Literal and 
Historical Method” in Hebrew Bible/Old Testament: The History of Its Interpretation, Vol. 1, Ed.: Magne 
Saebo, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Rupprecht, 1996), 559-560. 
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Aquinas also considered Chrysostom important because he believed him to be an 
authoritative resource on the Hebrew language27 and Chrysostom offered him the 
insight that Genesis 1 included Semitic idioms and figures of speech.28 Of the 
Antiochene tradition, Chrysostom asserted the primacy of the literal reading of the text 
and positioned his interpretation over against the interpretation of members of the 
Alexandrian tradition who often tended toward a more extensive use of symbolic or 
allegorical interpretation of Scripture. He too considered every word of the Scriptures to 
be potentially meaningful, no matter how apparently insignificant.29 
Dionysius, usually named “Denis” by Aquinas and commonly named “Pseudo-
Dionysius” today, was another important source within these Questions. Aquinas and 
most other medieval scholastics believed Dionysius was Dionysius the Areopagite, 
whose conversion is recorded in the New Testament.30 For most medieval theologians 
this association with Paul lent to the works of Dionysius an authority which was only 
exceeded by Scripture.31 Considered an intellectual who had conversed with an apostle, 
Dionysius would have been an important guide to understanding the Christian faith in 
light of classical philosophy. In actuality, Dionysius was a 6th century Christian Neo-
Platonist. Any skeptical analysis of these claims about Dionysius’ identity would have 
to wait for Lorenzo Valla and Erasmus in the period of the Renaissance and the question 
would not be finally settled until 1895 when Koch and Stiglmayr conclusively 
demonstrated Dionysius’ dependence upon the fifth century philosopher Proclus.32 
Aquinas was a devoted reader of Dionysius, quoting and alluding to his works over 
1700 times in his entire corpus33 and composing a commentary on at least one of 
27 I, 68, 4c,  In this Aquinas was mistaken. It appears that while the Antiochene school frequently 
resorted to argument from linguistic idiomata which they rooted within the Hebrew text, but it also 
appears they had little or no knowledge of Hebrew.  See Hidal, 553. 
28 I, 68, 1 ad2. 
29 Hidal, 560. 
30 Acts 17:34. 
31 Torrell, p. 127. See also Rorem, 15-20. 
32 Rorem, p. 17  While Peter Abelard had questioned the hitherto uncritically accepted confusion of 
Denis the Areopagite and Saint Denis of Paris, he did not question the validity of the claim that Dionysius 
of Acts 17 was in fact the author of the works attributed to him.  
33 Rorem, p. 37. 
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Dionysius’ works. Aquinas quoted Dionysius within the these questions eight times, 
seven of which are from De divinis nominibus34 primarily book IV but also from book 
II. There is one citation from De caelesti hierarchia.35 In terms of subject matter, five of 
these citations were cited in the discussion of light and its creation.  
The presence and occasional absences of Dionysius within these Questions merit 
attention for another reason. As already noted, throughout Aquinas’ career an intense 
debate raged throughout Western Europe over the role of the mendicant orders. We 
have already discussed36 the fact that Aquinas’ first regency in Paris had been forced on 
several occasions to enter into disputes over this issue. Dionysius wrote two important 
works on hierarchy and appears to have been the author who coined the term 
“hierarchy.”37 Within the Commentary Aquinas had dedicated an entire Article to 
examining the appropriateness of Dionysius’ use of this term.38 While Dionysius seems 
to have used the word to mean a “source of the sacred,” by the medieval period his 
writings would be the foundation of a white-hot controversy which raged between the 
Pope and the mendicants on one side against the local, secular clergy on the other 
side.39 A central issue was the propriety of the mendicants hearing confessions from 
wealthy Christians about to die and the gift customarily given to the one who heard 
these deathbed confessions. This state of affairs injected a natural economic urgency to 
the tension between mendicant and local clergy. The local clergy asserted that such 
confessions should be heard by the local church and its representative, and they in turn 
should benefit from the gift. The Pope and the mendicants naturally saw this very 
differently. Both sides would claim that Dionysius supported their claims to hierarchical 
authority and legitimacy in this regard.40  
34 PG 3, 587-996. 
35 PG 3, 119-370.  
36 Chapter 1, 45-50. 
37 Rorem, 1. 
38 Commentary II, 9, 1, 1, Utrum definitio hierarchiae data a Dionysio, sit conveniens. 
39 Lawrence, 109-112. Cf. Hinnebusch, The Dominican Order: A Short History, 19ff.  
40 Rorem, 32-33. 
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This dispute made Dionysius important to Aquinas who wrote multiple works in 
defense of the mendicants and one commentary41 on Dionysius’ De divinis nominibus. 
If Weisheipl’s admittedly tentative dating is correct, he had completed this important 
work while composing the prima pars shortly prior to the composition of these QQ.42 
This interest in Dionysius may have driven Aquinas to read the Areopagite much more 
carefully. This careful attention to Dionysius may manifest itself in the text of these 
questions without necessarily being attributable to a singular passage; but rather in the 
entire enterprise. Dionysius was noteworthy for his Neo-Platonist discussion of “signs” 
and “images.” While Dionysius is considered the master of an apophatic theology which 
denies the ultimate veracity of any positive statement about God, in a difficult and very 
densely written passage he also speaks of signs as creations of God which participate in 
the created procession (exitus in Aquinas’ language) and return (reditus) to God.43 Thus, 
in Dionysius’ theology, while the signs always fall short of being a univocal truth about 
God, for the Christian they become the gracious and transcending vehicle for God to 
communicate genuine truth. Dionysius himself used this separation between the essence 
of God and the language we use to discuss God as an argument against making 
polemical denunciations and refutations, arguing instead for a profound humility.44 In 
this appeal for epistemic humility, Dionysius was in agreement with Augustine’s central 
message in his later commentaries and discussions of Genesis. This appeal for epistemic 
humility which parallels Augustine’s own appeal for the same humility prompts the 
current reader to pay careful attention to I, 73, 2 and 3. In these two articles Aquinas 
broke off from the tension between Augustine and Basil and brought the reading of 
Augustine into a nuanced and subtle conversation with Dionysius.  
This humility before the “signs” and “images” which recognizes that they cannot be 
Truth in the final sense, and yet convey Truth from the one who is Truth, seems to lie at 
the heart of what Aquinas attempted in the reverential reading under consideration here 
41 Exposito super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, (1265-1267).  
42 Weisheipl, 382. 
43This would have obvious implications for Aquinas’ exitus and reditus schema in the ST. See Denis’ 
Letter 9: to Titus, the hierarch.  PG 3, 1105D-1108A. Even Aquinas admitted that Denis wrote in “an 
obscure style.” In librum Beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus exposition, Ed.: C. Pera (Turin: Marietti, 
1950), 1-2.  
44 Rorem, 12. See also Hankey, 24-30. 
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and elsewhere. For Aquinas, the human language cannot bear the strain of addressing 
the divine.45 This was particularly true in the discussion of Creation as it implied the 
creation of being, even the being of words and time, necessitating language which was 
at best an approximation of the truth.46 The words which Augustine used and the words 
which Basil used might appear to us to be in a complete contradiction with one another. 
They may also appear to be in contradiction with the observations of natural philosophy. 
In truth, they might both contain substantive error. But, in Aquinas’ estimation, that 
does not mean that they do not each convey Truth by the gracious action of the divine 
essence who seeks to communicate via those words.  
The last significant patristic resource found within these questions is John Damascene, 
whose De fide orthodoxa47  has been suggested to be the model on which Peter 
Lombard based his Sentences. A well-educated Syrian Christian of the 8th century, John 
wielded considerable influence in the medieval world, a role which he would continue 
to play through the Reformation and into the works of the 19th century Romantic 
theologian, Schleiermacher.48 John’s presence in the monasteries of Palestine locates 
him within the fierce defense of Chalcedonian Orthodoxy over against what they 
perceived to be a compromising Monothelite theology which was being promoted by 
the Byzantine Emperors. This is important to one of the larger controversies addressed 
within the ST and to understanding Aquinas’ use of John Damascene. In Part III of the 
ST, Aquinas wrestled with contemporary misunderstandings of Christology and would 
be unique in his extensive use of eastern conciliar documents and Orthodox theologians 
such as John Damascene.49 A comparison of the Christological sections in Commentary, 
written early in his career, and the same material treated within ST indicates that his 
quotations of patristic theologians, including Greeks, increased six-fold in the ST. When 
compared with his peers, Aquinas himself is noteworthy in that he is the first mediaeval 
45 ST I, 1, 9, Aquinas opened the ST with a discussion of the nature of theology and its ability to discuss 
God, arguing for the propriety and potency of metaphorical language.  
46 David, B. Burrell, C. S. C., Aquinas: God and Action, (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 
135-137.  
47 PG 94, 790-1228.    
48 Andrew Louth, St John Damascene (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002), 3. 
49 Weisheipl, 121-122. 
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theologian to make such use of the Greeks in the Latin West.50 This facility with 
patristic theologians of the Greek traditions enabled Aquinas to contextualize the readily 
accessible material of the Damascene and read it more deeply.  
De fide orthodoxa is cited 6 times within these Questions, according to the editor of the 
Blackfriar’s edition. Because of the paucity of references, and the scattering of these 
throughout the work, it is impossible to discern a particular emphasis or pattern within 
the citations.  
Other theologians also make brief appearances within these questions. Ambrose, the 
bishop of Milan to whom Augustine gives considerable credit for his conversion, is 
cited two times.51 Origen, whose theological creativity was unmatched in the first 
centuries of the Christian movement, is cited three times,52 always unfavorably. The 
Venerable Bede, an 8th century Latin author, is also cited twice. His relatively light 
treatment is in itself somewhat perplexing. Despite the obvious application to issues 
which Aquinas addressed within these questions, Aquinas does not cite Bede’s 
commentary on Genesis53 which was well known in the thirteenth century and notable 
for its allegorical interpretation in which Bede proposed, following on interpretation 
offered by Augustine, that the six days actually foreshadow later ages of considerable 
length.54 This is odd because Aquinas is clearly aware of Bede’s work. For a scholastic 
of Aquinas’ caliber, who is seeking truth, the omission of such an important voice itself 
is noteworthy. But for a Scholastic who is preparing an exercise in the reading of 
patristic theologians, it may well be that Bede and his more allegorical interpretation 
50 Torrell, 139. 
51 I, 66, 1c. and I, 67, 1sc. The editor also cites Ambrose no less than three times as the source behind 
the “others” that Aquinas cites, together with Basil and Bede.  
52 I, 65, 2c; I, 68, 2c; and I, 70, 3c.  
53 Calvin Kendall, On Genesis, (Liverpool: Liverpool Univ. Press, 2008), p. 59. In his introduction to Bede’s 
commentary Kendall posits that the work was well known in France in the medieval period, with no less 
than four medieval manuscripts extant in Paris and over half of the 22 extant medieval copies being 
located in France. 
54 Bede the Venerable, Libri quatuor in principium Genesis I, ii,3. CCL: 118A:35-39. See also Kendall’s 
translation, 100-105, and Karla Pollmann, ‘“And Without Thorn the Rose”? Augustine’s Interpretations 
of Genesis 3:18 and the Intellectual Tradition’, in Genesis and Christian Theology Eds.: N. MacDonald, et 
al., (Grand Rapids, 2012), 223f.  
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would have presented a serious complication to his reflection upon the Augustinian 
position of an immediate action on God’s part and Basil’s assertion of a literal six day 
creative event. Aquinas elected to focus his attention on the differences between 
Augustine and the theological strand championed by Basil, probably because of the 
popularity of Basil’s Hexaemeron sermons within the period. Again, this suggests that 
Aquinas was not engaged in a quest for truth in quite the same way as he was in De 
potentia or other similar treatments. A more likely explanation for the omission that 
perhaps regent master Aquinas is shaping the disputation within his classroom by 
limiting the discussion, bracketing out certain theologians whose ideas will create too 
much confusion in the minds of his incipient theology students and obfuscate his real 
goal for this section.  
3. The Third Category of Sources: Non-Patristic Sources55 
Aquinas lived at a pivotal moment for anyone engaged in scholarship. The recent 
recovery and translation of several Greek philosophical works, especially of Aristotle 
and his commentators, was in the process of transforming the world in which he lived. 
One cannot consider the sources within the ST without considering his use of Aristotle 
and the various commentators on Aristotle who had so revolutionized scholasticism in 
the decades prior to and during his career.56 The editor of the Blackfriars’ edition of thes 
QQ credits Aristotle with 22 direct citations from seven different works, De anima (1), 
De caelo (6), De generatione animalium (1), De generatione et corruptione (3), 
Metaphysica (3), Physica (6), and Topica (2).57 While he frequently placed Aristotle in 
the Objections, the more regular usage of Aristotle was as an insight leading to 
reconciliation between Scripture and a patristic source or between two patristic sources. 
55 Jordan, 56, Aquinas is extremely careful in his treatment of this distinction. He does not call a Christian 
theologian a “philosopher” and likewise he does not refer to a non-Christian philosopher, even Aristotle, 
as a “father”, his usual designation for the theologians of the Christian tradition.  
56 Baldner and Carrol, 14, suggest that Avicenna, one of these Islamic commentators on the works of 
Aristotle provided Aquinas with the philosophically critical insight that anything in which one might note 
a distinction between essence and existence had to an ontologically dependent being and could not be 
God.  
57 In discussing I, 66, 4ad5, Wallace, 50, note h, the editor attributes Aquinas’s ideas about time to 
Aristotle but does not cite any reference, however in his appendix 4, 188-92 of vol X, he attributes this 
same idea to Aristotle’s Physica. Wallace, 191. 
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A more interesting insight perhaps is that many of these references are grouped in a 
similar pattern as the Scriptural citations noted above. Question 70 accounts for seven of 
them, or one third of the references. The remaining references are all found within QQ 
65 (2), 66 (5), 67 (4), 68 (4). Only two of these, QQ 65 and 68, coincide with the surge 
of Scriptural quotations noted and the Aristotelian citations are not in the same Articles 
as the Scriptural citations. It would seem that here the material itself provided the 
rationale for the grouping. Question 70 examined the fourth day, especially the creation 
of light and relies heavily upon Aristotelian statements about heavenly bodies for the 
Objections and then for clarifications in the Responses. QQ 65-67 deal with the creation 
and diversification of forms, questions for which there is a natural connection to 
Aristotelian material. In Q 68 Aquinas turned to Aristotle to describe the heavens 
themselves as the firmament is made and the waters below are separated from the 
waters above. Ancient and medieval theologians devoted a great deal of attention to the 
problems raised by this proposition. Indeed it would seem that Aquinas’ preoccupation 
with such matters serves in some part to explain the seemingly embarrassed silence 
from most modern commentators on this section. QQ 69 and 73-74, in which there are 
no citations of Aristotle, deal with explicitly Christian theological topics about which 
Aristotle did not have as much to say, (e.g., God’s rest on the seventh day.) QQ 71 and 
72 are extremely brief, as noted above, it appears that Aquinas had said what needed to 
be said in question 70, but the hexaemeral form necessitated a question which addressed 
each of these days.  
Of interest to the reader is Aquinas’ usage of Aristotle in comparison with his usage of 
the patristic theologians. He went to some pains to point out that Aristotle was not to be 
accepted without critical examination. Most pointedly he even says that the reader has 
to be circumspect when reading Aristotle: “Still, we need not pay too much attention to 
the examples Aristotle gives in logical treatises, because he gives them as probabilities 
deriving from the opinions of others.”58 As closer analysis will demonstrate, 
comparison with Aquinas’ treatment of the same material in the Commentary and De 
potentia suggests that the role of Aristotle is greatly diminished, even, at some points, 
excluded from the discussion in ST I, 65-74. 
58 67, 2, ad2, Non tamen est multum curandum de eis exemplis quae Aristoteles inducit in libris 
logicalibus, quia inducit ea ut probabilia secundum opinionem aliorum. Trans.: Wallace, 59. 
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In addition to Aristotle’s works, Aquinas also makes use of several of the commentators 
on Aristotle; although, their roles are considerably smaller. Averroes and Avicebron 
show up once, and that in the response of the same article. Their respective ideas are 
listed in a catalogue of natural philosophers who are rejected. Avicenna is cited three 
times.59 Twice Aquinas rejects his ideas, and once he is cited for a comment about the 
spontaneous generation of maggots caused by sunlight.60 Of the non-Christian authors 
he cited other than Aristotle, Rabbi Moses Maimonides was used most often, four times 
from his Guide to the perplexed. 61 His role within the specific Responses to the 
Objections is notable. These responses often form Aquinas’ attempts to reconcile the 
tensions he had set up between the Objections and the sed contra. He frequently 
provides critical resolution or, in one instance, a simplification to a problem.  
But Maimonides and Avicebron are not only commentators on Aristotle, they are also 
Neo-Platonists. As he matured within his theology Aquinas gained access to the full 
texts and better translations of sources which in medieval theology had often been 
excised, cited, and strung together in works such as Lombard’s Sentences.62  This can 
even be detected in his treatment of Augustine. In philosophical terms Aquinas grew 
from the more simplistic reading of Aristotle which he had inherited from his mentor 
Albert the Great into a critical reader. In fact he has been cited as unique among 
medieval scholars for his ability to read and assimilate philosophical and theological 
sources while respecting their logical and semantic integrity.63  
Undertaken toward the end of his career, the ST represents Aquinas in his mature 
reading of Aristotle and Augustine. As he matured, Aquinas tended to grow somewhat 
in his appreciation of Platonism, especially the theology of Augustine which is indebted 
59 65, 4, resp; 67, 3, ob3; and 71, ad1. 
60 67, 3, ob3. 
6166, 2, ad5; 68, 1, ad1; 69, 1, ad5; and 74, 3, ad3.  
62 Wawrykow, “Thomas Aquinas” pp 829-30; although, Bruce Marshall, “Aquinas the Augustinian?” in 
Aquinas the Augustinian,  Eds.: Dauphanais, Barry, and Levering,  (Washington D.C.: Catholic University 
Press, 2007), 48-50, disputes this notion. 
63 David B. Burrell C.S.C. “Analogy, Creation, and Theological Language” in The Theology of Thomas 
Aquinas Eds.: Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow, (University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 77. 
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to Platonism. It must also be observed, as Torrell notes in his treatment of the neo-
platonic influences on Aquinas, Aristotle was a Platonist himself.64 
Plato is also cited. There are four direct citations to the Timaeus within these 
questions.65 Two of those, however, the editor considers to be reliant more upon the 
ideas of Calcidius, a fourth-century commentator on Plato whose work was known 
through Boethius. In addition, the editor sees Platonism and Neo-Platonism in at least 
two of the “Some philosophers” references.66  
In considering the philosophers, the analysis of the sources in this section of the ST 
suggests that they are utilized in a supportive role. Their most positive use is in the 
support of one position or another or in which they clarify what a theologian has said.67 
But this is infrequent. The most common utilization of the philosophers in these 
questions is to create the intellectual tension which is the ST’s modus.68 These articles 
are disputations in miniature. The philosophers are playing a supportive role with the 
structure of the articles, but not in the development of content. Regularly they posit the 
Objections against which the sed contra, quite often the text of Genesis itself, will push. 
The examination of this tension will give theologians an opportunity to speak, but not 
necessarily to provide answers.69 Often the philosophers are held up as proposing 
something different than the theologians, but which upon further examination is seen to 
be a matter of the definition of words or a distinction without a genuine difference.  
The third use of the philosophers evidenced within these questions is in a catalogue of 
opinions. This occurs three times in the text and accounts for most of the actual citations 
64 Torrell, p. 128. 
65 I, 66, 1ad4; I, 66, 2c; I, 68, 1c; and I, 70, 3c. 
66 I, 65 3c and I, 65, 4c. 
67 See I, 74, 1, in which Aristotle is brought out to support the tripartite actions which Augustine sees in 
the Creation as reflective of the Trinity. Augustine concurs that such triplets are a perfect form.  
68 See I, 68, 4, ob2 or I, 70, 2, ob4. 
69 See I, 68, 4c and ad2 which respond to the objection cited immediately above. The answer to 
Aristotle’s statement is not really the issue and is dealt with rather summarily, it would seem the real 
goal is the discussion which ensues and which gives Basil, Chrysostom, and Augustine occasion to 
present their various views on the empyrean heaven.  
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of philosophers.70 On each of these three occasions, a number of philosophical opinions 
are listed and critically examined as they pertain to the question at hand. But the 
answers are then woven into the various and competing answers given by the 
theologians. Thus the responses to the various objections raised begin with statements 
such as: “In this Augustine follows the opinion of Plato, who did not hold for a fifth 
essence.”71 It seems that by simply positing the disagreements within the philosophical 
community, Aquinas sought to explain the differences between the theologians. Again, 
however, the theologians are permitted to disagree with each other as they subscribe to 
various philosophical tenets.  
4. Conclusions 
Within QQ 65-74 of the prima pars of the ST, Aquinas organized resources into a clear 
hierarchy, the same hierarchy which is generally observed throughout the ST. In the 
first position stood Scripture itself. This was, for Aquinas, the font of theology. 72 A 
wider reading within the ST and a detailed reading of these QQ suggests that this was 
no platitude for Aquinas, but seemed to have been a tenet genuinely held and embodied 
within his theological works. His voluminous writings on Scripture and regular return to 
the text for argumentation purposes suggest that he accorded it this position. Beneath 
Scripture, in the second place are the theologians, particularly those who come from 
antiquity and whose ideas have stood the test of some time. While they do not always 
agree with one another, Aquinas held these interpreters of biblical text to be valuable 
guides for understanding. In the third place and in service to understanding both the text 
of Scripture and the theologians are the philosophers. It is especially interesting to 
notice that Aquinas never calls a Christian theologian a “philosopher.”73 He 
occasionally noted the dependence of even Augustine on certain philosophical ideas, but 
Augustine remained for Aquinas a theologian, not a philosopher. He perceives a 
distinct, essential difference between the two and places them into a hierarchy of 
70 See the responses of I, 65, 4; I, 66, 2; and I, 68, 1. I, 70, 3 might be considered a miniature version of a 
catalogue, noting Anaxagoras and the Platonists, but quickly shifting to theologians.  
71 I, 66, 2, ad1, Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus sequitur in hoc opinionem Platonis, non 
ponentis quintam essentiam. Trans.: Wallace, 39. 
72 Wawrykow, The Westminster Handbook to Thomas Aquinas, 137.  
73 Jordan, 55. 
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authority which was clearly demarcated both by how he utilized these resources and 
within his taxonomy.  
It should be noted, however, that the philosophers do not simply bow to the authority of 
the theologians and the theologians to Scripture. The interplay between these three 
sources is dynamic and complex. Quite often the insights of the philosophers are used 
for a critical examination of what the theologians have said, and both may be put into 
service to clarify the text of Scripture. By examining the words of a theologian such as 
Augustine, Chrysostom or John Damascene in light of Aristotelian language and 
philosophical constructs, Aquinas often sought to shed light and bring clarity to their 
words. The simplistic or obvious reading of the text or a theologian may not be the best 
reading. An apparent conflict between biblical text and theologian or between common 
sense and a theologian may be best resolved by the insights of a philosopher.  
This dynamic interplay of authorities is not at all unique to these QQ of the ST, but is 
evident throughout the Summa theologiae. What does appear unusual, perhaps unique, 
to these questions, however, is Aquinas’ reserve in bringing to bear the higher authority 
of Scripture to the questions addressed in the various articles. While the text of Genesis 
permeates the text, the rest of the Scriptural witness is singularly silent, even when clear 
passages exist, upon which Aquinas has elsewhere commented. The most reasonable 
explanation for this silence is that Aquinas was not interested in settling debate or 
answering questions, but was engaged in another goal which I believe to be related to 
the pedagogical goal stated in the introduction to the prima pars.  
The effect of this careful management of sources was to create an open field of inquiry 
about a foundational doctrine of Christianity: Creation. The incipientes who were taught 
from this text would have found no answers within these pages, but a reverential 
reading of two giant figures of the Christian tradition, Basil and Augustine, as they 
wrestled with the text of Genesis 1. With the exception of four Articles in which the 
answers were truly important for the entire project of the ST, the authority of these two 
theologians and the interpretational strands which they championed were left to stand. 
Scriptural authority would not be employed to take either side. The secondary authority 
of the philosophers played a supporting role but was not the primary focus. The text of 
Genesis 1, which might have been expected to be the authority, was the theological data 
104 
 
which they interpreted and evaluated, it did not answer the questions but its ambiguities 
were the occasion for the questions which the authorities posed and sought to answer. 
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 Chapter 4: The Pedagogical Arc within QQ 65-74 
1. Recapitulation of Arguments for a Pedagogical Goal 
Earlier chapters of this thesis have demonstrated that Aquinas’ treatment of hexaemeral 
material in QQ 65-74 does not fit neatly into either a philosophical or theological genre. 
Those who attempt to read this section as such, find it a disappointment.1 One who 
comes to these ten QQ looking for conclusive answers to metaphysical and theological 
questions about the Creation will for the most part find none herein. Aquinas’ use of 
resources and his refusal to reach a conclusion have led us to assert that Aquinas was 
not here engaged in writing toward the goal of making a philosophical or theological 
point which furthered what he had already posited within the ST. We have contended 
that two primary rationales best accommodate the treatment of Genesis 1 within these 
ten QQ. In chapter 2 we posited that the treatment of Augustine would more reasonably 
accommodate a polemical goal in the context of an effort to use Augustine as an 
authority to end speculative exploration of theology. That contention regarding the 
polemical goal, however, was made clear by reading ST I, 65-74 in light of its other 
intended purpose, the inculcation of a theological habitus within a body of student 
readers and auditors.  
As we suggested in chapter 1, these questions most likely were written for a group of 
students who were being trained themselves to educate the novice friars (incipientes) 
streaming into the Dominican Order in the 13th century. Noting the anomalous material 
within these ten QQ, anomalous in terms of genre, structure, and sophistication of 
content, we posited that these ten QQ serve to engage the one charged with educating 
incipientes with an eye toward inculcating a particular theological method or habitus. 
The reader who internalized this section of the ST approached the basic data of the 
theological discipline, Scripture and especially the patristic authorities whose writings 
have come to be accepted by the Christian community, in a reverential, faithful, and 
intellectually rigorous manner.2  
1 Wallace, Intr. xx-xxii. 
2 In this, Aquinas may not have been innovative. Philipp W. Rosemann, Peter Lombard, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004) 28, notes that Abelard may have had the same intent for Sic et non a 
century before Aquinas wrote.  
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The future lectores whom Aquinas directly taught and their students, incipientes, in the 
priories, as we have also asserted, would have been in particular need of such training. 
The audiences to whom the friars preached often included local clergy who were 
looking for any excuse to have these intruding Dominicans excluded from their parishes 
and from access to wealthy donors3. More charitably understood, these clerics may have 
honestly sought to protect their flocks from what they perceived to be a heresy. No 
matter the motive, these hostile auditors were listening for error. In the presence of such 
an audience, the preacher needed to exercise great care in the handling of sacred text 
and patristic theologians. While local parish priests had little or no training in writing 
and preaching, Dominicans were to receive in their priory a full year of theological 
education prior to being licensed to preach.4 This careful attention to the audience was a 
well-established element of medieval theological education. Peter Lombard himself was 
noted for carefully couching his formulations of Christology and making important 
distinctions between his audiences, calling his theologically trained students “safe ears” 
which enabled him to use certain more daring formulations.5  
If this hypothesis for the reading of Aquinas’ section on the hexaemeron is correct, the 
reader could reasonably expect that these ten QQ should exhibit some pedagogical 
structures. This chapter examines QQ 65-74 of the prima pars looking for such 
structure. A pedagogical document should evidence certain structures and content 
elements. The reader should be asked to make some discernible progress in either a skill 
or a body of knowledge. The material in its complexity should give evidence some 
synthesis as it moves from simple to more complex. Elements which are introduced 
should be subsequently integrated into the discussion and students should have 
opportunity to practice and test their skills. Initially the instructor should distill for the 
student clear principles, apply them simply to clear examples which the student can 
easily grasp. The student should not be overwhelmed by too much information or with 
exercises which are too complex. As the student’s skills increase, the material should 
continue to grow more challenging and complex.  
3 Lawrence, 152-154. 
4 Boyle, 4, and Lawrence, 84-88. 
5 Rosemann, 40-41. 
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Aquinas had already suggested such goals for the entire work, but such structures have 
been difficult to ascertain in earlier elements of the ST. Our intention within the first 
section of this chapter is to demonstrate the presence of pedagogical structures within 
these QQ. In the subsequent section of this chapter we analyze in some detail Aquinas’ 
use of patristic resources, demonstrating through comparative analysis that he has 
manipulated resources for pedagogical aims. In the final element of this chapter we note 
how this pedagogical goal of the document, particularly the epistemic humility, would 
benefit the reader who continued to read in the ST.  
2. A Patristic Primer  
Research has led the author of this thesis to conclude that the best presupposition to 
adopt when reading this section of the ST is that it is a primer or handbook for the 
reverential reading of patristic sources. The term “reverential reading” (exponere 
reverenter) first appeared in Aquinas’ written works shortly before he undertook the 
writing of the ST.  In 1263 Aquinas had been called upon to render an expert opinion 
for Pope Urban VI about certain documents which were put forward as part of ongoing 
conversations with the Patriarch of Constantinople. Aquinas’ response was delivered to 
the pope in a document entitled Contra errores Graecorum. While the actual documents 
to which he was responding have largely been proven to be forgeries, within his 
introduction to this document the reader gains significant insight into Aquinas’ method 
for reading patristic authorities. He argued for what he termed a reverential reading 
(exponere reverenter). This reading is marked by a willingness to contextualize the 
works of ancient authors charitably, most importantly not demanding of them the 
theological or philosophical precision which was only later achieved through councils 
and the development of theological discourse. This particular facet of Thomistic study 
has been thoroughly explored elsewhere and this thesis is indebted to the insights 
expounded elsewhere.6 
6 Weisheipl, 168-171, discusses the historical background to Contra errores Graecorum. M.-D. 
Chenu’s Toward Understanding Aquinas provides the most fulsome treatment of a reverential 
reading but several have subsequently treated it, including Walter H. Principe, C. S. B. “Thomas 
Aquinas’ Principles for Interpretation of Patristic Texts” in Studies in Medieval Culture, Vol VIII 
& IX edited by John Sommerfeld and E. Roxanne Elder, Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute of 
Western Michigan University, 1976. For a more recent (2003) but somewhat derivative 
treatment of this issue consider Mark Jordan’s previously cited Rewritten Theology: Aquinas 
After His Readers.  
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While Aquinas himself makes no specific pedagogical identification or claim for this 
section of the ST, it must also be admitted that he makes no such claims for any section 
within the ST. The causes of the ST have been debated for some time and a scholarly 
consensus about Aquinas’ motives for composing the ST has proven to be elusive. At 
the same time, readers of Aquinas’ ST, as with any work, must engage the text by 
constructing some such purpose in the absence of any stated goal.  
This assertion of a pedagogical thrust for these QQ is not intended to be entirely 
exclusive of other potential readings of this material. At the same time the reader of the 
ST who is alerted to this possible rationale for the prima pars and this section in 
particular will notice a pattern of development and synthesis within these QQ. This 
pattern becomes much clearer when careful comparative analysis is applied to Aquinas’ 
use of authoritative sources. This comparative analysis will be applied both internally to 
the ten QQ themselves and externally as Aquinas treats identical subjects in other 
works. The internal comparative analysis will yield the conclusion that Aquinas’ 
treatment of the authoritative sources grows increasingly complex as the ten questions 
progress. The comparison with his other works will yield the conclusion that Aquinas is 
indeed not writing to reach theological or philosophical conclusions, but has written this 
document to create a circumscribed arena for an intellectual debate to take place, a 
debate which will hone important skills necessary for the friar in the Order of Preachers.  
In order to create this medieval version of a virtual classroom, Aquinas excluded 
complicating factors, creating an artificially discrete debate between two interpretational 
strands. He was aware of a potent third strand of interpretation frequently applied to 
Genesis 1, the allegorical interpretation, but Augustine’s more allegorical writing on the 
subject of Creation in Confessions and the allegorical commentary on Genesis by Bede 
were largely excluded even though both were known to Aquinas. By such an exclusion 
of complicating interpretational strands, Aquinas created the arena for incipientes to 
focus on the skills of reverential reading.  
In order to see better how this works out within these ten QQ, the reader may benefit 
from a brief outline and recapitulation of the 29 Articles contained therein. As noted in 
the preceding chapter, when Aquinas’ use of extra-Genesis Scriptural sources is 
considered there is reason to bracket out four articles. Three of these articles deal with 
theological issues which appear to have been important to Aquinas and can arguably be 
tied to larger themes and purposes of the entire work. Within these bracketed Articles 
108 
 
the use of authoritative sources changes, moving up the hierarchy of authority. What is 
more, unlike the other Articles within the section, three of these four Articles reach 
definitive conclusions and the fourth and last Article of the entire section has a peculiar 
structure. I have indicated with boldface type the four articles which make extensive use 
of extra-Genesis Scriptural citation and which touch on subjects pivotal to the entire 
work and thus should be bracketed out of this pedagogical trajectory.  
Q 65 Creation of the material universe 
 Article 1: Do Material Creatures come from God – Yes! 
 Article 2: Patristic theologians can err and must be examined in light of the 
principles of Scripture and Reason. Origen’s idea that the physical Creation was 
a punishment for spiritual beings was simply wrong because it violated a 
principle of simple reason.  
 Article 3: Patristic theologians can be misunderstood easily; hence, one must 
read them reverentially, taking into account what one knows to be the truth.  
Augustine’s words on the wisdom of the Creator might lead one to 
misunderstand him. 
 Article 4: Patristic theologians can sometimes appear to contradict one another. 
Careful reading of these theologians will conclude that the disagreement is often 
resolvable. Boethius and Augustine seem to be in disagreement, but are not 
when one considers them in light of later philosophical development.  
Q 66 Creation related to diversification 
 Article 1: Patristic theologians sometimes simply do disagree – Basil and 
Augustine on Creation for instance – that disagreement, however, may not 
always be clearly settled. They might both be read as faithful interpretations of 
the sacred text.  
 Article 2: Patristic theologians must be read within their own conceptual worlds. 
Augustine was a Platonist and thus held certain ideas which Aquinas contested, 
but what he says must be understood as being said by someone who subscribed 
to a particular philosophical system.  
 Article 3: Patristic theologians often have an overlapping technical vocabulary 
which may reflect their varying concepts of reality. Thus one needs to 
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understand, for example, that Augustine followed Porphyry in this matter when 
he used certain terms. 
 Article 4: Patristic theologians, however, sometimes cannot be reconciled 
through philosophical argument. Their disagreement in a fundamental doctrine 
suggests an attitude of epistemic humility before the text and their theology. 
Augustine posited a twofold initial creation of primary physical being and 
angelic being, exclusive of time. Other theologians, however, insist on a four-
fold initial creation of physical being, angelic being, heavenly being, and time. 
Both interpretational strands have made strong arguments.  
Q 67 The work of differentiation 
 Article 1: A lesson in semantics: words sometimes mean different things. One 
must ask what a patristic theologian means by a term such as “light.” Augustine 
says it is a spiritual reality, Ambrose said it is a metaphor.  
 Article 2: But words are not devoid of meaning  nor is any meaning possible for 
a word. Some meanings for words must be rejected as physically impossible or 
inherently contradictory. Augustine, Aristotle, and Dionysius suggest that Light 
is a physical body, but philosophically this is impossible.  
 Article 3: Is light a quality?  What is a quality in precise terms?  
 Article 4: Augustine and Basil meant very different things by the word “light” 
which was mentioned on the first day of Creation. Both of them are possible, 
however, when judged by the criteria of Article 2.  
Q 68 The second day 
 Article 1: The simple fact of being a faithful interpreter of Scripture does not 
allow the patristic theologian to transcend reason or the reasonable world. In 
response to a contrived objection, the creation of the firmament on the second 
day is discussed under Augustine’s famous dictum that one not hold to a 
theological principle so resolutely that it forces one to retain it in the face of 
incontrovertible philosophical evidence.  
 Article 2: Yet, the faithful reading of the Scriptural text will also assert what the 
text demands the faithful reader assert. In the case of Genesis’ assertion about 
the second day, there are waters above. How, exactly, the various authors 
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understood those waters will vary, but they will all assert the waters above 
contrary to clear observation and reasonable logic.  
 Article 3: The principle of condescension is introduced. The faith of the author is 
tied inexorably with the faith of the audience. Moses does not make a 
philosophical argument here, but seeks the faithful response of his audience. 
Hence one cannot expect philosophical precision from his words. Moses’ 
audience would not have understood such philosophical precision and the 
purpose of Scripture would have been thwarted.  
 Article 4: Is there only one heaven?  
Q 69  The Third Day 
 Article 1: There is value to the perceived tension between authorities. The 
tension of the two interpretational strands of Augustine and Basil may even 
serve to enhance the interpretational task as Basil’s interpretation requires 
considerable effort in order to reconcile with philosophical truths and theology 
and this effort is fruitful.  
 Article 2: On the other hand, Augustine’s idea also provides critical insights into 
the possible nature of reality – rationes seminales.  
QQ 70-72 The fourth through sixth days 
 Article 1: Despite the differences among the patristic theologians, the reverential 
reading also recognizes a fundamental unity. In many things the patristic 
theologians agree and they help the reader understand the philosophers.  
 Article 2: Even Moses needs to be read reverentially – the needs of his audience 
forced him into using terms which were not precise. The principle of 
condescension is further explored 
 Article 3: Sometimes, when the patristic theologians disagree on one point, one 
must remember the essential unity of Article 1 and the condescension of Article 
2 and thus simply force the theologian into orthodoxy through an appeal to a 
principle of equivocation.  
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 QQ 71 and 72:7 A demonstration of the two readings and the richness of 
allowing both interpretational strands to exist side by side.  
Q 73  The seventh Day 
 Article 1: The completion of divine works –Reditus 
 Article 2: Epistemic humility, the fact that God “rested” is difficult to 
understand. Dionysius and Augustine can help, but Augustine is not the ultimate 
authority. He too needs to be read with an appropriate humility. 
 Article 3: Epistemic humility demonstrated:  God’s rest is simply what it is, not 
a tool in the hands of those who would make mincing arguments of it today. 
Dionysius’ parsing of etymologies needs to be read with a measure of good 
sense.  
Q 74 All Seven Days Taken together.  
 Article 1: Both interpretational strands re-addressed and demonstrated to be 
possible interpretations of Genesis 1. 
 Article 2: Intellectual space – two significant theologians can assert the same the 
thing, namely the Creation, and disagree profoundly on its details. There is room 
for such disagreement.  
 Article 3: Exercises in Reverential Reading 
In considering the recapitulation and the recasting of these QQ which follows, the 
reader should keep in mind the following observations:  
1. There was progression from simple to more complex. The initial treatment of the 
patristic authors was quite elementary and reflects the basic material of medieval 
scholasticism. The later treatment, such as that of Augustine in light of 
Dionysian theology in Q 73, 2 and 3, was quite sophisticated. Aquinas asked his 
reader to develop and apply critical reading and thinking skills while progressing 
through this section. 
2. The development is synthetic. Elements which were introduced early in the 
discussion are then used appropriately in Articles which follow. For instance, the 
7 Note that these articles were treated in only one article and hence are treated with Q 70 
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principle of condescension which first appeared in I, 66, 1, was used repeatedly 
and with greater sophistication in subsequent Articles.  
3. The Articles within the section were frequently themselves in a dialogue with 
one another. Consider 67, 1 and 2 in which the conclusions reached stand in a 
tension with one another.  
4. The oscillation between the introduction of concepts and the demonstration of 
those same concepts is a time honored pedagogical technique. (Aquinas was 
always a teacher.)  
5. The lack of resolution of the central question of whether this was a six calendar 
day Creation or an instantaneous Creation seemed designed to foster 
conversation among the readers, creating questions rather than answering them.  
Another interesting pedagogical feature which is not discernible in the outline form is 
the presence of simple or obvious opportunities for a student to challenge a point within 
the Articles. Normally Aquinas is very careful when establishing the suppositions of an 
argument. While the modern reader often finds the science of medieval texts to be 
risible, Aquinas is noted for exercising considerable care in this regard.8 In I, 73, 3ob2, 
however, Aquinas argued a theological premise upon the rather dubious foundation of 
the etymology of a Latin word. This is especially interesting in that he had already 
addressed within these QQ the fact that Genesis 1 had been written in Hebrew and 
Greek and the reader needed to take these languages into account in the interpretive 
act.9 He does not elsewhere indulge in this sort of etymological exercise within these 
QQ. In the Response to the Objection Aquinas let the theology stand for it was 
congruent with what he asserted, but he seemed to be inviting a challenge from a 
student based on the fact that this Latin etymology may not apply to what the Hebrew or 
Greek text of Genesis 1 or the words of Dionysius which were written in Greek.  
The internal analysis of these ten QQ is insufficient, however, to be conclusive. The 
findings are admittedly somewhat subjective and the brevity of this section may suggest 
to the reader that this is too narrow of a sampling of Aquinas’ work to make such a 
claim. The vagaries of subject matter and resources may also account for what I have 
8 Wallace, Intr. xx-xxii. 
9 I, 68, 4c. 
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labeled as synthesis and progression with the text. Another perfectly plausible 
explanation for this material could be that Aquinas was intending a more theological or 
philosophical treatise, but that he simply failed to execute very well. This seems to be 
the answer to which many of Aquinas modern readers subscribe.10 
These objections, while at this point plausible, become untenable when one compares 
these ten QQ to other works of Aquinas in which he addressed the same materials. This 
thesis directs your attention to this second analysis.   
3. A comparative analysis of Aquinas’ various treatments of the primary question 
of QQ 65-74 
The sense that ST I, 65-74 is a pedagogical and not a theological exercise is 
strengthened when one compares QQ 65-74 to Aquinas’ treatments of the primary 
questions of this section in his other works, both earlier and those written at 
approximately the same time. Aquinas addressed the days of Genesis 1 and particularly 
whether these were calendar days or a logical progression in two significant prior 
works: Commentary II, 12-15 and De potentia II-IV. Aquinas wrote the Commentary at 
the beginning of his career11 and it functioned as the thesis by which he entered the rank 
of Master of Theology. This was the regular purpose for such commentaries in that 
period.12 The disputations were conducted in Rome, just prior to writing the prima pars 
of the ST.13 Many have noted the literary and conceptual connections between these 
elements of Commentary and of De potentia and the contents of ST I.14  
A third work also needs attention in this comparison, the Summa Contra Gentiles 
(SCG).15 But here the reader engaged in comparing the texts notes an absence. The 
10 See discussion in Introduction, 8-17.  
11 Weisheipl, 358 dates this 1252-6 when Aquinas lectured on the Sentences and wrote this document. 
There is some indication that he may have edited sections of in subsequent years, but not apparently 
this section.  
12 Torrell, 40-41. 
13 Weisheipl dates De potentia to 1265-6 and the first portions of ST I to 1266. He completed the Prima 
Pars prior to his departure for Paris, likely in 1268. We know that Q 79 must have been composed 
sometime after Nov 22, 1267 as he quotes a translation of Aristotle which was published on that date. 
Weisheipl, 360-3. 
14 Torrell, 161-2. 
15 Weisheipl, 359-360, dates the composition of SCG to 1259-64. 
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entire second book of the SCG is given over to the questions of Creation. None of the 
primary issues which are addressed in ST I, 65-74 are found there. The SCG’s premise 
of presenting Christian theology without an appeal to revelation allows the reader to see 
just which elements of theology Aquinas thought were evident and accessible to reason 
alone, and which elements required knowledge only attainable by a human being 
through revelation. Since the answers to the question at hand depend upon both 
philosophical and theological objections to the creation of unformed matter, the fact that 
the SCG does not address these questions provides critical insight into Aquinas’ 
understanding of the nature of these QQ. By not addressing these questions in the SCG, 
Aquinas bracketed this entire discussion within the field of Scriptural interpretation. 
While every discussion was a philosophical discussion for Aquinas, he understood that 
the discussion of the days of Creation belonged properly to the realm of interpretation 
and exegesis. The understanding of the days of Creation was not accessible through 
unaided human reason. The questions which are addressed in QQ 65-74 of the ST 
involve what a theologian would commonly call a “mystery,” a theological truth which 
is accessible to reasonable exploration, but cannot ever be fully comprehended. This 
reasonable exploration is only possible through divine revelation. Like Trinity, 
Incarnation, Resurrection, et al., Aquinas apparently thought that human rational 
capability would not arrive at these divine truths or even ask these questions. As a 
result, they demanded epistemic humility of the theologian. 
Two works also need to be mentioned here because they are not included in the 
comparison for disparate reasons. Aquinas also treated the question of Creation in QQ 
44-49 of the prima pars of the ST. Herein he was mostly interested in the creative acts 
as an expression of the exitus, but in 44, 2 he catalogued and evaluated philosophical 
opinions regarding the relationship between form and matter. He does not directly 
address the subject of the six days here, but he does lay out what were Aquinas’ core 
philosophical objections which make a belief in a temporal six days problematic. A 
second work which would have been important had it been completed was Aquinas’ 
aborted second commentary on the Sentences. Lost for many years, it has been recently 
rediscovered.16 Before embarking on the ST, Aquinas had initially attempted a new 
16 Lectura romana in primum Sententiarum Petri Lombardi. Usually referred to as the Lectura Romana. 
The critical edition was published in 2006, edited by Leonard E. Boyle OP and John F. Boyle.  
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commentary on the Sentences, but abandoned this project before he arrived at these 
questions. Thus it is not able to serve as a point of comparison.  
At the outset of this comparison, one should make note of a matter of continuity within 
Aquinas’ thought. Peter Lombard in the Sentences had definitively taken the side of that 
interpretive strand for which Basil stood within this discussion, suggesting that the 
understanding of Genesis 1 which read the days as calendar days in which successive 
creative acts took place made more sense and had stronger support within the Christian 
tradition.17 He noted Augustine’s position, and did not positively refute it, but simply 
asserted the other interpretational strand made better sense to him, was easier to teach to 
people, and had stronger support. As early as his Commentary Aquinas had demurred.  
“This (interpretation of Ambrose, Basil, et. al) is the more common 
opinion and superficially seems more consonant with the text, but the 
first (interpretation of Augustine) is more reasonable and better protects 
sacred Scripture from the derision of infidels, which Augustine teaches 
in his literal interpretation of Genesis that Scripture be explained in such 
a way that the infidel cannot mock it; and this opinion is more pleasing 
to me; nevertheless, the arguments sustaining both will be responded 
to.”18 
Aquinas, contra the Lombard’s conclusion, clearly favored Augustine, but he insisted 
that the interpretation of Basil and Ambrose and others is perhaps, on a superficial level, 
more consonant with the text of Scripture and thus was also interpreted. We are not able 
to ascertain what he said in this regard in De potentia due to an unfortunate textual 
lacuna. The text breaks off in the middle of the corpus of question IV, article 2, which 
addressed the very question of whether the Creation happened in stages or 
immediately.19 While the objections and first portion of the Article place him on a 
17 Sentences, II, 2, 1, 3. Quam sententiam Gregorius, Hieronymus, Beda aliique plures commendant ac 
praeferunt, quae etiam Scripturae Genesis, unde prima huius rei cognitio ad nos manavit, magis 
congruere videtur. See also the discussion in Rosemann, 103-105 
18 Commentary II, 12, 2c, et haec quidem positio est communior, et magis consona videtur litterae 
quantum ad superficiem; sed prior est rationabilior, et magis ab irrisione infidelium sacram Scripturam 
defendens: quod valde observandum docet Augustinus super Genes. ad Litt., libro 1, cap. 19, ut sic 
Scripturae exponantur, quod ab infidelibus non irrideantur; et haec opinio plus mihi placet; tamen 
utramque sustinendo, ad omnia argumenta respondendum est.  
19 De potentia IV, 2, utrum materiae formatio tota simul fuerit, an successive. 
116 
 
                                                          
trajectory to come to a similar conclusion as both the ST and Commentary, the lack of 
material renders such a comparison purely speculative.20  
While this lacuna means one cannot use these documents to compare adequately the 
central assertion of QQ 65-74 of the ST, one can inquire into the methodology of his 
treatment of the individual components.  One is able to consider how Aquinas answered 
and approached the various sub-questions, and, more importantly, whether he answered 
them. It has been our contention that in other places Aquinas did answer these questions 
and in so doing used all the tools of medieval theology to arrive at answers which he 
believed best reflected what he would have called “Truth.” In ST I, 65-74, however, we 
demonstrate that he deliberately did not answer these sorts of questions. Aquinas used 
this ambiguity to create a virtual classroom within these QQ and Articles in which 
nascent theologians were given a scope and field to develop critical skills. He 
deliberately limited the tools of theology, particularly the complexity of the patristic 
resources, lest he overwhelm these incipientes. This comparison is especially valid 
because throughout the treatments of certain points, the same citations are repeated, but 
Aquinas’ use of these quotations and citations underwent considerable mutation in form 
and role. Thus, even when considering his treatment of identical patristic citations 
within multiple works, his use of the same theological data suggests that he is seeking a 
different goal in his treatment within the ST.  
For the purposes of this analysis, we propose to consider Aquinas’ treatment of one 
problem which vexed theologians and philosophers of the medieval period: the assertion 
in the text of Genesis 1 that on the second day God had placed waters above the 
heavens. He dealt with this question within this section of the ST in 1, 68, 2 and 3. He 
likewise specifically deals with the question in the Commentary on the Sentences II, IV, 
1-5. In De potentia he wrestled with this issue in IV, 1ob1-7 and the corresponding 
20 In the fifteenth century Dominican Vincent of Castronovo attempted to repair this lacuna and 
completed the corpus along with responses to all the objections. His reading of Aquinas’ thought clearly 
articulated openness to either interpretation but favored Augustine’s approach:  Harum igitur 
expositionum prima, scilicet Augustini, est subtilior, magis ab irrisione infidelium Scripturam defendens; 
secunda vero, scilicet De De potentia IV, 2 continuo, co, aliorum sanctorum, est planior, et magis verbis 
litterae quantum ad superficiem consona. Quia tamen neutra earum a veritate fidei discordat, et 
utrumque sensum circumstantia litterae patitur, ideo, ut neutri harum expositionum praeiudicetur, 
utramque opinionem sustinentes utriusque rationibus respondendum est. 
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responses IV, 1ad1-7. Of particular interest to this study will be Aquinas’ repeated use 
of this quote of Augustine from his literal commentary on Genesis:  
“In whatever form, however, waters may be there, and of whatever kind, 
let us have no doubts at all that that is where they are; the authority of 
this Scripture, surely, overrides anything that human ingenuity is capable 
of thinking up.”21  
Aquinas addressed the question of the waters above first within the pages of the 
Commentary in Book II, Distinction 14, Question 1, Article 1, under the title: Whether 
there are waters above the heavens.22 Lombard’s Sentences had focused on an apparent 
tension inside Augustine’s own writings regarding the nature of these waters and an 
apparent conflict between Augustine and the commentary on Genesis written by Bede 
who had taken a much more spiritual, metaphorical approach, which, however, also 
went back to Augustine. As with many of the commentators on the Sentences Aquinas 
significantly expanded the discussion and focused his writing upon philosophical and 
theological challenges which were only tangential to the material in Peter Lombard’s 
text or which must be imposed and imported to the discussion.23  
The quote from Augustine which was noted above serves as the substance of the 
Commentary’s first Objection of this Article. The rest of the objections argue for the 
presence of water above the firmament: The natural ordering of the human body in 
Objection 2 suggests that we regularly encounter physical things in what appear to be 
illogical arrangements. The established observation that Saturn moves very rapidly and 
must somehow be cooled and thus requires water forms Objection 3.  The sed contra is 
entirely comprised of philosophical, scientific arguments from Aristotle which point to 
the impossibility of the waters above. Within the corpus Aquinas arrived at a resolution 
of the philosophical tension with some ease. The only real Objection of substance is the 
one raised by Augustine. The notion of water above the heavens is simply implausible 
for Aquinas. It cannot be the same elemental water which we observe in this world 
21 Gen. ad litt. II, 5, 9,  Quoquo modo autem et qualeslibet aquae ibi sint, esse eas ibi minime dubitemus: 
maior est quippe scripturae huius auctoritas, quam omnis humani ingenii capacitas. 
22Commentary II, 14, 1, 1  Utrum aquae sint super caelos. 
23 Rosemann, 195-98, suggests that this is the real genius of Lombard’s text and one of the contributing 
reasons for its success in the medieval period. The ambiguity and lacunae in the text were just large 
enough for subsequent commentators and theologians to develop their own systems of thought.  
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below. The answer at which he arrived is that Scripture used an equivocation or 
condescension here, describing the otherwise unknown fifth essence with an element 
which would have been comprehensible to the audience.24 He made this even clearer in 
his Response to the first Objection after the corpus. Augustine was correct, but Aquinas 
argued that Scripture often resorts to metaphorical speech which is unintelligible when 
read in a plain or superficially literal sense.25 
For the purposes of this comparison, it should be noted that Aquinas has a definitive, 
correct answer. While there is some conditional phrasing of the conclusions, it is 
“better” to call this the fifth essence. He was aware that not everyone agrees, but he did 
not place the alternative views on the same footing in the discussion. For Aquinas these 
ideas are quite problematic philosophically. Augustine is allowed to stand, but only 
when the text is read metaphorically. The superficial literal readings are nonsensical for 
Aquinas (intelligi non valent). 
More than a decade later, in De potentia IV, 1, Aquinas again dealt directly with the 
question of Augustine’s approach to the second day and the approach of other 
theologians in two very long articles in which he asked whether the creation of formless 
matter preceded in duration the creation of all things and whether matter was given form 
all at once or in stages.26 The reader who compares this disputation to the material 
within ST I, 65-74 and the Commentary cannot but notice the degree to which the 
questions in De potentia are deeper, and the resources are more complex. This is a more 
mature and capable theologian and philosopher at work than the young man who wrote 
his Commentary. It should be remembered that the disputations which are recorded in 
De potentia were held immediately prior to the ST and seem to have served in many 
cases as a sort of conceptual laboratory for ideas which would appear in the ST. The 
24 Commentary II, 14, 1, 1c  Sed tamen melius possumus dicere, quod intelligatur de firmamento quod est 
caelum sidereum, supra quod sunt aquae, non quidem de natura hujus aquae quae apud nos est, sed de 
natura quintae essentiae, habentes similitudinem cum hac aqua, ratione cujus nomen aquae Scriptura 
eis attribuit, occulta per sensibilia nota manifestans.   
25 Commentary, II, 14, 1, 1ad1, Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in hoc nihil auctoritati Scripturae 
derogatur, si diversimode exponatur, dummodo hoc firmiter teneatur quod sacra Scriptura nihil falsum 
contineat. Constat tamen in Scriptura sacra multa metaphorice tradita, quae secundum planam 
superficiem litterae intelligi non valent.    
26 De potentia IV, pro, Et primo quaeritur utrum creatio materiae informis praecesserit duration 
creationem rerum. Secundo utrum material informis tota simul fuerit, an successive.   
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first Article alone raised 23 objections and offered eight sed contra statements. When 
one considers Thomas’ usage and treatment of sources, the interplay between the 
patristic and philosophical sources results in a far more rigorous and thorough 
exploration. Like the Commentary, however, the entire article in De potentia is clearly 
on a quest for definitive answers, the truth, whereas in the ST this is not the aim.  
The question of the waters above the firmament does not receive treatment as an 
independent Article in De potentia, but it is addressed in a series of Objections and 
Responses (1-7) in the first Article which was focused upon on the phrase “formless and 
void.”27 This structural difference also points to a more pedagogical role for the ST. 
While the discussion of the waters above the firmament lacks a true corpus in De 
potentia, the depth and volume of discussion exceeds that of either the ST or the 
Commentary. This substantial change in the form is most likely attributable to the nature 
of these disputations. Not initially conceived as a written work, these documents are 
each a reportio of a somewhat freewheeling exercise conducted in an actual disputation. 
De potentia reflects an experienced Master holding multiple ideas in tension with each 
other simultaneously and fruitfully combining and recombining elements of the 
discussion. No group of beginners (incipientes) would have been able to keep up with 
such a discussion. Thus in the ST we see the same material treated in much smaller and 
accessible portions.  
A simple numerical comparison of the sources indicates something of the character of 
this treatment with that in the other two works. In the Commentary the Augustine quote 
is only augmented with one other theologian, Ambrose, whose ideas are not adopted but 
put into the category of spiritual interpretation.28 The primary sources which informed 
the conclusion were various works of Aristotle. 
 In ST I, 68, 2 Aquinas made particularly rich use of citations in comparison with other 
articles in the section.29 He quoted Augustine from Gen. ad litt. three times, all from the 
beginning section of book II. He quoted Basil twice, both from his third homily in the 
27De potentia IV, 1ob 7 terra erat inanis et vacua  Gen 1:2 
28 Commentary, II, IV, 1, 1c, Sed hoc magis ad analogicam expositionem pertinet quam ad litteralem.  




                                                          
Hexaemeron. He also included a reference to Origen, a quote from Aristotle’s De caelo 
II, 4 and one citation of the glossa ordinaria which he attributed to Strabo.   
The richness of the sources in ST I, 68, 2 was significantly surpassed, however, in De 
potentia. IV,1, obs1-7/ads1-7. Aquinas’s citations ranged much more widely. He cited 
the same passage from Augustine Gen. ad litt. II which he used to form the first 
Objection in Commentary II, 14, 1, 1. but he also cited Gen. at litt. IV and I, 15, 29; II, 
1, 2; and II, 4, 7- 5, 9. He also cited a work as Augustine's which we now know to be 
pseudepigraphal30 on two occasions. Basil is also cited, but not only from Homily III, 
but also Homilies II and IV. Aristotle’s De caelo is likewise cited, but again from a 
much wider section of that text, with citations from books I and IV. In addition Aquinas 
referenced ‘the Philosopher’, as he likes to apostrophize Aristotle, from Physics I. Even 
Jewish interpreters make an appearance here with references to Rabbi Moses and Philo. 
The ST and De potentia seem to be attempting something different. The resources 
which undergird the arguments and the conclusions are far more complex and robust in 
De potentia.  
This conclusion is reinforced when the two texts are subjected to a verbal comparison. 
In ST I, 68, 2c Aquinas very briefly rendered an opinion about the possibility of the 
waters above being ultra-rarified vapor and somehow ascending above the sidereal 
heaven. He addressed the same question in considerably more detail in De potentia IV, 
1 ob5 and ad5. He clearly has the same argument in mind and uses the same terms to 
describe this idea. He labeled the idea “in every way impossible” (omnino impossibile) 
and “empty” (vanum) in the ST and used similar language to describe it inside De 
potentia: omnino vana, nec iterum esset possibile, and omnino frivola apparet. Despite 
the similar vocabulary for this one idea, when it comes to other ideas about the waters 
above and the waters below, the vocabulary is significantly stronger and more definitive 
in De potentia and much less definitive in the ST. In the ST, Aquinas approached the 
actual understanding of the waters above the firmament by accommodating the various 
theories put forward by patristic theologians to the Scriptural assertion in light of 
rationality and natural observation. In Aquinas words, there are a number of ways to 
30 Dial. quaest. # LXV, qu 21. 
121 
 
                                                          
define these waters.31 In De potentia, on the other hand, the reader encounters repeated 
statements of conclusive argumentation: Conclusions are unavoidable (necesse); 
contrary ideas simply cannot be understood (non posse intelligi); or contrary ideas are 
inadequate or do not hold together (non competat). In De potentia the idea that the 
waters referred to are above the earth but below the heavens as clouds is dismissed (non 
videtur pati litterae circumstantia.)  In ST I, 68, 2ad1 this idea is admitted as a 
possibility, but it requires one to amend Aristotelian understandings of the ordering of 
the elements and allow for what amounts to a subcategory of water (oportet ponere 
alium ordinem in elementis quam Aristoteles ponat.) This extremely charitable reading 
of an idea which Aquinas does not hold is nowhere to be found in the Objections and 
Responses of De potentia. Nowhere within this Article of the ST does one find a 
statement like this from De potentia IV, 1ad5 which addressed the corresponding 
Objection’s appeal to the authority of Scripture and the assertion that the waters are 
there simply because God placed them over the sidereal heaven. In his Response 
Aquinas stated in no uncertain terms that he disagreed.32 This exposition is “deficient” 
because it contradicts evident reason. In ST I, 68 2 Aquinas did not take the incipientes 
to that level of conclusion. This idea, which had been assessed as simply irrational in De 
potentia, was allowed, although only at the expense of recalibrating some Aristotelian 
thought. Aquinas expended considerable effort to allow for a conclusion which he 
expressly denied in a text written in preparation for the writing of this document.  
It is the use and positioning of the Augustine quote from Gen. ad litt. II, 5, 9, however, 
which offers the clearest insight into the divergent purposes of De potentia and ST I, 68, 
2c. This comparative exercise also offers an opportunity for an examination of Aquinas’ 
sources though his use of this quotation. A comparison and analysis of Augustine’s 
actual words, the Lombard’s citation of Augustine and Aquinas’ treatment of this 
citation is illuminating.  
A comparison of the quotation further reinforces the assertion made earlier in this thesis 
that Aquinas was reading his sources carefully and thoroughly, not content to trust the 
Lombard’s catalogue of citations but insistent upon delving into the source documents 
31 I, 68, 2c., Sed quales aquae sint, oportet diversimode definire, secundum diversam de firmamento 
sententiam. 
32 De potentia IV, 1ad5, Sed haec expositio in hoc videtur deficiere, quod asserit quaedam per Scripturam 
sacram intelligi, quorum contraria satis evidentibus rationibus probantur. 
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themselves. Furthermore the subtle changes to the quote suggest the importance of this 
passage for Aquinas’ thought. He apparently had the quotation memorized, but has 
remembered it in simpler Latin than the original quote. One also notes that Aquinas has 
manipulated the quotation to emphasize elements he considered most important.  
The original context for the quote from Augustine was within a larger discussion of 
problems raised by the text of Genesis 1:6-19. The section immediately prior (II, 4, 7) to 
this quotation in Gen. ad litt. includes a favorable evaluation of Basil’s homilies on the 
hexaemeron by Augustine. In II, 4, 7, Augustine praised (laude dignissimam iudico) 
Basil’s resolution of an intellectual problem surfaced by the Genesis assertion that there 
are waters above the firmament, without endorsing Basil’s solution. In Augustine’s 
estimation Basil’s idea was concordant with the faith and intellectually plausible, but 
Augustine took some pains not to go so far as to say that it was correct, only that it 
could be correct and he could believe it.33 In the passage which falls between the 
treatment of Basil’s solution and the quotation considered below, Augustine noted other 
solutions, refusing to give priority to one over another. This sentence from Augustine 
then serves within his own work as a hermeneutical rubric for reading the prior material. 
The fact of the water should not be doubted, but there are multiple possible explanations 
for its exact nature and form.  
Peter Lombard had roughly paraphrased the passage, combining it with a relatively 
faithful quotation from II, 4, 8 which immediately preceded the quotation under 
consideration. The admonition not to doubt is paraphrased, but the vaporization theory 
which formed one of the arguments allowed but not endorsed by Augustine is preferred 
and the other, alternative theories are not mentioned at all. The Lombard had an answer 
to the problem; it was one of several suggestions put forward by Augustine, probably 
the one preferred by Augustine, but still a solution which Augustine only argued as one 
plausible solution. For the Lombard, it was the solution.  
In Commentary II, 14, 1, 1 one notes that Aquinas had clearly read the passage in the 
original document as his quotation does not include the portion of the quote to which 
the Lombard alluded, but the adjoining material, leaving out entirely the admonition not 
33 Gen. ad litt. II, 4, 7, Quod enim dixit, neque contra fidem est, et in promptu posito documento credi 
potest.   
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to doubt, but stating the premise upon which that doubt was excluded and converting 
the premise into a positive statement of fact.34  
In De potentia the premise and the admonition against doubt was quoted after a 
paraphrase of the admonition against doubting the fact of the water above the 
firmament. But it should be noted that the quotation is even more precise in De potentia 
than the Commentary’s quotation of the same passage; although, it is not an exact quote.  
In ST I, 68, 2c, Aquinas included both elements of the Augustine quotation, closely 
quoting the Augustine text, however, reversing the two elements from the original, an 
editorial decision which served to emphasize the result, namely that the reader should 
not doubt that there are waters above.    















34 Sentences 14, 1, 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aquae super caelos sint. Quia, ut dicit 
Augustinus, major est sacrae Scripturae auctoritas quam omnis humani ingenii perspicacitas. Sed 




                                                          
Table 1: Aquinas’ treatment of the quotation of Augustine, Gen. ad litt. II, 5, 9 
Augustine, 
Gen. ad litt. II, 
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Peter Lombard, 
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Close reading and analysis suggests that Aquinas used the quote from Augustine for 
different purposes within each of his treatments. He has manipulated both the content 
and the placement of this important quotation/citation of Augustinian material.  
Aquinas’ manipulation of this passage from Augustine for pedagogical purposes 
becomes even more apparent when one considers the location and role the quotation of 
Gen. ad litt. II 5, 9 played in each of the works. In De potentia IV this passage is used at 
the conclusion of the catalogue of various opinions about the waters above to explain 
why Augustine rejected all of the various opinions about water vapors. “Hence 
Augustine does not adopt any of these explanations but dismisses them as doubtful. He 
wrote: Howsoever these waters may be there and of what kind they may be, one thing is 
certain, they are there. For indeed, the authority of this Holy Scripture is greater than the 
entire capacity of human genius.” 
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When presenting the same material in ST I, 68, 2c, the same quote from Augustine is 
used, but here it led off the discussion of the Article’s corpus:  “Reply: As Augustine 
observes ‘The Scriptural text has more authority than any human theory. Therefore, 
however and whatever these waters may be, we cannot in any way doubt that they are 
there.’ Not all writers give the same explanation of the nature of these waters…”35 The 
effect of the Augustine quote from Gen. ad litt. II, 5, 9 within the ST is to cast the 
content of the Article into the sphere of hermeneutics and to conduct the discussion 
about the waters above inside a parameter dictated by Augustine. In De potentia the 
quote established Augustine’s neutral position over against all the others while asserting 
the fact of the water. In ST I, 68, 2, Augustine’s position has become the rule under 
which the others are considered.  
In some respects, the ST mirrors the treatment in the Commentary which placed the 
Augustine quote as the first Objection and wrestled with its implications in the corpus. 
But even the Commentary’s approach diverges from the ST in that within the 
Commentary Augustine’s idea established a theological truth which was then placed 
into a tension with the natural philosophical understanding of the world. In ST I, 68, 2, 
the Augustine quote served to govern the attempted resolution of the tension created by 
other Objections and the contrary ideas raised by reason and philosophy.  
When comparing the treatment of this quotation of Augustine within the ST and the 
Commentary, a second point must be considered as well. The Commentary, in contrast 
to the ST, reaches a conclusion: The waters above the firmament are the fifth essence. 
This hermeneutical approach in the ST also stands in contrast to the use of Augustine in 
De potentia. Aquinas used the same quote by Augustine in De potentia to provide 
justification for his preferred understanding of the waters above: “Wherefore one would 
prefer to offer an explanation which would leave the text of Scripture unassailable, by 
suggesting that those waters are not of the same nature as our elemental water, but are 
of the nature of the Fifth Essence,…”36 In Aquinas’ estimation, Augustine did not 
35 ST I, 68, 2c, Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, II super Gen. ad Litt., maior est 
Scripturae huius auctoritas quam omnis humani ingenii capacitas. Unde quomodo et quales aquae ibi 
sint, eas tamen ibi esse, minime dubitamus. Quales autem sint illae aquae, non eodem modo ab omnibus 
assignatur.  
36 De potentia IV, 1 ad5, Et ideo aliter videtur dicendum ad hoc quod Scripturae veritas ab omni calumnia 
defendatur; ut dicamus, quod aquae illae non sint de natura harum aquarum elementarium, sed sint de 
natura quintae essentiae. 
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subscribe to the other theories and resisted any attempt to spiritualize the waters, even 
though he did not hold to the quintessence theory of Aristotle and hence could not 
explain them in a rationally coherent sense. This use of Augustine’s quote created a 
space in De potentia for medieval theologians to propose a model which allowed 
Augustine’s dictum to obtain and which answered the objections of reason and 
observation of the natural world. To understand the waters above as the quintessence 
was clearly the “right” answer in Aquinas’ estimation. Even though Augustine had not 
arrived at the proper conclusion in Aquinas’ opinion, Augustine’s insistence upon the 
inviolability of Scripture had left sufficient intellectual space for the proper conclusion 
to be reached by those who followed. Contrast this with the use of the Augustine quote 
in ST I, 68, 2 in which Augustine’s dictum is asserted but the Article comes to no 
conclusion about the nature of those waters.  
This distinction observed in a detailed analysis of this Augustine quotation is further 
reinforced when one turns to the treatment of other sources in both these three works, 
ST I, 68, 2; Commentary II, 14, 1, 1; and De potentia IV, 1. In the Commentary Aquinas 
marshaled first this quote of Augustine we have under consideration in the first 
objection, but the tension is created entirely by logic, observation, and citations of 
Aristotle. Within the corpus Ambrose is credited with a metaphorical solution but 
Augustine’s ideas form the principle point of discussion along with Rabbi Moses 
Maimonides. The solution to the problem is generated by an appeal to natural 
observation and the logic of Aristotle and demonstrated to be concordant with the faith 
by fitting under the rubric of Augustine’s wise reluctance to espouse any of the prior 
solutions. Aquinas contends that subsequent development of philosophy and science has 
enabled him to “say it better”37 with the quintessence.   
Within De potentia the various theories which seek to explain the waters above begin 
with the same citation of Origen as one finds in the ST 68, 2. But while in De potentia 
Basil is also present, the quotations in ST 68, 2 are different and there are significant 
omissions of sources which would have substantively complicated the discussion. 
Maimonides, much of the substance of Basil’s assertions, and another quote by 
Augustine, which peppered the De potentia discussion, are all absent from the treatment 
in ST 1, 68, 2. Origen’s idea of a spiritual essence for the waters above is put forward in 
37 Commentary II, 14, 1, 1c, Melius possumus dicere.  
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both texts,38 but in De potentia this was not met by Basil, but by “others” with whom 
Rabbi Moses agreed. In both, Basil disagreed with Origen, but in De potentia, Aquinas 
located Basil within a larger group of those who simply offered up other ideas. In ST 
68, 2c Basil’s role is increased. He is given the task of definitively refuting Origen’s 
spiritualization and asserting that the waters above are in fact water. Aquinas accepted 
that reality and proceeded to a catalogue of the several different ways one could 
understand these waters above. All these were put forward without any dependence 
upon a patristic source, but simply given as reasonable or possible solutions, assuming 
Basil is right and the waters are truly material.   
The preceding analysis may be summarized in the following table: 
 Commentary II, 14, 
1, 1 
De potentia IV, 1, 
ob1-7/ad1-7 
ST I, 68, 2 
Re: conclusion Aquinas reached a 
definitive 
conclusion: the 
waters above are the 
quintessence  
Aquinas reached a 
definite conclusion 
– the waters above 
are best understood 
to be quintessence.  
Aquinas reaches no 
conclusion, does not 
use term 
“quintessence.”  
Re: use of Gen. ad 
litt. II, 5, 9.  
Aquinas used quote 
as the first objection 
to articulate the 
Article’s point of 
tension. The sacred 
truth of Scripture is 
in tension with the 
observed 
phenomena and this 
tension when 
examined yielded 
the refinement of 
understanding 
which was stated as 
the conclusion.  
The Augustine 
quote is used at the 
end of the argument 
to justify the 









The quote from 
Augustine opened 
the corpus, and 
served as a 
hermeneutical 
umbrella under 




reader may reach, 
that reading cannot 
deny the sacred truth 








Re: use of other His sources within Aquinas’ use of Aquinas limited his 
38 In the Commentary II, 14, 1, 1c the spiritualizing interpretation was put forward by Ambrose and 
quickly dismissed.  
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sources the rest of the 
Article are almost 
entirely from 
Aristotle (De 
anima, De physica, 
and De generatione 
et corruptione). The 
only other patristic 
source is a citation 
of Ambrose’s 
metaphorical 
resolution in De 
spiritu sancto and a 
reference to 
“others” who offer 
various literal 
attempts at a 
resolution but which 




other sources was 
rich. He cited 
Augustine and 
Aristotle within the 
Objections; used 
two quotes of 
Augustine (De Trin. 
and Gen. ad litt.) 
within the sed 
contra’s; within the 
Responses to the 
Objections Aquinas 
quoted an expansive 
variety of patristic 
and non-patristic 
authors Augustine, 
Origen, and Basil’s 
hexaemeron 




Aristotle. Within the 
corpus the ideas of 
Basil, Origen, 
Augustine, and 
Strabo are all 
considered under the 
hermeneutical 
principle laid down 
by the Augustine 
quote. Some ideas 
are rejected as 
contrary to 




But no single idea 




If De potentia were not extant, the differences between the Commentary and the ST 
might be attributable to the maturation of Aquinas and his ideas. But the fact that in De 
potentia Aquinas is still making the argument of the Commentary, indeed more 
robustly, suggests that he had not abandoned the conclusion. In truth, he had reinforced 
it and asserted it more emphatically. Yet, when he turned to the same material a few 
months later in Q 68 within the ST, the reader encounters no such conclusion. In fact, 
the conclusion preferred in both of the earlier works is not even one of the possibilities 
suggested. Nor is it plausible that Aquinas had, in the months between conducting the 
dispute which became De potentia and the writing of the ST, somehow abandoned the 
idea of quintessence, as he used the term and defended it in ST I, 66, 2, a mere two QQ 
prior to this discussion. It would seem that the only alternative at this point is to suggest 
that the discussion of ST I, 68, 2 is a deliberately shaped conversation, not with the goal 
of arriving at a specific answer, and certainly not Aquinas’ preferred answer. It would 
appear the goal is to conduct the conversation itself. The primary objective here is not 
the identification of the waters above, but I would argue that the real goal of this Article 
is best seen in the role of Augustine and the hermeneutics which govern any 
interpretation of Scripture for Aquinas. As Aquinas used his words within this Question, 
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Augustine sets the parameters for the discussion. Aquinas desired the one who read this 
material to operate under this principle or rule: Whatever we might say about the 
creative event, we cannot deny Scripture’s authority. That said, Scripture itself allows 
for multiple interpretations or understandings of that creative event which might be 
valid and true.  
This Question and indeed all ten of the Questions of this section, for they are similar in 
this regard, do not compose a theological or philosophical writing which is seeking to 
answer the questions under which the discussions are conducted. It is a pedagogical 
exercise endeavoring to school the reader in how to ask the questions of patristic 
authorities and arrive at answers which are both fruitful and born of an appropriate 
epistemic humility.  
4. Subsequent Development 
In the section of the ST which begins at Q 75 Aquinas took up his innovative discussion 
of the creation of the human being, in which he explored the assertion he had made in 
his Commentary that the human being is the horizon creature, the pinnacle of God’s 
Creation, occupying the very point at which the physical and spiritual meet.39 In 
addition to all we have already said, Aquinas has been laying groundwork for this 
discussion and more which followed as he explored the reditus of all Creation through 
the incarnate Christ. From these ten QQ we know, for example, that the human being is 
not inferior to the heavenly bodies.40 The heavenly bodies, sun, moon, and stars, are not 
greater beings in that they are some great living intelligences looking down upon us 
from lofty heights. In Aquinas’ estimation they are but the bodies which angelic beings 
push around the various spheres. They are not, like the human person, truly living 
beings, with a rational soul. The sun, moon, and stars are not truly alive and thus are 
inferior in a philosophical sense to the human being.  
Though he has surely taken such steps to prepare the reader for the next section and 
moved the reader closer to the goals of the whole ST, it is also clear that there is a great 
deal of material in these questions which does not serve the purposes of simply laying a 
foundation of content which the reader will need for what follows. While the Christian 
39 Commentary III, pro. 
40 I, 70, 3. 
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doctrine of Creation is pondered within these QQ, he does not make a substantive 
theological advance over the material presented in QQ 44-49. An otherwise efficient 
writer, Aquinas would not have taken such an excursus with no purpose. It is the 
argument of this thesis that these questions are less about content than they are about the 
theological method which Aquinas seeks to inculcate within his reader.  
Aquinas was not so bound to the structure of the Sentences that he could not deviate 
from it, as he proved in the secunda pars and tertia pars of the ST. It has been our 
contention that the most logical reasons for such a treatment of the first chapter of 
Genesis have been pedagogical and to some extent, through the reader, apologetic. 
Aquinas was equipping his reader to be a lector with a theological text which avoided 
the meaningless repetitions of prior texts41 and which avoided the detrimental 
separation of the doctrinal from the moral component. He sought to equip these lectores 
so they might serve the Dominican Order, the Pope, and Christ himself in a mission to 
which he was personally committed. He envisioned that they would enter the priories of 
the Order in order to inculcate the careful and reverential reading of patristic sources, a 
reading which reflects the serious theological engagement of a mature and competent 
theologian. 42 He was also writing in a context in which the order itself is repeatedly 
subject to the charge that it is undoing the faith which was built upon the shoulders of 
the patristic theologians. In his survey of the impact of the mendicants upon the 
medieval world, C. H. Lawrence quoted a contemporary of Aquinas in Paris:  
“From the eminence of Ste Genevieve on the Mount, Stephen of Tournai 
looked down at the schools of Paris pullulating on the south bank and the 
island, and he did not like what he saw. ‘As if the works of the holy 
Fathers are not enough,’ he complained, ‘they dispute publicly against 
the sacred canons concerning the incomprehensible deity; they divide 
and rend the indivisible Trinity, and there are as many errors as there are 
masters.’” 43  
41 ST, I, pro., plurimum impediri, partim quidem propter multiplicationem inutilium quaestionum, 
articulorum et argumentorum.  
42 Jordan, 118-120. 
43 C. H. Lawrence, The Friars: The impact of the early mendicant movement on western society (London 
and New York: Longman, 1994) 13.  Stephen of Tournai found in PL 211, 517. 
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The friars of the Dominican Order needed theological and patristic acumen to face such 
a critique.44 Aquinas knew that critique from personal experience. His own inaugural 
lecture as a Regent Master of Theology at Paris had taken place amid violent rioting, 
incited by the sermons and publications of another Master of Theology, William of 
Saint-Amour. The situation was so tense that the king dispatched royal archers to serve 
as a security detail guaranteeing the safety of Aquinas and his fellow mendicants that 
day. Aquinas did not shrink from this contest. His first quodlibetal disputations in Lent 
of 1256 directly challenged the critique of the mendicants, and his first publication after 
his inception as a Regent Master was a rebuttal of William’s argument against the 
mendicants:  Liber contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem.45  
Such a spirited defense of the mendicant mission and the intellectual enterprise to which 
Aquinas was committed meant he also had to carefully prepare the friars he had 
defended. They would render his defense of the Order hollow if they had left their 
priories and had proven the validity Stephen of Tornai’s critique by their mishandling of 
theology’s primary materials: Scripture and the patristic sources.  
It also has to be acknowledged that Aquinas may have viewed the inclusion of a primer 
on how to read patristic authority as necessary. It would have filled what might have 
been perceived as a serious lacuna within the content of the ST itself. He had abandoned 
a recast commentary on the Sentences in order to write the ST. While it was perhaps too 
difficult for his students in Santa Sabina, the real strength of the Sentences of Peter 
Lombard was that it forced the reader to wrestle with the complexity of Scriptural 
interpretation by various patristic theologians. By setting aside the Sentences as a 
primary text and writing a more synthetic treatment of theology, Aquinas had stepped 
away from this valued facet of the Lombard’s work. These ten QQ may have supplied 
that perceived gap in the ST’s content.  
It is the goal of preparing his brother Dominicans which has led him to write this 
exercise in reverential reading which one finds in QQ 65-74 of the prima pars. In 
Aquinas’ estimation it was both simply good to do and necessary for the climate in 
44 Lawrence, 84-88, discusses the Dominican Order’s concern for the preaching task. He suggests that 
the purpose of the studium provinciale was purely utilitarian. It produced preachers as opposed to the 
studium generale which engaged in speculative theology.  
45 See Weisheipl, 82-89 and Torrell, 79-81. 
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which they ventured forth from the walls of their priory into the streets and squares of 
the burgeoning cities of Europe.  Among the crowds who gathered to hear them preach 
would surely be the cinctured Cistercians, Benedictines, and Augustinians, along with 
local priests and scholars, all of whom might be looking for an opportunity to catch the 
preacher in some error. Even though that mendicant preacher could claim special papal 
authority, he also threatened the stability of their medieval world. In Aquinas’ 
estimation his readers had to be able to inculcate this skill in the men who listened to 
their lectures in the priories of the Ordo Praedicatorum.46  
46 At least one theologian thought the climate so dangerous he refused to speak on certain issues, in this 
instance in a Quodlibetal debate in the 1270’s, lest he be “condemned.”  Torrell, 300. 
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 Chapter 5: Re-reading ST I, 65-74 in light of Aquinas’ use of sources 
1. Elementary principles of patristic reading: QQ 65-66. 
In the first two QQ of this section, Aquinas introduced the reader to several basic tenets 
which guide the reading of the patristic theologians and outlined the basic shape of a 
reverential reading. Briefly stated, these are: patristic theologians can be in error (65, 2), 
and thus do not constitute an irrefutable authority such as Scripture for Aquinas. But the 
reader cannot assume that what appears to be an error is always an error (65, 3). In 
positing this charitable reading, Aquinas guided the reader toward a position of some 
humility before these authors. The reader, he insisted, must ask why this authoritative 
source has written these things and what has changed in the centuries which have 
transpired since those words were penned. Aquinas introduced his readership to basic 
issues of semantics (65, 4), historical context (65, 3), and intellectual context (66, 2 - 3). 
The reader will also want to take note that in Q 66, 1 he introduced the interpretations of 
Basil and Augustine which resulted in a clear expression of the need for the epistemic 
humility in 66, 4 after exhausting the semantic and philosophical tools of reconciliation. 
Question 65   de creatura corporali 
Article 1 utrum creatura corporalis sit a Deo1 
Aquinas began his discussion of the Genesis 1 account of the Creation event with the 
weightiest of issues: Do material creatures come from God? This question had been the 
locus of some of Christianity’s greatest battles since its inception and had continued to 
exercise Christian theologians for centuries prior to Aquinas. The importance of this 
question had not diminished by the thirteenth century. The Dominican Order had only 
recently2 been birthed out of a necessity to confront the Cathar or Albigensian 
movement. In the minds of Aquinas and his peers, this dualist sect held that corporeal 
1 Cf. Commentary II, 1, 1, 1-3; De potentia III, 6; ST I, 44; and 45, 5. 
2 Lawrence, 13-15, Honorius III issued the Papal Bull which founded the Ordo Praedicatorum on Dec 22, 
1216. Thomas was born 9 years later in 1224/5 and joined the order in 1244.  
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things did not come from God.3 The Albigensian theology which the Aquinas and his 
peers rejected posited a schema of Creation in which only the spiritual truly came from 
God, the physical was not attributable to him. Eight centuries earlier this idea had been 
held by the Manicheans. Augustine had addressed much of his work, particularly early 
in his career, as an argument against this dualistic understanding held by the 
Manicheans.  The importance of this relationship between the Creator and the Creation 
meant that this first Article addressed a question for which Aquinas had a definite 
answer. Indeed, in reading the article, no room for ambiguity is found herein. Aquinas 
made this very clear. Regarding the alternative to a divine source for the Creation he 
held that this position is altogether impossible.4 Material Creation comes from God, 
says Aquinas.  
In considering the sources to which Aquinas appealed, the absence of Augustine 
citations must be noted. Scripture is widely cited, but Augustine is entirely absent, at 
least in citation if not in theological content. For the reader who is considering sources 
this omission is odd because Augustine had spent so much of his career in conflict with 
the Manicheans, a movement which Aquinas and others considered to be a parallel 
movement to the Albigensian heresy and which had been met with a serious response. 
Just a generation prior to Aquinas the response to the Albigensians had culminated in a 
crusade within France from 1209-1229. It would seem that Augustine would have been 
a natural resource for this argument. Augustine had penned a commentary on Genesis 
which he had entitled “against the Manicheans.”5 Augustine was certainly well known 
and well read for his anti-Manichean writings in light of the recent struggle against the 
Albigensians.6 Yet, Aquinas made no use of Augustine in the article which addressed 
the Manichean and, at least in his mind, the Albigensian error. While an argument from 
3 Mark Gregory Pegg, in A Most Holy War: The Albigensian Crusade and the Battle for Christendom, 
(Oxford: Oxford, 2008), has argued that the Cathar/Albigensian movement was in fact not a real heresy 
but a matter of perception. While a lack of documentary evidence means that it remains very difficult to 
know exactly what the Albigensians believed, it is very clear that Aquinas and his peers rejected the 
dualism which they ascribed to the Albigensians.   
4 ST I, 65, 1, resp,  haec autem positio est omnino impossibilis. 
5 Gen. contr. Man.  
6 Edward A. Synan, “It Seems There is No God, 1256-1274” in Studies in Medieval Culture, Vol. VIII & IX, 
Eds.: John Sommerfeld and E. Roxanne Elder, (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute of Western Michigan 
University, 1976), 103-4. 
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silence is ever problematic, the absence of such a voice from this article is suggestive. Is 
Augustine perhaps being saved for something else? Considering the proliferation of 
Augustine citations which follow, it would seem so.  
One could argue that the higher authority of Scripture supersedes and obviates the need 
for Augustine, but this does not accord with Aquinas’ use of patristic and Scriptural 
sources elsewhere in the ST. They often mingle and co-exist in the course of his 
argumentation.7 If our thesis is correct, and QQ 65-74 are indeed an exercise in the 
reading of patristic sources, Augustine’s absence in this first article makes considerable 
sense. Aquinas intended within this entire section to allow both Basil’s and Augustine’s 
interpretation of Genesis 1 to stand. If he had appealed to Augustine’s authority in 
settling this first and essential question, surely the ensuing debate could not have been 
held on anything like an equal footing. Had the goal of the section been to establish that 
Augustine’s reading of the Creation event was indeed the correct interpretation, then 
surely Aquinas would have wanted to bolster his credibility and authority by including 
him within this Article. By not including him, he makes possible the disputation 
between the interpretational strands of Augustine and Basil which one finds in 
subsequent Articles.  
Article 2 utrum sit facta (sc. creatio) propter bonitatem Dei8 
Having established that God was indeed behind the creation of material things, in the 
second Article, Aquinas undertook to explore the question how the Creation event 
happened. It is within this question that the examination of patristic resources began. In 
65, 2 Aquinas posed the question which wondered if material creatures were made to 
manifest God’s goodness. The first of the patristic resources was brought forward, 
Origen, the highly prolific, creative, and often controversial theologian of Alexandria 
from the third century AD. The choice of Origen to open this discussion is in itself 
interesting. Origen was a theologian whose ideas had come under suspicion by the end 
7 While nearly any place in the ST could be cited as an example, consider Q 94 of the Prima Pars in which 
Aquinas addresses the intellect of the first man, Adam. In Article 1 he quoted, John of Damascus, five 
different passages from Augustine, and Peter Lombard. In the same article he also cites passages from I 
Corinthians, Ecclesiastes, and Genesis.  
8 Cf. Commentary II, 1, 2, 2; ST I, 47, 2. 
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of the fourth century as a byproduct of the Trinitarian debates.9 By the medieval period 
Origen had come to have an almost dual existence in medieval theological writing. His 
highly allegorical commentaries, especially on the Song of Songs, were widely read and 
lavishly praised. Bernard of Clairvaux seems to have depended extensively upon him. 
At the same time, and occasionally in the very same paragraphs in which they had just 
praised him, some medieval theologians could also refer to his “madness,” “heresy,” 
and “blasphemy.”10 Within this Article, Aquinas used the obvious example of Origen to 
make the first assertion regarding the patristic theologians: they are not infallible, but 
may indeed err. The incipient theologian needs to develop the skill of discernment.  
Aquinas examined a theological idea Origen had posited11 in which he asserted that the 
creation of the corporeal beings was a punishment for the sins of spiritual beings prior 
to the Creation. Origen seemed to suggest that a heavenly body such as the moon was a 
prison for a disobedient angel. For Aquinas’ readers, this was clearly aberrant from the 
Christian tradition which had been received in the medieval period. It would appear that 
no one held this position in the 13th century within Aquinas’ sphere of readers or their 
acquaintances, making the discussion purely academic, or in this case, pedagogical. But 
this was not entirely an academic or theoretical issue. The medieval theologian needed 
to exercise discernment even here. The period had seen some extraordinary 
interpretations of Creation, the most outlandish perhaps being that of Bernard Silvestris 
in his Cosmographia which he presented to Pope Eugene III in 1147.12 
Aquinas had his reader consider the position of Origen in order to apply two criteria for 
evaluating the theology of Origen. The first principle for evaluating the teaching of a 
patristic theologian was the witness of Scripture. 13 But Scripture alone, in this situation, 
9 Michael A. Thomas, “Isaiah’s Vision of God: The Christian Interpretive Struggle of Isaiah 6:1-5 in Early 
Christianity.” (PhD Diss., Univ. of Virginia, 2008), 120-122. 
10 See Henri de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, Vol. 1, Trans.: E. M. Macierowski, (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2000), 172-184, for his discussion of the translation of Origen into Latin and his wide 
dispersal throughout the west. Particularly note #167 in which he observed Aquinas’ dependence upon 
and suspicion of Origen. Later de Lubac placed Aquinas in the stream of medieval theologians who 
accepted Origen, 221. 
11 Peri Archon III, 5.  PG II, 329.   
12 Marcia Colish, Peter Lombard, Vol. I, (Leiden/New York: Brill, 1994), 306-309.  
13 I, 65, 2c, Quae quidem positio erronea est. Primo quidem, quia contrariatur Scripturae,…  
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was not sufficient. Anyone who has listened to theological debates knows that every 
side appeals to Scriptural authority. Even the Manichees and Albigensians had appealed 
to Scripture. There was a second criterion: Origen’s position would be difficult to 
reconcile with simple logic and the observable world.14 He illustrated this with an 
example from nature. If the sun were indeed a prison for some angelic sinner, had there 
been two of the same sorts of angelic sinners there would have been two suns or three, 
or more. He concludes that this position is then in every way unsuitable or 
inappropriate.15 On the one hand the theologian’s comments are rejected because they 
contradict Scripture, and on the other because they are wholly unsuitable to the way 
things are. The reader will want to notice that the non-Christian philosophers, when they 
are cited, were primarily utilized to establish the “way things are.”  
This establishment of these two criteria of evaluation was not the end of this discussion. 
The evaluation of Origen’s error gives Aquinas an occasion to talk about the final 
purpose, the reditus, of the Creation and particularly the role that the human being has 
to play within that final purpose. This orderly universe is arranged in its various parts to 
bring glory to God, Aquinas asserts. As the various parts work together, this glory 
magnifies. But at the top of this hierarchy of glory stand the rational creatures of God, 
who “have God as their goal in a special way, since they can attain him by their own 
operations of knowing and loving.”16 
Because this now touched upon the matter of the meaning of humanity, after the initial 
assertion of a theology of Creation in which God was the origin of the corporeal 
Creation, Aquinas took up the final cause of Creation (finis omnium corporalium) but in 
so doing began to establish the critical evaluation of the patristic theologians. The 
example was obvious, it required no great thought on the part of the reader, but it gave 
Aquinas the opportunity to lay down the two chief criteria for evaluating the debate 
which followed. The patristic theologians are not an absolute source but must 
themselves adhere to Scripture and present a theology which reflects what we also know 
from observing and understanding the created world in which we live. More such 
14 I, 65, 2c, Secundo, quia sequeretur quod mundi corporalis dispositio quae nunc est, esset a casu.  
15 I, 65, 2c, Haec autem sunt omnino inconvenientia.  
16 I, 65, 2c, quamvis creaturae rationales speciali quodam modo supra hoc habeant finem Deum, quem 
attingere possunt sua operatione, cognoscendo et amando.   
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criteria followed as did an exploration of the obvious tension between these two 
elements, but these were his first and essential building blocks.  
In order to further establish the pedagogical nature of this section, the reader should take 
note of the simplistic use of patristic sources within the Article. The treatment of Origen 
is extremely elementary. The pedagogical arc of the entire section can be seen in the 
fact that Aquinas has more to say on this subject, but reserves this for later in the 
document. In 73, 2 Aquinas imposed this issue onto an otherwise unrelated question 
under consideration through a quote of Dionysius on the very subject of God’s goodness 
penetrating all of Creation.17 Dionysius was clearly available to Aquinas on this subject 
and would be soon utilized, even forced into the treatment of an unrelated topic. If this 
were a quest for theological truth, that Aquinas would omit him here is particularly odd. 
But if this is a pedagogical exercise, the movement from simple to more complex 
treatments of authors makes this much clearer. Dionysius’ words were not at all clear 
and would later be put into a very subtle tension with an interpretation on Augustine’s 
part which Aquinas found somewhat problematic.  
Article 3  utrum sit facta a Deo mediantibus Angelis18 
In the third Article of Question 65, Aquinas asked whether God used angelic 
intermediaries for the production of the material universe. Again, Aquinas came to a 
conclusion. In his estimation God did not. In considering his treatment of sources, 
Aquinas here made use of patristic resources and the philosophers who played a 
supporting role. In the objections he cited three reasons why one might think that God 
used such intermediaries. In the first of these he posited that since it is wise to delegate 
things and since God is wise, he must have delegated this work. In support he cites 
Aristotle and Augustine in a parallel treatment. They both say the lower serves the 
higher, Aristotle in his Metaphysics19 and Augustine in De Trinitate.20 The second 
objection asserted that the sheer diversity of the Creation suggests diverse creative 
17 De divinis nominibus II, 4. 
18 Cf. Commentary II, 1, 1, 3-4; II, 18, 2, 2; IV, 5, 1, 3q3; De potentia III, 4; ST 44, 1; 45, 5; and De 
substantiis separatis 10. 
19 Metaphysics I, 2. 
20 De Trinitate III, 1, 4. 
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agents. The third objection was based on the idea that omnipotence is disproportionate 
to the effect and hence an inefficient use of omnipotent power.  
The sed contra establishes a tension with this idea by simply restating Genesis 1:1 In 
the beginning God created heaven and earth.  
Aquinas had in mind the belief of certain Neo-Platonists. William Wallace, the editor of 
the Blackfriar’s edition, suggests Avicenna and Algazel.21 The real argument is not the 
first objection in which Aristotle and Augustine are cited. The real argument is found in 
Objections 2 and 3 and in answering these objections to divine creative agency Aquinas 
made an important distinction. The corporeal Creation is not really diverse; it is in fact 
unified by the fact of its corporeality, the ‘that-ness’ of its being, often called 
“quiddity.” Only the infinite power of God could possibly have created ‘being.’ Angelic 
powers might cause change within a being, but they are insufficient to cause being 
itself.  
The inclusion of Augustine and Aristotle in the first Objection afforded Aquinas 
occasion to explore the reverential reading of sources. Whereas in the prior Article 
Origen was simply wrong, in this Article Aristotle and Augustine were marshaled in 
support of the losing side in the argument, but then carefully read to allow that what 
they said was also true. This is the beginning of the reverential reading which Aquinas 
developed throughout this section. In the Response to the first Objection, Aquinas 
carefully allowed both Aristotle and Augustine to be correct but potentially 
misunderstood. Their words require a measure of analysis and criticism on the part of 
the reader. Yes, there is order and wisdom to the Creation, but it is not found in the 
delegation of the creative task. That sort of delegation is “impossible.”22 The order and 
wisdom are reflected in the hierarchy of Creation.  
As a result, in addition to establishing the divine act of Creation as properly belonging 
only to God, Aquinas also posited something about the reading of the patristic 
theologians. They can be read to support an error, but a reverential reading will ask 
what we know about the matter at hand and will seek to accommodate their words to it. 
Both Aristotle and Augustine noted that hierarchy is natural. Should one therefore 
21 Wallace, 14, note b.  
22 I, 65, 4, ad1, hoc enim impossibile est.  
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deduce that Creation was done through a hierarchy of creative agents? Aquinas offered 
up a definitive conclusion. Because the act of creating is a properly divine act, the 
words of both Aristotle and Augustine must therefore refer not to some proposed 
hierarchy of creative agents but to a hierarchy that was itself created.23 Their words 
were worthily said in Aquinas’ estimation, but both needed to be carefully and 
charitably understood in light of what has been demonstrated to be true. They clearly 
would not have asserted the erroneous conclusion posited, namely that God created via 
some hierarchy of beings, despite the fact that they had not deliberately rejected it and 
some of their writings could be incorporated into an argument in support of it.  
Article 4 utrum formae corporum sint ab Angelis, an immediate a Deo24 
In turning to the fourth Article in Q 65, Aquinas asked whether the forms of corporeal 
bodies came from angels. Again his content addressed a problematic expression of Neo-
Platonist realism. Aquinas understood the Creation event in terms of his Aristotelian 
hylomorphism. That philosophical understanding of the nature of matter held that forms 
do not exist independently of the composite. Aquinas seemed to understand that the 
actual thing was brought into being by the impartation of form to matter.25 But this can 
hardly suffice as the reason for this Article. It is the consideration of Aquinas’ 
utilization of sources which again bears fruit. Herein he demonstrates another step in 
their reverential reading. This time two theologians were superficially pitted against 
each other. Boethius, in the first Objection, asserted “forms that are in matter have come 
from forms that exist without matter.” 26 Since immaterial forms are angels, argued the 
Objection, Boethius had asserted that angels are the forms for corporeal beings. In the 
sed contra, however, Augustine said, “it must not be thought that this corporeal matter 
23 Again the absence of Dionysius needs to be noted. In this Aquinas is undoubtedly indebted to, but 
does not cite, Dionysius the Areopagite whose Letter 8 posits the necessity of just such hierarchy in 
order that the Creation return to/with its Creator. See Rorem, 1 and 19-24.  
24 Cf. Commentary II, 1, 1, 4; II, 7, 3, 1; II, 18, 2, 2; De potentia III, 4; SCG II, 43; III, 24, 69, 103; and ST I, 
44, 1; I, 91, 2; I, 110, 2; De malo XVI, 9 and De occultis operibus naturae. 
25 Wallace, Appendix 4, 188-192. 
26 I, 65, 4ob1, a formis quae sunt sine materia, venerunt formae quae sunt in materia. Quoting Boethius 
De Trinitate, 2, PL 64, 1250. 
141 
 
                                                          
is obedient to the angels, but rather to God.”27 This statement is then argued to mean 
that since corporeal matter obeys the agent from which it receives forms, its forms 
cannot be derived from angels.  
The corpus catalogues the opinions of several philosophers, noting that what they 
perceive as spiritual forms are for Christians angels. This of itself is significant in that 
the theologian has a clearer insight into the nature of these beings than the philosopher, 
reinforcing Aquinas’ hierarchy of sources. Aristotelian ideas about the nature of the 
composite, as noted above, were taken to be the best explanation and both Augustine 
and Boethius were carefully brought into concord with one another within this 
understanding of nature. Augustine was demonstrated from an earlier section of the 
same work to be developing an idea which harmonizes with Aristotle’s conception of 
the composite being. Boethius, in the Response to the first Objection is given a 
charitable reading as well. “By forms existing without matter Boethius probably means 
the ideas of things existing in the divine mind.”28 In other words, Boethius may have 
used his language imprecisely, but one can still, reading him reverentially, bring his 
imprecise words into a harmony with the reality which one knows. Just to be sure that 
the point is clear; the Apostle Paul is quoted saying something similar to Boethius’ 
words.29 If, Aquinas continued, Boethius did indeed mean angels when he said this and 
not the “ideas of things existing in the divine mind” (rationes in mente divina) which he 
supposed, this too can be harmonized with the world as we know it. For angels do 
indeed bring about corporeal forms, not as direct imparters of form, but as beings which 
can move or change corporeal beings from one form to another, bringing about a new 
being through change, but not through the creation of being itself.  
Aquinas concluded the first Question at this point. He had developed the conceptual 
trajectory of the work by closing off several avenues which were theologically 
problematic. Creation is in fact a divine act; it thus has a divine telos. It is an act which 
27 I, 65, 4c, non est putandum angelis ad nutum servire hanc corporalem materiam, sed potius Deo. 
Aquinas was quoting Augustine, De Trin. III, 8. 
28 I, 65, 4, ob1, Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Boethius intelligit per formas quae sunt sine materia, 
rationes rerum quia sunt in mente divina. 
29 The quote is from Hebrews 11:3 which is not generally credited to Paul by contemporary scholars, but 
which was widely regarded as Pauline in the medieval period.  
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is proper to the divine being and not to some subordinate being, whether as an active 
agent or as a formal agent of Creation. But along with this trajectory of ideas, there is 
another strand discernable in the treatment of his patristic sources which might be 
recapitulated as follows:  
Article 1 - The essential argument begins with Scripture and is settled there.  
Article 2 – That essential argument, however, hardly exhausts the interpretive potential 
of the text. The patristic theologians who address these open questions can be quite 
wrong at times, their words must be held up to the standard of both Scripture and the 
truths which are evident from the Creation itself.  
Article 3 – As with any author (Augustine and Aristotle are developed in parallel), 
theologians can be simply misunderstood. The reader must develop a reverential 
discernment which seeks to understand the words of the theologian in the best possible 
light.  
Article 4 – Theologians sometimes appear to contradict each other directly as with the 
example of Boethius and Augustine. Natural philosophy can help settle the matter and 
allow for the reverential reading of the theologians.   
Other than Origen, who was held up as a negative example, the patristic theologians are 
read with a great deal of care, construing their words into the most charitable manner. 
Augustine’s objection in Article 3 was shown to be misunderstood and reconciled in the 
Response to the Objection. In Article 4, Augustine was shown to be quite right, and the 
reader of Boethius was given two means to understand him as reflecting the truth.  
Thus far, however, Aquinas has only done in his treatment of sources that which any 
medieval theologian would have done. Indeed, what has repeatedly discouraged the 
theological readership of this section is the very fact that this is such an elementary 
treatment. Much of medieval theology was busy with the reconciliation of apparently 
opposing ideas and this treatment is not particularly a profound example of this 
medieval practice. His treatment of the Creation and the sources which we see here is 
not unusual nor in any way provocative or original. When we compare it to his earlier 
works, penetrating questions which were taken up in Commentary and De potentia are 
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left unexplored.30 But if this is indeed written with the goal of inculcating this 
reverential reading of sources, such a basic beginning makes much more sense. 
Effective pedagogues start with the familiar and elementary material and from this build 
to more complex skills and concepts. What we see here is familiar. The pedagogical arc 
for this section of the ST is not yet discernible. We have only a starting point, but this is 
the proper starting point for a pedagogical work, the basic skills and knowledge of a 
beginner.  
Question 66  de opere distinctionis  
In question 66 Aquinas took up the question of 
how the creative act relates to diversification. 
The medieval theologian noticed a bipartite, 
threefold pattern or progression within the 
Creation event recorded in Genesis 1. The first 
triplet observed entailed the creation of being, 
the diversification of being into various forms, 
and the ornamentation of those diverse beings. 
This three-fold pattern was again depicted in two 
sets of three days, or triads. There is a direct 
correlation between the first triad and the second (see chart). This sense of order and 
structure was also perceived in the direction or movement of Genesis 1. The Creation 
account in Genesis 1 moves from higher to lower, from heaven to earth, descending 
from fiery elements and bodies through air and water to conclude in earthly elements 
and bodies. This structure appealed to sensibilities of the ancient and medieval 
theologians who commented on this text but it should also be noted that this structure 
was eminently teachable.  
Article 1 utrum informitas materiae creatae praecesserit tempore distinctionem ipsius31 
In the first Article of Q 66 Aquinas introduced the disagreement which will occupy 
much of the remaining QQ and their Articles in this section but which will never be 
resolved: Was created matter formless for a time prior to its diversification? It is a 
30 See especially Commentary II, 12, 1-2 and De potentia 3. 
31 Cf. Commentary II, 12, 4; De potentia IV, 1; ST I 69, 1; and 74, 2.  
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question which derives from the medieval understanding of the three-fold actions of 
God in Genesis 1: Creation, Diversification, and Ornamentation. With most theologians 
of the time, Aquinas read his text literally and with an assumption that this conveyed an 
actual event upon which a metaphorical meaning might be built, but which also stood as 
a literal truth. Genesis 1:1 states that God made heaven and earth. For Aquinas and for 
Augustine before him that is the creative moment when God created being itself. The 
actions of the next three days are not Creation per se, but diversification of the created 
matter which had been created in the event described in that first verse. Likewise the 
second set of three days is an ornamentation of the things diversified in the first three 
days. These days do not describe what Aquinas considered to be creative in a technical 
meaning of that word. These days describe the impartation of forms and motions to 
matter which had been given being in a separate action on God’s part.  
The question at hand in this article is whether there was a gap of any time, even a 
moment of time, between the creative event and the subsequent acts of diversification 
and ornamentation. As the Blackfriar’s translator succinctly translates Aquinas’s words: 
“On this the holy authorities differ.”32 Augustine, in his Confessions,33 his influential 
commentary on Genesis, Gen. ad litt.,34 and elsewhere had posited the idea that there 
was no actual time between the events recorded in Genesis 1:1 and those recorded in the 
subsequent verses, despite the use of the word “day” to delineate those events. In 
Augustine’s conceptualization of the Creation event, the days mark out not temporal 
events but logical sequence. In another strand of patristic exegesis of this text stood the 
Cappadocian Basil the Great, Ambrose, Chrysostom, and others. These theologians also 
held that the first verse was the creative event, but that the days are just what a simple 
and literal reading would suggest them to be, days, periods of time, twenty-four hours 
long, during which the action of diversification and ornamentation took place.  
For Aquinas this second position posed a potential problem which was rooted in his 
Aristotelian hylomorphic physics. Just as forms do not exist without actually being 
32 I, 66, 1c, circa hoc sunt diversae opiniones sanctorum. Trans.: Wallace, 27. 
33 See Conf. XII, 29, 40. 
34 See especially Gen. ad litt. I, 9, 15.  
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imparted to matter, likewise matter does not exist without some form.35 If the 
diversification and ornamentation of subsequent days is the impartation of form on 
matter, what was that matter prior to this diversification and ornamentation? Did God 
create some vast quantity of primordial matter on which he then imparted the forms of 
sun, trees, rocks, and other corporeal things? This was important for reading these 
theologians, for the implication of an unformed matter meant that the position of Basil 
and the others sounded strikingly similar to the ideas of certain pre-Socratic 
philosophers who fall under the term “monists.” These philosophyers were generally 
considered to be atheists. Aquinas devoted considerable energies within this Q to 
extricate these theologians from that association.   
Aquinas solved the apparent dilemma by reading Basil, Chrysostom, and others to be 
saying that the primordial matter was not entirely formless, but it simply had not been 
fully formed, it lacked the three fold beauty which would be imparted to it by light 
instead of darkness, shape instead of shapelessness, and fullness in place of emptiness. 
But in so doing let the reader take note of the fact that Aquinas conveniently passed 
over the first part of this Article’s sed contra in which he asserted that a perfect creator 
would not have created without perfect or completed form. This reading of Basil and his 
theological heirs was only reached through a charitable interpretation and some 
accommodation.  
Clearly Augustine’s interpretation did not cause as many problems for Aquinas. The 
instantaneous Creation meant that while logically formlessness precedes form, it was 
not the case that relatively formless matter existed for a period prior to the reception of 
final form. But Aquinas took great pains in this rather long article to argue that the 
opinion of the other patristic theologians could also be faithful both to the Scriptural 
principle and to the Aristotelian hylomorphism which undergirded his conception of 
reality.  
He also introduced but did not yet fully develop another important principle of reading 
Genesis, that of condescension. Aquinas perceived that the text of Genesis 1 was 
originally written for a primitive audience. The realities of that audience required that 
35 Augustine had used this very issue to introduce his a-temporal interpretation of Genesis 1 in the Conf., 
see XII, 3, 3 – 8, 8. Therein he described his own attempts to imagine a formless existence. Upon failure 
in that attempt, he invited the reader to join him in thinking about Creation in another way.  
146 
 
                                                          
Moses write for them in terms which did not exactly fit into the more precise language 
of the patristic theologians, philosophers, or Aquinas himself.36 This was an important 
tool in Aquinas’ task of reconciling differences between the text and the statements of 
theologians and philosophers which he utilized on several occasions.37 This was also a 
pillar within his argument about reverenter exponitur in the prologue of Contra errores 
Graecorum.  
What stands out here, in contrast to the Articles which made Q 65, is that Aquinas 
resolutely refused to come to a conclusion, except to allow both of the interpretations to 
stand as possibilities. One might argue that Aquinas had the ability to make a judgment 
based upon the principle used in the prior Question. The Augustinian strand is much 
easier to reconcile with the philosophical conception of the nature of matter, thus it 
would seem the principle articulated above in 65, 2 could be used to argue that 
Augustine’s interpretation is the correct one. But he did not bring himself to say that 
Basil’s position is erronea or omnia inconvenientia as Origen’s position was found in 
that earlier article. The reverential reading which found Boethius’ assertion to be 
possible in 65, 4 is applied here. While he may have found it difficult to see how this 
would work, it is possible, in Aquinas’ estimation, for the interpretation of Basil to be 
true.  
Article 2 utrum sit una materia omnium corporalium38 
The second article of Question 66 bore a superficial resemblance to the preceding article 
but also stood in a sharp contrast to it. In the second article Aquinas addressed the 
question of whether one type of unformed matter is common to all bodies.39 This 
Article’s argument developed around the medieval understanding of heavenly bodies 
which held that such bodies did not seem to undergo change and decay in the same way 
as earthly bodies. Here it is the natural philosophers who disagree. Interestingly, the 
phrase to describe this situation is exactly the same as that used to describe the differing 
36 See I, 66, 1ad5.  
37 This principle will resurface in I, 67, 4c, where it received more extensive treatment. See also Gilson, 
Thomism, 204-205. 
38 Cf. Commentary II, 12, 1; SCG II, 16; De substantiis separatis 7; and In De caelo I, 8. 
39 I, 66, 2, Utrum una sit materia informis omnium corporalium.  
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opinions among patristic theologians: diversae opiniones. The treatment of this, 
however, is quite different. The natural philosophers of antiquity and the medieval 
period are given their opportunity to state their case, much as the patristic theologians in 
the prior article were carefully reported and examined. But unlike the first Article, 
Aquinas concluded that Aristotle was correct. The other philosophers’ were given 
means to be in accord with Aristotelian thought, but Aristotle’s quintessence theory of 
heavenly bodies is clearly favored.  
To the modern this question is difficult to appreciate on the basis of the content. The 
editor of the Blackfriar’s edition noted that this entire article hangs on issues which only 
pertain to medieval scientific understanding.40 From the perspective of post-Newtonian 
physics and atomic theory which undergird modern cosmology, the argument of this 
article borders on the risible. But the ancients had heated debates about the exact nature 
of heavenly bodies and these debates were still reverberating in the medieval world of 
Aquinas. Even within the Objections and the sed contra of this Question Aquinas noted 
Aristotle was arguing against himself.41  
While one might appreciate the importance of this question for the medieval theologian; 
this entire article presents another challenge for the traditional reader of the ST. It does 
not really touch upon the ultimate exitus and reditus goal of the ST except perhaps with 
an eye toward man’s position within the Thomistic universe but that seems farfetched. 
An interesting tangent for the theologian, its place in the whole trajectory of the summa 
is difficult to ascertain. It could be that Aquinas, after an exploration of the patristic 
theologians in the first Article is simply letting the natural philosophers have their say in 
this discussion of the nature of heavenly beings. In this reading of why Aquinas 
included this material the voices of the philosophers were loud enough that Aquinas felt 
they had to be given this space. But that idea suffers in that if this is so, Aquinas does 
not behave consistently in this regard. There are other places within this section of the 
ST in which the philosophers are quiet and in which one might expect them to have 
something to say. Another reading of Aquinas’ motive might be that this Article is 
reflective of an essential character trait of Aquinas himself. Aquinas was clearly 
knowledgeable about ancient and medieval science. One cannot rule out the possibility 
40 Wallace, 33, note a. 
41 See I, 66, 2ob2 and 2sc. 
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that this Article reflects a touch of the pride to which members of academe are often 
subject and he is simply showing off. But that also seems out of character for Aquinas.  
The key to understanding this Article’s rationale becomes clear through two 
comparisons. Aquinas had asked almost exactly the same question in his Commentary.42 
There the debate between the various philosophical voices was far more robust, but 
Augustine was entirely absent. The simplification of the philosophical debate and the 
insertion of Augustine suggest that the integration of Augustine’s position is what 
Aquinas was really pursuing here.  
The second comparison is internal to this Q, namely the disparate treatment of patristic 
sources between the first and second Articles of Q 66. The location and use of 
Augustine may offer another way to read this Article. In the first Article the natural 
philosophers appear briefly in the corpus of the Article as a sort of negative example of 
how the diversification of forms ought not to be understood. In the second Article, 
Augustine was cited in the first Objection and its Response, but nowhere else in the rest 
of this quite lengthy article, nor do any others of theologians. The citation of Augustine 
is from Confessions43 and is interpreted to side with the more Platonic notion that the 
heavenly bodies are made of the same sort of material as the earthly bodies. In his 
conclusion Aquinas politely disagreed while admitting the other position could be 
admitted if one understood that the unity in substance was limited to the level of 
corporeality.  
If one allows that this section of the ST is about reading the patristic theologians 
reverentially this appearance of Augustine becomes significant. Aquinas explored 
briefly the best ideas that the philosophers had to offer on the nature of heavenly bodies, 
located Augustine within that tradition, and disagreed with him. In order to read 
Augustine reverentially, Aquinas suggested that one had to accept that Augustine 
understood his world within a particular philosophical framework or context. Augustine 
had taken a side within a debate in which thinkers had engaged long before Augustine 
had been born and on which subsequent science had shed further knowledge and 
demonstrated that even Augustine could err.  
42 Commentary II, 12, 1. 
43 Conf. XII, 12, 15. 
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“In this Augustine follows the opinion of Plato, who did not hold for a fifth essence.”44 
This little line furthered the point he had originally made with Origen in I, 65, 2 but now 
applied to an authority who was read favorably, Augustine himself. Even Augustine 
cannot be read as an absolute authority. Like all theologians past and present, in 
Aquinas’s estimation, a reverential reading of Augustine means that one has to allow 
him to be a product of his age and the information which was available to him at the 
time of his writing. In the prologue to Contra errores Graecorum Aquinas had noted 
that the patristic theologians often discussed a doctrine which subsequently would 
become a matter of controversy and debate. Their discussions of these controversial 
issues prior to resolution often lacked the theological precision which one would expect 
of theologians after the conclusive debate had taken place.45 Aquinas argued for the 
reverential reading which took into account that these theologians did not have the 
benefit of the subsequent argument and the clarity it brought to the issue.  
Augustine in the second Article of Question 66 is contextualized within the larger 
philosophical community. His theological commentary where it touched upon the 
essential nature of heavenly bodies was also part of another discussion, a discussion 
which continued long after his death. It so happened that Aquinas considered the side of 
the argument which Augustine favored to have been demonstrably wrong in its 
conclusion. But that was an opinion which benefited from the eight centuries of 
discussion which lay between Aquinas and Augustine. Augustine followed Plato in this 
regard and Aquinas read him accordingly.  
Article 3  utrum caelum Empyreum46 sit concreatum materiae informi47 
44 I, 66, 2ad1, ergo dicendum quod Augustinus sequitur in hoc opinionem Platonis.  Trans.: Wallace, 39. 
45 This was especially true for the subsequent readings of Origen whose works prior to the Arian 
controversy and the Council of Nicaea were subsequent to the Councils read as potentially supportive of 
the Arian heresy. As a result many of his works were condemned. His many supporters in the ancient 
church would argue for just such a reverential reading, giving rise to what came to be called the 
Origenistic controversy which would sweep up many contemporaries of Augustine in the late 4th 
century, including Jerome.  For a more substantive treatment of this subject, see Michael Thomas, 138ff.  
46 For further discussion Aquinas articulation of the Empyrean heaven, see Commentary  II, 2, 2 and the 
discussion of the Creation of angels in De potentia III, 18 and 19.  
47 Cf. Commentary II, 2, 2, 1-2; II, 12, 1, 5; De potentia IV, 1ad15; and ST I, 70, 3.  
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This principle of reading a patristic theologian within the limits of his context gets 
further treatment in 66, 3 in which Aquinas addressed the co-Creation of the empyrean 
heaven. The empyrean heaven is a concept which roughly coincides with what most 
Christians would call heaven today. The empyrean heaven was for Aquinas the physical 
place in which the beatific vision was realized, where the human being beheld God for 
an eternity of bliss.48  
The question under consideration revolves around three points which are addressed 
within the corpus. The first and primary point is whether this place was created at the 
first Creation or whether it will be created at the point of resurrection as part of a new 
Creation, a second divine creative act. As a sub-point, Aquinas also notes that there are 
some who have questioned whether this is a physical place or should be better 
understood as an intellectual activity or state of being, irrespective of physical location. 
Finally, in a second sub-point, Aquinas also addressed how this place related to the 
known spheres of heaven.  
The resolution to these questions is simply stated: The empyrean heaven was part of the 
original Creation, it is a real place, but it has either no influence on the lower spheres 
which we can access through the senses or only a mediated, indiscernible influence. But 
these statements and their arguments occupy at most a handful of sentences within this 
fairly substantial Article. The bulk of the Article, especially the corpus, is more properly 
described as an evaluation of the arguments put forward by Strabo, Bede, Basil, and, 
lastly, Augustine who needed to be understood carefully in his philosophical context. 
For when Augustine referred to the empyrean heaven, he did not mean what Aquinas 
and other “modern” readers meant by this term.49 
In reading the entire article, one quickly observes that Aquinas was not simply seeking 
to establish the answers to these three questions about the origin, nature, and location of 
the empyrean heaven. The answers to the questions are interestingly dealt with via 
arguments which are outside the discussion of the majority of the material. It is as if the 
actual answers to the questions are dealt with through a train of thought which is alien to 
48 I, 66, 3c, In cuius positione quantum ad aliquid conveniunt, scilicet quantum ad hoc quod sit locus 
beatorum.  
49 I, 66, 3c, nunc ponitur a modernis.  
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the Article itself. The majority of the Article wrestles with what various theologians 
have said. Aquinas only found three, Basil, Bede and Strabo50 who argue for his 
position. And he found their arguments weak: “These arguments are not completely 
convincing.”51 When he turned to the arguments of the other patristic theologians, he 
found various opinions which seem to be answering a different question. In answering 
the question himself, Aquinas drew a “better argument”52 from the condition of glory 
which is both the corporeal and spiritual reward. Because it is the place to which we are 
going, it is most fitting that the place, the goal, actually exists.  
The topic, unlike the prior question of the nature of heavenly bodies, has a clear 
connection with the reditus of the ST which in part would explain its presence. But this 
question is not prima facie essential to the commentary on the first chapter of Genesis. 
The subject and its question must be introduced and hence, as a reader seeking 
philosophical or theological answers, it seems quite contrived. But while it did not make 
sense theologically or philosophically, the introduction of this material did allow 
Aquinas to develop another step of the reverential reading. Again this revolves around 
the reading of Augustine. At the end of the corpus Aquinas asks the reader to “notice”53 
that Augustine is quoting Porphyry who is working with a different referent for the 
empyrean heaven. This is “to correct any impression that Augustine held for an 
empyrean heaven as this is now understood by moderns.”54  
Thus in Article 2, when the question did not directly impact the final purposes for the 
ST, the principle of a contextualized reading of the patristic theologian is established. In 
Article 3, when it directly impacts that question, the same contextualized reading allows 
Aquinas reverentially to set Augustine’s words aside; although, these same words could 
50Wallace, 40, n. 5, Although Aquinas believed the work he cited was by Strabo, it was not actually that 
of the theologian Walafridus Strabo, a monk of Fulda, who died in 849. It was not until relatively 
recently that this work was discovered to be that of Anselm of Laon (d. 1117) which may have in some 
part been derived from Strabo’s work. It appears that Aquinas worked with a copy of the Glossa 
ordinaria and other glosses which are not extant.  
51 I, 66, 3c, Hae autem rationes non sunt multim cogentes.   
52 I, 66, 3c,  convenientior ratio (or with some mss. read: convenientius).  
53 I, 66, 3c, Sciendum est.   
54 I, 66, 3c, ne aliquis opinetur Augustinum caelum empyreum posuisse sicut nunc ponitur a modernis.   
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be construed to contradict Aquinas’ own conclusions. Because Augustine is following 
Plato and Porphyry, his ideas about the empyrean heaven do not apply to the discussion 
in which Aquinas is engaged.  
Again one may take note of the pedagogical nature of this text. Having established a 
principle in a rather simple context within Article 2, the principle is then demonstrated 
in a more complex situation in Article 3. The reader who is searching only for 
theological truths or philosophical insights is left wondering why deep questions are so 
perfunctorily addressed, but the reader who observes the treatment of sources finds that 
an important principle of reverential reading has been articulated and demonstrated.  
Article 4 utrum tempus sit eidem concreatum55 
This Article returns the reader to the basic disagreement which was laid out in the first 
Article of the Question, the polarity in which the Augustinian position stands over 
against that of the “other theologians.” The topic at hand is one which has long intrigued 
interpreters of Genesis 1. What is the relationship of time to the act of Creation? 
Augustine held that there were only two initially created things: Angelic nature and 
unformed matter. Basil, Chrysostom and others hold for a four-fold initial Creation. 
Along with angelic nature and unformed matter, they hold that time and the empyrean 
heaven had been created.  
As Aquinas noted in the prior question, Augustine used the word “empyrean heaven” 
with a different referent than we do, thus Aquinas holds that he did not talk about the 
creation of an empyrean heaven. Augustine also held a very different idea about the 
creation of time, suggesting that it was not part of the creative act described in Genesis 
1, which described a logical progression, not a temporal progression. The other patristic 
theologians think differently about this. Basil and Chrysostom and others hold that time 
was initially created and the days recorded in Genesis 1 are in fact days.  
In the corpus of this question, Aquinas simply stated the two positions, explaining how 
each position was logically deduced by the respective theologians. Augustine’s 
treatment requires a little more attention as it is a less intuitive reading of the text. It is 
within the Responses to the Objections that Aquinas addressed the real substance of this 
55 Cf. Commentary II, 12, 5; and ST 46, 3. 
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Article. In the Responses to each of the Objections, the statements of Augustine and 
Basil are carefully woven into the Aristotelian and Biblical framework.  In the first 
reply Augustine’s position has integrity, but one has to realize that it is based on concept 
that angelic nature and unformed matter precede time in “origin or meaning.”56 In the 
Response to the second Objection, which had focused on how time, which was 
measured by the cycle of light and darkness, could exist before God differentiated light 
from dark, Aquinas suggested that the gradual formation which Basil suggested might 
also apply to time. At the first, only crude days could be distinguished, but later, 
seasons, years, months, etc., could be delineated as time was more fully formed.  
The Response to the third Objection is perhaps the most illuminating. The Objection 
was based on the fact that time was measured by the movement of celestial bodies. The 
Objection suggested that time could not exist without the movement of those bodies 
which were not created until the fourth day. Hence, time could not have been created at 
the beginning. Aquinas’ Response, the longest of the five included in this question, 
suggested the possibility that since time is a measurement of movement, perhaps it was 
another, first movement which was measured. Aquinas’ answer suggests that Aquinas 
himself was aware of the limitations of his own knowledge. There were movements and 
activities which were not recorded in the first chapter of Genesis or anywhere else in 
Scripture.  
This fourth Article could then be seen to establish yet another principle for the reader of 
patristic resources: epistemic humility. This humility would prove essential to Aquinas’ 
proposed reverential reading of the patristic theologians and to the enterprise of the 
whole ST. Confronted with solidly orthodox theologians who disagree on an essential 
doctrine of the Christian faith, Aquinas recognized a certain breadth of possibility and in 
so doing he makes an argument for intellectual space in a climate in which the 
boundaries of orthodoxy were constricting. There is much that is unknown, so much 
that one can read the differing conclusions of Augustine and other theologians about a 
basic doctrine such as Creation and be unable to conclude who is right and who is 
wrong. Even a literal reading of divine revelation leaves room to disagree. 
56 I, 66, 4ad1, natura angelica et materia informis praecedunt origine, seu natura, tempus.  
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Question 66 has advanced the reverential reading of the patristic theologians in several 
important ways. Having briefly surveyed the generally accepted reading of the patristic 
theologians in Question 65, Aquinas established two important principles in this 
Question. The first principle is not yet fully developed, that of condescension in reading 
Genesis. The second principle receives a more thorough treatment, that of intellectual 
contextualization. Augustine was the subject here, especially as he dealt with the 
empyrean heaven. According to Aquinas, his words on this essential topic of the ST 
have to be read in his Neo-Platonic context, “he follows Plato in this.”57 His words need 
to be carefully scrutinized in this philosophical context lest the reader think that 
Augustine understood the empyrean heaven to refer to the same thing as the moderns.58 
When Augustine referred to the empyrean heaven he was not referring to the same thing 
as other theologians. This principle was immediately demonstrated in the next Article as 
Aquinas noted Augustine only admitted two initially created things, angelic nature and 
unformed matter. Most added two more to that list, empyrean heaven and time. This 
Article posited a conflict between these two strands of interpretation, but the tension is 
resolved by the carefully reverential reading of Augustine in the two preceding Articles. 
Empyrean heaven has been placed in another category and time by the principle of 
contextualized reading. In the subsequent treatment of Genesis 1, the remaining 
disputed element of Creation, time, will become the focus of the distinction between 
Augustine and other theologians in Aquinas’ subsequent treatment.  
At this point again, a comparison with Aquinas’ earlier treatment leads the reader to 
conclude that he was engaged in an activity which is quite distinct from his earlier 
treatments of this material, both within other works (Commentary and De potentia) as 
well as earlier within the ST (I, 44-49). This treatment, I am arguing, is pedagogical. 
More than ten years prior to writing these words, in the Commentary, Aquinas had been 
aware of this conflict between Augustine and the rest of the interpreters of Genesis 1. 
But unlike in the ST, he dealt with it immediately. Distinction 12 of Book II within the 
Lombard’s Sentences began the treatment of the six days of Creation. Aquinas 
Commentary treated the Lombard’s six Chapters in five Articles. In the second and third 
of these Articles Aquinas wondered if everything had been created simultaneously and 
57 I, 66, 2ad1. 
58 I, 66, 3c. 
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then whether the distinction of the days according to Augustine’s exposition was viable 
(salvetur). In the ST, Aquinas reserves the consideration of this direct conflict between 
Augustine’s exposition and Basil’s strand of interpretation until 74, 2, the penultimate 
Article of the entire section, in which he finally asked whether the Creation event was 
one day or seven days.59 It is in the space created by delaying the answer to this 
question in which Aquinas argued for intellectual maneuvering room by having both 
Augustine’s exposition and that of Basil and the many who understood Genesis 1 with 
him play out.  
2. Q 67 as Further Development of Reverential Patristic Reading: Semantics.  
In Q 67 Aquinas expanded upon the careful consideration of the words which patristic 
authorities employed. More than a recapitulation of what he had just said, this was a 
substantive advance upon his earlier treatment in 66, 3. Considering the creation of light 
recorded in the first day of the Genesis account, Aquinas carefully parsed both the 
literal and metaphorical meaning of this term. He established that there were indeed 
multiple ways in which the word “light” could be understood (67, 1). But there were 
also limits to that multiplicity of meaning. A word could not have just any meaning or it 
would cease to have meaning. Some meanings for the term light were philosophically 
impossible (67, 2). Having established both the possibility and the limits of semantic 
parsing, however, Aquinas asserted that there was a substantial field of meaning 
possible for the word. Augustine’s and Basil’s understanding of this word “light” 
presented something of a test case for the productive implementation of the semantic 
principles of reverential reading (67, 4). Article 3 of this Q is one of the Articles which 
are bracketed out of this process by the use of wide ranging Scriptural citation.  
Question 67  de opere distinctionis secundum se 
In QQ 67-69 Aquinas took up the issues which surround what he understood to be the 
act of differentiation in Genesis 1, or the first three days recorded in Genesis 1. That 
rather nuanced distinction is important. While the more popular understanding of 
Genesis 1 read the days as calendar days, Augustine held that the first six days were not 
actual days, but logical markers which provided structure to the Creation account. 
Throughout these Questions, the temporal understanding of other patristic theologians 
59 I, 74, 2, Utrum omnes isti dies sint unus dies. 
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and the non-temporal or logical progression understanding which was credited60 to 
Augustine were both allowed to stand. Each was carefully worked into the interpretation 
of Genesis 1. If the reader should happen to think like Basil and the others, Aquinas 
demonstrated how that could be understood within the best scientific understanding of 
the day. The position of Augustine required far less treatment as it posed fewer 
intellectual and philosophical challenges for Aquinas, but it too was integrated into both 
the exegesis of the text and the understanding of current philosophy.  
More than simply a demonstration of a reverential reading, Question 67 also developed 
the practice. While the contextualized reading of Question 66 continued, Aquinas 
deepened the examination of a principle of interpretation in this Question: that of 
sensitivity to language and especially its ambiguity. Words can have more than one 
meaning. The reverential reader of the patristic theologians had to take this semantic 
reality into account. Of course, this is not a new concept. Medieval scholastics spent a 
great deal of time and energy parsing the meanings and usages of various words. Their 
occasionally well deserved reputation for hair-splitting theology largely stems from this 
practice of carefully categorizing and noting minute differences in the words of a text.  
This again is suggestive of an audience. This Article seems a likely candidate for 
Wallace’s disparaging comments within his introduction to the Blackfriar’s edition of 
the text and its translation.61 This material would have been even more pedantic and 
simplistic to a scholastic audience of the universities of medieval Europe. This is not a 
treatment conducted at the university level, but is quite simplistic. But it makes a great 
deal of sense if Aquinas’s audience were not schoolmen; rather, they were the young 
men who were streaming into the priories of the Dominican Order and the lectores who 
were charged with their daily education. It is true that students at the universities of 
medieval Europe would have spent years noticing the distinctions between words as 
they progressed through the Trivium, Quadrivium, and into the Bachelor and Master 
ranks. Young friars in a priory, however, who were engaged in theological reflection for 
the first time, would not have the benefit of the basic Liberal Arts curriculum which 
60 This idea is not original to Augustine, but was already articulated in the first century by the Jewish 
interpreter Philo. See Fearghus Ơ Fearghail, “Philo and the Fathers: The Letter and the Spirit” in 
Scriptural Interpretation in the Fathers:  Letter and Spirit  Eds.: Thomas Finan and Vincent Twomey. 
(Dublin/Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 1995), 50. 
61 Wallace, Intr. xx. 
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would have prepared them for this activity. The priories were busily educating young 
men who did not otherwise have access to the quite limited opportunities for education 
in the medieval world. In Q 67, at least in some small part, Aquinas sought to fill in that 
missing element.  
Question 67 was dedicated to the consideration of the first day and hence revolved 
around the topic of light in four Articles. The third Article which carefully addressed 
whether light is a quality stands out from the other three Articles in this Question. Not 
so much an intellectual hinge, it is set apart in that the patristic theologians are only 
cited once, and this reference is a statement which seems to serve little purpose in the 
sed contra. This article seems to address different purpose in the larger goals of the ST. 
In Article 3 Aquinas honed important language. In this instance, he delineated exactly 
what is a quality or attribute. This was important for the subsequent discussion of the 
Incarnation in the tertia pars of the ST where Aquinas came to discuss the Sacraments 
(III, 60-90) and the Incarnation (III, 1-26).  
The other three Articles, however, gave Aquinas an opportunity to explore another 
principle of reading reverentially, the nuanced understanding of a word’s meaning. The 
intellectual tension within these Articles was again created by positing Augustine’s 
position over against that of the other theologians. Augustine had taught that the light 
created on the first day was not the light which enables our physical eyes to see.62 
Augustine held that this first light was actually a term which described, and hence was a 
synonym for, the angelic nature, a spiritual light. In Augustine’s view, the light which 
enables the physical eye to see was created with the celestial bodies that provide it on 
the fourth day. The other patristic theologians held that the light created on the first day 
was indeed the physical phenomenon with which we see today and the fourth day was 
an ornamentation of the first day’s diversification.  
It should also be noted that Aquinas treated this material in other works as well. These 
much richer and complex treatments again serve to illustrate that ST I, 65-74 are 
engaged in a different sort of activity. We will address several of these comparisons 
under each Article.  
62 Gen. ad litt. IV, 21, 38 – IV, 34, 50. 
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Article 1 utrum lux proprie in spiritualibus dici possit63 
Within the Objections and sed contra of this article Aquinas set up a weak tension 
between three authorities who asserted that light is a proper, not figurative, description 
of spiritual beings. Augustine said exactly this,64 Dionysius said light was God’s 
name.65 Even the Apostle Paul, in one of the rare citations of Scripture outside of 
Genesis, is quoted to suggest that light is spiritual in a rather contorted reading of 
Ephesians 5:13. This is contrasted with a citation from Ambrose who says that splendor 
(splendorem) is metaphorically applied to God.66  
The tension gave Aquinas opportunity to make a most elementary of statements: Words 
can have more than one meaning. He uses the word “vision” as an example, citing 
Matthew 5:8, the beatitude in which Jesus says the blessed shall “see” God. In a parallel 
construction, he then applied the principle it to the use of the word “light.” The answer 
is a simple appeal to semantic contingency. The word has more than one meaning. So 
basic is the resolution to the issue that Aquinas broke with the usual form of an Article 
and dispensed with any Responses to the Objections. The tension created in the opening 
of the Article simply was not real, but the statement about multiple meanings for a word 
was a necessary foundation for what followed, as indeed it would have been 
foundational for almost all medieval theology. The more pressing question for the 
modern reader is the purpose of this material. For someone trained in logic, grammar, 
and other Liberal Arts at a university, this would have been extremely pedantic, even 
insulting, as if one’s algebra teacher felt compelled in the middle of the term to insert a 
unit on basic addition and subtraction. Aquinas clearly did not consider it to be insulting 
to his audience.  
Article 2 utrum lux sit corpus67 
63 Cf. Commentary II, 13, 2; In Joannem I, 3.  
64 Gen. ad litt. IV, 28, 45. 
65 De divinis nominibus IV, 5. 
66 I, 67, 1sc, ponit splendorem inter ea quae de Deo metaphorice dicuntur. 
67 Cf. Commentary II, 13, 3; and In De anima  II, 14.  
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The second Article of the Question pondered the nature of light. Is light a body? Again, 
Augustine68 and Dionysius69 combine, but this time with Aristotle,70 to form three 
Objections which are arranged to assert that light is indeed a body. The sed contra 
argues that since two bodies cannot occupy the same place at the same time, and since 
light and air occupy the same space, light cannot be a body.  
This occasioned a substantial response from Aquinas in the corpus. He marshaled a 
three-fold argument, largely based on logic and medieval natural philosophy, to assert 
that light could not be a body (corpus). As such the argument is a thorough exploration 
of contemporary state of scholarship at the time and is notable in that it avoids some of 
the more fanciful treatments of light found at the time, most notably an interpretation 
commonly held at Oxford and formulated by an early contemporary of Aquinas, Robert 
Grosseteste (1168-1253). His ideas are expressly denied here,71 reiterating a position 
which is found in a much more thorough treatment of this question in Commentary II, 
13, 1, 3.72 
It is in the comparison of these two treatments, however, that the pedagogical nature of 
ST, I, 67, 2 again becomes clear. The Commentary is far lengthier and detailed, 
exploring the philosophers in some detail, including the Arab commentators of 
Aristotle. The central arguments which form the core of the corpus in the ST are also 
found in the Commentary. It is in the Responses to the Objections which form the actual 
point of the Article in the ST. Augustine and Dionysius are extracted from difficulty by 
an appeal to the semantic differentiation noted in the prior Article. Interestingly, 
Aristotle is also and similarly extracted but with a notable distinction in that, unlike the 
other two, the reader is told that Aristotle may simply be ignored in these matters.73 
68 De libero arbitrio II, 3, 8.  (Note that Wallace, 54, n. 2, erroneously places this citation in book III). 
69 De divinis nominibus II, 4. 
70 Wallace suggests Topics V, 4. 
71 See Wallace’s appendix on “Medieval Optics,” 193-196.  
72 The question of whether light is a body is not substantively treated within De potentia.  
73 I, 67, 2ad2, Non tamen est multum curandum de eis exemplis quae Aristoteles inducit in libris 
logicalibus, quia inducit ea ut probabilia secundum opinionem aliorum. 
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When considering the first two Articles of Q 67, Aquinas again did not resolve the 
dispute between Augustine and the other theologians, but in Articles 1, and 2, explored 
how various theologians and philosophers used the word “light.” This rather elementary 
material only makes sense as a pedagogical exercise. Not only is the intellectual tension 
negligible in these Articles but the Objections and their Responses are simple, almost 
child-like. Consider the statement of what would be obvious to a scholastic in the 
corpus of the first article: “Any term may be employed in two senses: one in keeping 
with its original imposition, the other with common usage.”74 The implication is 
obvious. The reverential handling of the patristic theologians requires the reader to 
inquire about a word’s use in its context. In this case, light is a word which has multiple 
meanings in various contexts. It is a simple and appropriate illustration of the point 
which also happens to fit neatly into the sequence of Genesis 1.   
These first two Articles of the Question themselves stand in a very simple relationship 
with one another, a relationship which continues to be familiar for anyone engaged in 
thoughtful reading. Article 1 asserts that words such as “vision” or “light” have different 
meanings to different theologians. Hence the reader must take this into account. The 
second Article then pushes back against this relativizing tendency by asserting that there 
are some things which cannot be said.75 Other ideas are simply “ridiculous” and thus 
should be rejected.76 That words have multiple meanings is obvious, but that does not 
mean words have no meaning. Aquinas does not propose some conceptual chaos in 
which all meanings are valid, but he does assert the basic principle that words are often 
given different referents in various authors. The reverential reader must practice a 
valuable skill in both contextualizing the word and evaluating it in light of what is 
known.  
Article 3 utrum lux sit qualitas77  
74 I, 67, 1c, Dicendum quod de aliquo nomine dupliciter convenit loqui: uno modo, secundum primam eius 
impositionem; alio modo, secundum usum nominis. This is simply elementary level scholastic thinking 
and again might be seen as another reason why so many theologically erudite readers have passed over 
this material.   
75 I, 67, 2c, Nec potest dici quod fiat in tempore imperceptibili. 
76 I, 67, 2c, Ridiculum est etiam dicere quod.... 
77 Cf. Commentary II, 13, 3; In De anima II, 14; and De 108 articulis 7.  
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As noted above, the third Article in Q 67 seems to be engaged in a different sort of 
argument. The exploration of semantic nuance is suspended. Aquinas was on a quest for 
truth here, particularly the proper understanding of what is a quality (qualitas). As 
already noted, this would be an important facet of the Christological discussion which 
occupies the tertia pars. Other than John Damascene’s statement in the sed contra the 
patristic theologians and the text of Genesis are completely absent. This is a 
philosophical discussion of a category. There is a correct answer and Aquinas logically 
proceeds toward it. Light is a quality, but more importantly, the understanding of 
exactly what is a quality is advanced.  
But even the definitive answer is simplified for this audience. Aquinas had asked a 
similar question in Commentary II, 13, 3, Utrum lux sit accidens. There the treatment 
was much longer and cited Augustine, Dionysius, and several additional references to 
Aristotle and his commentators. One can presume that this Article from the 
Commentary was in fact undergirding this ST Article by virtue of the fact that the two 
Articles make use of an almost identical sed contra statement, citing the same passage 
from John of Damascus. The Augustinian and Dionysian materials were stripped out of 
this Article, leaving the philosophical material, but even that much simplified. Aquinas 
must have been writing down to an audience who were simply unable to attain to the 
level of the Commentary. This question had to be answered, and he felt compelled to 
retain some of the philosophical material, but the patristic material he removed, 
presumably because it would have complicated his treatment of those same patristic 
theologians in the prior two Articles. When Aquinas sought an important answer, he set 
aside the consideration of the patristic theologians.   
Article 4 utrum conveniens fuit prima die fieri lucem78 
After the interlude of the third Article in the Q, Aquinas returned to the reverential 
reading of the patristic theologians, examining in greater detail the principle of multiple 
meanings for a word. The Article established a tension which many have noted about 
the text of Genesis 1, the creation of light prior to the creation of the light-emitting 
bodies such as the sun and moon. Aquinas intensifies the tension with the prior Article’s 
78 Cf. Commentary II, 13, 4; De potentia IV 1ad15; and ST I, 69, 1.  
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assertion that light is a quality, not a thing of itself. Aquinas argued that a quality is not 
properly created prior to the actual thing of which it is a quality.  
Here the larger tension between Augustine’s interpretation and that of the other strand 
of interpreters again is examined. Augustine had proposed that the light created on the 
first day was actually the creation of the angelic minds, which are best described as light 
in his opinion.79 Aquinas simply stated this. Others (Basil in particular was singled out) 
suggested that the angelic nature is not mentioned here because God created that prior to 
the events recorded in Genesis 1. This second model assumed that the physical 
phenomenon of light was created on the first day. This position Aquinas felt compelled 
to defend at some length. He listed four reasons that this might be possible. The first 
was an appeal to the principle of condescension mentioned above. Chrysostom had 
noted80 that the primitive audience of Moses was prone to idolatry, especially of 
heavenly bodies. As a result, Aquinas imagined that the language used to describe the 
Creation event had been distorted to prevent them from falling into this idolatry. This 
explained why the description of the creation of the sun, moon and stars was delayed 
until the fourth day. The second reason suggested that the formation of the created 
matter was gradual, reflecting the wisdom of God. The third reason, according to 
Basil,81 was that light was necessary to see anything and hence had to be the first 
created thing. The fourth reason seems to have been Aquinas’s own. Light is necessary 
for the enumeration of days and hence had to be the first thing created.  
Beginning with the second Response, Aquinas catalogued how one might reasonably 
hold to the creation of light on the first calendar day. Some have suggested a luminous 
cloud which either returned to its unformed state after the creation of the celestial bodies 
or adheres now to the celestial bodies, or from which the celestial bodies were made. 
These explanations were rejected for Aristotelian reasons. The Neo-Platonist Dionysius 
provided82 the answer which Aquinas preferred. It was indeed the light of the sun, but 
the material of the sun had not yet been fully formed. It could not yet distinguish 
79 Gen. ad litt. I, I, 3; I, 2, 4 and I, 4, 9. 
80 In Gen. Homily 5,  PG 53, 52. 
81 Hex. Homily 2, SC 28:142. 
82 De divinis nominibus IV, 4, PG 3, 700. 
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seasons and the moon could not yet mark off the months. The partially formed Creation 
had begun with the quality of light which was emitted in a waxing and waning 
oscillation. This oscillating light roughly approximated the 24 hour period of a day.   
Basil did receive a critical reading83 as well. He had suggested84 that the day and night 
cycle of the first days was the product of emission and contraction and not the product 
of some motion. Augustine had objected to this85 and Aquinas noted that elsewhere in 
the same work, Augustine had not countenanced an appeal to the miraculous.86 Here 
Aquinas expanded upon Dionysius’ suggestion that the further formation of the light 
and the light bearing bodies would result in the companion motions which determined 
the seasons and other motions by which time is measured. In the first three days, only 
days could be measured, the measurement of seasons, years, months, etc., would have to 
wait for the creation of the heavenly bodies by which they are still measured today.  
The reverential reading has been advanced significantly in the fourth Article. The 
patristic theologians did disagree and occasionally one can determine that one was more 
“correct” than another. There are right answers, and there are answers which are more 
appropriate than others, but sometimes we do not know and must admit that there are 
multiple possibilities. Semantic nuance while valuable, has limitations and humility 
before the question is essential.  
Augustine’s position, which increasingly provided the creative tension with the other 
interpretational strand is reiterated and given further explanation in the reply to the 
fourth objection. Augustine did not hold that there was any interval of actual time and 
understood that the production of light in the first day was not the physical, but the 
spiritual light which are the angels. The light and darkness is the differentiation between 
the enlightened creatures first formed and the not yet formed creatures which were still 
83 I, 67, 4ad3. 
84 Hex. Homily 2, SC 28:176-178.  
85 Gen. ad litt. I, 16, 31. 
86 Gen. ad litt. II, 1, 2. 
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in a formless darkness. The other alternative, according to Aquinas, is that the darkness 
is the foreknown spiritual darkness of the devil.87  
Question 67 then can thus be read as an exercise in reading theologians in a semantic-
historical context. The meaning of their words must be understood as they were spoken, 
in the context of the theologian’s intellectual ideas and the situations to which they were 
addressed. This reading incorporates the ideas which Aquinas had developed in the 
prior Articles of QQ 65-66. It must be reiterated at this point that none of this is novel in 
the time or particularly unique to Aquinas. Indeed, much of this material would have 
been as simplistic to a medieval audience of scholars as it is to the philosophers and 
theologians of this era. The distinctions and skills developed here were foundational for 
the discussions of the medieval scholastic community. As he is writing the First Part of 
the ST, however, Aquinas does not have that community in mind as an audience. From 
the prologue of Contra errores Graecorum one can deduce this was a concept which 
had recently exercised Aquinas. It appears, however, that he used this section of the ST 
as a pedagogical tool for inculcating this skill in his actual audience, the friars in the 
studia of the Dominican Order.  
3. Reverential reading as a theological habitus: Condescension and the sensitive 
treatment of authority in QQ 68-72.  
In the next several QQ, Aquinas substantively developed the theological habitus which 
is critical for success as a reader of patristic authority. Having established the basic tools 
of reading these documents in prior QQ, the reader was now equipped to enter the 
theological treatment of both Scriptural texts and the authoritative interpreters of those 
texts. In a complex interplay of Scriptural and patristic sources, Aquinas constructed a 
nuanced hermeneutic for his reader which honored authorities with appropriate 
questions and critical thought, but which did not forget the undergirding epistemic 
humility for which was arguing. Of primary importance for the reader is the authority of 
the Scriptural text itself. Aquinas posited that while Scripture remained inviolable (68, 
2), human interpretation of Scripture needed to be carefully delineated from the text 
itself (68, 1). This, however, did not completely satisfy the interpreter, as occasionally it 
appeared that Scripture itself had erroneously described the created world. For these 
87 I, 67, 4ad4. 
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situations Aquinas introduced the concept of condescension which would be an 
important tool in the hands of the interpreter (68, 3).  
At several points the development of reverential reading moves into a demonstration 
both of technique and value. The reverential reader’s humility and sensitivity conveyed 
substantive benefits. While a superficial reading of the patristic theologians could have 
resulted in the simplistic rejection of either Augustine or Basil, the reverential reader 
found the disagreements of the patristic interpretations not to be a liability but to be a 
benefit to the reader of theology. The diversity of opinion served to strengthen the 
interpretation (69, 1) and this can be clearly seen in efforts of both Augustine and Basil 
to answer difficult questions, (69, 1-2).  
That appropriation of diversity, however, is only possible in the presence of deep and 
underlying unity (70, 1). Once recognized, however, this unity allows one to apply the 
reverential reading even to Scriptural authority. The tools of condescension and 
intellectual contextualization are not a rejection of the authority of Scriptural authors but 
positive tools which enable the reader to access the truth of Scripture (70, 2). 
By its very nature, a habitus is more than an intellectual assent, but a practice which 
needs to be embodied.88 In brief treatments of the fourth and fifth day (71 and 72), 
Aquinas demonstrated for the reader how both the interpretation of Augustine and that 
of Basil were compatible and how each mutually reinforced the understanding of the 
singular doctrine of Creation to which both subscribed.   
Question 68  de opere secundae diei 
Question 68 introduced the reader to another facet of the reverential reading of patristic 
theologians, especially as they strive to become preachers and the interpreters of 
Scripture, Aquinas’s highest authority. Through wrestling with the issues which 
surround the creation of the sea and sky, waters below and above in verses 6 and 7 of 
Genesis 1, Aquinas grappled with the role of faith as a hermeneutic criterion.89 The text 
88 Charry, 19-26. 
89 This question has again come to the fore for the current generation of Christian theologians. 
Responding to Modernity, many have endeavored to reassert the validity of faith as a functional 
hermeneutic for reading Scripture. Frequently they are referred to as the “Narrative Movement.” The 
reader is commended to the works of Brevard Childs, Hans Frei, Ellen Davis, Richard Hays, Robert 
Jensen, Richard Bauckham, et al.  
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of Genesis 1 asserted that there was water above the sky. Common sense, medieval 
physics, and simple observation made this a difficult proposition to maintain in the 
thirteenth century just as it is difficult for an educated human being in the twenty-first 
century to seriously entertain the idea. Humanity has visited and returned from outer 
space. There would appear to be no waters above the firmament (sky), yet the text of 
Genesis 1 asserts it.  
The Question was broken into four Articles as it addressed the second day: Was the 
firmament made on the second day? Are there waters above the firmament? Does the 
firmament separate some waters from others? And is there only one heaven, or are there 
many? As we have noted above, within this fourth Article the Scriptural references 
suddenly and forcefully reappeared in the argumentation. Unlike the prior Article in 
which Scripture dominated, 65, 1, the patristic sources are not absent from this Article. 
Indeed the patristic theologians provide the tension for the Article. As also noted in 
chapter four,90 this is the Question in which Augustine’s Scriptural hermeneutic came to 
the fore as well.  
A comparison with Aquinas’ earlier treatment of this material will once more prove 
very fruitful. He treated the waters above the firmament in both the Commentary and De 
potentia. These two works afford us an opportunity to examine not only how Aquinas 
treated this material in other places but also how his own ideas grew as he matured as a 
theologian for his Commentary was written early in his career and De potentia was 
written immediately prior to the prima pars of the ST.  
Article 1 utrum firmamentum sit factum secunda die91 
The first Article of Question 68 combined the prior contextualized reading with yet 
another important principle for the reverential reading of the patristic theologians: while 
their faith moved them to speak of lofty matters, their knowledge was finite and limited 
to their conceptualization of the world in which they lived. To demonstrate this Aquinas 
brought up a seemingly simple question: was the firmament made on the second day? 
The text seems perfectly clear that it was indeed made on the second day, but he raised 
three substantive objections to this statement from logic. In the first Objection Aquinas 
90 Pp. 114ff. 
91 Cf. Commentary II, 1, 1, 6; and De potentia IV, 1ad15.  
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observed that the text already recorded the creation of heaven and earth in the first 
verse. This complaint is rooted in the fact that Aquinas’ Latin text had refered to the 
firmament with the same word used in verse one for “heaven” (caelum). How can the 
creation of the “heaven” occur on the second day when heaven has already been 
created? In the second Objection, Aquinas observed that this was out of order as the 
firmament (caelum) is more primary than water or earth, both of which had been 
mentioned prior to the creation of light on the first day. Perhaps even more significantly, 
the third Objection noted that this places the creation of the heavens within the six days 
of Creation, but the Creation which is described in the biblical Haexameron is entirely 
corruptible, and heaven itself is incorruptible. The sed contra on the other hand, simply 
restates the text of Genesis 1:6-7 in which the firmament is made on the second day.    
Thus far in the discussion the patristic theologians have not appeared. The discussion of 
their treatment of this question and how that relates to the various opinions of 
philosophers occupied the corpus, but in a treatment which diverges from that which 
has come before within this section of the ST, this examination of the various patristic 
opinions fell under the overarching rubric of Augustine’s two-pronged statement which 
opened the corpus: the Scriptural text is always right and one should be careful in 
matters of speculation lest a later discovery forced one to defend in a futile manner an 
erroneous statement made too authoritatively.92  
After stating Augustine’s double hermeneutical point, Aquinas catalogued various 
philosophical opinions about the nature of the heavens which are visible to the eye. 
Each of them is, via the hermeneutic Augustine stated, brought into congruence with the 
text of Genesis 1. But Aquinas was not interested in bringing the Greek philosophers 
into congruence, but their patristic readers. Patristic theologians had based their 
expositions of the text upon these philosophical assumptions. In a corpus which is 
longer than usual for this section of the ST, Aquinas demonstrated how each 
philosophical explanation of the nature of matter and the firmament resulted in a 
92 I, 68, 1c, Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus docet, in huiusmodi quaestionibus duo sunt 
observanda. Primo quidem, ut veritas Scripturae inconcusse teneatur. Secundo, cum Scriptura divina 
multipliciter exponi possit, quod nulli expositioni aliquis ita praecise inhaereat quod, si certa ratione 
constiterit hoc esse falsum, quod aliquis sensum Scripturae esse asserere praesumat, ne Scriptura ex hoc 
ab infidelibus derideatur, et ne eis via credendi praecludatur.  Aquinas paraphrased this material from 
Augustine, Gen. ad litt. I, 18, 36 – I, 21, 41.  
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particular theological position taken by a different patristic theologian. If one 
understood the world as Empedocles did, or Plato, or Aristotle, then a theologian would 
logically reach this or that conclusion. Aquinas thus built on the prior Q as he 
demonstrated the philosophical underpinnings of various theological conclusions: 
Dionysius seemed to follow Aristotle; Basil understood this in a slightly different way.  
Near the end of the corpus, Aquinas returned to the governing hermeneutic of 
Augustine which began the corpus with these important words, “Granting this 
interpretation, none of the above opinions holds any unacceptable consequences.”93 
They are all possible because they do not transgress the two-fold dictum established 
above. The authority of Scripture is maintained because each interpretation allows the 
reader to confess the creation of the firmament on the second day in the various ways 
that day is understood, and thereby the text of Scripture is allowed to stand. What is 
more, the reader acknowledges that different philosophical presuppositions result in 
different literal interpretations of the text.  
In light of what followed, the reader should also take careful note of the treatment of 
Augustine. Within the corpus Aquinas noted that all this difficulty is eliminated if one 
followed the reading of Augustine who held that these days are markers of logical 
sequence and not temporal, calendar days. This would seem to favor Augustine’s point 
of view. That preference, however, is tempered when one comes to the last words of the 
corpus in which Aquinas quoted Augustine’s favorable opinion of Basil’s view. He 
again directly quotes Augustine “I judge this view (Basil’s) most worthy of praise, for 
what it maintains is not contrary to faith and can readily be believed on the basis of this 
text.”94 Despite the fact that Aquinas considered Augustine to have the obviously 
superior interpretation, Aquinas pointedly demonstrated that Augustine had not 
excluded the interpretation of Basil. This balance between Basil and Augustine was 
consistently and carefully maintained throughout this section.  
The sense that this entire Article is a pedagogical exercise increases when one arrives at 
the response to the first Objection. Chrysostom, in his sermons on Genesis, suggested 
93 I, 68, 1c, Et secundum hanc expositionem, nihil repugnans sequitur cuicumque opinioni.  Trans:. 
Wallace, 75. 
94 I, 68, 1c, Hanc considerationem laude dignissimam judico; quod enim dixit, neque est contra fidem, et 
in promptu, posito documento, credi potest.  Trans.: Wallace, 75. Aquinas quoted Gen. ad litt. II, 4, 7. 
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that the first verse was simply a figure of speech, much as the builder of a home might 
say he built the house and then go on to describe the various stages of that 
construction.95 This particular insight on Chrysostom’s part essentially removes the 
dialectic tension from the Article. Using this observation of Chrysostom, Aquinas 
carefully integrated various interpretational strands and thus resolved all the tension of 
the first and subsequent Objections. Indeed, so thorough was Chrysostom’s answer that 
Aquinas took the unusual step of not even bothering to write a separate Response to the 
second and third Objections.96  The resolution of the tension which formed the Article 
established in the Objections and sed contra had been in his hand the entire time, but he 
withheld that element in order to use the tension to provide a field for Augustine’s 
dictum to work out. Chrysostom’s observation of a builder and his house elegantly and 
simply allowed both the Scriptures to be true and for the theologians to speculate 
without committing to a position which would later be considered erroneous. Aquinas, 
however, did not immediately leap to Chrysostom’s elegant solution, but used the 
tension to illustrate Augustine’s hermeneutic.  
Article 2 utrum aliquae aquae sint supra firmamentum97 
The second Article asks a question which might seem more pertinent than the first 
Article. The quest for the answer to this second Article, however, required a careful 
application of the faith presupposition which had been established in the first Article. 
The patristic theologians may have indeed been circumscribed by the limitations of their 
knowledge, but they wrote in faith. The Article simply asks: Are there any waters above 
the firmament?98 The modern reader who has witnessed the scenes from telescopes and 
spacecraft finds the struggle with this assertion from Genesis’s account of the second 
day intensified. While astronomers tell us that icy water is found in the soils of Mars or 
within the shadows of some lunar crater, the overwhelming image one has of space is 
arid. For Aquinas the objections to the waters above the firmament were observational 
and logical. Aquinas’ understanding of his cosmos suggested that since water is heavy, 
95 In Genesim, homily 2, PG 53, 30. 
96 I, 68, 1ad2 et ad3, Ad secundum et tertium patet solutio ex supra dictis.   
97 Cf. Commentary II, 14, 1; De potentia IV, 1; and Quodlibet IV, 2.  
98 I, 68, 2, utrum aquae sint supra firmamentum.  
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it should flow down toward the lower position it occupied beneath the air. In order for it 
not to flow down, he could only conceive it would require a container of some sort, but 
there was no container to be seen. Even more problematic for Aquinas, this water above 
would serve no purpose and that too is contrary to the nature of God. The sed contra is 
again simply a restatement of the text of Genesis 1:7.  
Once more Augustine’s words begin the corpus, this time placing a more forceful 
Scriptural limit on reason and reasoning. “The authority of Scripture is greater than the 
capacity of every human talent. Therefore whatever and what sort of waters might be 
there, nevertheless that they are there we can in no way doubt.”99 This seemingly 
authoritarian, almost fundamentalist, response could potentially be used to end the 
debate, but this is not how Aquinas utilized this sentence from Augustine. Origen is 
cited for an opinion that the waters above are actually spiritual beings, but Basil cited 
parallel Scriptural words which indicate that hail, fire and other similar objects are up 
there. Aquinas was not happy with either opinion. Strabo100 and others argued that this 
refers to the sidereal heaven and hence this water does not refer to the element of water 
at all. But then one has to account for the fact that the text said that this day involved a 
division of water above from water below. If Augustine is correct and the water simply 
referred to unformed matter, then Aquinas allowed that it might work. On the other 
hand, it might be that these waters above simply refer to the water vapors which 
evaporate and form the clouds. Augustine had tried to have it both ways, suggesting that 
the water vapors ascend as far as the sidereal heaven which Aquinas finds simply 
preposterous (omnino impossibile).101  
All this is simply left to stand. No resolution is reached. The actual conclusion seems to 
be located in that very failure of resolution. Aquinas continued to assert the possibility 
of more than one reading. But as with prior Articles, he also used this question to refine 
the technique and the limits of those possible readings. While it is possible within the 
99 I, 68, 2c, Major est scripturae hujus auctoritas quam omnis humani ingenii capacitas. Unde quomodo 
et quales aquae ibi sint, eas tamen ibi esse, minime dubitamus. Aquinas here paraphrased a passage 
from Gen. ad litt. II, 5, 9 Quoquo modo autem et qualeslibet aquae ibi sint, esse eas ibi minime 
dubitemus: maior est quippe Scripturae huius auctoritas, quam omnis humani ingenii capacitas. See 
fuller discussion within this thesis, Pp. 114ff. 
100 Wallace, 79, n. 9, suggests, Glossa ordinaria super Gen 1, 1 
101 I, 68, 2c. 
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constraints of thirteenth century natural philosophy and knowledge to follow either path 
without a mutually excluding conflict ensuing, occasionally both camps put forward 
ideas which had to be rejected. These are not such, however, that they invalidate the 
entire model, but are simply errors within the model of understanding words under 
consideration. In terms of a reverential reading, Aquinas may have simply been seeking 
balance here. Basil was the corrector of Origen’s error; Augustine, while not completely 
refuted, was noted for his erroneous view on the evaporation of water. One might 
wonder if Augustine, who had been the champion of earlier Articles was here 
“dethroned” lest in the course of this disputation in miniature he become too weighty an 
authority. This was more clearly the case in Q 73 where Augustine’s words were once 
more found to be insufficient (alia expositio est principalior et prior).102  
Again one can note that the real intent of the Article seems to be found within the 
Responses to the Objections. These Responses gave Aquinas an opportunity to heal the 
breach between the theologians created in the corpus. As Aquinas carefully 
accommodates the various positions to both the best science of the day and the text of 
Genesis 1, he does not assert that one is right over against another’s ideas, but in so 
doing suggested that we can respect all of these ideas put forward by these faithful 
readers of the text. The reader has encountered the limits of human ingenuity (humani 
ingenii capacitas) in this Article which forces the reader to adopt a position of 
interpretational or epistemic humility.  
That is not to say that all the answers are possible. Aquinas held that there are limits to 
the deference which one might accord to the patristic theologian. The appeal to the 
“God of the Gaps” sort of a theory is rejected. One cannot simply assert that the waters 
are up there because God miraculously holds them there. That is not the way God 
works, at least in Aquinas’ estimation, an estimation for which he credits his 
indebtedness to Augustine.103 An answer needed to be logically consistent and 
concordant with the observable world. The approaches of Basil and Augustine were 
demonstrated to be logically consistent with a variety of possible solutions. Perhaps the 
water is not the same sort of water as envelops the earth. Perhaps it is heavenly water 
which rests on the firmament as the liquid water rests upon the earth. In an insight 
102 I, 73, 2ad3.  
103 I, 68, 2ad1 quoting Gen. ad litt. II, 1, 2.   
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which demonstrates Aquinas’ own humility, he suggests that perhaps the observer’s 
perspective prevents a true observation. In this suggestion the objection based on the 
spherical shape is simply founded on an erroneous assumption about one’s ability to 
observe it. From our perspective what looks like a sphere may in fact be another shape 
because we are beneath it. It would seem that the operative principle at play throughout 
this discussion is the multiplicity of possibilities. Strangely, and it must be stressed that 
this is very unusual in the ST, Aquinas came to no conclusion, but the reader was left 
with many more questions than he initially brought to the discussion. It is as if Aquinas 
simply wanted the reader to pause for a moment and realize that there are many 
questions for which he did not and, in truth, no one had an answer.  
This article plays a critical role within the conclusions of this thesis that the best way to 
read these QQ is as a pedagogical text, a primer of some sort on the proper use of 
patristic resources. What brings one to the inescapable conclusion that this is in fact a 
pedagogical exercise and not a quest for truth per se, is that in fact, as has been 
demonstrated earlier in this thesis,104 Aquinas actually did have an answer to the 
quandary posed by the tension within this Article. Within both the Commentary II, 14, 
1, 1 and De potentia IV, 1, ob1-7 and ad1-7, Aquinas had argued forcefully and 
consistently that the waters above were in fact what Aristotle would have called the fifth 
element, the quintessence. Philosophically, theologically, and rationally, this answer 
made the most sense to Aquinas. Yet, he steadfastly refused to offer up this answer here. 
All the opinions of the theologians are examined, fitted into the philosophy and 
theology of the day, and allowed to stand.  
This re-reading of these questions in light of what was discovered in our earlier 
examination suggests that reading these questions as a quest for truth may reflect an 
erroneous presupposition. In reading a document on a quest for truth, an author who 
deliberately withholds answers to questions can only be considered dishonest and 
untrustworthy. But that is not the case in reading a text which has the formation of the 
reader in mind. The most obviously compelling answer for this behavior on Aquinas 
part is his desire to inculcate a habit of theological inquiry among his readers. Any 
master of a subject area may hold a debate among his students which seeks to answer a 
question which he, by virtue of his more advanced studies, has already solved. The 
104 Pp. 117ff.  
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purpose of such debates, common in any classroom, is not really the answer, but the 
student’s ability to arrive at such answers through the processes of the discipline. These 
QQ of the ST give the modern reader a window by which to see into the way that 
Aquinas thought about Genesis 1, but also into medieval pedagogy and Aquinas’ 
theological method.   
Article 3 utrum firmamentum dividat aquas ab aquis105 
In Article three of Q 68, Aquinas raised what seems to the modern reader to be an 
example of the stereotypical scholastic dissection of meaningless minutiae. He asked: 
does the firmament separate some waters from others? For the modern who has 
dismissed even the existence of such waters, this would seem a waste of time. The 
question apparently is not really what Aquinas is after either, as the treatment of the 
question is not particularly profound, especially when compared to his other treatments 
of this question. As such this Article could serve as another example which occasions 
the theological and philosophical readers of these QQ to despair. But when read through 
the lens of a pedagogical primer, it becomes clear. Aquinas was integrating prior skills 
and expanding the application of an idea he had introduced earlier, the principle of 
condescension.   
The Objections raised three philosophical and rational points gleaned from his earlier 
treatments, but not exhausting the Objections raised in those earlier treatments. This is 
very much a constrained, even managed dispute. The divided waters should touch both 
sides of the thing which divides them. If the substance on one side is other than one the 
other side, these waters are then essentially different. There can be no act of truly 
separating what is already distinct. A second Objection suggested that it does not make 
sense that there are waters above and below, a single species should occupy but one 
place. What is more, continued the third Objection, if there are waters above, should we 
not see such water up there? From his treatment of the Article, it might be argued that 
even Aquinas saw these as trivial Objections, but this arcane dispute in miniature gave 
him the occasion to expand upon the reverential reading of the patristic sources.  
105 Cf. Commentary II, 14, 1, 1; De potentia IV, 1, ob5, ob15, ob17, and ob20 with corresponding 
Responses; De potentia IV, 2, ob31, ad31, and corpus; as well as Quodlibet IV, 2, 2.  
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After dismissing the philosophers, particularly Thales and his monistic assertion that all 
was water, Aquinas re-introduced the reader to an important hermeneutical principle he 
had used earlier in the treatise, in I, 66, 1ad1: Moses accommodated his descriptions to 
the understanding of the people to whom he was writing. The language is particularly 
strong here. Moses’ original audience is described as ignorant (rudis) and he must 
condescend to their intellectual weakness (imbecillitas).106 Aquinas concluded that the 
interpreter of Genesis 1 cannot demand of Moses the same philosophical precision 
which we might use in light of what we have learned about the physical universe.107 The 
implications of this are enormous for Aquinas. The objections were all disposed of with 
this device. The word “waters” becomes then a term which would have been understood 
by Moses audience but which might have stood in for any number of actual things. 
Perhaps, as Augustine speculated, it was unformed matter. Perhaps the division refers to 
different species of water, perhaps it does not refer to water at all.  
This principle of admitting that Moses wrote for a particular audience and his words 
were therefore conditioned by the needs of that audience might have broken the 
fundamentalist reasoning of Basil and the other patristic authorities who insisted on a 
six-day Creation event. If everything that Moses said was actually an accommodation of 
the limitations of his audience, then what of this account could be read as historical? It 
would seem that Aquinas had in his hands at this point the very tool one would need to 
dispense with any sort of a fundamentalist reading in favor of the Augustinian 
interpretation which he found much more congenial to his philosophical concepts. But 
that is not what happened in the course of the ST; rather, Aquinas let the more 
literalistic reading stand as one possibility, but without the fundamentalist assertion that 
such a reading is the only literal and legitimate reading of this text.  
Aquinas appears here to ask his reader to combine and integrate into their reading at 
least three of the prior principles which he had earlier posited:  
1. From 68, 1 and 2, he asserts that the text of Scripture remains absolute. No 
interpretation of Scripture can violate that faithful assertion. There are waters 
106 I, 68, 3c, Sed considerandum est quod Moyses rudi populo loquebatur, quorum imbecillitati 
condescendens, illa solum eis proposuit, quae manifeste sensui apparent. 
107 I, 68, 3c. 
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above the firmament and whatever understanding of those waters we may hold 
cannot deny their existence. The final words of the third Response make this 
clear, the waters, however understood, are there.108   
2. From I, 68, 1, Augustine asserted that an interpretation of a dubious or difficult 
passage should be made humbly, so as to allow for the possibility that one is 
mistaken. Within this article several opinions are again examined, all of them 
allowed to stand. There is more than one possible answer. 
3. From 67, 1 and 2, in which Aquinas explored the multiple meanings of words. 
How one understands the division of these waters to take place depends on how 
one defines the word “water.”  
These three are then integrated with the tool of condescension as a viable means to read 
the various patristic theologians reverentially.  
The treatment of these patristic theologians is growing more and more complex. The 
anticipated pedagogical arc is now able to be charted. From the simplistic rejection of 
Origen’s ideas in 65, 2, the reader has advanced to a far more sophisticated evaluation 
of seemingly contradictory statements by various theological authorities. The 
philosophical authorities have also had their say, but their place is certainly subservient. 
They may shed light upon the dispute, they may help the reader understand something 
which the theologian has said, but the disputes between the theologians are the disputes 
which really matter here.  
Article 4 utrum sit unum caelum tantum, vel plures109 
The fourth and final Article of Question 68 asked the question of how many heavens 
exist. Aristotle set up the tension, noting that when you have an entity made up of one 
element, such as the sea is made up of water, no matter how vast it is, there is truly only 
one sea. But again the stated question of the Article and the Objections are better seen 
as a pretext for the discussion which followed. In this instance, however, the nature of 
the Article is markedly different than earlier articles. The patristic theologians provided 
108 I, 68, 3ad3, Et sic manifestum est quod ex utraque parte firmamenti, qualitercumque accepti, sunt 
aquae. 
109 Cf. Commentary II, 14, 1, 4; In De caelo I, 17-20; Super Joannem VI, 4;  and Super II Corinthios XII, 1.  
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a brief diversion as Basil and Chrysostom seem to disagree, but this was easily resolved 
through an appeal to literary devices. What was really at stake was a question about the 
nature of heaven. The patristic theologians receded into the background and wide-
ranging Scriptural citations reasserted themselves. As we have argued earlier, this 
question touched upon the goal of the entire ST, the reditus of the Creation toward the 
Creator. Because this was a point which needed a definitive answer, the level of the 
authorities which Aquinas cited increased. Beginning with the sed contra which is a 
quotation from Psalm 148, Aquinas drew upon citations from throughout the text of the 
Bible, Isaiah 14:13, Matthew 5:12, Psalm 8:9, and II Corinthians 12:2. The claim that 
this represents an increased level of authority is buttressed by the fact that these 
citations are taken from central passages of these works. Isaiah is theologically 
significant, the Psalter the most frequently used biblical text in liturgy, Matthew is 
quoted from the Sermon on the Mount, and Paul was speaking of his conversion 
experience, one of the key events of the New Testament. Even within the hierarchy of 
Scriptural witnesses, these passages carry significant weight.  
For the purposes of the ST, the article was important because it established the 
definition of the third heaven, over against the sky and the sidereal heaven. The third 
heaven is understood to have multiple meanings, but all of those meanings involve the 
presence of God. Exactly what Aquinas intended to make of this is unfortunately 
inaccessible to us. Aquinas broke off his writing of the ST on the sixth of December, 
1273,110 in the middle of his treatment of Penance, and died three months later without 
having treated the beatific vision at the end of the ST.111  
Question 69 de opere tertiae diei 
Following his hexameral pattern, Aquinas turned to the third day in his treatment of Q 
69, which is recorded in Genesis 1:9-13, and addressed this material in just two Articles. 
This unusual, although, not unheard of, brevity requires comment, especially as it 
110 Weisheipl, 320-327. O’Meara, 31, notes that there are several explanations for this cessation. 
Aquinas’ contemporaries attributed it to a mystical experience, but, while some continue to argue that 
point of view, many today consider a stroke or some other neurological event more likely.  
111 Weisheipl, 362, Aquinas’ secretary (socius), Reginald of Piperno, oversaw the completion of the 
remaining questions (Supplement), primarily drawing from Aquinas’ earlier treatments of the same 
material.   
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resurfaces in QQ 71 and 72 which take the very unusual form of articulus unicus. While 
earlier Articles within prior sections of the ST are treated with some brevity, QQ 71 and 
72 are first instances within the ST in which a Question is treated in only one Article.  
It appears that in these QQ Aquinas is adhering to the hexameral form but does not 
actually have a great deal of material to consider, or at least material that served his 
purposes here. This is borne out by a comparison with the treatment of the third day in 
both the Commentary and De potentia. In Commentary II, 14, 1, 5 the third day 
occupies a single Article and its material is substantively repeated here in the ST. 
Aquinas divided the single Article in the Commentary into two Articles in ST, but this 
was a logical division as the earlier treatment had really dealt with two questions, the 
propriety of the division of waters to fashion dry land and the appropriateness of the 
vegetative creation on this day. De potentia IV, 1 and 2 devoted even less attention to 
the third day, including mention of the gathering of waters and the creation of plants as 
secondary issues in only two Objections and their Responses.  
A closer examination of the sources cited and discussed in the ST, however, again 
reveals a marked divergence from the earlier treatments. The two articles in ST I, 69 are 
substanially longer than the single article in the Commentary; although, the Objections 
are almost identical. This is unusual in that normally the Articles in the Commentary are 
far longer than those in this section of the ST. The corpus in each article was expanded. 
The additional material was entirely devoted to an examination of the two 
interpretational strands of Augustine and Basil. In the first Article, the question asked 
was completely subsumed into the discussion of Augustine and other “saints” 
(sanctorum).112 The second Article begins with three sentences which restate the 
essence of the material in the Commentary and then once more takes up these two 
differing opinions of Augustine and Basil.113 The reader who observes the treatment of 
sources may conclude that this Question of the ST is not as much about the answers to 
questions raised by the Genesis material as it is about the treatment of these patristic 
theologians. Aquinas had addressed the questions of the third day, those answers were 
112 I, 69, 1c, Respondeo dicendum quod hic oportet aliter dicere secundum expositionem Augustini, et 
aliorum sanctorum.  
113 I, 69, 2c, Sed tamen circa productionem plantarum, aliter opinatur Augustinus ab aliis.   
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touched upon here, but the Article invests very little intellectual energy into these 
answers.  
When one compares the authorities cited, Basil, who is extensively examined in ST I 
69, never appeared in the corresponding material within Commentary II, 14, 1, 5, nor, 
for that matter, do any other patristic sources save one comment by Augustine who is 
cited for his idea that God created the seeds (semen) of the plants without actually 
creating the plants in their final form. This important idea of Augustine’s was more 
fully articulated in I, 69, 2. Within the Commentary Aristotle’s works are cited most 
frequently. In Q 69, Aristotle is almost completely absent. Wallace credits114 Aristotle 
as the source behind a single reference to “some philosophers” in the fourth Response of 
the first Article, suggesting a work which is not cited in the Commentary’s Article on 
the third day.  
As a reverential reading, Aquinas does not introduce new principles of such reading 
here, but seems to be demonstrating what he has earlier proposed, namely that a careful 
application of semantic nuance, philosophical contextualization, condescension, and 
other basic principles of medieval patristic reading allowed for either strand of 
interpretation to stand. The ideas of Augustine and Basil are further developed and 
refined in the understanding of the reader, potential problems are addressed, but both 
were deemed acceptable alternatives. It is perhaps in the use of intellectual space that 
this Question stands out. Aquinas seems to use that space created in the prior QQ to 
develop one of Augustine’s more ambitious ideas, that of the rationes seminales.   
Article 1 utrum aquarum congregatio convenienter dicatur facta tertia die115 
In the first Article Aquinas framed his question, “whether the gathering of waters is 
appropriately described as being done on the third day?”  Modern readers of patristic 
and medieval theology frequently find this sort of question frustrating. Patristic 
theologians regularly appealed to what is “fitting” or in the Latin of this question 
convenienter.116 This is the adverbial form of the common verb convenio which has 
114 Wallace, 99, note k. 
115 Cf. Commentary II, 14, 1, 5; De potentia IV, 1.  
116 According to the Index Thomisticus, Aquinas uses the term 262 times in the ST alone.  (accessed via 
Internet, November 15, 2013.) 
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many uses which revolve around something being proper or fitting. A marriage might 
be convenienter, so might a speech or a dwelling. For the modern reader, Aquinas 
seems to be addressing an inappropriate question. S/he wants to know if something is 
“true” not whether it is “fitting.” But of course, in rendering this judgment, the modern 
is engaged in the very assignation of the title “fitting” which s/he deplores in the 
medieval scholar. 
Aquinas and many others117 approached the text of Scripture with an expectation that 
God works convenienter, “appropriately” or “fittingly.” Having this expectation, 
Aquinas frequently framed his questions with this device. It is not the case that Aquinas 
stood in some sort of critical judgment of the text of Scripture; rather, the discovery of 
something “unseemly” became an occasion to wonder “Why?” When the text 
transgressed the perception of what was fitting, it was grounds for an exploration of 
meaning. Aquinas and many theologians of the ancient and medieval world found this 
to be particularly fruitful in the development of their theology, often serving to expand 
their preconceptions of what was “fitting” for God.  
Within this Article, Aquinas established a tension between simple logic and the text of 
Genesis 1:9 which he does not even bother to quote in the sed contra  but tersely 
asserts: “On the other hand, the authority of Scripture suffices in this case”118 Some of 
the objections to the gathering of the waters seem banal. Aquinas objected that the word 
“gathered” seems to be poorly chosen since water is not in fact gathered in one place as 
there are many different bodies of water.119 If the earth was in fact covered in water, 
how could it be gathered in one place if the water was deep enough to cover the whole 
face of the earth? Where did it all go?120 Further, to Aquinas, this seemed to be simply a 
matter of movement, hardly a matter of the creative process at all. Aquinas noted that it 
117 Brian Daley S. J., “Is Patristic Exegesis Still Useable?” in The Art of Reading Scripture, Eds.: Ellen F. 
Davis and Richard Hays, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003) 78-80, addresses the frequent appeal to 
arguments which derive from this sense of what is “fitting” and the issues such a reliance raises for the 
post-enlightenment interpreter.  
118 I, 69, 1sc, sed in contrarium sufficit auctoritas Scripturae. 
119 I, 69, 1ob3. 
120 I, 69, 1ob2. 
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would have happened without God commanding it, as water naturally flows downward 
without any command of God.121  
More substantively, the Latin text had described the divine action on the third by 
utilizing a different vocabulary.122 It also seems to contradict the action of the first verse 
which had already spoken of the creation of the heaven and the earth. In a repetition of 
the same argument regarding the creation of the firmament in 68, 1ob1, Aquinas 
wondered how could earth (terra) be created again. 123 This last objection is in fact one 
of Augustine’s principal objections to the literal reading of Basil and others. His 
contention124 was that they had not read the text truly literally because they had not 
accounted for this very question of how the first verse related to the later text which also 
spoke of the creation of the earth. Basil and those who read the text with him followed 
what was perhaps a more straightforward reading which rested on the precedent of 
earlier interpreters who had read the first verse as a literary device.125 
Thus, inside this Article, Aquinas set up conflict, however artificial it sounds to the 
modern ear. The corpus of the Article explored how both interpretational strands can 
answer this question.126 Augustine poses little or no problem here for the question of 
whether this is fitting.127 Because he did not presuppose a temporal progression in the 
text, but a logical progression, it is in fact fitting that water and earth be discussed after 
angelic beings (light) and the heavenly realms of the first two days. The other patristic 
sources were also not difficult to fit into this, in Aquinas’ opinion but they did require a 
little more effort. Presupposing a temporal progression, they had assumed that the 
121 I, 69, 1ob4. 
122 1, 69, 1ob1, within the Latin translation Aquinas was using, the verb used to describe the divine 
action of days one and two was facio but in day three the Latin text uses congrego. 
123 I, 69, 1ob5. 
124 Gen. ad litt. I, 9, 15. 
125 John Chrysostom,  In Gen.  Hom. 2, had likened this initial verse of the Genesis account to a carpenter 
saying he “built” a house and then going on to explain that he laid the foundation, then framed the 
walls, then established the roof, etc.  
126I, 69, 1c, Dicendum quod hic oportet aliter dicere secundum expositionem Augustini et aliorum 
Sanctorum.    
127 I, 69, 1ad2, patet solutio secundum Augustinum.  
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creation of partially formed matter on the first day meant that subsequent days would 
involve the imposition of increasingly specific form. It was not the case that water and 
earth were perfectly formed the first day, but these elements were thus perfectly formed 
by the third day resulting in the water’s coming to rest in its appropriate place and 
revealing the dry land. The separation of the waters was not an actual movement of 
water so much as it was the imposition of proper forms upon the matter which had only 
been partially formed.  
The number of possible explanations proposed in order to render the temporal 
understanding possible stands out to the reader of this Article. Aquinas called upon 
Maimonides128 to suggest some sort of equivocation as one solution.129 Aquinas’ 
presentation of Basil’s ideas is particularly noteworthy as Aquinas consistently framed 
the discussion so that the readers knew that Augustine was drawing on the prior ideas 
put forward by Basil.130 No single idea was asserted as the only possible or even the 
best solution, rather the reader was presented with a catalogue of possibilities. The 
Article’s initial question, which Aquinas had dealt with elsewhere, has become a pretext 
for Aquinas to address two different patristic concepts of Creation, evaluate them both, 
and declare that both of them had merit.  
Article 2 utrum plantarum productio inconvenienter tertia die facta legatur131 
Likewise the second Article of Question 69 asks a question of propriety: “Is the 
production of plants improperly described as taking place on the third day?” Again, as 
in the previous article the objections are all from simple observation and are drawn from 
those found in Commentary 14, 1, 5. As living creatures they should be described with 
the other living things on the sixth day.132 Since plants are specifically mentioned as 
part of the curse of the earth in Genesis 3, they should not be described here.133 And 
finally he says that this seems to be only focused on one part of the Creation. There is 
128 Guide to the Perplexed II, 30. 
129 I, 69, 1ad5. 
130 I, 69, 1ad2 and 1ad5.  
131 Cf. Commentary II, 14, 1, 5; ST I, 70, 1; and I, 102, 1.  
132 I, 69, 2ob1. 
133 I, 69, 2ob2. 
182 
 
                                                          
no discussion of the creation of minerals or stones (lapides) which could be presumed in 
the creation of dry land. 
Once more this rather pedestrian question presented Aquinas with an opportunity to 
demonstrate his reverential reading. The answers at which he had arrived in the 
Commentary were not particularly profound and it appears that this was not an issue 
which excited Aquinas or his peers. The resolution of the tension within the Objections 
and sed contra is speedy. What had started out as formless and empty (void) is now 
given shape by the arrangement of land and water and clothed by the creation of plants. 
Were the question as simple as that, this Article would be short indeed. But the 
reverential reading of the prior QQ and the immediately prior Article afforded Aquinas 
space to delve into the “opinions of Augustine and others” which “differ.”134  
Quickly dispensing with the tension of the Objections and sed contra, Aquinas almost 
immediately began an explication of an important idea about the Creation event: 
Augustine’s suggestion that the Creation involved embedding the ability135 to produce 
such plants within the earth itself, analogous to seeds, not the creation of the plants 
themselves.136 Obviously for the modern reader who is versed in the evolutionary 
theories and understandings of contemporary science, this is quite suggestive.137 It must 
be remembered that Aquinas was not an heir of the Enlightenment and did not engage 
this argument with anything like the scientific depth which a modern reader would 
desire. But despite that contextual reality he may have delivered the larger and 
intellectually more significant message to his readership and the modern reader.138 
Augustine’s idea was provocative and interesting, but in the final analysis Aquinas did 
134 I, 69, 2c, aliter opinatur Augustinus ab aliis.  
135 I, 69, 2c, Idest producendi accepisse virtutem and non ergo in tertia dei productae sunt plantae in 
actu, sed causaliter tantum.  
136Gen. ad litt. V, 4, 9-10 and VIII, 3, 6. 
137 A search through the Internet will reveal many sites which address the implications of Augustine’s 
idea for the current Creation and evolution debates. For a recent treatment by a scientist and 
theologian, consider an article posted May 8, 2009 on the Christianity Today website by Alistair McGrath 
of King’s College, London. http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2009/may/22.39.html . 
138 Wallace, Intr. xxii, while he does not cite this passage specifically in his introduction, one has to 
consider that this is what Wallace had in mind when he held up Aquinas as an early exemplar of careful 
science.   
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not adopt it nor reject it. Both the more common literal reading of a six day Creation 
and the more unconventional, alternative literal reading of Augustine were both 
permitted to stand. Both were examined in regard to this question and found to be 
congruous with both the text of Scripture and the hylomorphic understanding of physics 
to which Aquinas and his medieval scholastic peers subscribed.   
Within Q 69 Aquinas has applied the principles of reverential reading rigorously to the 
third day of Creation recorded in Genesis 1. Unlike his treatment of Origen in Q 65, 
however, he has not come to any preference for one answer over another. Even more 
striking, unlike his treatment of the same issues and same questions in other works, he 
has persistently refused to favor Augustine’s non-temporal but still literal reading over 
that of the temporal literal readings of Basil and those who followed his interpretational 
strand.  
When one considers that Aquinas was here stepping back from conclusions he had 
espoused mere months prior in the writing of De potentia, one is compelled to ask why 
he would do this. In De potentia Aquinas clearly had favored the interpretation of 
Augustine as the one which provided the best answer, but he did not posit that 
conclusion here. The only reasonable conclusion, it seems, is that Aquinas wanted to 
continue in his examination of the literal interpretation of Basil, and if he simply 
declared it to be inferior to Augustine’s, he would be crippling that further examination. 
But if he honestly believed Augustine’s interpretation be superior, it seems only logical 
that setting aside Basil would have allowed him to explore Augustine’s ideas in even 
greater depth. One might argue that the tension provided by Basil was a tool, a foil, for 
Aquinas to use while examining Augustine’s idea, but further reading will reveal that at 
no time does he exclusively prefer Augustine to Basil. One might argue that Aquinas 
was simply responding to the pressure of his peers who overwhelmingly favored Basil’s 
conclusions. But considering that he will later label most of those peers “Nestorians,” 
this also seems unlikely.139 It is the contention of this thesis that in maintaining the 
validity of both Basil’s and Augustine’s positions, Aquinas was carving out intellectual 
space for inquiry. Not only does Aquinas appear to be equipping his reader to approach 
the discipline of theology with appropriate humility by demonstrating that there are 
many unanswered questions, he also seems to have insisted that certain conclusions 
139 Wawrykow, “Hypostatic Union,” 222-251, esp. 246. 
184 
 
                                                          
assumed within the theological community of his day were in fact still open questions. 
Against the Augustinist faction, Aquinas was creating the possibility that it is both 
intellectually honest and theologically faithful to think about a foundational doctrine 
such as Creation differently from the majority of his peers.   
Questions 70-72 
Aquinas addressed within these questions the second triad of the Creation story, what he 
understood to be the ornamentation of the now differentiated physical world. Only in Q 
70, which treated the fourth day, did Aquinas engage the implications of the Genesis 
text in any depth. Having established the rules of reverential reading, in these three 
Questions he continued to demonstrate this technique by examining both traditions and 
striving to place both within the parameters of what he thought to be true of the natural 
world and the truth he believed to be revealed in the Christian Scripture. It has already 
been noted that QQ 71 and 72 are very brief, only one Article each. Q 70, on the other 
hand, is treated in three Articles of some substance. Aquinas treated Question 70 
differently because it was important to him. It dealt with the nature of heavenly bodies, 
the relationship of human beings to the Creation, and thus, at least to some extent, the 
reditus of the ST.  
His treatment of sources in each of the three Articles is also illustrative. Having noted 
that the two strands of interpretation indeed diverge, in Q 70 Aquinas stressed the unity 
of the patristic sources, even when faced by what appeared to be direct contradictions. 
Having indulged in the prior two Questions in the exploration of the differences 
between the two interpretational strands, in these three Questions, the fundamental unity 
of the disparate interpretations is again emphasized and explored. The reader paying 
attention to the use of sources notices that the principle of a unifying faith behind both 
interpretational strands asserted itself. 
Article 1 utrum luminaria debuerint produci quarta die140 
This Article addressed a number of objections to the creation of the heavenly bodies on 
the fourth day. It was not uncommon for ancient critics of the Biblical account to focus 
on the account of this day as problematic. Augustine had been prompted within his 
140 Cf. Commentary II, 15, 1, 1; De potentia IV, 1. 
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treatments of Creation to address such criticisms as expressed by the Manicheans.141 
Aquinas acknowledged this extensive prior history as he catalogued several “problems” 
within the Objections: Since, as he believed, the heavenly bodies are incorruptible, they 
should have been made prior to the earth and plants which are subject to corruption. 
These heavenly bodies should have been made on the first day with light, since they are 
containers of light. They should have been made on the second day with the firmament, 
since they reside there. He also held to the medieval idea that the sun was causative of 
vegetative life, he objects that it is out of order to have the effect (plants) precede the 
cause. Finally, demonstrating his knowledge of the best of medieval science, he noted 
that some stars are in fact larger than the sun and moon and hence these two bodies 
should not be called “greater lights.” The sed contra again does not quote the text but 
simply asserts the authority of Scripture.142 Within the Objections, no patristic 
authorities nor any philosophers are cited and they remain almost entirely absent from 
the corpus.  
This corpus also presents something of a departure for Aquinas from prior Articles 
within this section. He effectively ignores all the objections and the minimal tension 
created by the sed contra. His material here is rather an explanation of the difference 
between diversification and adornment. He pointed out the double triad structure of the 
six days. At the conclusion of the corpus, without addressing any of the Objections, he 
noted that there was no tension among the patristic theologians. This again is suggestive 
of his audience. Because it is so elementary, no readership within a university would 
benefit from this material. Aquinas could not have had such an audience in mind. 
Again, we propose, the only audience for which this would not have been intellectually 
insulting would be a body of readers who had not benefited from the medieval Liberal 
Arts tradition. The most logical place for Aquinas to have encountered such a readership 
would have been the priories of the Dominican Order whose educational program he 
had been charged with revising.  
When one turns to the Responses to the Objections in I, 70, 1, an examination of how 
various patristic authorities answered these questions comprises the entirety of this 
material. Aquinas had already noted that none of the patristic theologians substantively 
141 Gen. ad litt. II, 14, 28 – 18, 38; Gen. contra Man. I, 14, 20-23. 
142 I, 70, 1sc, sed in contrarium sufficit auctoritas Scripturae. 
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disagree.143 With no patristic tension to speak of, Aquinas resorted to the natural 
philosophers, especially Ptolemy, for the tension against which their ideas might 
contend. The patristic theologians, Basil, Chrysostom, Denis, and, of course, Augustine, 
are all given their chance to answer one of the rational objections. Not cast in tension 
with each other, they each serve to fill or complement the understanding of the creation 
of the luminous heavenly bodies. This Article, especially these Responses, reads more 
like the catenae which Aquinas and others wrote at the time in which they strung 
together patristic quotes around verses and themes of the Scriptures. While the tension 
between the two interpretational strands of the theologians was referenced144 it did not 
serve as the focus of this Article, rather the unity of the theologians was on display, as if 
to suggest that those who posited different interpretations might also be found to agree. 
Key to this unity was the insight of Chrysostom that the creation of the heavenly bodies 
was delayed for theological reasons, to inoculate Moses’ original audience from 
idolatrous worship of these bodies.145  
This rationale for the delay is worthy of note. Aquinas saw the material in Genesis 1 
being shaped by the needs of Moses’ audience, not by some effort to convey the events 
in some strictly literal sense as the modern reader would define it. He is quite 
comfortable suggesting here that the material in Genesis 1 has been purposefully shaped 
to avoid what he considered to be a heretical idea. In this case it appears that the 
creation of the heavenly bodies may not have actually occurred on the fourth calendar 
day, but it is recorded here because of an imagined propensity to the idolatrous worship 
of these heavenly bodies within the audience of Moses.  
The modernist reader who operates with the contemporary definition of literal finds this 
incomprehensible. In the context of an author who is not reliably conveying historical 
truth, the literal reading collapses. But Aquinas and his peers would have found the 
modernist’s objection to be a non sequitur. The historical record may have been 
deliberately modified for the sake of the audience, but the word on the page is still 
verbum dei and thus deserving of close scrutiny.  
143 I, 70, 1c, In productione luminarium non discordat Augustinus ab aliis Sanctis. 
144 I, 70, 1ad1 and 1ad2.  
145 I, 70, 1ad1, ut per hoc removeat populum ab idololatria, ostendens luminaria non esse deos, ex quo 
nec a principio fuerunt. 
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The reader interested in sources notices within this treatment of the authorities a 
departure from what has taken place in prior Articles. Aquinas has, up to this point, 
been highlighting the tension created by these two interpretational strands, a tension 
which he has steadfastly refused to reconcile, but has simply let stand. It would appear 
within this Article, that he is appealing to unity of these authorities to validate this 
approach by demonstrating the usefulness of each strand. Here one finds an argument 
for letting both approaches to Genesis 1 stand as possibilities. If, as an example, one 
were to favor Augustine’s reading over that of Basil, then Basil’s ability to serve the 
needs of the current interpreter by answering these rational objections to the biblical 
account of the fourth day would be compromised. By allowing both traditions to stand 
as possible readings, Aquinas seemed to be demonstrating that the interpreter of the text 
can draw freely upon insights of theologians who have subscribed to one or the other 
tradition.  
But what is the basis for this unity? If the two interpretational strands indeed are in 
logical tension with each other, it would appear that the answers given by one or the 
other must be somehow suspect. But Aquinas apparently did not think so. In this he was 
simply embodying the epistemic humility which he had learned from Augustine. The 
following Article, then, can be read as an exposition of how it can be valid to draw on 
both interpretational strands for insight.  
Article 2 utrum inconvenienter causa productionis luminarium describatur146 
In the first Article Aquinas had addressed the propriety of the creation of the heavenly 
bodies on the fourth day. In this Article he wondered whether this act of ornamentation 
is in fact appropriately described. Aquinas had presented the patristic theologians united 
in their refutation of the various Objections of the first Article. From this unity in the 
patristic witness Aquinas proceeded to apply the principle of condescension and the 
value of this multifaceted reading through a reverential reading of Moses himself in the 
second Article of Q 70. The Objections address the wording of the Genesis text which 
had ascribed to the sun and moon the purpose of being signs for seasons and 
illuminating the earth. A sign was a technical term for anyone who had read Augustine 
and the sun and moon did not seem to Aquinas and to fit that technical category. Not 
146 Cf. Commentary II, 15, 1, 1. 
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only had Scripture elsewhere enjoined us not to treat the heavenly bodies as meaningful 
signs,147 the heavenly bodies ought better be described as causes, not signs. He 
furthermore objected that the sun and moon were superior bodies to the earth, hence 
they should not serve it, but rather earth ought to serve their needs. In the fifth and final 
Objection Aquinas noted that the moon had to have been made new, and a new moon is 
dark, and thus it could not have ruled over the night.  
Moses’ description, as characterized in the Objections, thus seemed to be deficient. He 
had only presented one of the multiple categories of a cause. To a medieval theologian 
well versed in the intricacies of Aristotelian logic and dialectic reasoning, this would 
have been an inexcusable lapse or indication of incompetence. Aquinas instead brought 
the reader back to the important issue of condescension which had also occupied the 
first Article of this question. Moses may be excused for his incomplete treatment of the 
causes because he first and foremost was combating an idolatrous impulse among his 
readership who were used to worshiping these heavenly bodies.148 The reader should 
not expect Moses, and by extension any biblical text, to answer these questions 
according to such a standard.  
The application of this principle to Moses himself is significant. This is one of the 
lynchpin arguments of Aquinas in the prologue to the inaptly named “Against the errors 
of the Greeks”149 which had been composed contemporaneously with this section of the 
ST. Therein Aquinas argued that one could not hold patristic theologians to the same 
exacting standard which theology had developed in the subsequent centuries through its 
contentions with heretics and others.150 One had to contextualize the author to the 
audience and the state of theological discourse at the time in which that author had 
written. By applying the principle of contextual reading to another and higher level in 
the hierarchy of authority, even to Moses himself, Aquinas bolstered its application to 
147 I, 70, 2ob1 citing Jeremiah 10:2, one of the few quotations of Scripture outside of Genesis 1 in this 
section of the ST.  
148 I, 70, 2c, Sed Moyses, ut populum ab idololatria revocaret, illam solam causam tetigit, secundum quod 
sunt facta ad utilitatem hominum.  
149 Contra errores Graecorum. 
150 Contra errores, pro. See Chenu, Toward Understanding Aquinas, p. 130ff, and Jordan, p. 28ff for 
further discussion of Aquinas’ treatment of this concept.  
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the patristic theologians. If one had to read Moses this way, presumably Augustine or 
Basil could be read this way as well.  
This undergirding of the condescension principle does not exhaust Aquinas’ purposes 
for this Article. Aquinas made a singular specific reference within this Article to a 
patristic authority. This was a citation of Augustine in the Response to the fifth 
Objection which had questioned whether a new moon could be said to rule the night 
when it was dark. Aquinas responded with an argument that while created things do 
tend to progress from incomplete to complete, Creation is an entirely distinct category 
of change in which completion is the initial state. Thus, the moon was most likely 
created full and hence properly described as ruling the night. But Augustine, he noted, 
had no problem with God creating something less than complete.151 Aquinas likely has 
in mind152 a section of Augustine’s Gen. ad litt.153 in which Augustine had addressed 
this very issue and asserted this idea in reference to the creation of the moon. But what 
the reader who is focused on sources finds interesting is that Augustine, within this 
same paragraph of his literal commentary, rather forcefully made Aquinas’ argument on 
the creation of the moon in its full phase. His rationale is exactly the same as that put 
forward by Aquinas; yet, Aquinas does not cite Augustinian authority for this idea, 
instead Aquinas pointed out that Augustine had proposed a different idea, when, in fact, 
they were in agreement on the larger issue which was under consideration. He casts 
Augustine to be in error, but cites as the far more important issue another of Augustine’s 
ideas, stated immediately next to the erroneous idea cited.  
Again, we would point to the reader to implications for the identification of Aquinas’ 
audience. Aquinas must realize that they are not familiar with the text by Augustine, 
otherwise the whole Article loses some of its integrity. What is more, he must not have 
been terribly concerned that his readers would have read Augustine’s own words on the 
subject. While no one who has ever taught young scholars should ever underestimate 
their predilection for intellectual sloth, Aquinas had lived long enough in the intense 
intellectual world of the University of Paris to know that this would be challenged 
151 I, 70, 2ad2, Augustinus tamen hoc non asserit, quia dicit non esse inconveniens quod Deus imperfecta 
fecerit, quae postmodum ipse perfecit.  
152 Wallace, 118 n. 15. 
153 Gen. ad litt. II, 15, 30. 
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eventually. As a quest for truth, this treatment of Augustine would have to be evaluated 
as problematic. But as a conditional treatment put to pedagogical purposes it serves a 
purpose. The student in whom the theological habitus had been inculcated, however, 
would eventually come back to this material, read Augustine for himself, and be on that 
quest for truth.  
The careful reader of sources has noticed that Aquinas has manipulated his sources. 
Clearly Aquinas was aware of the Augustinian root of his idea, as he quotes from the 
adjacent passage for another idea. When reading these QQ it is clear that Aquinas is 
strongly attracted to the idea put forward by Augustine. It philosophically made more 
sense to Aquinas. But it appears here and elsewhere that Aquinas took pains to avoid 
putting Augustine into a dominant position and frequently treats his material with a 
notable sense of reservation in order to maintain some semblance of balance. The 
widely accepted and more problematic strand of interpretation championed by Basil and 
others was allowed to stand and in order to achieve that, Aquinas was willing to 
diminish his presentation of Augustine’s material. Here one notes that by not citing the 
source of the answer which is clearly Augustinian, but pointing to a tension with 
Augustine’s words, the incipientes for whom he wrote would have been better able to 
access both strands of theology.  
Aquinas also inadvertently posited a principle which the twenty-first century reader 
does well to remember when reading Aquinas on this very Article. He pursued a line of 
inquiry which was respectable among scholastic theologians of his day but which is 
risible in the eyes of most today. Aquinas devoted considerable attention in the corpus 
of Article 2 to whether the moon had been created full or new. Relying on an idea which 
has become synonymous with much that is wrong with pre-enlightenment thinking, he 
presupposed spontaneous generation154 and, as if to compound his scientific ignorance, 
cited approvingly in the subsequent article that Anaxagoras was condemned by the 
Athenians for suggesting that the sun was just a ball of burning rock and not a God.155 
Some have read such things in Aquinas and seen them as occasions to turn their 
attention elsewhere, despairing of anything of substance within these pages.156 But to 
154 I, 70, 3ob3. 
155 I, 70, 3c. 
156 Wallace, Intr. xx-xxii. 
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ignore Aquinas for this reason is to miss this point entirely. The author of a prior 
generation has to be read within the context of his times and the limitations of what he 
knew at the time; and this applies to the modern reader of Aquinas as well. Indeed such 
a charitable reading is all that any modern author can hope for from his readership in 
generations to come.  
Article 3  Utrum luminaria caeli sint animata157 
The third Article of question 70 repeated a pattern already demonstrated earlier in our 
treatment of the ST.158 Aquinas here applied the principle addressed in an earlier article 
to a more difficult and important question which held serious implications for the reader 
and in this instance for the entire thesis of the ST: Are the luminous heavenly bodies 
living beings?159 While to a post-enlightenment reader educated in basic science this 
question seems risible, this was an important question for Aquinas which he had treated 
extensively in other works. The precise nature of these heavenly bodies concerned the 
larger goals of the work, most especially the reditus of the Creation to the Creator but 
also the exitus of the Creation from the Creator. He noted that neither philosophers nor 
patristic theologians agree among themselves on this issue.160 As noted above, Aquinas 
used the example that Anaxagoras had thought the sun to be inanimate but Platonists 
held it to be a living creature. Likewise a number of theologians held either position.  
Within the corpus of Article, Aquinas does come to a conclusion. He does not believe 
that heavenly bodies are living, but his answer is unusually well developed for this 
section and as such provides a window into ideas he would more fully developed later 
within the ST. This development stands in marked contrast to his treatment of this 
question in the Commentary where he treats this question on at least two occasions. 
157 Cf. Commentary II, 14, 1, 3; SCG II, 70; De veritate V, 9; De potentia VI, 6; De spiritualibus creaturis 6; 
De anima 8ad3; Quodlibet XII, 8; In De caelo II, 3; and II, 13.  
158 Consider Aquinas’ treatment of Origen in I, 65, 2, as a case study in the principles of identifying error 
in a patristic theologian which was then applied in the Article which immediately followed.  
159 Wallace, 118-119, note a, and Appendix 8, 5, 217. Just as the objections to the Creation of the 
heavenly bodies on the fourth day had been a stock objection raised by the Manichees, this question 
was also traditional, but may have taken on a new relevancy in light of recently received works by 
Islamic commentators on Aristotle, particularly Averroes who had argued that the spheres were 
“intelligences” which emanated from one another.   
160 I, 70, 3c, diversa opinio. 
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Aquinas first broached the subject in the Commentary under the question of whether the 
heavenly bodies are moved by an intelligence.161 Therein Aquinas argued that they were 
moved by a mind, but it was the intelligence of angelic beings who were proximate 
causes of the movement.162 It is not quite the same question posed here, but almost 
exactly the same answer.  
He uses the conclusion he reached in Commentary II, 14, 1, 3 on two subsequent 
occasions. In the next Distinction Aquinas addressed the possibility that the heavenly 
bodies had an effect upon on corporeal bodies.163 There the issue was subsumed into a 
polemic against astrology, a practice which he contended was based upon a manifold 
error (multiplex error).164 He again denied this idea in De potentia but there as well it 
was a minor point in a more pointedly polemic discussion about the nature and potential 
effects of angelic and demonic bodies.165 The treatment of the question in ST I, 70, 1 is 
far more robust. While he had arrived at this point via another question in Commentary 
II, 14, 1, 3, he did so asking whether the movement of the heavenly beings was 
attributable to intelligence. In I, 70, 1 he has asked a subtly different question.   
In 70, 1 Aquinas was not addressing the errors of astrology or delving deep into the 
nature of angels and demons, but he had entered into an exploration of the nature of 
what it means be a living being and the relationship of the soul to the physical body. 
After much wrestling through the attendant issues he concluded that the only possible 
purpose which a living soul would have for these heavenly bodies, which he believed to 
be immutable, would be physical motion. But motion can be achieved simply via an 
application of power and is an insufficient purpose for a soul to be joined to a body. The 
heavenly bodies, therefore, are not themselves living, but propelled in their respective 
spheres by living servants of God, angels, exactly the conclusion reached in 
Commentary II, 14, 1, 3.  
161 Commentary II, 14, 1, 3  Utrum motus caeli sit ab intelligentia.  
162 Commentary II, 14, 1, 3c, Et ideo Angelos, qui movent orbes proxime, possumus motores dicere, non 
formas vel animas. 
163 Commentary II, 15, 1, 2c. 
164 Ibid. 
165 De potentia VI, 6, 2c and 2ad10. 
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But whereas that earlier discussion had focused the attention of the reader upon angelic 
nature, this treatment has given Aquinas a moment to reflect on the exitus and to posit 
separation of the object moved from the mover, especially important when discussing 
the “first mover” of Creation. But it also has given Aquinas an opportunity to discuss 
the relationship of a soul to the body with regard to the heavenly bodies, a matter which 
he discussed in much greater detail in the next section of the ST with regard to the 
human being.166 Aquinas has his mind on what comes next within his schema for the 
work and within this Article prepared the reader for what follows. He has identified the 
purpose and the nature of the soul which will undergird that subsequent discussion. The 
human soul is in the body in order to be sentient and nutritive. This is a reality which 
does not apply to heavenly bodies, and for this reason the heavenly body is not a truly 
living thing. The human being has not been deposed from his place at the pinnacle of 
physical Creation. The heavenly bodies are not like humans, horizon creatures who live 
in both the spiritual and the physical realms. The heavenly bodies are simply the 
inanimate objects of forces applied by spiritual intelligences which obediently cause the 
cosmos to function according to the divine plan.  
In terms of the questions of this thesis’ focus on sources the opening and concluding 
lines of the corpus are significant. Aquinas began by noticing that the theologians were 
in disagreement. Origen and Jerome had asserted that the heavenly bodies are living. 
Basil and the Damascene said they were not. Augustine, true to form, demurred, 
refusing to take a position. Aquinas’ response here is interesting: “In such a diversity of 
opinions, in order that the truth in some part be known, one must keep in mind….”167 
Herein he began his treatment of the relationship between a body and a soul, concluding 
that the sun and moon and other heavenly bodies are not alive, but simply pushed in 
their orbits by some angelic force. It is clear (manifestum est) and obvious (patet) that 
one cannot call them living except in some equivocal sense (aequivoce). Aquinas is not 
in doubt about whether these beings are living or not. The language he used within this 
Article has become much more specific and forceful.  
Having just explained that the heavenly beings cannot be living, however, he then 
excuses the patristic theologians who assert the contrary with an appeal to the slippage 
166 ST I, 75-80. 
167 I, 70, 3c, In hac autem opinionum diversitate, ut veritas aliquatenus innotescat, considerandum est…   
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of language. “Thus between those who hold that the heavenly bodies are alive and those 
who deny it, there is not a real but merely verbal disagreement.”168 Even though 
Aquinas has come to see that there really is a conclusion to be reached here, those who 
hold what appear to be opposing positions are again read “reverentially.” The difference 
is semantic (in voce tantum), not in substance. There is no cause to contend over this 
issue. It is so manifest that Jerome, despite what he actually wrote, must have been 
speaking metaphorically when he called these heavenly bodies “living.” While the 
patristic theologians at some points do differ, Aquinas also noted a fundamental unity, a 
unity which he would in this instance arbitrarily enforce. But it should be noted that 
Aquinas was not alone in this practice. His own mentor, Albert the Great, seems to have 
advocated that one occasionally needed to “do violence” (vim facere)169 to a patristic 
source in order to bring their works into line with orthodoxy.170 
QQ 71 and 72    
QQ 71 and 72, were treated by Aquinas as single Articles. While not unheard of in the 
ST, this is quite unusual. Aquinas was here following the pattern set forth in Genesis 1 
and which had been part of the Sentences of Peter Lombard and other treatments of the 
hexaemeron. The reader who comes to the text looking for theological or philosophical 
answers might reasonably despair at this point. On the surface, it would appear that 
Aquinas did not have much to say.  
Question 71 de opere quintae diei171 
In Q 71 the question posed through the Objections lacks real tension. Aquinas wondered 
if the description of the fifth day was “fitting.” The sed contra is not even a quote, but 
simply an appeal to the authority of Scripture.172 It is only in the response to the first 
168 I, 70, 3c, parva vel nulla differentia invenitur in re, sed in voce tantum.  
169 Albert the Great, III Commentaria in III sententiarum d. 15, A10c. Cited and discussed by Chenu, 
Toward understanding St. Thomas, 146-7. 
170 For more on Aquinas’ use of the unity and the plurality of the literal sense see also Thomas Prugl 
“Thomas Aquinas as Interpreter of Scripture” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, Eds.: Rik van 
Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow. (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2005), 395-6. 
171 Cf. Commentary II, 15, 2, 2; De potentia IV, 2, ob33 and ob4, corpus, and Responses. 
172 I, 71, 1sc, In contrarium sufficit auctoritas Scripturae. 
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Objection that Aquinas’ intellectual fires were seemingly lit as he addressed a 
commentator on Aristotle, Avicenna,173 over the issue of whether the earth was latently 
capable of producing life or whether some exchange of genetic material is always 
required. Unfortunately for the reader, Aquinas’ conclusions about the spontaneous 
generation of insects through the process of putrefaction does not likely hold an 
enduring place in either theology or natural philosophy.  
But when one returns to the consideration of sources, another pattern begins to emerge. 
Augustine and the theologians of Basil’s more literal stream of interpretation each have 
valid contributions to make to this discussion and certainly pose no insurmountable 
problem for the reader of Genesis 1. The description of the fifth day can fit within either 
approach and benefits from reading through both approaches. Those who held to a 
Creation over six calendar days would say that the animals were created in actuality on 
this day. Augustine had suggested a Creation in potentiality. But both of them are useful 
in correcting the error of Avicenna, who had asserted that the elements themselves were 
capable of generating life.  
Question 72 de opere sextae diei174 
Q 72 repeated the pattern. Augustine and members of the other strand of interpretation 
were arranged into a mild conflict which was again resolved by the reader simply 
understanding that Augustine saw this differently from the others. Both ideas were 
allowed to stand, both were acceptable. Sometimes Basil’s answer to an objection is 
cited175 and at other times Augustine is cited.176 Again, this may be the essential point 
to be made here. Had one rejected Basil in favor of Augustine, his valuable insights into 
173 Avicenna, De anima 15, 1. 
174 Cf. Commentary II, 15, 2, 2.  
175 I, 72, ad1. This objection centers on the relative intelligence of various animals and was it “fitting” to 
describe the Creation of fish and birds before more intelligent creatures such as are found in many land 
mammals. One can begin to discern the incipient sciences in that Aquinas himself begins to question this 
premise. He notes in this response that some lower creatures, ant and bee colonies, are quite “clever” 
(sagacitates).  
176 I, 72, ad6. This is an extended quote from Augustine’s Gen. contra Man. I, 16, 25 in which he likens 
poisonous plants and animals to sharp tools in a craftsman’s workshop. The unskilled who pick them up 
may well hurt themselves.  
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the way Scripture spoke of the hierarchy of animals would not have been heard.177  
Conversely, had the approach of Basil been assumed and Augustine ignored, the lengthy 
quote of Augustine which explained the creation of poisonous animals would not have 
been heard.178 Aquinas seems to be demonstrating in both of these Questions an 
important principle. Deciding that one strand was correct and the other wrong 
effectively silenced the strand of interpretation which had fallen out of favor. That 
impoverished the interpreter. The interpreter who retained the validity of both these 
strands met the challenges posed by error and misunderstanding with the resources of 
both strands at his or her disposal.  
Critical to this endeavor is the idea that a literal interpretation can lead one into at least 
two very different understandings of the text. Both are legitimate, both are viable. 
Specifically to QQ 70-72, however, the treatment of the fifth and sixth days embodied 
how the interpreter would hold the discreet interpretations within a unity which was 
forcibly observed in the prior Question. Thus, Aquinas has posed and demonstrated a 
limit to the idea that there is a plurality of literal senses. They may have reached 
different literal readings of the text, but the patristic theologians are still subject to the 
words of the text itself and the rules of logic and the natural world. They cannot posit 
something impossible, such as, in this instance, that heavenly bodies are living 
creatures. If they do, the medieval interpreter might simply appeal to the hermeneutical 
tools of the equivocation of language or the condescension to the original audience. At 
the same time, this unity does not preclude diversity. Augustine held that the creation of 
living creatures was in potentiality while others contended that this creative act was in 
actuality. Both strands of interpretation, for all their differences, fall within the 
theological unity, despite their apparent and real differences. That diversity of 
interpretation is not a liability for the interpreter, but a valuable resource.  
It would seem the young friar or lector is ready to engage in the reading and teaching of 
patristic texts with a number of critical tools at his disposal. However, Aquinas was not 
done. The final two QQ will take the reading of patristic sources into a much more 
complex arena. Temporarily this will necessitate setting aside the conflict between 
Augustine’s and Basil’s interpretation. After this interlude, however, Aquinas returned 
177 I, 72, ad1. 
178 I, 73, ad6. 
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his reader, somewhat chastised one would think, to the primary discussion which had 
governed his treatment to this point.  
4. The Reverential Reading Fully Formed: Humility and Potential in QQ 73-74. 
The final two QQ of this section of the ST challenge the reader on several fronts. Q 73 
significantly diverged from the prior QQ. For three Articles the tension between 
Augustine’s interpretation and that of the other group of theologians led by Basil 
disappears. The discussion of the seventh day was addressed in a completely different 
way. Q 74, on the other hand, resumed the attention paid to the interpretation of 
Augustine and Basil, but the very structure of the ST was altered, a structure which had 
otherwise been extraordinarily consistent. We have already noticed in QQ 70 and 71 
that the structure of Questions and Articles was not always a perfect fit for this 
exegetical project, but we also noted that Aquinas was willing to force the material into 
the ST’s basic shape even if that meant writing Questions with only one Article. In the 
first and third Articles of the final Question, however, the structure of the Articles 
themselves is distorted. The disputation in miniature format which has dominated the 
ST to this point no longer was utilized. Aquinas opted for another shape for this 
material, a singular departure from his treatment of the prior 73 QQ which he had 
divided into 322 Articles and to which he would return for the subsequent thousand and 
more Articles.  
These differences will necessitate an examination of these QQ which also diverges from 
what has already been done. These structures contain some very provocative content. 
We will need to ask what Aquinas said and how he treated his sources, but we also need 
to ask why he diverged from his earlier treatment, and how this might be best 
understood.  
Question 73  de iis quae pertinent ad septimum diem 
Like many commentators, Aquinas extended his treatment of the hexaemeron into the 
seventh day. This was not unusual. Certain textual issues associated with the seventh 
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day179 had long interested the interpreters of Genesis 1 and many scholars who 
undertook to write a hexaemeron had also treated this day prior to Aquinas. The 
subjects addressed by the three Articles within the Question were not original to 
Aquinas but reflected Peter Lombard’s treatment in the Sentences.180 The Lombard had 
organized his material under the three verbs which are attributed God in the Latin text 
of Genesis 2:1-3. Already within his commentary on the Sentences of Lombard Aquinas 
had noted different approaches to the seventh day.181  The material Aquinas produced in 
ST I, 73 drew heavily upon that earlier treatment, but a comparison of the two suggests 
that Aquinas did not simply recapitulate his prior work.   
A comparison with the Commentary brings to light several striking omissions of 
content. Aquinas excised any mention of the rationale for worship which the Scripture 
itself182 made regarding God’s activity on the seventh day. In Commentary II, 15, 3, 3c 
Aquinas had asserted two arguments which would explain why God sanctified the 
seventh day. The first argument is repeated within the ST, namely that God’s injunction 
to multiply and fill the earth began that day and required divine blessing but not direct 
divine activity. But more the more forceful argument within the Commentary attributed 
the blessing of the seventh day to the Scriptural mandate to worship.183 This is 
completely absent from the ST’s treatment of the same question. This absence is 
puzzling. Aquinas had not changed his mind in this regard. In ST II-II, 122, 4, in 
179 The LXX and Hebrew text differed slightly from the Vulgate in the description of the completion of 
God’s work on the seventh and the characterization of God’s “rest” on that day. The Vulgate located the 
cessation of activity on the seventh day while the LXX and Hebrew texts indicated that God ceased his 
labors on the sixth day.  
180 Sentences XV, 7, 8, and 10.  
181 Commentary II, 15, 3, 1-3. 
182 Exodus 20:10-11, by no means an obscure passage, it falls within the statement of the Ten 
Commandments.  
183 Commentary II, 15, 3, 3c, In sacra enim Scriptura sanctificatio interdum dicitur ex hoc quod aliquid ad 
cultum Dei dedicatur: sic enim dicitur tabernaculum sanctificari, et vasa ejus et ministri; et ita etiam dies 
septimus sanctificatus est, idest ad cultum Dei dedicatus est; ut sicut scilicet Deus, qui res condidit, non in 
ipsis rebus conditis quasi in fine quievit, sed a rebus conditis in seipso in quo beatitudo sua consistit: cum 
non sit beatus ex hoc quod res fecerit sed quod factis non eget, in seipso sufficientiam habens: ita etiam 
et nos non in operibus ejus aut in operibus nostris discamus quiescere sicut in fine; sed ab operibus in 
ipso Deo in quo beatitudo nostra consistit: propter hoc enim institutum est ut homo sex diebus laborans 
in operibus propriis, septimo die quiesceret, ejus cultui vacans. 
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treating the Decalogue and the command to observe the Sabbath, Aquinas concluded his 
argument with a quotation of this very verse of Genesis and once more made the strong 
connection between the description of the Creation event and the divine command to 
worship.184   
As we have stated earlier, it appears that Aquinas intentionally shaped and simplified 
his treatment of material to suit the needs of an unsophisticated readership (incipientes) 
for whom unnecessary complexity may have overwhelmed their abilities or distracted 
from the point Aquinas sought to make. It also appears, however, that the simplification 
process was not limited to redacting his own material.  
The comparison which yields more dramatic evidence of editing is a comparison of ST 
I, 73 with book IV of Augustine’s Gen. ad litt. Augustine had devoted substantial 
attention to the issues of the seventh day and the enumeration of the Creation days. 
Because he had not held these to be actual calendar days, he considered the description 
of the creative act in six days and the description of the seventh day to be spiritually 
significant and the number six occupied much of his interpretational energies. At times 
Augustine indulged in extraordinary interpretations based upon Neo-Platonic 
numerological mysticism and other devices.185 Aquinas demonstrated what Wallace 
calls “considerable restraint” in his approach to this issue in Q 73. Augustine’s ideas 
were not entirely ignored, nor were they too fulsomely embraced.186 Is this, as Wallace 
suggests,187 evidence of Aquinas’ suspicion of Neo-Platonism?  Perhaps, but it would 
seem that the pedagogical reasons which we have noted in the prior questions also may 
184 ST II-II, 122, 4c, Et quia praecepta Decalogi sunt quasi quaedam prima et communia legis principia, 
ideo in tertio praecepto Decalogi praecipitur exterior Dei cultus sub signo communis beneficii quod 
pertinet ad omnes, scilicet ad repraesentandum opus creationis mundi, a quo requievisse dicitur Deus 
septimo die, in cuius signum, dies septima mandatur sanctificanda, idest deputanda ad vacandum Deo. 
Et ideo Exod. XX, praemisso praecepto de sanctificatione sabbati, assignatur ratio, quia sex diebus fecit 
Deus caelum et terram, et in die septimo requievit. 
185 Augustine’s explication of the significance of the number six runs through Gen. ad litt. IV, 1, 1 – IV, 7, 
14, a full nine pages in Hill’s 2002 translation of Augustine’s works on Genesis, (241-249). In Gen. contra 
Man.  I, 23,35 – I, 25, 43, Augustine used the six days to support a notion of multiple stages in the 
history of the world and also of the multiple phases of a human life.  None of this material is reflected or 
even explicitly rejected in Aquinas’ treatment, but had been part of the medieval discussion of this 
material, e.g. in Bede (see in this thesis P. 98).  
186 Wallace, Appendix 11, pp. 230-233. 
187 Ibid., 232. 
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be cited as a cause when one considers the sort of use to which Aquinas puts Augustine 
in the second Article.  
Within these three Articles, Augustine is cited only once;188 however, these three 
Articles are heavily dependent upon Augustine’s thought. The conclusions reached in 
each Article can easily be attributed to a careful and thorough reading of Augustine’s 
Gen. ad litt. IV, but Aquinas did not attribute this to Augustine, nor did he fully 
replicate Augustine’s thoughts. This is a treatment of the seventh day which relies 
heavily upon Augustine, but it is a heavily edited and redacted version of Augustine’s 
material. At several points Aquinas chose to ignore the argument Augustine made, 
eliding large sections, especially when Augustine delved into the perfection of the 
number six. At other points, however, the elements of Augustine’s commentary were 
taken apart and recombined. The most obvious example of this is in the first Article in 
which Aquinas largely ignores all the issues which Augustine had raised regarding God 
completing his work and imported insightful conclusions about Creation and 
Eschatology which Augustine had treated under the locus of God’s rest on the seventh 
day.  
It is not only Augustine who is oddly treated here, but the reader notes that the entire 
and rich corpus of patristic theology on this subject is nearly silenced. As noted, 
Aquinas cited Augustine once in the second Article189 and to this he added a brief 
reference to a single passage of Dionysius’ De divinis nominibus in the same Article, a 
citation which he reused in the third Article.190  
One more comparison bears fruit. When compared to this section’s prior Questions and 
Articles these three Articles could be seen to be altogether sui generis. His primary 
commentator, Wallace, also notices this distinctive nature, dedicating an appendix to 
Aquinas’ treatment of the seventh day.191 The tension between Augustine and the other 
interpretational strand championed by Basil is entirely absent. But when one looks at the 
admittedly limited treatment of the patristic theologians herein one begins to notice a 
188 I, 73, 2c. 
189 I, 73, 2c, Wallace suggests Gen. ad litt. IV, 8, 15.   
190 I, 73, 2c and I, 73, 3ob2, at which points Wallace suggests De divinis nominibus IV, 4 and 20.  
191 Wallace, Appendix 11, 230-233. 
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familiar pattern emerging. Just as we noted in Q 68, Aquinas reached back into his 
earlier work for a quotation but put that same quotation to purposes in the ST which are 
at some variance from how that source had been used in prior treatments. Here, it will 
be the quote from Dionysius which he relocated from a minor supporting role in an 
Objection within the Commentary to a far more significant role within the corpus of 73, 
2.  
Based upon the foregoing, the analysis of the individual articles which follows will 
engage in a three-fold comparison.  
1. The analysis will compare and consider the instances in which Aquinas’ 
treatment mirrors and diverges from Augustine’s treatment of this material in 
Gen. ad litt. IV.  
2. The analysis will further compare and consider instances in which Aquinas 
repeats or diverges from his earlier treatment of this material in Commentary II, 
15, 3, 1-3.  
3. This analysis will continue to compare the treatment of sources within these 
Articles to the treatment of sources in the preceding QQ of this section of the ST 
as well as within other works.   
The results of this comparative analysis will suggest that the while this material 
diverges significantly from the prior QQ, certain elements remain the same. The 
hierarchy of authorities which has already been noted is retained, especially evident in 
the first Article. But once that question was firmly answered, Aquinas appeared once 
more to be not so interested in making theologically final statements about the seventh 
day as much as he was interested in the inculcation of a theological habitus within his 
audience.  
When one turns to the comparison of this Question with the material from Augustine 
and his earlier treatment in Commentary, this comparative process will reinforce earlier 
conclusions. The only plausible explanation for his editorial decisions seems to be that 
this served his purpose to prepare his audience (incipientes) for the preaching task and 
furthering his audience’s ability to handle complex patristic texts, in this case the 
significant work of Augustine. Throughout the prior eight QQ of the ST Augustine had 
been compared with other theologians. While Aquinas never asserted that Augustine 
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was “right” and the others “wrong” in so many words, it had become increasingly clear 
that Augustine’s interpretation was indeed more concordant with Aquinas’ natural 
philosophy and theology. Within the second and third Article of Question 73 Augustine 
was subjected to the very principle of epistemic humility for which he so frequently and 
eloquently argued.192 Aquinas’ readership would have thus been enabled to come to 
their own reading of Augustine’s work equipped to be critical readers of this significant 
authority figure. Much of what Augustine said was good in Aquinas’ estimation, but 
some could be passed over and other elements could be creatively recombined. None of 
it was a final word.  
Article 1  utrum completio divinorum operum debeat septimo diei adscribi193 
As already noted, Aquinas treated the seventh day by organizing his material upon the 
three verbs which his Latin text of Genesis 2 attributed to God on that day: complete, 
rest, and bless (compleo, requiesco, and benedico). In verse 2, the Latin text which 
Aquinas used recorded that God completed (compleo) his work on the seventh day. And 
while the Article superficially retains the question of whether this ought to be ascribed 
to the seventh day, this question does not generate tension nor is it meaningfully treated 
within this Article.  
When one compares this to the treatment of Augustine one notices that Aquinas has 
shifted material. Whereas the idea of completion had prompted Augustine to delve into 
the spiritual significance of the number six and particularly the perfection of that 
number, the idea of completion gave Aquinas occasion to address both the activity of 
God in the present and God’s future activity in light of eschatological anticipation. 
Significantly Aquinas did not address the textual issue which the Lombard had noted, 
namely that Augustine appears here to follow the pre-Vulgate version of the Latin text 
of Genesis 2:2 which asserted that God completed his work on the sixth day.194  
Aquinas also omitted the extensive Augustinian reflection upon the number six as a 
perfect number, jumping ahead in the Augustinian material toward the eschatological 
implication. Yet, while he does not treat this significant element of Augustine’s material 
192 Gen. ad litt. I, 19, 39 – I, 20, 40.  
193 Cf. Commentary II, 15, 3, 1. 
194 Wallace, 230. 
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the way Augustine did, Aquinas’ discussion of the seventh day remained very much in 
keeping with Augustine’s treatment of this material in Book IV of Gen. ad litt. 
Augustine had also connected the seventh day to current divine activity and 
eschatological promise. He had located the discussion of current and eschatological 
divine activity, however, he had done so in the discussion of the divine rest,195 which 
Aquinas treated in the following Article. Aquinas, in contrast, began the eschatological 
discussion immediately, under the heading of “completion.” Aquinas has conveyed the 
Augustinian material, but substantively reshaped it, redacting and recombining elements 
in a significant divergence from Augustine’s treatment.  
But while Aquinas’ ideas were rooted in the Augustinian intellectual framework, the 
reader also notes that this Article differs sharply from the material which is read in the 
QQ which immediately precede this Article. Aquinas stated these things and defended 
them as truth from the text of Scripture without any credit given to Augustine. Perhaps 
more significantly, this material is placed into no substantive tension with any other 
opinion. Basil and the other strand of interpretation which he represented are completely 
absent. In fact, Aquinas attributes none of this material to any patristic theologian by 
name or even by one of the many anonymous formulae to which he had frequently 
resorted. 
The reader who considers Aquinas’ treatment of his sources is faced with a lack of 
patristic citation within this Article, but not with a lack of citation. Scripture, not the 
patristic theologians, dominates the first Article in a full range of biblical citations from 
the New and the Old Testament. As we have noted above,196 this use of Scripture seems 
to coincide with Articles whose content occasioned Aquinas to set aside the lessons on 
reverential reading and address themes important to Aquinas and the whole ST, 
questions to which the answers were significant. When Aquinas sought to settle issues 
definitively, when those issues rose to the necessity of a firm answer, Aquinas ascended 
the hierarchy of the authorities at his disposal and increased the authority level of the 
material he cited. He turned to Scripture.  
195 This begins with Gen. ad litt. IV, 8, 16 and is woven through the rest of book IV.  
196 See my earlier commentary on 65, 1; 67, 3; and 68, 4.  
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This model for explaining these changes in the handling of sources, that is the increased 
breadth of Scriptural citations and the reduction in patristic citations, also holds true 
here. The first Article immediately gives the reader an indication that Aquinas had 
turned his attention toward the themes of the entire book (exitus/reditus). As Wallace 
noted within his commentary, this material is “set apart” from the rest of this section 
and should be numbered among eleven loci in which Aquinas touched upon eschatology 
throughout the ST.197  
It should be mentioned that the four Articles in which extra-Genesis 1 Scriptural 
citations are found could prompt another line of inquiry. Does one notice a progression 
in the treatment of Scripture as a resource which is similar to the progression we note in 
his handling of patristic resources? While four Articles do not provide one with 
sufficient material to make a definitive conclusion, it does not appear that these four 
Articles can be read this way. The treatment of Scriptural citations in I, 73, 1 when 
compared to the treatment of Scriptural citations in I, 65, 1 does not appear to be 
discernibly more robust, complex, sophisticated or complete. 
But this Article also can be distinguished from Articles 65, 1; 67, 3; and 68, 4 which 
share the breadth of Scriptural citation with this one. Unlike those earlier Articles in 
which the Scriptural citations were noted within these QQ, this Article does not truly 
make an argument with which the reader is compelled to agree. It reads much more like 
an exposition of a theological point than the usual disputation in miniature which is the 
normal character of an Article within the ST. The question which is stated for the 
Article, whether the completion of the works of Creation should be ascribed to the 
seventh day is almost completely ignored. The Article devotes most of its attention to 
explicating the fact that there are two different categories of completion. The Creation 
could be said in one sense to be complete on the seventh day and yet not complete in 
another sense. The “new Creation” which had begun in the Incarnation of God in Jesus 
of Nazareth is necessary for the final, creative completion to take place, the beatific 
vision of the last day.  
One may discern this other character and content of this Article most fully in the 
response to the first Objection which had suggested that completeness should only be 
197 Wallace, 230-231. Aquinas never comprehensively addressed the eschaton as a topic, having broken 
off his writing of the ST prior to reaching that section of the tertia pars. 
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attributed to the final end of all things. It is worthy of full quotation here. I would have 
the reader notice that Aquinas introduced several topics to this discussion without 
making any argument or cause for their inclusion: nature, grace, beatitude, and 
Incarnation. These are not points of argument, but assumed as fact and used to explain 
how Creation could be described as complete and yet leave room for a fuller 
eschatological completion.  
As we have said, the first sort of completeness is the cause of the second. 
Since to attain blessedness, two things are required, nature and grace, the 
consummation of beatitude will take place at the end of the world, as we 
have said. But this consummation pre-existed causally, on the side of 
nature, at the first forming of things, and on the side of grace, in the 
Incarnation of Christ, because grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. 
(John 1:17) Thus on the seventh day came the consummation of nature; 
in the Incarnation of Christ, the consummation of grace; and at the end of 
the world, the consummation of glory will come.198  
While several rationales for this article might be advanced, it seems most likely that the 
word “complete” sparked a contemplation of last things for Aquinas. A broader reading 
of the ST has led most scholars199 of Aquinas to the conclusion that the work had been 
conceived and written with an eye toward understanding all of theology in light of this 
consummation. In this first Article of the Question, the seventh day reminded Aquinas 
of the reason he wrote the work, striving toward a day when he believed that we would 
no longer “see through a glass darkly.”200 Perhaps the better understanding of this 
Article is that herein Aquinas reminded the reader that the reverential reading of the 
198 I, 73, 1ad1, Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, perfectio prima est causa secundae. Ad 
beatitudinem autem consequendam duo requiruntur, natura et gratia. Ipsa ergo beatitudinis perfectio 
erit in fine mundi, ut dictum est. Sed ista consummatio praecessit causaliter, quantum ad naturam 
quidem, in prima rerum institutione, quantum ad gratiam vero, in incarnatione Christi, quia gratia et 
veritas per Iesum Christum facta est, ut dicitur Ioan. I. Sic igitur in septima die fuit consummatio naturae; 
in incarnatione Christi, consummatio gratiae; in fine mundi, consummatio gloriae. Trans.: Wallace, 141.  
199 While it has not gone unchallenged; the exitus/reditus model of M.-D. Chenu remains dominant 
within the field and is assumed for the purposes of this thesis. See also the introduction to this thesis.  
200 I Corinthians 13:12 “For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part; then 
I shall know fully, even as I have been fully known.” (English Standard Version)  This verse was a 
frequent quote within the patristic theologians whom Aquinas read.  
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patristic theologians is but a tool toward that final goal. If so, this Article is perhaps seen 
far more naturally as less a medieval disputation in miniature and more a reflection 
upon theological mystery. One might say that the writing here borders on the 
devotional. Aquinas affects the posture of one standing in awe, contemplating the idea 
of the beatific vision, not yet being able to partake of it. There is a consummation of 
both nature and grace which will fully transpire but has not yet fully transpired outside 
of Christ. Before this reality Aquinas waits in anticipation. This devotional posture is at 
the heart of the epistemic humility which Augustine had asserted and which Aquinas 
sought to inculcate within these incipientes to whom he wrote.  
The absence of patristic sources in this Article may not be accidental. The patristic 
authorities, along with Aquinas and the reader, stand in the same position. In the 
following two articles two authorities of considerable gravitas will make an appearance 
by name: Augustine and Dionysius. Aquinas’ reader was likely already familiar with 
Augustine’s Gen. ad litt. and quite likely had read and puzzled over Augustine’s 
reflection on the perfection of the number six and role of God’s rest within the created 
order. But even if Augustine had not yet been read, the student of Aquinas would have 
been forced to acknowledge Aquinas’ muted treatment of Augustine’s material when he 
did eventually read Augustine’s text. When he came to the seventh day, Aquinas said 
far less than Augustine.  
 It would seem that as he began to dethrone Augustine’s work from the ascendant 
position which it may have assumed in the prior Articles, and before he completed this 
task in the subsequent Articles, Aquinas engaged in a profound reflection upon matters 
which touched upon the very reason for theology’s existence. He paused to bring the 
final goal of his theological reflection back into focus and establish its priority for the 
task at hand. Within this first Article Aquinas has also himself embodied the principle 
which he seems to have explored in the following two Articles. He addressed the deep 
mysteries of his Christian faith cogently and rigorously and at the same time 
acknowledged that this Creation which always includes both the theologian and his 
reader, awaited its final consummation. There are limits to what theologians can say.  
Article 2 utrum Deus septima die requievit ab omni opera sua201 
201 Cf. Commentary II, 15, 3, 2; and Super Hebraeos IV, 1. 
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The second Article engaged the second verb attributed to God on the seventh day: rest 
(requiesco). The three Objections of this Article again demonstrate both Aquinas’ 
indebtedness to Augustine’s commentary and his redaction of the Augustinian material. 
The first Objection, without citing Augustine, quotes John 5:17 in which Jesus states 
that his divine father has been working continuously up that point. Augustine had 
wrestled with this very question in Gen. ad litt. IV, 11, 21 – IV, 12, 23. But whereas 
Augustine posited two explanations for the apparent contradiction raised by John 5:17, 
Aquinas only restated one, and that very briefly. Augustine’s first answer had been that 
this was a figure of speech by which God was pointing forward to Christ resting in the 
tomb on the seventh day of the week.202 Aquinas ignored this and opted instead to 
summarize briefly the second explanation, namely that the rest referred only to the fact 
that God made no new creatures. God was still engaged in the essential sustenance of 
the universe. Aquinas’ passing over the connection to the image of Christ “resting” in 
the tomb is especially odd in light of the preceding Article in which he had asserted that 
Christ’s Incarnation was essential to the completion of God’s work. It could have, to use 
Aquinas’ own words, been appropriately (convenienter) applied here.  
The second Objection and Response also reflected Augustinian material. Here the 
question is more philosophical than textual. How can God, who is the unmoved cause, 
be said to rest since rest implies a cessation of movement? Augustine had considered 
this question at some length.203 His conclusion is summarized in the Objection and 
corpus of the article, but, within the corpus, Augustine is credited for the subtle 
discussion of what it means to rest “from” and not “in” his works.  
Aquinas considered one more Augustinian point in the third Article. In Gen. ad litt.204 
Augustine had proposed a rather strained reading of the biblical text, a technique which 
he would utilize in other places as well.205 Augustine had argued that the verb “to rest” 
attributed to God could not actually be said of God since God neither desired nor 
202 See Hill, On Genesis, 256, n. 30. Hill notes that this is the only place in which Augustine expressed this 
idea. He treated the injunction to rest on the Sabbath in several sermons but never proclaimed this 
rationale for resting in any extant sermon.  
203 Gen. ad litt. IV, 8, 16 – IV 10, 20.  
204 Gen. ad litt. IV, 9, 17. 
205 De Trinitate 1, 12, 23. 
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labored and hence could not be said to rest. He argued that Moses had used a type of 
literary device to describe God bestowing rest upon his Creation, especially humanity. 
Anyone who has read the opening paragraph of Confessions knows how important this 
concept of rest was to Augustine. He potently articulated humanity’s final goal as 
simply to rest in God. He therefore saw that the Genesis text under consideration is not 
truly about God’s rest as much as it is a figure of speech which pointed the reader 
toward God’s gift to humanity. God had given cause for humanity and indeed the whole 
Creation to rest. Aquinas did not disagree, but he carefully distanced himself from this 
argument and suggested that this was only a partial answer to this Article’s question and 
it may not be the best answer. 206  
Aquinas addressed this argument of Augustine’s without attributing it to Augustine, 
who was nowhere associated with this idea by name within the Article. In the Objection 
Aquinas objected to the Augustinian idea with an argument rooted in consistency. He 
posited that “God rested” cannot mean God made humanity to rest, since the text surely 
does not mean that God gave humanity to create when it says God created. The 
Response allows the interpretation, but places it in a secondary position, after other 
arguments which had been put forward in the corpus and which reflect other 
Augustinian material.  
The comparison of this Article to Aquinas’ treatment of sources within this section of 
the ST is also fruitful. As already noted, the tension between Augustine and Basil is not 
found.  But one does find within the corpus another patristic source quoted, 
Dionysius.207 These two are not put into the same sort of obvious tension as Augustine 
and Basil had been earlier, but the introduction of Dionysius’ ideas is initially puzzling. 
It does not seem to add anything to the argument.   
206 I, 73, 2ad3, Est ergo conveniens expositio,…Sed non est haec sola ponenda; sed alia expositio est 
principalior et prior. 
207 I, 73, 2c. See the earlier discussion of Dionysius’ role under “Patristic Sources” above. This instance 
might be read to support an observation by Paul Rorem that within medieval theology Dionysius was 
either extensively quoted or only “fleetingly” referenced as here. When he is extensively quoted it 
almost always involved the author misappropriating Dionysius’ material for a political end. Rorem, 30, 
asserts that in the fleeting references medieval authors communicated Dionysius’ ideas most accurately.   
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Denis, as Aquinas referred to him, was significant for Aquinas for two reasons. He was 
a patristic source who spoke of all Creation in terms of exitus and reditus and was a 
source for the epistemic humility which this author believes is the central issue here. 
Dionysius had championed apophatic theology, asserting that one could not assert any 
positive truth about God univocally, but only speak negatively of the true nature of God. 
That said, he also asserted that God, as the creator of language, used language to 
communicate positive truths about himself, in a process that Dionysius seemed to 
understand almost incarnationally or sacramentally. In a sense, Dionysius collapsed the 
semiotic theory of Augustine which relied upon the distinction between “things” and 
“signs.” For Dionysius the sign could also be the thing. While the elements of a 
sacrament could not be in any way called God, yet, Dionysius asserted, the elements 
were the communication of God himself. When applied to words, especially Scriptural 
metaphors, these words contained meaning which transcended the words themselves 
and thus were often more than what intellectually was attainable.208 This idea seems to 
be behind what Aquinas meant in this Question as Dionysius twice is called upon to 
assert that the nature of goodness is to diffuse throughout all things, hence the things 
become not merely signs of the good but the goodness itself. 
Here the comparison with Commentary II, 15, 3 is again illuminating. Aquinas had used 
this same citation from Dionysius there as well, but as was typical for him he also made 
use of quotations from a wide range of Scriptural books, multiple works of Aristotle, 
Moses Maimonides, Gregory, and others. This citation fell in the second Objection of 
the third Article of Question 15 and was a rather small part of that Article. In a similar 
action to which we drew attention in Question 68, Aquinas took a minor citation in the 
Commentary and brought it forward to the corpus in the ST and greater prominence. 
Here Dionysius’ idea about the diffusion of good throughout the Creation was set into a 
relationship with Augustine’s insight into God’s rest.   
In Aquinas’ estimation, Augustine’s interpretation of the seventh day had merit 
(conveniens expositio), but that interpretation ultimately cannot be said to communicate 
the entirety of what the Scriptural text contained. The resting of God might have 
something to do with this strange diffusion of goodness, a motion which not only 
208 See Dionysius, Epistle 9 and especially the commentary by Rorem from my prior note, 25-27.  
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continues unabated, but which challenged Augustine’s entire understanding of things 
and signs.  
Article 3 de benedictione et sanctificatione huius diei209 
The third Article of this Question is remarkable for its brevity. On the seventh day 
Genesis records that God blessed and sanctified the seventh day. Aquinas asked whether 
blessing and sanctification belonged to the seventh day. This brevity in itself merits 
attention for it again reflects both the redaction of the Augustinian material and the 
simplification and reduction of the material which Aquinas had already written within 
Commentary II, 15, 3, 3. In that earlier treatment Aquinas had marshaled Gregory and 
multiple citations of Aristotle to argue that blessing did indeed belong on the seventh 
day. His argument was based on a finely parsed understanding of blessing and rest. In 
the second element of the corpus he had firmly connected the divine blessing to the 
establishment of the Sabbath. If one takes a step back from the details of this analysis of 
the ST and considers this material in light of the entire ST, this Article in the 
Commentary is the Article one would have expected Thomas Aquinas to have written 
because it is a thorough and rigorous treatment of a topic important to Aquinas. But this 
is not the Article which one finds within the ST.  
When compared to Augustine’s Gen. ad litt.,210 one again notices a dependence upon 
the Augustinian treatment and considerable omissions, some of which are puzzling. 
Reading Augustine’s treatment of God blessing the seventh day could have again given 
Aquinas an occasion to comment upon the legitimacy of the mendicant orders, a subject 
in which he was personally and professionally invested. As we have already noted 
within this thesis211 the defense of the mendicant orders was important to Aquinas. 
From Aquinas’ earliest days at the University of Paris, he had contended with local 
clergy and academics, particularly William of St. Amour over the mendicant, non-
working, status of the Dominicans and Franciscan orders. In the conflict over Aquinas’ 
assumption of the Chair of Theology in Paris in his first regency, Aquinas had written 
one of his only truly polemical tracts, Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem, in 
209 Cf. Commentary II, 15, 3, 3.  
210 Gen. ad litt. IV, 13, 24 – IV, 17, 30.  
211 Pp. 42-50.  
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1256.212 Herein he addressed this very question at considerable length. 213 That God 
rested on the seventh day and blessed that day of rest would seem to provide an 
occasion to address William’s assertion that no man who is not in a monastery214 should 
eschew work as the mendicants did by begging.  
Reading Augustine might also have provided an occasion, as it did for Aquinas in the 
Commentary, to discuss another favorite medieval subject: worship on the Christian 
Sabbath. Aquinas engaged neither of those avenues of argumentation. While the initial 
question about whether it is proper for God to have blessed and sanctified the seventh 
day is addressed, these two issues are oddly absent.215  
Augustine, on the other hand, had addressed under God’s blessing of the seventh day 
both the contemplative life and the Sabbath command in Gen. ad litt. IV. He made a 
pointed comparison and contrast between the blessings of work and rest or 
contemplation based upon the story of Mary and Martha recorded in Luke 10:38-42.216 
The potential presented by this story was not lost on Aquinas. He had already 
extensively used it within both the Commentary217 and Contra impugnantes218. Nor can 
it be argued that he had changed his mind on the matter for in ST II-II, 182, 1 Aquinas 
used this very account and comparison of Mary and Martha to form the heart of an 
argument for the contemplative life. Despite all of Aquinas’ attention219 to the story of 
212 See discussion in Weisheipl, 79-80  and Torrell, 79-83.  
213 Contra Impug. II, 4. 
214 Torrell, 80, notes that William, Aquinas’ opponent, did not seem to recognize the distinction between 
a monk and a friar, insisting that all members of a religious order were bound by the Rule of Benedict.  
215 Wallace in his commentary on the Section also notes the absence of any such questions, 148.  
216 Gen. ad litt. IV, 14, 25. 
217 Commentary III, 35, 1, 1sc1 and III, 35, 1, 3, qc3. 
218 Contra impugn. II, 4c and III, 4ad6. 
219 An evaluation of Aquinas’ treatment of Luke 10:38-42 should also include his commentary on the 
four Gospels which was contemporaneously written with this section of the ST. Therein Aquinas read 
Augustine’s carefully nuanced theology of work and rest. In Catena aurea in Lucam, 10, lect. 10 Aquinas 
had collected comments of eight individual theologians around this passage from Luke 10. Aquinas 
placed Augustine in tension with his fellow patristic theologians, defending the service of Martha as 
good and also worthy of praise over against those who would have used the praise of Mary to elevate 
the contemplative life over the life of labor. 
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Mary and Martha and his close reading of Augustine on this matter in relationship to the 
seventh day, this story and the conclusions which Aquinas drew from it with Augustine 
are not found within ST 73, 3.  
As we noted above, Augustine had also addressed the Sabbath command within book 
IV, weaving the rest of God and the blessing of the seventh day into a complex excursus 
on the nature of God’s rest and the rationale for that rest. He had argued that the divine 
rest had in fact been creative of the human rest which was the ultimate goal of 
humanity. That had precipitated a brief excursus into the nature of the Christian Sabbath 
on the part of Augustine.220 
Aquinas addressed neither of these two issues in this brief article. He limited himself to 
applying the two ways to understand the rest of God which necessitated the use of the 
term “blessing” (benedico) to describe the divine activity on the seventh day. In an 
analysis of the treatment of sources, 73, 3 is notable in that it has only one patristic 
source cited, the same passage from Dionysius,221 which was utilized in the prior article.  
Aquinas’ treatment of material in this Question may be read as something of an 
interlude in the inculcation of reverential reading, but I would argue this is not the case. 
It clearly is a break from the examination of the competing ideas of Basil and 
Augustine. Yet, reverential reading remained at the center of this Question. We have 
already demonstrated this in the second Article as Aquinas insisted upon subjecting 
Augustine to a hermeneutic of epistemic humility, a humility which he had gleaned 
from the apophatic theology of Dionysius. Augustine’s more ambitious and optimistic 
application of Neo-Platonist ideas to the text had been treated with considerable caution. 
Augustine may be right, but in Aquinas’ estimation Augustine had overstated his case 
(admittedly, an evaluation which Aquinas does not make in so many words but which 
can be reasonably deduced from his redaction of the Augustinian material). In the third 
Article one might read such epistemic humility and restraint personally applied as 
Aquinas, confronted with opportunities to enter the fray of medieval politics and 
theology, opted for an exceedingly muted treatment. Able to draw upon no less of an 
220 Gen. ad litt. IV, 13, 24. 
221 De divinis nominibus IV, 4 and 20.  
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authority than Augustine, Aquinas refused to press Genesis 1 into the service of 
contemporary conflicts, even stripping such material out of his prior treatment.  
Question 74  de omnibus septem diebus in communi  
In the final Question of this section, Aquinas returned to the reverential reading of both 
Augustine and Basil which occupied QQ 66-72. He address here the seven days of the 
Creation event as a group. The subject matter is varied and covers the entirety of the 
Creation narrative. The section is drawing to a close and the inattentive reader might 
conclude that Aquinas had a few things to address which he was determined to include 
within this section but that his mind was already looking ahead to the anthropological 
section which followed these QQ. At some points, especially in the final Article, this 
Question appears to be little more than a disjointed collection of items. But I argue for 
another reading of this Question. Having established in prior Questions the fact that 
both of the patristic readings, the reading by Augustine and the reading by Basil, are 
congruent with a faithful and thoughtful reading of the text, and having revisited the 
goal of the whole document in 73, 1, Aquinas in this Question put to the test the very 
reverential reading which he had sought to establish and he put the reader him/herself to 
the test. Or, in a more pedagogical understanding, he led the lector and the friars whom 
he taught into a laboratory of theology so that they might now learn through 
experimentation. In so doing Aquinas stretched to the breaking point the basic structure 
of the ST which had heretofore obtained consistently throughout the work and to which 
he would return in the QQ and Articles which followed this section. In the first Article, 
any tension between the Objections and the sed contra is entirely missing. That tension 
returned in the second Article, but the treatment of that tension in the corpus and in the 
responses to the Objections is deliberately designed to thwart the format’s normal 
resolution. There simply is no corpus nor a sed contra to be found in the third Article.  
It would seem that Aquinas had something different in mind for this Question. It is my 
contention that it is an exercise in the reverential reading he had developed over the 
prior nine QQ and an opportunity for the reader to develop skills through the practice of 
such a reading. Indeed, one might speculate that the absence of a corpus in the last 
Article is an invitation for the student to write one or to see the pairs of Objections and 
Responses as opportunities to hold the sort of disputations which resulted in more 
formal Objections, Responses, sed contra and corpus. 
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Article 1  utrum sufficienter isti dies enumerentur222  
The first Article of this section asked whether the number of days recorded in Genesis 1 
is sufficient. The objections posed and what is marked as the sed contra are in a 
particularly strange relationship. They both posed problems with the biblical depiction 
of seven days, but very different problems. The Objections suggest that the enumeration 
is improper because the act of Creation does not actually have a day ascribed to it while 
the acts of differentiation and ornamentation have three each; the elements do not each 
receive proper treatment, but water and earth are described more fully than fire and air; 
and birds and fish are lumped together when they differ from each other as much as they 
do from animals which are treated on a separate day. The sed contra on the other hand 
does not, as one would expect, cite biblical or other authority that the seven days of 
Creation are proper. It does not present a logical argument that the days are properly 
numbered at all but posed further problems with the Genesis text. The first sed contra 
points out the problem of light being differentiated on the first day but the heavenly 
bodies on the fourth. In an unusual223 second point in the sed contra, Aquinas posited 
the observation that nothing actually happened on the seventh day and hence it should 
not be included in this enumeration. The result of this is that the Article does not convey 
the intellectual or rhetorical tension as other Articles we have examined. This is carried 
through to the Responses, which respond not only to the Objections but, in another 
departure from usual form, include Responses to the two sed contra. In this respect, the 
first Article is very similar to the third Article of this Question, but this Article does 
have a corpus.  
Within the corpus the two interpretive strands reassert themselves, are again held up to 
the Objections presented to the enumeration of the seven days, and each interpretative 
strand is fitted into both the text and the philosophical underpinnings with which 
Aquinas worked. The majority of theologians who followed Basil’s understanding are 
called upon to provide one answer to the question the number of days. The double triad 
neatly includes both extremes and the middle in a double treatment. This is supported 
by a citation from the “Pythagoreans” and deemed to be a quite acceptable answer.  
222 Cf. De potentia IV, 2c; ST I, 70, 1; and Super Hebraeos IV, 1.  
223 It should be noted that multiple sed contra statements are unusual in the ST, but not in his other 
works, especially De potentia in which a single Article may have up to six or seven contrary statements.  
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Augustine, on the other hand, was also given an opportunity to answer this question. He 
agreed on the second triad of days, but differed on the first. His conception of the 
perfection of the number six meant he wanted to see the first day distinguished from 
days two and three, thus mirroring that number’s perfection. Augustine was referring to 
the fact that six is the sum of its aliquot parts or factors. The factors of six are one, two, 
and three, which, added together, make six. Thus the first day was the creation of 
heavenly beings (light) and the next two days established the heavenly and earthly 
extremes, and days four through six ornamented the top, middle, and bottom of that 
heavenly schema. For Augustine this perfection of the number six was the reason that 
the days were thus enumerated. 224 
What is important here for the incipient theologian is to see that both strands of 
theologians, though they differ, are not pitted against one another. They offer up useful 
ways to understand this text. Both strands are able to answer the objections raised. The 
rejection of one or another strand as “untrue” would have left the interpreter without 
useful wisdom and insight and the dispute between Augustine and Basil would have 
distracted from the text itself.  
The rationale for this article seems to be the inclusion of Augustine’s counter-intuitive 
argument about the six days. Aquinas, writing to the lectors of the various priories of 
the Dominican order, knew from personal experience the impulse to literal and legalistic 
readings of patristic theologians and Scripture. He had encountered that impulse first 
hand in the period of his first regency in Paris. He saw them at work even as he wrote 
these words in his dealings within the Papal court.225 He lays out this mystic 
224 Gen. ad litt. IV, 7, 14: “That is why we cannot say that the reason the number six is perfect is that God 
perfected all his works in six days, but rather the reason God perfected his works in six days is that six is 
a perfect number. And so, even if none of these existed, it would still be perfect, while unless it were 
perfect these would not have been completed and perfected in accordance with it.” Trans.: Hill, On 
Genesis, 249. See Richard Bauckham “Humans, Animals, and the Environment in Genesis 1-3” in Genesis 
and Christian Theology,  Eds.: Nathan MacDonald, Mark W. Elliot, and Grant Macaskill, (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 2012), 175-178, for a contemporary reflection on the enumeration of the days of 
creation and the structure of Genesis 1.  
225 One can certainly deduce that Aquinas was concerned with conflict rooted in literalistic readings of 
patristic theologians from his argument in the prologue of Contra errores Graecorum. This conclusion is 
reinforced by his intense interest in procuring accurate translations of Greek patristic and philosophical 
works during this period.  But this seems to have been limited to patristic and philosophical texts. He did 




                                                          
interpretation by Augustine, without rendering any judgment as to its validity or 
propriety. Other theologians were noted within this Article, and it is moreover affirmed 
that this agrees with the philosophers, especially the Pythagoreans, but Augustine and 
his mystical reading of the number six predominates.  
The lector or friar who came to this Article of the ST in teaching the friars of his Priory 
would have been both equipped to answer their questions and lead them in a discussion 
of this thought provoking passage in Augustine. Aquinas did not script the conversation. 
He did not provide the “right” answer, but simply provided, within the various 
Responses, a few parameters for the discussion. If there is a “right” answer, it would 
seem to be that there is no “right” answer. Even something as strange as what Augustine 
had said could be the Truth to which they all were moving, the consummation of the 
whole of Creation.  
Article 2  utrum omnes isti dies sint unus dies226 
In the second Article of Question 74, Aquinas broached the subject of whether the 
Creation account is really instantaneous or actually stretches over multiple days. This 
question had been lurking in the background of the discussion throughout this section, 
and at this point Aquinas formally brought it to the surface. Was Creation an event 
which transpired over six calendar days or was it an instantaneous event which is 
logically broken into six phases, phases or logical markers which happen to be called 
“days?”227 Finally, it appears, Aquinas would have to answer the question of whether 
Augustine or Basil was the correct reading.  
Aquinas increased the tension with Scriptural quotations and presented both 
interpretational strands, now reduced to this one critical question which stood at the 
heart of the divide. The objections took Augustine’s position and made use of one of 
Augustine’s favorite passages, Ecclesiasticus 18:1 in which the text stated that God had 
made the entire universe “at the same time.”228 This had been the Scriptural lynchpin of 
226 Cf. Commentary II, 12, 2-3; De veritate VIII, 16; De potentia IV, 2; and Super Hebraeos IV, 1.  
227 This idea has a close contemporary correlation between those who suggest that the “days” of 
Genesis 1 are more than 24 hours long. In fact some postulate that these are eons or epochs which are 
millions of years in length, e.g., http://home.att.net/~jamspsu84/ttocday.html.  
228 Qui vivet in æternum creavit omnia simul http://www.sacred-texts.com/bib/vul/sir018.htm#001  
Most current translators, cf NRSV, treat the LXX Greek (‘Ω Ζῶν εἰς τόν αἰῶνα ἒκτισεν τά πάντα κοινῆ) 
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Augustine’s argument. The sed contra posited what seems like a clear statement in the 
text of Genesis 1 which enumerates multiple days and surely would have been the 
primary text utilized by those who challenged Augustine’s idea and would have likely 
referenced Basil’s reading of Genesis 1.  
The theologian or philosopher who has come to this question eager for resolution must 
leave it with a measure of disappointment. The corpus does not resolve the tension so 
much as discuss it. In this matter, “these two opinions … differ widely.”229 Aquinas 
clearly understood the tension and made sure the reader clearly understood the tension 
as well. But he steadfastly refused to assert one interpretive strand over against the 
other; in fact the tension is not resolved as much as it is bracketed into a point of some 
irrelevancy. Augustine and the other patristic theologians clearly disagree. But there is 
also an essential agreement: “But if these two opinions refer to the manner in which 
things were produced, there is no great difference between them.”230 Agreement on the 
fact of the Creation does not necessarily imply an agreement on the manner of Creation. 
Both interpretational strands assert that God created, but they understand231 this to have 
happened differently. That disagreement is simply left to stand because it does not 
negatively affect the larger point. Aquinas clearly wanted to place the assertion of the 
quiddity of Creation into a hierarchically higher position than the discussion of the 
mode of Creation. Indeed, the contest regarding the mode of Creation might simply be a 
distraction from the far more important discussion of Creation’s quiddity.  
What is perhaps most interesting to the reader interested in Aquinas’ use of sources is a 
particular line which is found at the end of the corpus: “So as not to prejudice either 
view, we must deal with the reasons for both.”232 The Responses which follow this 
idiomatically as “he made the whole universe” but not Jerome’s Vulgate translation upon which Aquinas 
relied.   
229 I, 74, 2c, hae duae opiniones,…magnam diversitatem habent.  
230 I, 74, 2c, Sed si istae duae opiniones referantur ad modum productionis rerum, non invenitur magna 
differentia.  
231 The Latin intelligo is used to describe those who adhere to both strands.  
232 I, 74, 2c, Ut igitur neutri sententiae praejudicetur, utriusque rationibus respondendum est. In his 
commentary, Wallace notes that this quite unusual for Aquinas, but reflects his “cautious reserve on the 
entire subject of cosmogony and Scriptural exegesis.” 159, note j.   
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statement clearly and deliberately refused to take a side, but demonstrated how both 
understandings could accurately reflect the biblical text and current philosophical 
understandings of the nature of matter and the world. Imagining that this is a manual or 
text for the instructor, it seems Aquinas was anticipating the question of the perceptive 
student for the sake of the lector. Having given the lector the prior exercise with his 
students, Aquinas equips the lector with an answer to the question of his brightest 
students.  
Article 3 utrum Scriptura utatur convenientibus verbis ad exprimendum opera sex 
dierum 
The last Article of the section is noteworthy for its peculiar structure. The Article is no 
more than list of seven objections which are then addressed in seven responses. There is 
no sed contra or corpus. Aquinas made no attempt to explain this nor offered up any 
potential purpose for this peculiar alteration of the otherwise very uniform ST pattern; 
yet, this change is noteworthy. This is the 325th Article in the ST. Aquinas was very 
regular in his form, very seldom deviating from the disputational structure of 
Objections, sed contra, corpus, and Response. Most of the deviations from that form 
were noted by Aquinas within the text of the Article itself. In I, 1, 4; 32, 4; 43, 8; 52, 1; 
and 52, 2 he omitted the Responses, simply indicating that there was no need given the 
content of the corpus.233 In I, 39, 8 and 54, 5 he does not formally break off the corpus 
to compose Responses but incorporates the Responses into the corpus. On three 
occasions, I, 5, 3; 14, 15; and 41, 1 the corpus is very brief, but still a discreet unit, set 
apart from the subsequent elements in the Article by the usual formula (responsio).   
Cajetan, Aquinas’ most significant commentator in the period of the Reformation, 
thought this so odd that he forced the Article into an approximation of the ST paradigm 
by treating the first Response as a corpus.234 Aquinas’ modern commentator, Wallace, 
233 I, 1, 4c, Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. 
234Cajetan, Commentaria I, 74, 3 found in Summa Theologiae. Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII 
P. M. edita, t. 4-5: Pars prima Summae theologiae (Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 
Romae, 1888-1889). Nota quod, cum quaestio sit de omnibus, in corpore, (quod est etiam responsio ad 
primum) s. Thomas respondet de communibus ad creationem et alia, inquantum Deum respiciunt. In 
responsionibus vero argumentorum, ad alia verba discendit.   
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also notes this structural anomaly and Cajetan’s solution, and poses no other solution or 
explanation for this.235  
It seems inconceivable that Aquinas would have simply neglected or forgotten the 
structure to which he had assiduously adhered for the prior 324 Articles already 
addressed in the prima pars of the ST. Yet, this idea seems to lie behind Cajetan’s 
attempt to force Aquinas back into a proper, disputational shape, as if Aquinas 
somehow had been in error or had forgotten what he was doing and needed his 
commentator to repair this apparent lapse. Wallace’s failure to comment or explore the 
issue seems to be rooted in his own admitted indifference to Aquinas treatment of this 
material.236 
It would seem a reasonable line of inquiry to ask why Aquinas might have altered the 
very format of his work at this point. Is this structural shift significant? It cannot be 
asserted that the subject matter necessitates it. The question posed within the Article 
does not diverge from the sort of questions which had been asked in earlier QQ. 
Aquinas here returned to a familiar topic as he wondered if the description of the seven 
days as a whole makes use of fitting language (convenientibus verbis). It thus cannot be 
asserted that the content is strikingly different from those earlier Articles and 
necessitated a singularly different treatment. Nor can one justifiably suggest that this 
material did not merit a corpus or a full treatment. The third Objection and its Response 
are as long as some of the briefer Articles and the material, the Trinitarian implications 
of the Creation event, is theologically rich. 
One might better attribute this abrupt change in structure to the location of this Article 
at the conclusion of this section. Its place at the end of this exegetical material may 
better explain the cause of the structural changes. One potential solution might be that 
this peculiar Article is something of an omnibus Article, a collection of matters which 
Aquinas did not address at earlier points within the treatment of the Creation account 
but which he considered worthy of treatment. Yet this rationale also suffers upon closer 
examination. The Objections can each be logically placed under this question and 
address apparent points at which the descriptions within the seven days are problematic. 
235 Wallace, 162-163, note: a. 
236 Wallace, Intro, xx-xxii. 
220 
 
                                                          
That said, if this question about proper language is a real question, these points could 
have been addressed far more forcefully throughout the earlier exegesis of these verses 
in Genesis, either as additions to existing Articles or as Articles themselves. As an 
example, consider the first Article which could have easily been developed into an 
entire Article under Q 65. Consider also the second Objection which complains that the 
creation of water is never explicitly mentioned and therefore the Creation is poorly 
described. This Objection and Response would have been a logical subject for inclusion 
within 68, 1, 2, or 3 since these Articles address creation of the firmament and the 
division of the waters into the waters below and the waters above that firmament. The 
reader may remember that this occasioned significant inquiry into the exact nature of 
these waters and how this problematic verse was to be read. It is a reasonable 
conclusion to think that a question about the sort language employed to describe that 
water would have been important to any real quest for theological or philosophical truth 
at that point. Yet, Aquinas did not mention this objection in Question 68 but reserved 
this observation and the problem it raised for this final Article within this section.  
I assert once more that the pedagogical purpose for this section provides a clearer 
justification for what Aquinas wrote. For the instructor who has spent time with any 
contemporary text book, the purpose here seems clear. This is a list of exercises for the 
lector and his students to hone their reverential reading skills. Aquinas listed an 
Objection to the Biblical content, clarified the issue in the Response with an appropriate 
citation from the patristic theologians, and then moves the reader onto another example. 
Each of these could have presented an incipiens with an opportunity think about the text 
within the parameters of reverential reading which Aquinas had proposed. While there 
is no rubric inside the text which describes how this might be used, one can imagine that 
here at the end of this whole exercise on reverential reading, the lector would pose an 
objection and ask his students to answer it reverentially. The responses are the 
“answers” in the teacher’s edition.  
When one considers those “answers” in light of his use of patristic sources, the 
indebtedness of these Responses to what has preceded within this section is clear. The 
first Objection had complained that the description of the Creation was deficient 
because the second person of the Trinity, the “Word of God,” was insufficiently 
described. The Response carefully addressed the question from the Augustinian 
perspective of the Creation event and that of the “others” (alii). Likewise, the second 
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Objection’s complaint that water was not created is treated by Augustine, Basil, and 
others.  
The theologically significant third Objection and its lengthy response also explore the 
various ways that these patristic theologians interpret this material, but Aquinas wove in 
an additional element for the student. The complaint of the Objection focused the 
reader’s attention upon the fact that the text does not record God’s approval, i.e., “and 
God saw that it was good” on the second day. In a complex explanation in which 
Aquinas dwells upon Augustine’s reading of the first day237 he concluded that the first 
and second days were an adumbration of the Trinity.238 The other patristic theologians 
are briefly mentioned at the very end of the Response as offering a “mystical 
explanation” (rationem mysticam), but in a substantial paragraph immediately before 
that end, Rabbi Moses Maimonides239 is credited with a three-fold answer to the 
objection. Considering the complexity of Augustine’s answer and the exceedingly brief 
treatment of the “Others” at the end of the section, one cannot but notice that Rabbi 
Moses was made to sound much clearer on this matter than anyone else. Did Aquinas 
introduce a Jewish interpreter at this juncture intentionally? This is an especially 
provocative idea since in ST I, 13, 2 Aquinas had taken the unusual step of rejecting 
Maimonides’ particular expression of the via negativa in no uncertain terms. His 
understanding of Maimonides may have been flawed, but within the ST Aquinas had 
already cast this Jewish philosopher into a category of suspect sources.240 Augustine 
had led the interpreter down a complex path which only a Christian could traverse with 
its Trinitarian implications. The “others” had chosen a mystical but not terribly 
convincing option. This unexpected source, a Jewish interpreter, may sometimes help 
the incipient theologian more than the patristic theologians.  
237 Gen. ad litt. I, 8, 14. 
238 See Emery, 62-67, for discussion of Aquinas’ treatment of this topic in other places both within the ST 
and his other works.  
239 Guide to the Perplexed II, 30. 
240 Jennifer Hart Weed, “Maimonides and Aquinas: A Medieval Misunderstanding” in Revista Portuguesa 
de Filosofia 64:1 (2009), 385-386. For a more positive approach to Aquinas’ use of Maimonides see 
Warren Zev Harvey “Maimonides and Aquinas on Interpreting the Bible” in Proceedings for the 
American Academy of Jewish Research, 55 (1988), 69ff. 
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Rabbi Moses made his second appearance in the Article in the Response to the fourth 
Objection in which Aquinas had complained that to describe the Spirit of God in a 
physical place, in this instance the Spirit of God hovering “above the waters” was not a 
proper description. Rabbi Moses suggested that this was simply a divinely moved wind 
or air.241 Against this backdrop, Augustine’s understanding of the waters as unformed 
matter is cited,242 and Basil was credited with suggesting that the Spirit of God 
quickened the waters and injected his vital powers into it.243 Here Rabbi Moses, having 
been accredited in the prior Response by providing a clearer answer, serves as an 
intellectual grounding for the rather speculative ideas of both Augustine and Basil. 
Aquinas seemed to say that Augustine and Basil could apparently both be wrong and 
that this “Spirit of God hovering over the waters” might simply be so much wind.  
Was Aquinas endeavoring to keep his incipient theologians grounded here as well? The 
temptation to rather florid exegesis has plagued Christian biblical interpretation since its 
beginning. One is here reminded of Aquinas’ rejection of Origen’s postulation that the 
heavenly bodies were prisons for disobedient angels in I, 65, 2 and his refusal to 
incorporate Augustine’s mystical explanation of the number six in the Articles 
immediately prior. Aquinas’ use of Moses Maimonides seemed to be reminding his 
students that there may be a very simple answer to objections raised, and that simple 
answer might be found in surprising places outside the Christian tradition. 244 
The Responses to the fifth, sixth, and seventh Objections are brief and catalogue the 
various ideas of Augustine, Basil and Chrysostom in response to the questions raised 
within the Objections. The section is coming to a close and these final Objections and 
their Responses have the feel of some loose ends which are being gathered up before the 
ST moves on to its next subject.  
5. Summary of QQ 65-74. 
241 Guide to the Perplexed II, 30. 
242 Gen ad lit I, 7, 13. 
243 I, 74, 3ad3, vivificabat aquarum naturam,… vitalem virtutem his quae foventur injiciens. 
244 Pieper, 27. 
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The reader who has persevered through this re-reading of these ten QQ of Aquinas’ ST 
has been given an occasion to notice several elements:  
1. The theological and philosophical reading of these questions is frustrated. At 
several points Aquinas has edited, redacted and removed material from his 
earlier and fuller treatments. This has frequently left important questions either 
unaddressed or insufficiently addressed. Aquinas is not questing for theological 
or philosophical truth as he does in De potentia or his Commentary.  
2. These QQ are almost exclusively focused upon the use of patristic sources. 
When the answers matter to Aquinas, he sets them aside and argues from 
Scripture, only to return to the patristic sources once more.  
3. Aquinas argued consistently for the validity of multiple literal readings of the 
Creation narrative. Augustine’s counter-intuitive reading and Basil’s more 
traditional reading were both held to be valid and consistent with the text of 
Genesis and the best scientific understanding of the day. The question of which 
one was “right” was a question which Aquinas refused to answer.  
4. The complexity and sophistication of the reverential reading increased as the QQ 
progressed. The ease with which the reader is given to reject Origen’s ideas 
about the nature of physical bodies in I, 65 is slowly transformed into the subtle 
and sophisticated reading of Augustine’s Gen. ad litt. IV, in ST I, 73.  
As we have argued from the beginning of this thesis. The reader who turns from this 
material because he or she finds a more robust and sophisticated argument being made 
in Aquinas’ De potentia, Commentary or ST I, 44-49, may have valid reasons for doing 
so in a quest for Aquinas’ most profound treatments of Creation. But that turning away 
from these QQ is also missing something else. The simplification of material and the 
focus on careful reading of patristic sources is highly suggestive of a pedagogical 
purpose for these QQ. Aquinas’ deliberate manipulation of sources and argumentation 
suggests that this simpler treatment was not a product Aquinas failure to pay attention to 
his subject matter adequately. Rather, it suggests that he had carefully arranged this 
material, had marshalled his important arguments regarding Creation under an earlier 
section (ST I, 44-49), and had here an opportunity to do something other than he had 
done there.  
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Conclusion: Letting Augustine Carry the Day by Not Winning the Argument 
In the final paragraph of the first book of Gen. ad litt., after he had raised many 
questions about the Creation account, Augustine imagined a conversation with a 
skeptical reader in which that reader demanded to know the benefit of all his 
questioning about the Genesis.1 We have come to a similar moment of reckoning within 
this thesis. While the discussion of Aquinas’ use of Augustine within these QQ and 
other elements of his oeuvre could continue, it is time to recapitulate and consider the 
material which has heretofore been presented.  
1. Recapitulation and Summary 
We have made several interlocking assertions within this thesis which we have 
demonstrated through exemplars and the comparative study of texts. These assertions 
have led to the conclusion that ST I, 65-74 merits reconsideration by the academic 
theological and philosophical communities through a re-imagined hermeneutical lens. 
We have constructed that lens and conducted that rereading, demonstrating that Aquinas 
had both a pedagogical and an apologetic goal in mind for his treatment of the Creation 
narrative within these QQ which need to be considered prior to a more traditional quest 
for exegetical, philosophical, or theological truth. This reading has enabled us to posit a 
heretofore unconsidered hermeneutic for these QQ which the academic community of 
Thomstic scholarship has found frustrating and hence neglected.  
It should not be assumed from this assertion that the fundamental questions of the 
exegesis of Genesis 1 were of no import to Aquinas. Just twenty QQ prior to this 
section, Aquinas had engaged in a substantive exploration of the doctrine of Creation in 
QQ 45-49. Many of the issues which remain critical to reading Genesis 1 were treated 
there, including creatio ex nihilo (45, 1); the eternity of the universe (46, 1) and the 
relation of evil to the good creation (48, 1-48, 5). Notably, these were all issues which 
could be addressed in an exegesis of Genesis 1, but are not addressed in QQ 65-74. The 
problems addressed  in these QQ are really the problems of creation itself as much as 
they are the problems occasioned by the text of Scripture and its literal reading. Thus, 
the section under consideration remained an exegesis of a biblical text whose 
1 Gen. ad litt. I, 21, 41, Dicet aliquis: Quid tu tanta tritura dissertationis huius, quid granorum exuisti? 
quid eventilasti?   
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understanding and interpretation were important to Aquinas and his contemporaries. 
The conclusions which Aquinas reached herein were therefore substantive and 
important for understanding this text of Genesis 1. Reading QQ 65-74 purely as an 
exegetical exercise, however, does not adequately explain the content which the reader 
finds within these QQ. The failure to resolve issues which had been resolved elsewhere 
in Aquinas’ works, even within the ST, suggests another goal than simply explicating 
the text. It is this persistent sense that Aquinas had another goal in mind which 
occasioned this research initially and which has born this fruit.  
Before further recapitulating the findings of this research, two problematic readings of 
this thesis and Aquinas need to be addressed. The preceding thesis could be 
misconstrued as proposing an anachronistic reading of Aquinas. The observation that 
Aquinas refused to conclude that either Basil or Augustine was correct may lend some 
credence to the idea that Aquinas held for the idea of a duplex veritas or multiplex 
veritas, as if both interpretational strands represented by Basil and Augustine were 
correct in their expositions. I do not read Aquinas to be saying this. While he respects 
both of these interpretational strands, he is, within these QQ, asserting an epistemic 
humility, not multiple truths. Aquinas did not believe humanity has the basis in 
revelation or in native rational ability to determine which interpretation is the correct 
interpretation, at least not definitively. From his treatment of these materials in both De 
potentia and Commentary it is clear that he personally prefers the interpretation of 
Augustine when engaged in theological exploration. Within these QQ, however, he 
refuses to assert that as a conclusion or even as a probability. Both interpretational 
strands may be, in Mark Jordan’s words, a “refraction of the truth” 2 but Aquinas 
deliberately refuses to endorse one over the other. In Objections 3 and 4 of the final 
Article, and particularly in the Responses to those Objections, he seems to have gone 
even a step further and asserted that both Augustine and Basil could in fact be in error.3 
It is our conclusion that this section of the ST is best understood as a treatment of the 
proper handling of patristic resources.  
A second and related approach to Aquinas’ treatment of these two strands also must be 
addressed and ultimately rejected. One could posit that Augustine represented for 
2 Jordon, 23.  
3 See above, pp. 222-223.   
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Aquinas a more philosophical or rational source of knowledge and that Basil therefore 
represented a more “faith based” approach which simply appealed to a revealed truth 
over observation and philosophical truth. In this misconstrual, Aquinas is cast, again 
anachronistically, into a post-enlightenment faith and reason or religion and science 
debate. Aquinas did not conceive of a tension between faith and reason in anything like 
the categories in which many within post-enlightenment Christianity have considered 
this tension since the days of Hume, Descarte, and Locke. The tension between faith 
and reason, in so far as there is a tension for Aquinas, was a dialectal opportunity to 
think deeply about a very rational faith, not an occasion to pit one against the other into 
a conflict which demanded a winner.  
Aquinas did not appear to have considered that Augustine represented for the reader a 
sanitized philosophical reading of Genesis 1 while Basil’s interpretation was contrasted 
as the faithful reading of the text. Not only does this presume a modern bifurcation of 
theology and philosophy which Aquinas did not truly recognize, it is not present in the 
text itself. At numerous points, both Basil and Augustine are situated within 
philosophical communities.4 Both of them were shown to diverge from philosophical 
truth in light of scriptural revelation. Aquinas was careful to maintain the distinction 
between the philosophical community and the theological community, and at no point 
does he more closely associate Augustine with the philosophers.5 Both Basil and 
Augustine were consistently named within the theological community. The debate 
presented in these ten QQ took place inside the interpretational tradition of Christianity 
and not between Jerusalem and Athens.  
For Aquinas, there were two valid literal interpretations of Genesis 1 which could not be 
eliminated on the bases of reason or Scripture. It is not the case that Aquinas saw them 
both as true; rather, he saw that the human being could not render a final judgment 
about whether one was the correct interpretation. Both Basil and Augustine had 
faithfully read the text, both had applied sound and rational theological skills to the text. 
They each had come to radically different conclusions about how to read Genesis 1.  
4 ST I, 66, 2ad1; 66, 3ad3; 68, 1c; 70, 3c; et al.  
5 Jordan, 73 
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As we have demonstrated, Aquinas’ assertion and insistence on this point is surprising 
because in earlier works, he had clearly favored the interpretational strand of Augustine 
and within his own more speculative theological works had espoused definitive 
conclusions which were not reached within these QQ of the ST.6 This self-restraint 
subsists at the core of this thesis’ assertion that this section of the ST is pedagogical and 
apologetic. Unlike his previous works, Aquinas was not ultimately on a quest for final 
truth here as much as he was engaged in inculcating a habitus within the incipientes for 
whom this book was written. It seems that after exploring the necessarily final 
statements about Creation in QQ 45-49, he returned to the primary scriptural locus of 
Creation to make another point. Instead of building upon prior statements and furthering 
what he had said, he seems to be exploring and establishing an epistemic boundary. He 
may consider that Augustine is correct, but he cannot say it so conclusively as to 
exclude Basil’s very different interpretation of these same words. For these 10 QQ he 
has insisted that both approaches can be used to explicate the text faithfully and 
reasonably, but not in a way which is exclusive of the other.  
It should be noted as well that this goal for Aquinas would not have been a lesser goal 
than the quest for philosophical truth in these QQ. At the end of the prima pars, in Q 
117, Aquinas takes a rather surprising excursus into the question of whether human 
beings can actually teach.7 He rejects several philosophical approaches to teaching and 
settles on a mystical discussion of teaching in which the teacher participates 
instrumentally in the divine creative act. Later in the ST, in the discussion of Christ’s 
mind, Aquinas posited that the ability to learn was essential to being truly human.8 
Aquinas appears to have observed his students learning with something of a holy awe. 
Creating a virtual disputation which explored the limits and possibilities of that learning 
process would have been quite in character and congruent with his own attitudes and 
expressed statements about learning itself.  
The academic community, failing to notice Aquinas’ method and purpose for this 
section, has neglected these questions, despite repeated pleas for the integration of 
6 See: pp. 115-130, 144-147, and 217-219 
7 Boland, 294. 
8 ST III, 12, 2c. 
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Aquinas’ exegetical works into the understanding of his theology and philosophy. As 
we demonstrated in the introduction, multiple authors labored to establish important 
conclusions about Aquinas’ doctrine of Trinity and his hermeneutics which, had they 
utilized these ten QQ, they might have been made much more simply and 
convincingly.9 We have asserted that the most reasonable explanation for this neglect is 
predicated upon an assumption on the part of most modern readers that within these QQ 
Aquinas was on a quest for philosophical or theological truth. We have concurred that if 
this was the primary goal of these QQ and if that is why one reads them, their neglect 
reflects a reasonable estimation. As a quest for truth, these QQ are insufficiently robust, 
shallow, and leave far too many exegetical questions unaddressed or inadequately 
addressed. But we have questioned the validity of the presupposition which leads to that 
conclusion. Having noted the stated goals of the prima pars and the fact that Aquinas 
had already dealt with the philosophically and theologically significant content of the 
Creation topic in QQ 45-49 of the ST, we posited that these QQ need to be read in light 
of the assertions we have made immediately above.  
An examination of the historical and intellectual context in which Aquinas wrote the 
prima pars confirmed and strengthened the assertion that these QQ were written for 
purposes other than as a quest for truth. These findings were gathered into three 
categories: Identification of the incipientes who were the first audience;10 Aquinas’ own 
vocation as a Domincan;11 and the intellectual climate of the middle decades of the 13th 
century when Aquinas wrote.12  
Aquinas composed these QQ after his first regency in Paris and toward the end of his 
decade among the priories and studia of the Italian province of the Dominican Order. 
Because the students whom Aquinas was charged with teaching in Santa Sabina were 
struggling to assimilate the standard material of the medieval university, namely the 
Sentences of Peter Lombard, Aquinas had altered his plans and embarked upon writing 
the ST. His newly conceived work, the ST, bore similarities to the Sentences in 
9 See pp. 9-15.  
10 See pp. 26-40.  
11 See pp. 40-43. 
12 See pp. 43-48.  
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arrangement and scope, but treated the material more synthetically and frequently 
reflected a simplification of the argumentation and complexity of resources within his 
prior Commentary. It is this audience of young men whom the Ordo Predicatorum was 
training to be preachers who were the intended beneficiaries of the ST, especially its 
prima pars. With perhaps only a single year of training before licensure to preach, they 
were in need of an intensive and broad-ranging education. Aquinas’ own experience of 
anti-mendicant conflict and hostile audiences in Paris impressed upon him the need for 
these young men to have epistemic humility and the ability to handle patristic sources 
carefully and adroitly before they embarked on their vocations as public preachers.  
Research into Aquinas’ person led us to conclude that his devotion to the Order likely 
drew his attention to this portion of Scripture. Forged as a mission to reconvert 
Albigensian apostates, the followers of Dominic had been necessarily focused on the 
doctrine of Creation. For Aquinas Creation remained a life-long object of study and one 
which he had placed into the service the Dominican Order.13 His treatment of Creation 
remained consistent throughout his career, both in terms of its relative importance and 
in terms of his approach to Creation.  
As early as his Commentary Aquinas had formulated his larger synthetic treatments of 
theology around an exitus and reditus motif. Most modern readers of Aquinas concede 
that to some degree this motif operates as an organizing principle of the entire ST. As 
such, these ten QQ fall within a treatment of the exitus, the created world originating 
with God. However, the exitus is rarely present without some acknowledgement and 
treatment of the reditus, the teleological goal of Creation, also being present.  
Integrating Aquinas’ use of sources and this exitus and reditus motif into a filter while 
reading these ten QQ yielded important results for this thesis. By their very nature, 
every Article addressed the exitus of creation in some way. At important junctures, 
however, when an individual Article touched upon the reditus, the character of the 
Article and the resources utilized by Aquinas underwent an important shift. Aquinas 
raised the level of authority and quested for definitive answers.14 Within the three 
Articles cited (65, 1; 67, 3; and 73, 1) the patristic resources all but disappear, replaced 
13 See pp. 57-59 and 130-132. 
14 See pp. 84-92, 134-136, 162, and 198-207.  
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by Scripture, and the primary arguments which occupied the Articles prior and 
subsequent to each of these Articles is suspended and then resumed. When these 
Articles were bracketed out of the flow of the section, a particular pattern began to 
emerge which suggested that Aquinas was engaged in a particular goal for this section 
which would have served those incipientes. It became clear that the primary object of 
this exegetical exercise was not best understood as the explication of the text itself, but 
the integration of two interpretational strands which had been received from Christian 
patristic theologians and which were embodied by the works of Augustine on one hand 
and on the other hand Basil who was joined by John Chrysostom, John of Damascus, 
and others in minor and supporting roles.15  
A close comparative reading of this section of the ST with neighboring sections of the 
prima pars also yielded important observations. What marked this particular section of 
the ST apart from its neighboring sections is the fact that a tension runs throughout most 
of these Articles which is never resolved. The tension is between Augustine’s a-
temporal interpretation of Genesis 1 and Basil’s more traditional reading which saw the 
six days of the Creation narrative as six 24 hour periods which correspond to what 
humans experience as days in this time. Any final resolution of the tension is explicitly 
denied at several points and the reader is forced to accommodate both interpretational 
strands to the dual criteria of the Scriptural witness and natural reason. At no point is 
one favored,16 indeed, at several points, it appears that when one strand of interpretation 
was threatening to overwhelm another, Aquinas deliberately undercut the authority of 
that patristic theologian to create a parity among the disputants.17 Aquinas appeared to 
be conducting a form of artificial disputation which valued the process more than the 
conclusion. He deliberately maintained an open question.  
Further research into the historical and intellectual climate of the middle decades of the 
thirteenth century also led us to posit that Aquinas’ use of Augustine’s extensive 
treatments of Creation as a central element within this hexaemeral treatment may have 
15 See pp 92-99 and 144-147.  
16 See ST I, 74, 2c and discussion thereof on pp. 13 and 218-219.  
17 See pp. 166-170. 
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served another goal than purely pedagogical; although, this secondary motive was 
complementary to the pedagogical goal. 
The theologians of the 13th century were generally moving toward more careful and 
thorough reading of patristic authorities. This was often articulated as a reaction to 
Aristotelian influences and especially Latin Averroism. Aquinas occupied an almost 
unique place within this reactionary movement. His mentor, Albert the Great, had been 
instrumental in the reintroduction of Aristotelian material to western thought. Aquinas 
himself, however, we have noted was far more reserved and careful in his treatment of 
Aristotle.18  
But Aquinas never lost sight of the value of Aristostle and his commentators for himself 
or for his readership. To the end of his writing career he apparently engaged in 
commenting on Aristotle’s works.19 Some see these commentaries as an attempt to 
rescue Aristotle and the Arts faculty of the University of Paris from Averroism.20 Even 
if this is true, he is not advocating for the rejection of Aristotle nor for the rejection of 
all that Averroes had written, for both Aristotle and Averroes are found cited within the 
ST. Aquinas was seeking a path of moderation between two occasionally 
complimentary and occasionally conflicting forces which were rising in the 13th 
century. On one hand he concurred with the return to patristic sources, expanding his 
own use of them extensively.21 At the same time, he was committed to the value of all 
knowledge, even the knowledge of those outside the Christian faith such as the pagan 
Aristotle, the Jewish Rabbi Moses Maimonides, and Islamic commentators such as 
Avicenna and Averroes, all of whom are cited repeatedly within the ten QQ under 
consideration here and throughout the ST and other works by Aquinas. In his second 
posting to Paris, Aquinas combatted an excessive Averroism, perhaps even coining the 
term. Yet, he did not stop reading Aristotle or Averroes as some, including 
Bonaventura, were advocating. 
18 See pp. 52-53. 
19 Torrell, 228-239 and Weisheipl, 316. 
20 Weisheipl, 280-281. 
21 Torrell, 245-246. 
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Bonaventura, a former colleague of Aquinas at the University of Paris and at this time 
serving as the Secretary General of the Franciscan Order, was advocating for the 
exclusion of Aristotle and all Aristotelian works from the teaching of Theology.22 It is 
this over-compensating reaction to Averroist excess which frequently asserted the all-
sufficiency of Augustine’s thought. While the primary documentary evidence of the 
Augustinist movement dates from slightly after Aquinas wrote this section, but it is not 
plausible that the Augustinist movement sprang full grown from the heads of men such 
as John Pecham and Stephen Tempier in the 1270’s, within five years of Aquinas’ death 
and less than a decade from the writing of these QQ. Already in the late 1260’s this 
growing Augustinist movement coupled with an existing anti-mendicant reaction 
threatened both Aquinas’ academic projects as well as the mission of the Ordo 
Praedicatorum to which he and his Dominican students were devoted. His vantage 
point of serving as a theological resource to the popes of the 1260’s would have given 
him ample opportunity to witness and participate in the fierce debates of the time which 
revolved around these issues.   
The complex interplay of these interlocking contextual factors led us to propose a 
bipartite hermeneutical lens for the reading of these QQ. The primary element of this 
lens was pedagogical. The lectores of the Order would have found within these QQ a 
potent tool for the inculcation of the reverential reading of patristic sources in their own 
students in the priories. The inculcation of this skill served their primary vocation as 
preachers to the burgeoning cities of the High Middle Ages. A treatment of the 
reverential reading of patristic sources also served to restore one of the important 
elements of the abandoned commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. This 
pedagogical purpose was evidenced in the increasing sophistication of the treatment of 
sources as the QQ progressed and the synthetic integration of interpretational principles 
which had been introduced in prior Articles. We also noted structural elements which 
were more easily integrated into the pedagogical schema: Articles which seemed to 
demonstrate prior principles, e.g., Q 71-72, and the peculiar structure of the final Article 
(I, 73, 3) in the section which seemed to be a list of exercises.  
The apologetic element of the hermeneutical lens was revealed in the close reading of 
sources, particularly Augustine. While Basil’s conclusions regarding Genesis 1 
22 Weisheipl, 285. 
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generally were the received teaching of the Church at the time, Augustine was being 
held up as the authoritative source for all theology. Aquinas did not use Augustine to 
refute Basil; rather, he used Augustine, the preferred theologian of the Augustinist 
movement, to create the very space the Augustinists were seeking to constrict. This 
required delicate balance. Augustine would be allowed to “win” but only in heeding his 
call for an epistemic humility which denied the possibility that Augustine was right at 
the expense of Basil.  
Aquinas accomplished this through multiple devices. At several points within the 
treatment, Augustine’s considerable contribution to the subject under immediate 
consideration was reduced and even silenced, e.g., I, 65, 1 or I, 73, 1. This silence 
cannot be attributed to an ignorance of Augustine’s works, since, in prior treatments of 
the same issues, Aquinas had made use of Augustine to answer these very questions. 
Augustine’s writing on Creation had been prodigious, but while he wrote far more than 
any other theologian on this subject, he was not allowed to overwhelm other ideas.  
A second device involved the casting of a tension between Augustine and Basil. The 
majority of Articles within these QQ saw Aquinas placing Augustine’s ideas about a-
temporal creation into a tension with the temporal interpretation of Basil and other 
theologians. Aquinas carefully balanced the approaches of these theologians in order to 
prevent one or another treatment from gaining a position of dominance. 23 When 
Augustine’s conception of the creation, which Aquinas personally favored, seemed to 
be dominating, Aquinas brought forward an idea of Augustine in an Objection (e.g., I, 
66, 2ob1) which could be refuted or he carefully demonstrated that Augustine was 
dependent upon the ideas of Basil (e.g., I, 68, 1c.)  
Near the end of the document, Aquinas engaged in a third device which served to 
restrict Augustine’s influence while maintaining his appeal for humility. When it 
appears that Augustine’s ideas are simply better and easier to accommodate to reason 
and Scripture, Aquinas abandons the tension of the prior Articles to address specifically 
the authority of Augustine in Q 73.24 In the second and third Article Augustine’s 
material from Gen. ad litt. IV is substantively repeated, but it is reshaped and not 
23 See pp. 155-156, 163-165, 184-185. 
24 See pp. 198-214. 
234 
 
                                                          
credited to Augustine. Within those two Articles the singular reference to material 
credited to Augustine is subordinated to an idea which is taken from Dionysius. It 
appears that Augustine’s authority is being contained, even when it stands behind much 
of what Aquinas himself thought. Augustine appears to have been subjected to the very 
epistemic humility to which he had himself appealed.  
We noted that Aquinas’ treatment of the Augustinian material in Q 73 is puzzling, but 
makes a great deal more sense when read in light of a context in which Augustine was 
being put forward as the answer to every question.25 At the end of the section which had 
been inculcating a reverential reading of patristic theologians, Augustine was given the 
most critical attention. This critical reading was not antithetical to a reverential reading 
but is necessary for that reverential reading. For Aquinas, the reverential reading 
involved just such a critical process. The patristic theologian who was read reverentially 
was not placed into a position of undue authority, but was read as an authority among 
many. Augustine was here subjected to a critical analysis in light of Dionysius. Some of 
his material was used, other elements ignored. Augustine had his voice, but not more 
than was reverentially due.  
The apologetic and pedagogical purposes in which patristic sources were employed 
became yet more clearly demonstrated in the comparative analysis of Aquinas’ use of 
those same resources. Particularly fruitful was a comparison of these QQ with parallel 
treatments in both his Commentary and De potentia.26 Frequently when treating the 
same question or disputed item, in the ST Aquinas removed complicating material 
creating an artificially simplistic intellectual arena in which the question might be 
contended. Patristic sources were manipulated and relocated within arguments to 
emphasize the skill of reverential reading instead of the quest for the answer to the 
contested question (e.g., Augustine quotation in I, 68, 2-3.)27 
In taking a step back from the parsing of individual Articles and comparison of the 
instances of recourse manipulation within those Articles, one must not lose sight of the 
larger observation. Perhaps the most important element of this treatment of patristic 
25 See pp. 54-56.  
26 See pp. 67-75 and 114-130.  
27 See pp. 114-124. 
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sources is not to be found in the conclusions reached or the demonstrable shifting of 
resources within the argumentation of the individual Articles. The element which sets 
these Articles apart from the rest of the ST and his treatments of this material in other 
works is that Aquinas never reaches any conclusion which resolves the tension between 
the interpretation of Basil and Augustine. In his lectures at the University of Notre 
Dame, Thomas O’Meara O.P., once declared to this student that there was never a 
contradiction or tension which Aquinas could not resolve. Yet within these QQ he 
resolutely and deliberately refused to do so. For one who is seeking theological and 
philosophical truth, this lack of resolution is frustrating. For one who is beginning the 
life-long quest for that truth or a career as a proclaimer of truth, however, this humility 
which these QQ embody may be absolutely essential.  
2. Reading and Studying Aquinas in Light of Epistemic Humility and Reverential 
Reading 
This thesis has challenged presuppositions and assumptions which are demonstrably 
governing Thomistic scholarship. As should be clear by this point, this author contends 
that the neglect of these QQ is predicated upon a faulty presupposition. Much earlier in 
this thesis, we began with Etienne Gilson’s mournful estimation of these QQ in the 
early decades of the 20th century and noted that his estimation was substantively 
repeated in the mid-twentieth century treatment of this section by William Wallace, O. 
P., Aquinas’ most recent English language translator and commentator on these QQ. 
Wallace despaired of finding anything of value for the modern reader in these pages. 
Those two estimations continue to this day as was demonstrated by the more recent 
journal articles of Mark Johnson and Giles Emory. We have noted that contemporary 
scholarship has consistently disparaged and neglected Aquinas exegetical treatment of 
Genesis 1 in particular while it explored his words on Creation with intense interest.28  
Obviously this author dissents from that assessment of these QQ. I do, however, not 
because I believe the conclusion to be in error, but because the presupposition which 
undergirds the questions asked of the text are faulty. Along with other students of 
Aquinas and Augustine, I have lamented the fact that Aquinas’ ST has become 
something it was never intended to be, primarily a systematic theological text and 
28 See pp. 11-16. 
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frequently a source book for those who would score points in theological debates. 
Aquinas intended the ST as a means to inculcate the habitus of a theologian, a way of 
thinking, praying, reading, and proclaiming divine truth to what he perceived as a world 
desperately in need of what he and his confreres of the Dominican Order were 
preaching.  
The inculcation of habitus in a reader and student is not so easily parsed via word 
searches and comparative analyses of disparate texts. It requires a much more holistic 
reading. Furthermore, reading a text which is intended to produce the aretegenic results 
envisioned by Ellen Charry through the hermeneutical lens of systematic theology 
which focused on fact and final conclusion leads to misrepresentation and 
misunderstanding.29 It has in the reading of these questions and it likely has throughout 
the ST. In the case of these QQ the scholarly community has become exasperated with 
Aquinas’ exegesis of Genesis 1 and elected to ignore him in QQ 65-74, even when he is 
speaking relatively plainly to the issues at hand. Neglect, however, is only one 
problematic result of such errant expectations; albeit, perhaps the most evident in these 
QQ. Even a friendly reader of Aquinas like Gilson, whose estimation of this section was 
noted above, could allow his need for scholarly categories to interfere with his reading. 
On a quest for philosophical and theological truth, Gilson concluded that the entire 
section was about the hermeneutical principle of condescension.30 While condescension 
does indeed occupy two of the 29 Articles within QQ 65-74, it is but one element of 
Aquinas’ approach to the interpretations put forward by Augustine and Basil. As we 
suggested earlier in this thesis,31 Gilson’s reading of Aquinas could have meshed with 
his own preferred pedagogical methods, but he does not perceive Aquinas as a teacher, 
only a philosopher. He did not notice that Aquinas was teaching his students in much 
the same way that Gilson taught his own students some 700 years later, through an 
inductive method which placed into their hands the very material of the discipline under 
the guidance of a mentor.  
29 See pp. 4-5 for discussion of Charry’s work. 
30 Gilson, 204-205. For fuller treatment within this these, see pp. 15-16.  
31 See p. 4. 
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Thus, Gilson, whose work I generally admire and appreciate, misread these QQ, 
mistaking one of many elements for the central thrust of the entire section. This 
misreading, however, was not simply an erroneous finding. Misunderstanding this 
section, he placed it into a category of work which did not suit the purposes of a 20th 
century philosopher. Condescension, necessary to answer pre-Enlightenment questions, 
was not useful to him in his context. Had he approached this through the lens of patristic 
sources and as a pedagogical exercise, however, he might have discovered that the 
epistemic humility for which Aquinas argued was quite helpful for one who was 
seeking a way out of the modernism controversy of that period of Roman Catholicism’s 
intellectual history.  
The same estimation could be applied to William Wallace, who is, like Aquinas, a 
Dominican and hence might be expected to offer up a charitable reading of his Order’s 
most notable member. His mid-twentieth century estimation, however, is wholly 
dependent upon an evaluation of Aquinas’ scientific knowledge, primarily the 
inadequacy of Aquinas’ knowledge. These QQ are thus reduced to a useful data point in 
the ongoing history of scientific development and Aquinas is read as a good proto-
scientist for his refusal to embrace some of the more risible medieval scientific 
conclusions.32 
Like Gilson, Wallace missed the point that Aquinas was embodying and inculcating an 
epistemic humility and reverential reading of the fathers which would have served his 
mid-twentieth century generation well. The neglect of these QQ within the studia of the 
Dominican Order, noted by Wallace, might have been an occasion to question the 
character of that educational system. Instead, it was taken as established fact that these 
QQ had little offer the person seeking after divine truth. 
To this point, we have deliberately limited this discussion to these ten QQ. While our 
research has extended beyond these QQ, the material covered and conclusions reached 
have amply sufficed for this project. That said, however, one cannot but wonder if other 
portions of the ST also suffer from the failure of the scholarly community to take into 
account the pedagogical or aretegenic nature of this work. Vivian Boland O. P. has 
suggested as much by asserting that the best way to apprehend the ST properly is in a 
32 See pp. 9-11. 
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community which is as devoted prayer and reflection as it is to study and reading.33 
Mark Jordan as well has lamented that the readers of Aquinas have for centuries missed 
the point that Aquinas was writing a text which had as a goal the inculcation of 
theological habitus.34 This appeal by Boland and Jordan for a reading of Aquinas which 
is embedded into a pastoral and spiritual context further suggests the importance of this 
section of the ST for their project. Torrell locates the root of Thomas’ spirituality within 
his understanding of Creation.35 
Both Boland and Jordan, like earlier citations of Charry and others, make their 
congruent points based on both the prooemium of the ST and generalized observations 
about the ST. This thesis seeks to contribute to the general thrust of their arguments by a 
suggesting that this aretegenic and pedagogical character of the ST is discernable in an 
examination of these ten QQ in detail. The pedagogical character of the questions is 
necessary for the fruitful reading of these ten QQ.  
Expanding the scope into a somewhat wider field, this research also suggests a potential 
line of inquiry for the study of Aquinas and Augustinian reception. Of particular interest 
to this author would be the suspicion that Augustine’s treatment of Genesis 1 has 
become something of a meme or motif within the ST, functioning as a placeholder for 
the concept of epistemic humility. In the discussion of the incarnate Christ’s knowledge 
(ST III, 9) Aquinas endeavored to posit a theologically daring conclusion related to the 
intellect of the incarnate Christ. In the third Article of that Q he incorporates an 
otherwise unnecessary quotation from Gen. ad litt. into the corpus of the Article. The 
suspicion of this author is that Aquinas has included this quotation because alluding to 
Augustine’s treatment of Genesis 1 has become a shorthand means for Aquinas to 
introduce epistemic humility to arguments in which such humility is necessary. Because 
these quotations are often subtle and the Corpus Thomisticum does not provide the 
ability to search patristic citations, pursuit of this notion would require painstaking and 
careful reading of the ST for other occasions in which Aquinas made potentially 
controversial points and then commentaries of the text which have noted the sources of 
33 Boland, 302-304.  
34 Jordan, Rewritten Theology, 53 and 193. 
35 Torrell, 163-164. 
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allusions and citations. It is anticipated that the digitizing of more resources, particularly 
these commentaries, would enable a computerized search which would greatly facilitate 
this sort of research at some point in the near future. 
A second line of inquiry would be the exploration of medieval pedagogical theory and 
whether Aquinas was reflecting that theory or seeking to establish a pedagogy which 
was based upon a different theory of learning. As Vivian Boland pointed out, Aquinas 
had a somewhat mystical understanding of what happened when a teacher a taught and a 
student learned. Aquinas furthermore considered that the ability to learn was essential to 
the human condition (see ST III, 9 cited above.) While the pedagogical nature of the 
prima pars has been widely acknowledged, it has not been thoroughly integrated into 
the reading of this document.  
A third line of inquiry might pursue the reception of these QQ within the Dominican 
studia of the 14th century. Analyzing the catalogues of texts at various universities, 
studia, and other centers of learning has suggested that the prima secundae partis and 
secunda secundae partis were far more widely distributed and presumably more widely 
read as well. It would be interesting to ask if the institutions in which the prima pars 
was read produced scholars with a noticeably more refined reverential reading of 
patristic sources.  
A fourth line of inquiry could involve reading and researching the vast summa genre of 
the 13th century. While all these documents were ultimately part of the educational 
mission, did they include anything which might be construed as a hermeneutic for 
reading sources? Was Aquinas unique in this? Was he patterning his work on something 
else? Did others create primers on patristic sources? Did others seek to reign in the 
authority of Augustine or another patristic theologian this way?  
3. Larger Significance for Academic and Public Spheres 
 Pushed by his imagined interlocutor in the passage cited at the beginning of this 
conclusion, Augustine proffered up two rationales for his winnowing (eventilare) of the 
Genesis text. He first asserted that he had learned to give the answer which could be 
given regarding the text of Scripture which corresponds to the faith.36 When it came to 
36 Gen. ad litt. I, 21, 41, Cui respondeo, ad eum ipsum me cibum suaviter pervenisse, quo didici non 
haerere homini in respondendo secundum fidem. 
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Creation, there were things he could and needed to say. In Augustine’s estimation, 
something important, people’s faith, depended on these answers.  But he also learned a 
second thing by gleaning through the text of Genesis 1. Sometimes that answer was not 
entirely obvious or clear. There were times when the authorial intent was not evident.37 
In such situations, Augustine felt not an obligation to silence or some sort of 
equivocation, but that the text itself, capable of many meanings, supported any meaning 
which was congruent with both the letter of the text and the faith of Christianity. 
Reading book XII of Conf. and later sections of Gen. ad litt. one does not find that 
Augustine argued that he was right and others wrong, but he would only go so far as to 
say that his interpretation was in fact a possible interpretation. He exhorted the reader to 
evaluate it and submit it to the governing hermeneutic which he had articulated in De 
Doctrina Christiana, the twin loves of God and the fellow human being.38  
Aquinas’ treatment of the six days of Creation permitted Augustine’s more significant 
hermeneutical idea to carry the day by refusing to assert his exegetical conclusions. In 
QQ 65-74 Aquinas saw to it that Augustine’s more important hermeneutical point 
ultimately succeeded by not declaring a winner in the argument which was apparently 
under discussion. Aquinas clearly preferred Augustine’s novel approach to the Creation 
narrative, but he was not about proving which of these two traditions had the better 
answer. He was able to admit his own humility before this subject and admit that both 
interpretive strands were congruent with natural philosophy and scripture as he 
understood them both. Both of them had a legitimate claim to be a literal and authentic 
reading of the text.  
Even a casual familiarity with the ongoing debates about origins which take place at the 
intersections of the sciences such as Biology and Geology and religious communities 
suggests that Aquinas’ appeal for epistemic humility remains valid. In the very week in 
which this author set out to make final revisions to this document, William E. Carroll, 
made just that argument in an online article published in First Things.39 The small, 
37 Gen. ad litt. I, 21, 41, Si utrumque vitetur, perfecte se habet fructus legentis: si vero utrumque vitari 
non potest, etiam si voluntas scriptoris incerta sit sanae fidei congruam non inutile est eruisse 
sententiam. 
38 De Doctr. Chr. I, 36, 40.  




                                                          
Christian, Liberal Arts university at which this author teaches has at times been sorely 
conflicted by this issue. The fact that two philosophers and theologians of the 
acknowledged stature of Augustine and Aquinas found an appeal to this epistemic 
humility valuable in their time should give us an occasion to reflect on our times as 
well.  
The epistemic hubris which drives the conflict between religious communities and 
scientific/academic communities has proven both distracting and destructive to both 
scientific inquiry and religious mission. Since the Enlightenment an increasingly 
reductionist materialism has posited a powerful narrative which some have sought to 
employ as the explanation of everything. In response, religious communities have often 
posited an equally hubristic paradigm for knowledge based upon an interpretation of 
divine revelation. Both sides of this conflict predicate statements upon the false premise 
of a complete knowledge. Having personally engaged in such conversations and 
lamented the silent alternative to such conversations after they have concluded badly, it 
seems that any hope for the future lies in the frank admission of our limitations and the 
appropriate boundaries of respective disciplines. In short, the way forward will depend 
upon an adoption of epistemic humility.  
This epistemic humility must begin internally, it cannot authentically be imposed. 
Aquinas saw the need for this epistemic humility in his confreres of the Dominican 
Order. While Aquinas believed in the mission of the Order, argued vigorously on its 
behalf, and served it with considerable energy, he knew that the Order’s success 
depended upon the humble preaching, service, and scholarship of his fellow 
Dominicans. This humility was not a capitulation to the arguments or premises of those 
whom he opposed in his tracts. Rather, this epistemic humility which he learned from 
Augustine was the foundation which allowed him to make the arguments and engage his 
opponents on the intellectual battle fields of the medieval period.  
Aquinas himself put this into practice. As he completed the prima pars, Aquinas was 
posted once more to Paris for an unusual second regency (1268-1272) on the university 
faculty. While he was there, in addition to serving the Order as the primary articulator 
of the Dominican response to the threat against the mendicants and in addition to his 
duties as a Regent Master, Aquinas mediated and helped to resolve a controversy in the 
Liberal Arts faculty which was rooted in an uncritical adoption of some of Aristotle’s 
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ideas.40 It was the reaction to this Aristotelian excess and similar ideas which resulted in 
the condemnations of 1277. Aquinas was also troubled by what he heard and wrote a 
polemic against the principle articulator of these ideas on the Arts faculty, Siger of 
Brabant,41 in which he may have invented the label “Averroists”.  
But the polemical exchange was hardly the end of the matter and it is to his adoption of 
epistemic humility that we owe a far greater debt to Aquinas. Aquinas also argued on 
behalf of the Arts faculty. While he disagreed with the conclusion about the eternity of 
the world based upon his reading of Scripture, particularly Genesis 1, he also was able 
to understand the Aristotelian point. The problem was not Aristotle but a hubristic 
reading of the Stagirite and his commentators which was leading the young men within 
the Arts faculty to heretical conclusions. Weisheipl labels Aquinas actions in his second 
regency over against the Liberal Arts faculty a type of “academic apostolate.”42 His 
more recent biographer, Torrell, does not go so far, but acknowledges the significant 
role of this conflict for Aquinas.43 Aquinas, in addition to his duties as a Theology 
faculty member, the primary articulator of the Dominican response to the anti-
mendicant forces, and his continuing work on the ST’s prima-secundae partis and 
secunda-secundae partis, also undertook a complete commentary on all of Aristotle’s 
works on behalf of the Arts faculty. So frenetic was his publishing and writing that 
Weisheipl suggests that Aquinas physical breakdown, which happened shortly after his 
return to Italy, was a result of exhaustion brought on by excessive work and the 
emotional toll of this apostolate.44 
Aquinas efforts to “rescue” the Arts faculty would have been impossible if he had not 
the ability to enter the conceptual world of his opponents, an ability which was made 
possible by this epistemic humility. His efforts were also largely successful. The 
condemnations of 1277 which were the result of the Augustinist agitation were, for the 
most part, welcomed by the very faculty it presumably condemned in 1277. Perhaps an 
40 Torrell, 188-190 and Weisheipl, 272.  
41 De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas, (1270). See Weisheipl, 272 and 385.  
42 Weisheipl, 280-281. 
43 Torrell 182-190 
44 Weisheipl, 279-282.  
243 
 
                                                          
even greater indication of the effect Aquinas’ advocacy on behalf of the Arts faculty had 
is a letter written to the Dominican Chapter (Lyon, 1274). Upon hearing of Aquinas’ 
death, the Arts faculty at Paris requested of the Dominicans that his body be interred in 
Paris so as to be guarded by the members of the University. Realizing this was not 
entirely plausible, they also requested that the capitular fathers send them any of 
Aquinas’ philosophical treatises, commentaries on Aristotle, several of which they had 
reason to believe had been begun in Paris and completed in Italy in months following 
his departure.45 
Aquinas, embodying epistemic humility, modelled something which this generation and 
his own generation desperately needed: the means to cross deep divides between 
conflicted groups of people. In ST I, 65-74 Aquinas both embodied that epistemic 
humility and sought to inculcate that humility in a body of students. Neglected by the 
community of Aquinas readers, these QQ may in fact convey a most significant 
contribution of Friar Thomas Aquinas for all who quest for truth. 
 
45 Weisheipl, 332. 
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Technical terms utilized within this thesis: 
 
Article – The basic literary unit of the ST and much of medieval theological writing. Within an 
Article an author posited conflict and normally resolved this conflict for the reader. 
Within medieval theological literature, Articles take on a variety of shapes, but all were 
an effort to encapsulate the basic element of medieval education, the disputation. 
Comprised of four elements, Objections, sed contra, corpus, and Responses, Articles 
within the ST are normally quite uniform in structure. Departures from this structure 
are noted within this thesis.  
Chapter – In addition to the normal contemporary usage of this term to designate a portion of 
this thesis, the term is also used to designate an official gathering of leaders of the 
Dominican Order, either on behalf of the whole Order or on a provincial level, to make 
administrative decisions. These “chapters” are distinguished from one another by 
noting the location and year of the gathering, e.g. Anagni, 1265. The leaders gathered 
at a Chapter are frequently referred to as “capitular fathers.”  
corpus – Aquinas’ response to the intellectual tension created by the Objections and sed 
contra within an Article. Normally in the ST the corpus offers a resolution of the 
tension.  
Disputation – Refers both to the academic exercise and the genre of literature which reported 
the proceedings of disputations held. Disputations were an essential building block of 
medieval academic research and education. Arranged thematically, the academic 
disputation was a serious quest for truth by a master and his students. Aquinas 
conducted several academic disputations in Rome in preparation for writing the prima 
pars. The term was more broadly used, however, in the medieval period. In the case of 
the formal inception of a new faculty member at Paris it was a highly stylized debate. 
Quodlibetal disputations, at which Aquinas was said to excel, involved an opportunity 
for members of the audience to pose difficult questions to the one who was presiding 
over the disputation.  
Distinction – The second largest division of the Lombard’s Sentences. Each of the Sentences’ 
four Books was further divided into a number of Distinctions. Aquinas retained this 
term in his Commentary. When referring to material within the Commentary, the first 
Arabic numeral refers to the Distinction. Example: II, 14, 1, 1, could be written out 
more fully as Book II, Distinction 14, Question 1, Article 1.  
Friar – A brother in one of the mendicant orders. This term is frequently confused with but 
should be distinguished from “monk.” The monastic (monk) tradition was 
contemplative and ideally was practiced in some isolation from the world. The friars, 
while also contemplative, did not practice that contemplation through isolation but 
engagement with the world.  
Hexaemeron – This term may have one of three referents. The six days of the Creation 
narrative are named the hexaemeron. This term has also been applied to both the 
genre of commentary on the six days and as a title of works within that genre. Thus, 
Bonaventura’s Hexaemeron was a hexaemeron (commentary) on the hexaemeron (six 
days of Creation). 
lector – Every priory of the Dominican order was obligated to appoint one member to be a 
lector who was charged with conducting daily lectures on Scripture.  
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Objection – The initial element of every Article was a series of Objections raised to the 
assertion made either expliticitly or implicitly within the title of the Article.  
pars – The largest element of the ST, Aquinas initially conceived of his work in three parts, but 
due to the expansion of the material in the second part, he subdivided that element, 
creating the first (part) of the second part (prima-secundae partis) and the second 
(part) of the second part (secunda-secundae partis).  
Priory – the basic communal unit of the Dominican Order, not to be less than 12 members, a 
priory was the home of the friars who served under a prior at which they studied and 
sang the daily office.  
prooemium – Introduction to a work.  
Province – The largest division of the Dominican Order, at the time of Aquinas there were five 
provinces.  
Question – A literary unit within the ST which normally includes multiple Articles under a single 
theme or topic expressed as a question.  
Regent Master – A Regent Master of Theology was both acknowledged as qualified by his 
peers and licensed by ecclesial authority to “reign” over the education of students and 
the preparation of Bachelors and other Masters. The period which an individual served 
on the faculty of a university was frequently referred to as the period of his “regency.”  
Response – After addressing the tension created between the Objections and sed contra 
statements in the corpus, Aquinas normally addressed each Objection with a 
Response. 
Section – Clearly delineated but not specifically named as such by Aquinas, QQ are grouped 
into clusters around topics. These clusters of variable size are often referred to by the 
term “section.”  
Sentence – A sentence in medieval theology was an authoritative opinion or conclusion 
rendered about a Scriptural passage.  
sed contra – After listing multiple Objections Aquinas posited a contrary authority, 
observation, or fact. This “but on the other hand...” statement articulated the Article’s 
intellectual tension in tandem with the Objections.   
studium – a Dominican house of theological study, frequently, but not always, associated with 
a university. There were several kinds of studia. The most important was the papally 
licensed studium generale such as St. Jacques associated with the University of Paris. 
Most provinces also operated a second tier of schools, the studium provinciale, which 
trained friars within the Province. Aquinas taught at the studium generale in Paris and 
later at the studium provinciale in Naples and then at Santa Sabina. Some (Boyle and 
Torrell) have posited that Aquinas was operating a studium personale or an 







The elements of the ST are subdivided into various smaller units, Questions, Articles, 
Objections, etc. Because these are also terms which are frequently employed in any discussion 
of this material, I have endeavored to capitalize these elements throughout the document 
when indicating one of these literary divisions of the ST: Question (Q, QQ), Article, Objection, 
and Response. Following convention and in the absence of a suitable English term, I have 
retained the Latin titles for corpus (c.) and sed contra (sc.), indicating all Latin terms with 
italics. The only exception to this is the term “section.” Aquinas himself did not recognize or 
distinguish this literary unit nor is it a term which he used to designate the various conceptual 
clusters within the ST. For this reason I have elected not to capitalize this term.  
 
Because certain theological terms function as more than one grammatical element within this 
discussion, I have capitalized these terms when referring to theological topics, e.g., Creation, 
Trinity, Incarnation, etc.   
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